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ESSAYS 


ON   SOME   OF   THE   FIRST    PRINCIPLES 


OF 


mBTArnirszcxs,  bthicss,  aitb  tbeoloot. 


iHUHUHUHUm 


v/ 
By  ASA  BURTON,  D.  D. 


PASTOR  OP   THE    CHURCH   OF   CHRIST   IN   THETFORD,    VERMONT. 


PORTLAND : 

PRINTED  AT  THE  MIRROR  OFriCE, 

ISM. 


District  of  Vermont^  To  wit  : 

SBSBSeasSB    BE  it  REMEIVIBERED,  that  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  February, 
ffi -     -  ...  -  .     _    .         .  ^ 


®  1^        in  the  forty-eighth  year  of  the  Independence  of  tlie  United  States  of 


L.S.  I*        America,  the 
11 


1  B.SV.  ASA  BURTON, 


m 

»  _ 

Oo  CC  35  03  93  no  !■ 

of  the  said  District,  hath  deposited  in  this  office,  the  title  of  a  book,  the  right  where- 
of he  claims  as  author,  in  tne  words  following,  to  wit  : 

"  Essays  on  some  of  the  first  principles  of  Metaphysicks,  Ethicks,  and  Theology. 
"  By  Asa  Burton,  D.  D.  Pastor  of  the  Church  in  Thetford,  Vermont." 

In  conformity  to  the  act  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  entitled  "  An  act 
for  the  encouragement  of  learning,  by  securing  the  copies  of  maps,  charts,  and  books 
to  the  authors  and  proprietors  of  such  copies,  during  the  times  therein  mentioned." 

JESSE  GOVE, 

Ckrk  of  tht  District  Court  of  Vermont. 

A  true  copy  of  record,  examined  and  sealed  by  me, 

J.  GOVE,  Clerk, 


XZtf TRODVCTZOm : 

Containing  preliminary  Observations^ 

THE  AUTHOR  oi  the  following  essays,  when  he  first  entered  on  the 
Study  of  theology,  felt  the  importance  of  forming  a  just  and  true  the* 
ory  of  the  human  mind.     This  feeling  prompted  him  to  read  with 
attention  all  the  most  noted  and  distinguished  authors,  he  could  find, 
on  the  subject  of  pneumatology. — He  expected,  by  studying  them, 
to  digest  a  true  system.     This  course  he  pursued  for  several  years. 
When  he  had  carefully  attended  to  English,  Scotch,  French  and  Ger- 
man authors,  instead  of  finding  increased  light,  his  mind  was  more 
darkened  and  perplexed  with  respect  to  several  parts  of  this  very  im- 
portant subject.     Failing  of  success  in  this  way,  he  determined  to  lay 
aside  reading  authors,  except  occasionally,  and  make  an  attempt  by 
an  exertion  of  his  own  powers,  to  arrange  his  thoughts  systematically 
on  the  principles  and  operations  of  the  human  mind.     In  this  way, 
he  has  succeeded,  in  some  good  measure,  to  his  own  satisfaction. — 
That  theory  of  the  mind,  which  was  the  result  of  much  study,  and 
which  he  had  taught  students  in  divinity  under  his  care  ;  which  was 
generally  approved  by  them,  and  which  they  frequently  urged  him  to 
publish,  it  is  the  object  of  these  essays  to  illustrate  and  explain.     In 
doing  this,  he  determined  not  to  adopt  the  plan  or  theory  of  any  au- 
thor he  had  ever  read,  for  this  reason  ;  he  does  not  agree,  except  in 
part,  with  the  system  or  plan  of  any  preceding  author.     He,  howev- 
er, approves  many  things  they  have  advanced,  and  views  them  as 
having  reflected  much  light  on  this  science.     He  feels  himself  much 
indebted  to  them,  for  a  number  of  important  suggestions,  which  have 
afforded  him  much  assistance  in  the  work  before  him. 

As  it  is  not  his  design  to  follow  others  by  adopting  their  theories ; 
so  he  does  not  write  in  opposition  to  them,  any  further  than  is  necessa- 


ry  to  support  his  own  opinions.  His  object  is  to  illustrate^  as  far  as 
he  proceeds,  the  true  theory  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  avoid  all  dispu- 
tation, as  far  as  can  be  done  consistently. 

In  the  essays  on  the  mind,  he  means  to  take yac^«,  experience,  and 
commoji  sense  for  his  guides.  He  does  not  design  to  form  a  system 
on  any  other  principles,  than  those  which  are  self-evident,  or  capable 
of  demonstration.  Whatever  opinions  respecting  the  mind  he  may 
advance,  which  do  not  agree  with  experience,  with  facts,  and  the 
teord  of  God,  are  to  be  rejected.  For  principles,  which  contradict 
daily  experience,  cannot  be  true.  Principles,  which  do  not  agree 
with  the  lives,  and  conduct  of  mankind,  are  not  to  be  received.  And 
if  they  do  not  accord  with  what  the  word  of  God  teaches  us  concern- 
ing the  characters  of  sinners  and  saints,  they  are  false.  All  the  ex- 
ternal, visible  actions  of  mankind,  whether  virtuous  or  vicious,  may 
be  traced  back  to  first  principles  in  the  mind.  By  these  principles 
we  can  account  for  the  conduct  of  all  men,  or  for  the  events  which 
take  place  in  the  moral  world,  as  well  as  we  can  explain  the  phenom- 
ena of  nature,  by  the  first  principles  in  natural  philosophy.  Hence 
n©  hypothesis  is  to  be  admitted  as  true,  which  does  not  agree  with 
experience,  with  facts  respecting  our  visible  conduct,  and  with  the 
word  of  Jehovah. 

Again,  As  every  science  is  founded  on  what  may  be  justly  term- 
ed ^rst  principles,  so  this  is  especially  true  with  respect  to  the  science 
of  theology.  And  no  person  can  be  considered  as  understanding 
systematically  any  science,  if  he  is  unacquainted  with  its  first  princi- 
ples. And  whosoever  will  examine  the  subject  carefully,  and  can- 
didly, will  find,  that  intelligent  existence  contains  the  first  principles 
of  divinity.  It  is  generally  granted,  that  if  a  person  does  not  under- 
stand the  subjects  of  moral  agency,  and  liberty,  there  are  many  oth- 
er  subjects  connected  with  these,  of  which  he  cannot  have  a  consist- 
ent view,  and  which  he  cannot  satisfactorily  explain.  Of  course  he  is 
not  a  systematic,  or  good  divine.  But  a  knowledge  of  moral  agency 
and  liberty  involves  a  knowledge  of  the  principles  and  operations  of 
the  mind.  Hence  these  principles  and  operations  are  the  foundation 
of  divinity.  Without  a  knowledge  of  these,  a  person  is  not  acquaint- 
ed with  the  foundation  on  which  divinity,  considered  as  a  superstruc- 
ture, rests.  This  shows  tlie  importance  of  a  thorough  acquaintance 
with  the  first  principles,  and  the  operations  of  the  mind. 


These  essays  therefore,  are  designed  as  an  introduction  to  divinity. 
The  author's  great  object,  in  explaining  what  appears  to  him  to  be 
the  true  theory  of  the  mind,  is,  to  assist  the  student  in  acquiring  a  sys- 
teraatic  and  consistent  knowledge  of  divinity.  He  does  not  purpose 
to  attend  to  any  questions,  or  disquisitions  relative  to  the  mind,  which 
are  not  necessary  to  answer  this  end.  Whatsoever  will  not,  in  his 
view,  serve  to  reflect  light  on  subjects  in  theology,  does  not  come 
within  the  compass  and  design  of  his  plan. 

It  has  been  found  by  experience,  that  the  classing  of  objects  assists 
the  memory,  and  renders  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  more  easy,  and 
rapid.  This  is  the  plan  the  author  designs  to  adopt  with  respect  to 
operations  of  the  mind.  If  certain  qualities  are  found  to  belong  to  a 
number  of  individual  existences,  they  are  classed  together,  and  de- 
nominated by  some  general  name.  For  instance  :  We  find  many 
inplividuals  are  endued  with  life  and  motion;  they  are  formed  into  a 
class,  and  called  animals.  Though  these  properties  are  common  to 
them  all,  yet  some  of  these  individuals  possess  properties,  which  oth- 
ers do  not  ;  for  this  reason  a  general  class  is  divided  into  a  number, 
called  species.  Man  is  one  species  of  animals  ;  beast,  bird,  and  so 
on,  are  other  species.  Hence,  among  individual  existences,  according 
to  the  various  qualities  with  which  they  are  endued,  there  is  a  generic 
and  a  specific  difference.  In  like  manner,  the  operations  of  the  mind 
are  not  all  of  one  kind,  but  they  differ  from  each  other  ;  for  which 
reason  they  ought  to  be  formed  into  distinct,  general  classes ;  and 
these  general  classes  may  be  divided,  according  to  their  specific  dif- 
ferences. This  method  will  give  a  systematic  arrangement  to  the  sev- 
eral divisions  of  mental  operations.  It  will  greatly  assist  the  memo- 
ry ;  and  help  the  student  in  acquiring  a  clear,  and  distinct  knowledge 
of  the  principles  and  operations  of  spiritual  substances. 

Authors  have  pursued  different  plans  in  the  study  of  the  human 
mind.  Some  have  not  only  attended  to  its  faculties  and  operations, 
but  have  in  connexion  with  them  attended  to  all  the  objects  with  which 
the  mind  is  ever  conversant.  This  leads  them  into  a  very  extensive 
field,  in  which  a  student  is  in  danger  of  being  lost.  In  these  essays, 
the  author  has  pursued  a  different  course.  He  has  attended,  as  far 
as  possible  consistent  with  perspicuity,  to  the  faculties  of  the  mind, 
and  their  operations,  without  describing  the  numerous  ol>jects  of  per- 
ception and  choice. 


Others  have  not  only  attended  to  all  tlie  materials  of  knowledge 
with  which  the  mind  is  furnished  ;  but  have  considered  particularly 
the  connexion,  relation,  similitude,  and  association  ofobjects  or  ideas, 
and  shown  how  one  suggests  and  leads  to  another  in  a  regular  train  or 
series.  And  on  the  principle  of  suggestion,  resemblance,  or  associa- 
tion, have  formed  their  system  of  classification.  This  view  ofobjects 
has  not  been  attempted  in  the  following  essays. 

Again.     In  forming  distinct  classes  in  the  views  taken  of  the  mind, 
different  methods  may  be  adopted.     For  instance,  we  may  classify 
the  operations  of  our  faculties,  a.id  also  the  objects  of  the  mind.     This 
is  a  double  classification,  which  serves  to  confuse,  instead  of  elucidating 
the  subject  of  the  mind.     It  is   also  needless.     For  the  objects  with 
which  we  are  acquainted  are  alreac'y  formed  into  distinct  classes,  in- 
cluding both  the  genus  and  species.      Hence,  to  give  a  systematic 
view  of  the  mind  nothing  more  is  requisite,  than  to  form  its  operations 
under  each  faculty  into  distinct  classes.     The  plan  adopted  in  these 
essays,  of  confining  the  attention  to  the  faculties  and  operations  of  the 
mind  itself,  excluding  a  consideration  of  the  objects  of  perception, 
feeling,  and  volition,  as  far  as  could  be  done  with  perspicuity,  presents 
the  mind  with  all  its  operations  to  view  in  a  much  narrower  compass. 
And  the  more  concisely  any  subject  is  discussed,  if  it  is  done  perspicu- 
ously, the  more  easily,  and  distinctly  will  it  be  understood  by  the  rea- 
der. 

If  it  be  admitted,  that  the  animal,  vegetable,  and  inanimate  creation 
are  three  general  classes,  which  include  all  the  individuals  of  the  ma- 
terial creation  with  which  we  are  acquainted  ;  the  addition  of  anoth- 
er general  class  would  be  needless,  and  serve  to  confuse  and  lead  the 
mind  away  from  the  truth.  When  these  are  divided  into  species,  the 
work  is  done,  and  all  material  existences  are  clearly  and  systemati- 
cally arranged.  In  doing  this,  there  is  no  need  of  considering  the 
faculties  or  operations  of  the  mind. 

So  in  relation  to  the  mind,  when  the  number  of  faculties  with  which 
it  is  endued,  and  the  operations  of  each  faculty  with  the  real  differ- 
ence between  them  are  known,  the  way  is  then  prepared  to  form  them 
into  general  and  specific  classes.  And  in  doing  this,  there  is  none(d 
of  attending  to  the  several  classes  into  which  the  material  world  is  di- 
vided.— And  if  perceptions,  sensations  and  affections,  and  volitions, 
include  all  the  operations  of  the  mind ;  these  three  general  classes  arc 


sufficient.  Form  these  three  general  classes  into  their  specific  divi- 
sions ;  then  the  work  of  classifying  is  finished,  and  a  systematic 
view  of  the  mind  is  formed.  And  this  seems  to  be  the  only  rational 
plan  for  accomplishing  that  end. 

The  existence  of  an  eternal,  independent,  absolutely  perfect  being, 
is  the  first  principle  in  divinity,  and  the  foundation  on  which  the 
whole  superstructure  rests.  Every  doctrine,  then,  in  theology,  must 
be  explained  in  consistency  with  his  character.  But  how  can  this  be 
done,  by  any  person,  unless  he  has  just,  clear,  and  distinct  views  of 
the  character  of  God  ?  Hence,  generally,  all,  who  teach  divinity, 
begin  with  proving  the  existence  of  God,  and  giving  a  description  of 
his  character.  If  any  err  concerning  the  character  of  Jehovah,  errors 
will  prevail  through  their  whole  system  of  sentiments,  in  a  greater 
or  less  degree.  And  all  we  know  of  God  is  by  the  revelations,  or  dis- 
plays he  has  made  of  himself  in  his  works  and  word  ;  or  by  actions 
and  declarations.  These  are  the  signs  by  which  he  is  made  known. 
All  existences  produced  by  him  are  either  material,  or  immaterial,  or 
what  we  call  spiritual.  The  material  creation  contains  but  a  com- 
paratively faint  display  of  his  character.  Here  we  see  no  communi- 
cations of  his  nature,  or  moral  attributes.  AVe  behold  goodness  dis- 
played, but  see  no  inherent  principle  of  goodness  in  any  material 
being.  We  discern  no  inherent  principles  of  action  ;  nothing,  which 
constitutes  intelligent  agency.  Hence  material  existences,  however 
great,  are  not  viewed  as  rational  agents,  or  as  rewardable  for  any  of 
their  operations. 

But  God  is  an  agent  worthy  of  love,  service,  and  praise,  on  account 
of  the  various  operations  of  his  agency.  And  no  where  do  we  find, 
through  the  vast  extent  of  his  works,  a  real  resemblance  of  himself, 
but  in  immaterial,  spiritual  beings.  Such  beings  are  rational  agents. 
And  the  mind  or  soul  of  man  is  the  most  perfect  agent  in  kind  or  na- 
ture, to  be  found  in  this  world.  Man  sustains  the  highest  rank  among 
all  creatures  on  earth,  which  have  life  in  themselves,  from  the  lowest, 
smallest  insect,  through  every  rising  grade.  In  him,  then,  we  may 
expect  to  find  the  most  perfect,  and  entire  resemblance,  in  kind,  of 
Jehovah.  It  must,  therefore,  be  evident  to  every  reflecting  mind,  that 
we  cannot  have  just,  and  correct  views  of  God,  as  the  first,  eternal, 
and  infinite  agent,  any  farther  than  we  form  just,  and  correct  ideas  of 
man,  as  an  agent.     Hence  the  study  of  man  is  the  most  important. 


8 

and  interesting,  and  useful  study.     He,  who  kno'vs  himself  correctly, 
may  have  just  conceptions  of  God. 

Man  is  an  agent.  He  is  endued  with  such  powers,  and  is  capable 
of  such  operations,  as  to  be  considered  a  moral  agent ;  a  being,  who 
is  a  proper  subject  of  praise  and  blame,  and  of  future  and  endless  re- 
wards. Hence  arises  the  interesting,  and  important  inquiry,  what 
powers,  qualities,  or  faculties,  are  necessary  to  render  a  moral  agent 
■worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  and  of  final  rewards  ? — This  inquiry  will 
lead  to  the  discussion  of  many  very  interesting  subjects  ;  such  as  the 
following  :  In  what  does  agency  properly  consist  ?  Is  it  some  in- 
herent, abiding,  primary  piinciple  of  action  ;  or  no  more  than  a  sim- 
ple exercise  ?  Can  all  our  actions  be  traced  back  to  some  primaiy 
active  principle  in  us,  from  which  they  all  proceed  ?  What  is  the 
difference  between  the  natural  and  moral  powers  of  the  mind  ?  What 
powers,  or  faculties  are  necessary  to  constitute  a  complete  moral 
agent  ?  And  when  these  are  ascertained,  then  the  question  arises, 
%chy  are  they  requisite  to  make  such  an  agent  ?  This  is  a  question 
which  I  have,  as  yet,  never  found  answered,  in  any  systematic,  or 
satisfactory  manner,  by  any  author,  who  has  published  on  this  subject. 
Yet  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  subjects  to  be  clearly  understood 
in  the  vhole  range  of  subjects,  which  relate  to  moral  agency  ;  and 
one  which  reflects  by  far  the  most  light  on  this  inquiry.  In  what  does 
that  liberty  consist,  which  is  considered  necessary  in  a  moral  agent ; 
and  why,  for  what  reasons,  is  it  requisite  ? 

When  questions  of  this  complexion  are  answered  correctly,  then  a 
person  knows  what  things  are  needful  to  constitute  a  perfect,  moral 
agent ;  and  he  also  clearly  discerns  the  reasons  why  they  are  neces- 
sary. A  person  may  then,  and  not  before,  be  said  to  understand  the 
subject  of  moral  agency  ;  and  the  ground  on  which  praise  and  blame 
may  be  predicated  of  man ;  and  why  final  rewards  suited  to  his  char- 
acter are  perfectly  just  and  proper.  This  knowledge  will  enable  him 
to  form  just  views  of  the  being  and  character  of  Jehovah.  He  can 
then  explain  and  unfold  to  view  the  divine  character  ;  and  describe  in 
a  consistent,  and  systematic  manner  all  the  doctrines  and  precepts  of 
the  Bible.  But,  until  he  is  acquainted  more  or  less  distinctly  with  the 
subject  of  moral  agency  in  the  light  above  exhibited,  his  mind  must 
be  full  of  darkness,  confusion  and  uncertainty  respecting  the  leading, 
and  fundamental  doctrines  of  the  gospel. 

These  observations  are  sufficient  to  show,  and  impress  on  every 


9 

mind,  the  importance  of  commencing  the  study  of  tlieology  with  a  dis- 
cussion of  leading  ideas,  which  relate  to  the  subject  of  moril  agencv. 
This  is  the  first  subject  with  which  the  student's  mind  ought  to  be  oc- 
cupied ;  and  his  attention  to  it  should  be  continued,  until  he  clearly 
understands  it.  He  is  then  prepared,  and  not  before,  to  understand 
systematically  the  doctrines  of  divinity  ;  and  he  cannot  well  fail  of 
forming  consistent  views  of  the  doctrines  of  the  gospel  fiom  the  begin- 
ning to  the  end  ;  in  case  his  powers  of  mind  are  sufficient  to  qualify 
him  for  a  teacher. 

It  will  be  granted  that  every  sentiment,  when  explained,  which 
does  not  agree  with  moral  agency  and  liberty,  ought  not  to  be  admit- 
ted as  a  doctrine  of  the  gospel  ;  for  every  doctrine  actually  taught  in 
the  bible  is  consistent  with  moral  agency  and  liberty.  But  how  is  it 
possible  for  any  divine  to  know  the  doctrines  he  believes  do  agree  with 
the  true  theory  of  moral  agency  and  liberty,  unless  he  is  previously 
acquainted  with  that  theory  ?  Does  not  this  clearly  show,  that  correct 
\iews  of  moral  agency  lay  the  foundation  for  a  consistent  explanation 
of  gospel  doctrines?  Of  course,  in  digesting  a  system  of  divinity,  he 
ought  to  begin  with  the  study  of  this  subject. 

Again.     It  is  well  known  that  the  systems  of  divinity  embraced  by 
Calvinists  and  Arminians  difier  widely.     This  difference  arises  in  part 
from  different  views  of  the  subject  of  moral  agency  and  liberty.     The 
latter  say,  that  necessity  destroys  the  liberty  essential  to  a  morpV 
agent.     Hence  they  reject,  as  far  as  they  can  consistent  with,  them- 
selves, every  doctrine,  which  implies  necessity.     But  Calvinists  admit 
that  one  kind  of  necessity  not  only  agrees  with  liberty,  but  is  necessa- 
ly  to  its  existence.     Hence  they  can  believe  in  those  doctrines,  plain- 
ly' taught  in  the  Bible,  which  imply  this  necessity.     This  shows  that 
divines  do  in  fact  difier  in  their  sentiments,  according  to  their  ideas  of 
that  liberty,  which  is  consistent  with  moral  agency,  or  praise  and 
blame.     They  must  then  begin  with  the  study  of  moral  agency  and 
liberty,  and  fix  their  principles  on  this  subject,  before  they  are  pre- 
pared to  explain  the  word  of  God,  and  adopt,  or  reject  the  doctrines 
it  inculcates.     These  and  many  other  considerations  show,  that  we 
ought  to  begin  the  study  of  divinity  with  forming  consistent  views  of 
the  subject  of  moral  agency.     But  to  have  consistent  views  of  this 
subject,  we   must  attend  to  the  faculties   and  operations  of  the  mind. 

When  every  thing  is  considered,  which  might  ^d  ought  to  be,  it  is  ve- 
B 


10 

Yy  evident,  mat  we  ought  to  begin  the  study  of  divinity  with  the  Study 
of  the  human  mind.  If  we  agree  here,  and  are  consistent,  we  shall 
agree  in  all  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  bible. 

The  author  is  aware  that  many,  at  this  day,  are  greatly  prejudiced 
against  all  kinds  of  metaphysical  reasoning  and  investigation  ;  and  are 
disinclined  to  read  discussions  of  that  character.  It  is  not  expected 
that  persons  of  this  class  will  attend  to  the  following  essays  Yet 
some  subjects  are  so  abstruse,  and  the  truth  so  difficult  to  be  explain- 
ed, that  a  close  metaphysical  investigation  is  necessary,  and  in  no 
other  way  can  light  be  reflected  on  them.  And  this  is  especially  the 
case  with  all  subjects,  \\hic!i  respect  the  mind,  moral  agency,  liberty, 
necessity,  and  worthiness  of  praise  and  blame.  Must  we  remain  ig- 
norant of  all  these  subjects,  which  are  'n  fact  the  foundation  on  which 
a  whole  system  of  divinity  rests,  because  what  is  called  a  metaphysi- 
cal investigation  is  necessary  to  understand  them  ?  If  we  proceed 
on  this  ground,  and  attend  to  no  subject  which  requires  patient,  and 
accurate  reasoning  ;  the  course  of  mankind  will  soon  be  retrograde. 
Instead  of  making  new  discoveries  and  advances  in  the  field  of  science, 
each  succeeding  generation  will  be  less  informed  ;  mental  imbecility 
will  ensue ;  and  the  most  important  and  practical  truths  will  be  involv- 
ed in  darkness. 

Metaphysical  reasoning  strengthens  the  rational  powers  of  the 
•Qiind  ;  and  begets  a  habit  of  close  attention,  and  patient  investigation. 
But  tJ^ose,  who  content  themselves  with  superficial  views,  and  are 
willing  to  rcjnain  ignorant  of  every  thing,  which  requires  mental  ex- 
ertion to  understand,  will  soon  find  their  powers  weakened,  and 
mere  declamation  will  constitute  all  their  excellence  and  worth. 
But  the  author  hopes  we  have  many  in  our  nation  yet,  who  are  willing 
to  give  every  subject,  and  especially  the  human  mind,  that  laborious 
and  thorough  investigation,  which  is  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  a 
competent  knowledge.  And  he  flatters  himself,  that  these  essays  will 
afford  them  some  liglit  and  assistance  in  their  study  of  the  mind  ;  and 
serve  as  a  clue  to  further  inquiries  ;  and  thus  enable  them  to  explain 
and  defend  those  doctrines  of  our  holy  religion,  which  at  this  day  are 
attacked  with  great  zeal,  by  men  who  have  not  neglected  mental  dis- 
cipline. If  these  essays  should  be  useful  to  any  in  these  respects,  he 
will  feel  himself  repaid  for  all  his  trouble  and  labor. 

The  author  has  nothing  to  say  in  defence  of  his  stile.     He  confes- 


11 

ses  he  has  always  attended  more  to  ideas  and  matter,  than  to  the  or- 
naments of  speech  ;  and  is  willing  to  acknowledge  he  has  been  too 
negligent  in  this  particular.  He  has  made  it  his  aim  to  avoid  all  vul- 
gar expressions  ;  and  to  use  words,  which  shall  not  offend,  if  they  do 
not  please.  The  main  character  of  stile  at  which  he  has  caretully 
aimed  \s  perspicuity.  If  he  has  failed  in  this,  he  will  lamer.t  it  ; 
though  he  trusts  there  will  not  be  much  complaint  arising  from  this 
source.  A  desire  to  be  well  understood,  is  the  only  excuse  he  has  to 
make  for  repeating  so  frequently  the  same  word  in  a  sentence,  and  the 
same  idea  in  different  words.  On  abstruse  subjects,  perhaps  any  per- 
son would  find  it  difficult  to  use  what  is  called  an  eloquent  style.  An 
argumentative  style  must  differ  in  its  character  from  others. 

Some  of  the  essays  too  were  written  in  too  much  haste,  owing  to  nu- 
merous avocations  &  interruptions,  incident  to  the  care  of  a  large  church 
&  society.    He  begs  the  candor  and  patience  of  the  reader,  hoping  his 
attention  will  be   so  occupied  with  the  sentiments  advanced,   as   to 
make  every  allowance  for  imperfections  of  style,  as   far  as  the  most 
hberal  candor  will  admit.     Nothing  but  diffidence,  and  a  backward- 
ness to  appear  in  print  on  subjects  so  often  discussed  by  learned  men, 
has  kept  these  sheets  from  the  public  eye  for  several  years.     But  he 
has  finally  yielded  to  the  judgment  &  importunity  of  particular  friends. 
He  expects  various  opinions  will  be  embraced  concerning  what  is  here 
written,  and  different  feelings  excited.     But  he  hopes  no  one  will  form 
a  hasty  opinion,  or  condemn  any  sentiment  advanced,  unless  he  can 
detect  the  fallacy  of  the  reasoning  by  which  it  is  supported.     The  au- 
thor is  advanced  in  age,  and  has  no  expectation  of  living  to  hear  what 
may  be  said  for  or   against  the   system  he  espouses.     He  believes 
however,  there  are  those,  who,  if  they  agree  in  opinion  with  the  author, 
will  be  able  to  defend  him,  and  repel  the  attacks  which  may  be  made. 
He  has,  therefore,  nothing  more  to  say,  but  to  leave  the  work  with 
God,  to  bless  and  give  it  success,  as  far  as  what  is  published  may  be 
agreeable  to  his  mind  and  will.     What  is  written  was  with  a  view  of 
affording  assistance  to  candidates  for  the  ministry  of  the  gospel,  and  to 
defend  in  general  that  system  of  doctrines  called  the  reformed,  or  Cal- 
vinistic  creed.     The  author  earnestly  prays  it  may  not  in  any  respect 
prove  injurious  to  gospel  orthodoxy  ;  but  rather  a  means  of  increasing 
«.be  true  light,  and  of  diffusing  it  through  the  world. 


ESSAY  X. 

On  the  Faculties  of  the  Mind. 

All  existence,  as  far  as  human  knowledge  extends,  is  either 
material,  or  immaterial ;  corporeal,  or  spiritual.  And  though 
it  is  generally  granted,  that  certain  properties,  aside  from  their 
operations,  are  essential  to  matter,  yet  this  is  not  acknowledg- 
ed to  be  true,  by  some,  with  respect  to  the  mind.  It  becomes, 
therefore,  necessary  to  inquire  whether  the  mind  has  properties, 
or  faculties,  antecedent  to  the  operations  of  thinking,  feeling, 
and  willing,  and  distinct  from  them.  However,  what  is  meant 
by  a  faculty  of  the  mind  ought  to  be,  in  the  first  place,  explain- 
ed. There  was  a  time,  when  the  word  faculty  was  first  used. 
It  was  then  used  to  express  some  idea  which  the  speaker  then 
had.  What  was  it  .'*  If  the  original  meaning  of  the  word  is 
retained  in  our  language,  it  was  at  first  used  to  signify  a  jpre- 
paredness  in  the  mind  for  certain  operations.  It  communicates 
no  more  than  a  simple  idea.  Hence  it  does  not  admit  of  a  lo- 
gical definition. 

The  way  many  have  taken  to  evade  truth,  and  silence  an 
antagonist,  has  been  to  request  a    definition  of  words  ;  and  if 
they  cannot  be  defined,  they  are  said  to  be  used  without  any 
meaning.     Many  do  not  consider,  that  some  words  are  incapa- 
ble of  any  definition,  and  yet  may  be  well  understood.     This 
is  true  of  every  word   which  conveys   only   one  simple  idea. 
Would  it  not  be  impertinent  for  any  person  to  ask  another,  to 
define  the  terms  pain  and pleasu7e  ?     The  reason  is,  they  are 
terms,  which  convey  simple  ideas.     All  such  terms  are  incapa- 
ble of  any  logical  definition.     There  is  but  one  way  to  explain 
them,  which  is  to  use  some  other  terms,  of  the  same  meaning, 
which  are  better  understood,  if  there  are  any  of  this  class.    The 
word  faculty  is  a  term,  which  conveys  a  simple  idea,  and  can 
no  more  be  defined,  than  we  can  define  the  word  pain.     Yet 
it  no  more  follows  from  this,  that  no  such  property,  which   is 
called  a  faculty,  exists,  than  it  follows,  that  there  is  no    such 
thing  as  pain,  because  it  cannot  be  defined.     And  there  is  n» 


14 

.propriety  in  asking  for  a  definition  of  simple  terms.  If  all  per- 
sons would  keep  in  view  the  difl'erence  between  simple  and  com- 
plex terms,  they  would  never  ask  for  a  definition  of  the  former, 
nor  deny  the  reality  of  a  thing  merely  because  it  cannot  be  ex- 
plained by  a  definition.  There  is  reason  to  think,  that  some 
reject  certain  truths  because  the  words,  which  convey  truth, 
cannot  be  defined.  This  appears  to  be  one  reason,  why  some 
disbelieve  the  existence  of  faculties,  as  antecedent  to  exer- 
cises, because  the  word  is  undefinable.  Some  do  not  believe 
in  the  existence  of  faculties,  because  they  have  not,  what  they 
call,  a  consciousness  of  their  existence.  They  are  conscious  of 
their  fruits,  or  operations,  and  this  is  sufficient.  Will  any  per- 
son aflirm  that  pain  has  no  cause,  has  nothing  which  occasions 
it,  when  he  has  no  consciousness  or  knowledge  of  that  cause, 
or  antecedent .''  No  ;  he  infers,  from  the  pain  he  feels,  the  ex- 
istence of  something  which  produced  it.  And  he  may  as 
safely  infer  the  existence  of  faculties,  from  their  operations  or 
exercises.  Hence,  candor  will  admit  the  existence  of  faculties 
or  properties  of  the  mind,  though  they  cannot  be  defined,  and 
though  we  have  no  consciousness  of  them  except  by  their  oper- 
ations. 

By  a  faculty,  then,  I  jinean  a  preparedness,  a  fitness,  a 
capacity,  or  an  adaptedness  of  the  mind  for  those  various  op- 
erations, of  which  we  are  daily  conscious.  And  I  would  here 
give  notice,  that  I  shall  use  the  term  operations  in  these  essays, 
to  denote  all  the  thoughts,  feelings  or  affections,  and  volitions 
of  the  mind.  Every  thought  is  an  operation  ;  every  affection, 
and  every  volition,  is  an  operation  of  the  human  mind.  I  shall 
generally  use  the  word  in  this  extensive  sense.  And  now  the 
inquiry  is,  whether  there  is  in  the  mind  a  faculty  or  prepared- 
ness for  thinking,  a  preparedness  for  feeling,  and  a  prepared- 
ness for  willing  ;  or  whether  there  is  not  ;  and  whether  these 
faculties  are  antecedent  to  every  operation  of  the  mind,  and 
objects  of  distinct  consideration.  Some  believe  that  faculties 
and  operations  are  as  distinct  objects,  as  motion  and  the  body 
moving  ;  and  that  the  former  are  antecedent  to  the  latter. 
Others,  in  philosophical  discussions,  deny  this  distinction. 
Some  arguments  will  now  be  adduced  to  show,  that  such  a  dis- 
tinction ought  to  be  admitted. 

1.  This  distinction  is  so  obvious  to  common  sense,  that  it  has 
been  admitted  by  all  nations,  in  every  age  of  the  world.  This 
is  evident  from  the  general  construction  of  languages.     In^v- 


15 

^ry  language,  verbs  are  used,  which  always  have  a  nominative 
case,  expressed  or  implied.  A  nominative  case  denotes  au 
agent,  or  something  capable  of  action.  And  a  verb  expresses 
the  act  of  the  agent.  Accordingly  we  say,  the  understanding 
thinks,  the  heart  feels,  the  will  chooses  and  refuses.  This 
mode  of  expression  is  common  to  all  languages,  and  is  found- 
ed on  this  distinction,  that  the  faculties  of  the  mind  are  objects 
as  distinct  from  their  acts  or  operations,  as  matter  is  from  mo- 
tion. If  we  deny  this  distinction,  and  say  the  mind  is  nothing 
more  than  a  composition  of  thoughts  or  ideas,  feelings  and  vo- 
litions, or  as  some  have  said,  a  bundle  or  union  of  exercises, 
then,  to  be  understood,  we  must  alter  our  mode  of  conversation 
and  writing.  Instead  of  saying  the  understanding  thinks,  the 
heart  feels,  the  will  chooses,  we  must  say,  thoughts  think  ;  feel- 
ings feel  love,  and  hate  ;  volitions  choose  and  refuse.  And  this 
destroys  all  distinction  between  verbs  and  their  nominatives  ; 
an  action  is  the  nominative  and  the  verb  at  the  same  time. 

Some  to  avoid  this  difficulty  say,  the  proper  mode  of  expres- 
sion is  this  ;  the  mind  thinks,  feels,  chooses.     Actions  ought  to 
be  predicated  of  the  mind,  instead  of  faculties.     This  supposes 
the  mind  and  its  exercises  are  not  synonimous  ideas  ;  that  the 
mind  is  one  thing  and  its  exercises  another.     This  solution  of 
the  difficult}'  implies  the  same  distinction  between  the  mind  and 
its  actions,  as  has  been  made  between  faculties  and  their  respec- 
tive operations.     Here  it  may  be  asked,  what  is  the  mind  ?  Is 
it  a  number  of  faculties  or  properties,  united  ?    This  will  not 
be  granted  by  those  who  deny  the  existence  of  faculties.     Is  the 
mind  nothhig  but  various  exercises  united  ?     Then  to  say,  the 
mind  thinks  and  acts,  is  only  saying,  that  exercises  think,  and 
act,    or  that  exercises  exercise,  and  acts  act ;  and  thus  the  ob- 
jector involves  the  very  difficulty  he  is  attempting  to  avoid.     It 
may  be  still  asked,  what  is  the  mind  ?  Will  it  be  said  it  is  an 
essence  ?       Then  it  is  an  essence  that  thinks  and  acts.     Is  it 
agreeable  to  common  sense,  and  the  common  use  of  words,  to 
predicate  actions,  exercises,  or  operations  of  an  essence  ?     An 
essence  is  often  supposed  to  be  the  substratum  or  supporter  of 
properties  ;  but  to  predicate  actions  of  it,    is  a  new  thought, 
and  an    improper  use  of  words.     But   has  any  one    a  clear 
and    distinct   idea   of   the   meaning    of   the    word  essence  .'' 
Can  he  tell  what  it  is  ?     Has  he  a   consciousness  of  any   such 
thing  ?  If  not,  how  does  he  know,  that  things  which  exist  have 
an  essence  .'*  Does  he  infer  it  in  this  way,  that  properties  must 


16 

have  an  essence,  or  something  to  support  them  ?  Then  he  be- 
lieves some  things,  of  which  he  has  no  knowledge  by  conscious- 
ness. Hence  it  does  not  become  such  a  person  to  deny  the  ex- 
istence of  faculties,  for  the  want  of  a  know  ledge  of  any  such 
properties  of  the  mind  by  consciousness.  We  may  as  consist- 
ently infer  the  existence  of  faculties,  from  those  operations  of 
which  we  are  conscious,  as  we  can  infer  an  essence  from  the  ex- 
istence of  properties. 

Again  ;  it  may  be  said,  it  is  not  the  mind,  or  any  particular  fac- 
ulties which  operate  ;  but  it  is  the  person,  who  acts. — Here 
it  may  be  asked,  what  is  a  person  9  Is  he  a  being  ?  Is  his  be- 
ing a  union  of  properties,  or  of  exercises  ?  If  the  former  be 
admitted,  then  the  thing  contended  for  is  granted.  If  the  latter 
be  affirmed,  then  all  the  absurdities,  which  attend  the  tlieory 
that  exercises  act,  return  upon  us.  Objections  of  this  kind, 
when  fairly  examined,  have  no  weight.  Hence,  notwithstand- 
ing the  evasions  which  have  been  noticed,  the  argument  retains 
its  full  force,  which  is  this,  that  we  must  admit  the  difference,  on 
which  the  distinction  is  founded,  between  faculties  and  their 
respective  operations  ;  or  believes  an  opinon,  which  has  pre- 
vailed in  all  ages  without  any  particular  bias  in  its  favor,  is 
false  ;  and  also  alter  the  general  construction  of  all  languages. 
This  opinion,  which  has  so  generally  prevailed  in  all  nations, 
of  a  difierence  between  faculties  and  their  operations,  has  been 
proved  from  the  construction  of  every  language  among  men. 
And  mankind  have  not  been  led  to  embrace  this  opinion  by 
any  particular  bias  or  prejudice  ;  for,  it  is  presumed,  no  such 
general  bias  can  be  named. 

2.  From  our  actions  and  operations  we  may  safely  infer  the 
existence  of  faculties. 

That  we  think,  feel,  love,  hate,  choose  and  refuse,  is  certain. 
What  is  it,  which  thinks,  which  loves,  which  chooses  ;  some- 
thing or  nothing  ?  It  must  be  one  or  the  other.  Will  any  one 
boldly  say  nothing  acts .''  Nothing  operates .''  If  this  is  too  absurd 
to  be  admitted,  it  must  be  granted  that  where  there  are  opera- 
tions, there  is  somethmg  which  operates.  By  what  particu- 
lar name  'shall  it  be  called  ^  If  it  be  said  it  is  the  mind,  or  the 
person,  which  acts  ;  it  has  been  made  evident  these  evasions, 
instead  of  invalidating  the  argument  under  consideration,  in- 
volve absurdities  too  gross  to  gain  belief.  That  property  of 
the  mind  which  is  employed  in  thinking,  has  been  generally 
called  the  understanding.  And  it  is  by  the  will  the  mind  choos- 
«?s  and  refuses.     As  it  is  absurd  to  predict  actions  of  nothing ; 


17 

and  equally  absurd  to  predicate  actions  of  themselves^  ot  of  ac- 
tions ;  and  as  they  must  be  predicated  of  something,  from 
them  we  infer  the  existence  of  faculties.  From  our  thoughts, 
we  infer  the  faculty  called  the  understanding,  which  thinks,  or 
perceives  objects  ;  and  from  our  feelings  or  affections,  we  in- 
fer a  feeling  faculty  ;  and  from  our  volitions,  we  infer  the  fac- 
ulty termed  the  will,  which  choOses  and  rejects.  And  there  is 
no  way  to  avoid  this  inference,  unless  we  say  there  may  be  op- 
erations without  an  operator  ;  which  is  as  inconsistent,  as  to 
assert  there  may  be  design  without  a  designer. 

3.  If  We  have  no  faculties,  mankind  are  not  agents.  Agents 
act,  or  operate.  But  agency  exists,  antecedent  to  actions. 
Now  if  men  have  no  faculties,  what  constitutes  that  agency 
which  is  employed  in  thinking  and  choosing,  and  which  by  its 
operations  becomes  visible  .''  Is  it  actions,  operations,  or  ex- 
ercises .''  Is  perception,  or  volition  the  agent  which  perceives, 
or  wills  .''  Then  agency  and  action  are  the  same  thing  ;  and 
we  return  to  the  former  absurdity,  that  actions  act.  If  it  be 
granted  that  men  are  agents  in  thinking,  in  choosing,  in  all 
their  operations,  then  something  exists  antecedent  to  all  our 
exercises.  If  we  say  it  is  the  mind,  still  what  is  the  mind  ^ 
We  have  seen  where  interrogations  of  this  kind  lead  us. 

If  we  say  men  are  not  agents  in  thinking  or  willing,  and  are 
to  be  considered  only  as  the  subjects  of  such  operations,  how 
can  this  afford  any  strength  to  an  objector  ?  If  we  are  not 
agents,  who  act,  and  nothing  more  than  subjects  acted  upon, 
what  in  this  sense  constitutes  us  subjects  ?  Whatever  it  be,  it 
must  exist  before  it  can  be  acted  upon.  It  must  be  a  substance 
of  some  kind  or  other,  wholly  distinct  from  the  operations  of 
some  other  agent  upon  it.  Indeed,  let  us  view  this  subject  in 
whatever  light  we  may,  a  being  must  exist  before  he  can  think, 
feel,  or  will.  The  operations  of  thinking,  loving,  hating,  and 
choosing  are  objects,  as  distinct  from  the  being  of  whom  they 
are  predicated,  as  any  two  objects  in  existence.  This  is  so  ev- 
ident, that  no  person  can  deny  it,  who  has  given  a  proper  atten- 
tion to  the  subject.  This  is  Certain,  that  neither  actions,  nor 
exercises,  nor  Operations,  constitute  this  being.  What  then  is 
this  being  ?  Nothing  but  a  mere  essence,  or  substratum  .'* 
This  will  not  be  pretended,  if  what  was  said  respecting  it  un- 
der the  first  argument  receive  proper  attention.  What  are 
called  the  understanding,  heart,  and  will,  constitute  the  human 
mind.     AVhcther  these  properties  have  an  essence,  or  substra- 


18 

tuin,  for  their  support  ;  and  whether  this  substratum  is  the  di- 
vine agency,  or  something  else,  are  questions,  which  do  not  in 
the  least  affect  the  subjects  considered  in  these  essays.  I  there- 
fore leave  them  to  the  decision  of  others.  That  to  our  being 
do  belong  such  faculties  as  have  beei;!  mentioned,  the  arguments 
which  have  been  used,  fully  evince.  However,  if  any  persons 
wish  for  further  proof,  I  refer  them, 

4.  To  the  word  of  God.  This  corresponds  with  the  reasons 
which  have  been  offered.  God  is  the  author  of  our  being. 
He  is  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  nature  and  properties  of  our 
minds.  He  can  give  us  a  just  description  of  men.  Accord- 
ing to  his  word,  men  possess  three  distinct  properties  or  facul- 
ties. An  understanding,  wliich  is  the  seat  of  knowledge  ;  the 
heart,  which  is  the  fountain  of  depravity  ;  and  the  will,  as  the 
cause  of  all  the  visible  effects  wrought  by  us. 

The  last  time  Christ  appeared  to  his  disciples  after  the  resur- 
rection,it  is  said,"  then  opened  he  their  under  standing, ih^iiihey 
might  understand  the  scriptures."  Here  the  understanding  is 
that  faculty,  by  which  his  disciples  were  to  obtain  a  knowledge 
of  the  great  doctrines  of  the  gospel.  By  this  they  would  per- 
ceive the  truth  ;  and  become  acquainted  with  the  gospel  scheme 
of  salvation,  and  be  able  to  teach  it  to  others.  Also  Eph.  1. 
18.  "  The  eyes  of  your  understanding  hemg  enlightened,  that 
ye  may  know  what  is  the  hope  of  his  calling,  and  what  the 
riches  of  the  glory  of  his  inheritence  in  the  saints."  The  eyes 
of  the  understanding  were  enlightened,  for  this  purpose,  that 
saints  might  know,  or  clearly  and  distinctly  percetye  the  objects 
of  their  hope  and  desire.  Many  passages  might  be  cited  of 
the  same  import,  which  teach  us,  that  the  understanding  is  that 
faculty  of  the  mind,  by  which  we  perceive  or  obtain  a  knowl- 
edge of  divine  truth. 

And  the  scriptures  teach  us  that  the  heart  is  another  distinct 
faculty  of  the  mind,  and  the  source  of  all  moral  good  and  evil. 
Christ  says,  "  A  good  man,  out  of  the  good  treasure  of  his 
heart,  bringeth  forth  tliat  which  is  good  ;  and  an  evil  man,  out 
of  the  evil  treasure  of  his  heart,  bringeth  forth  that  which  is 
evil  ;  for  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart  his  mouth  speaketh." 
Here  the  heart  is  represented  as  either  a  good,  or  evil  treasure, 
fountain  or  source,  from  which  good  and  evil,  as  streams,  pro- 
ceed. And  there  is  a  plain  distinction  made  between  the  heart, 
and  \hegoodor  er/Z  which  proceeds  from  it.  In  another  place 
Christ  says,  "  For  out  of  the  heart  proceed  evil  thoughts,  mur- 


19 

ders,  adulteries,  fornications,  thefts,  falsewitness,  blasphemies." 
Our  Lord  taught,  if  a  man  look  on  a  woman,  and  lust  after 
her,  he  hath  committed  adultery  with  her  in  his  heart  already  ; 
by  the  sins  mentioned  in  this  passage,  not  only  external  ads, 
but  the  internal  motions  or  desires  of  the  heart  are  included. 
Here  an  evident  distinction  is  made  between  the  heart,  and  the 
evil  affections,  or  desires  which  proceed  from  it.  They  are  as 
distinct,  as  a  fountain,  and  the  streams  which  flow  from  it  ; 
and  are  so  represented  by  our  Lord.  These  passages, and  ma- 
ny others  which  might  be  adduced,  do  not  represent  the  heart 
as  the  seat  of  knowledge,  but  as  the  source  of  moral  good  and 
evil.  Hence  they  make  a  plain  distinction  between  the  under- 
standing and  heart,  and  between  them  and  their  operations. 
Perceptions  of  truth  are  the  operations  of  the  understanding; 
and  the  affections  are  the  operations  of  the  heart.  These  things 
are  clearly  taught  by  the  passages  to  which  we  have  given  at- 
tention. 

And  the  will  is  represented  in  scripture  as  another  distinct 
faculty  of  the  mind.  "  Which  were  born,  not  of  blood,  nor 
of  the  will  of  the  flesh,  nor  of  the  ivill  of  man,  but  of  God." 
Regeneration  is  a  great  change,  wrought  In  man.  Thisefiect 
is  produced  in  the  heart,  but  the  will  of  man  is  not  the  cause  of 
it.  The  will  of  man  produces  many  eflects  ;  some  it  cannot 
produce.  And  this  change  in  the  heart  is  one  of  the  latter. 
Here  the  will  is  mentioned  as  a  cause  in  man,  which  produces 
effects ;  and  is  clearly  distinguished  from  the  heart,  in  which 
regeneration  is  wrought.  Again  we  read,  "  For  prophecy 
came  not  in  old  time  by  the  ivill  of  man  ;  but  holy  men  spake 
as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost."  Whether  men  shall 
sit  or  walk,  keep  silence,  or  speak,  and  man}'  other  actions, 
depend  upon  the  will.  But  foretelling  the  events  of  future  ages 
does  not  depend  on  their  will.  Here,  according  to  tlie  repre- 
sentation of  the  Spirit,  the  will  is  a  cause  of  many  effects  ;  and 
the  will  and  its  operations  are  no  more  one  and  the  same,  than 
a  cause  and  Its  effect  are  the  same  thing.  The  will  by  its  vo- 
litions or  exertions  produces  effects.     This  is  Its  ofiice. 

Hence  the  scriptures  teach  us  that  the  mind  is  created  with 
three  distinct  faculties,  whose  operations  are  very  diflerent  from 
each  other.  Perceptions  of  objects  are  the  operations  of  the 
understanding.  The  affections  are  the  operations  of  the  heart. 
And  volitions  are  the  operations  of  the  will.  These  distinc- 
tions are  founded  on  a  real  difference,  and  are  taught  aiid  sup- 


^0 

ported  by  the  holy  scriptures.  To  view  the  huinau  mind  a& 
possessed,  or,  if  any  prefer  it,  composed  of  three  distinct  fac- 
uhies,  which  are  to  be  considered  as  existing  antecedent  to 
their  operations,  and  to  whicli  very  different  operations  are 
severally  ascribed,  are  truths  supported  both  by  reason  qnd 
scripture. 


Of  the  Understanding. 

Matter  is  a  general  na.me  giveii  to  all  corporeal  betngs,  oi'  to 
all  kinds  of  existence  which  are  inert  ;  which  never  act,  except 
when  acted  upon.  Mind,  or  spirit,  is  the  general  name,  by 
Avhich  all  intelligent,  active  beings  are  distinguished.  What 
the  essence  of  matter  is,  we  know  not.  We  are  acquainted 
with  its  properties,  and  their  operations  and  effects.  This  com-' 
prises  all  our  knowledge  of  matter.  And  we  know  not  what 
the  essence  of  mind,  or  spirit  is.  It  is  endued  with  certain  pro^- 
perties.  This  we  are  obliged  to  believe,  or  renounce  our 
claim  to  common  sense.  We  are  also  acquainted  with  the  op- 
ei'ations  of  the  mind,  and  the  effects  they  produce ;  and  this 
comprises  all  pur  knowledge,  at  present,  of  spiritual  existence. 

The  faculties  of  the  mind  are  its  essential  properties.  By 
these  the  mind  acts,  and  produces  effects.  Its  operations  are 
generically  different.  For  this  Reason  they  cannot  all  be  con- 
sidered as  operations  of  the  same  faculty.  Hei>ce,  philoso- 
phers have  been  led  to  consider  the  mind  possessed  of  two  fac- 
ulties or  properties,  called  the  understanding  and  ivilL 
Whether  it  is  endued  with  any  other  faculties  or  not,  will  be 
determined  in  subsequent  essa3's.  At  present,  I  shall  confine 
myself  to  the  understanding.  This  faculty  is  uiulefinable  ;  for 
two  reasons.  1.  It  is  an  individual  property.  2.  It  is  simple 
in  its  nature.  And  of  individual,  simple  existences,  no  one  can 
give  a  logical  definition.  If  a  person  does  not  know  what  is 
meant  by  the  t^rms  solidity,   extension,  perception,  pain,  an4 


volition,  it  is  not  possible  to  give  him  a  knowledge  of  them  by 
any  definition  whatsoever.  An  attempt  to  define  such  words, 
has  occasioned  darkness  and  confusion,  instead  of  clearer 
knowledge.  Where  such  words  are  not  understood,  all  that 
can  be  done  is  to  explain  them  by  other  words,  with  the  mean- 
ing of  which  persons  are  better  acquainted.  By  the  under- 
standing, then,  I  mean  a  preparedness,  or  an  adaptedness,  or 
a  fitness  in  the  mind,  if  tiiese  words  are  better  understood,  for 
a  certain  class  of  operations.  Many  are  apt  to  conclude, 
if  they  cannot  define  a  word,  it  has  no  meaning.  Hence  they 
infer,  there  is  no  such  faculty  as  the  understanding,  because  it 
cannot  be  defined.  And  they  might  as  well  conclude  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  pain,  because  it  cannot  be  defined.  Hence, 
though  the  understanding  cannot  be  defined,  yet  this  is  no  ob- 
jection against  its  being  considered  a  faculty,  nor  any  evidence 
against  a  belief  of  its  existence. 

Perceptions  are  the  operations  of  this  faculty.  By  a^^ercep- 
iion,  a  thought,  an  idea,  I  mean  the  same  thing,  the  same  oper- 
ation of  the  mind.  A  perception  must  have  an  object  ;  and 
the  same  is  true  with  respect  to  thoughts  anfi  ideas.  When 
we  perceive,  there  is  something  perceived  ;  when  we  think,  Ave 
think  of  something;  and  when  vve  have  an  idea,  we  have  an 
idea  of  something.  Whether,  when  material  objects  are  per- 
ceived, we  see  the  objects  themselves,  or  only  their  images,  as 
some  suppose,  is  a  question  Avhich  it  is  not  the  design  of  these 
essays  to  determine.  In  whatever  way  it  be  determined,  the 
design  which  lies  before  me  will  not  be  materially  afiected.  I 
would,  however,  give  notice  that,  by  the  objects  of  perception, 
I  mean  the  objects  themselves,  and  not  any  image  or  represen- 
tation of  them.  I  shall  take  it  for  granted,  that  a  material 
world  really  exists  ;  that  when  I  see  a  tree,  it  is  the  tree  itself, 
and  not  its  image,  which  I  perceive. 

Difierent  theories  have  been  adopted  and  supported  concern- 
ing our  perceptions,  thoughts,or  conceptions.  Some  of  the  an- 
cient philosophers  believed,  that  men  do  not  see  the  objects 
created,  but  ihe'ir forms,  which  they  called  phantasms,  or  ima- 
ges. And  modern  philosophers  have  advanced  various  other 
theories  on  this  subject.  Of  late  there  has  been  much  dispute 
concerning  the  sense  in  which  Locke  used  the  term  idea. 
Whether  he  meant  tiie  real  object  existing,  or  some  image  of 
it  in  the  eye.  Some  have  denied  the  existence  of  a  material 
world ;  and  such  various  opinions  have  given  rise  to  skepticism, 


whicli  has  been  carried  to  a  ^reat  length.  It  is  not  my  object 
to  attend  to  any  of  these  various  thcnies,  either  to  state,  ex- 
plain, defend,  or  confute  them.  But  as  I  have  observed,  it 
will  be  taken  for  granted  through  these  essays,  that  a  material 
world  does  exist,  distinct  from  the  mind  ;  and  that  all  objects, 
of  which  we  obtain  a  knowledge  through  the  medium  of  our 
bodily  senses,  are  real  existences.  It  is  objects  as  they  exist, 
which  we  see,  whether  properties  or  modes  ;  and  not  images, 
or  representations  of  them. 

It  may  now  be  observed,thatin  all  the  operations  of  the  under- 
standing three  things  are  to  be  noticed  ;  an  agent,an  operation, 
and  an  object.  These  are  the  things  meant  in  the  construc- 
tion of  all  languages,  by  nouns  when  in  the  nominative  case  ; 
by  verbs ;  and  nouns  in  the  accusative  or  objective  case.  1 
perceive  a  man.  /  is  the  agent,  in  the  nominative  case  ;  per- 
ceive denotes  its  action  or  operation  ;  and  man  is  the  object  in 
the  objective  case.  There  cannot  be  a  perception  without  an 
agent,  and  an  object.  And  the  mind  is  so  formed  by  its  Crea- 
tor, it  can  perceive  objects ;  it  can  be  pleased,  or  disgusted 
with  them  ;  it  can  make  exertions  to  produce  external,  visible 
effects.  This  ^reparecZness  in  its  formation  Xo  perceive,  \s  the 
understanding.  Can  the  same  simple  faculty  be  the  subject  of 
operations  so  different,  ns perceiving,  feeling,  and  willing  are.'* 
This  is  so  unphilosophical,  that  but  few  have  ever  admitted 
it.  Writers  have,  therefore,  generally  adopted  the  division  of 
the  mind  into  the  faculties  of  the  understanding  and  will.  And 
according  to  this  division,  all  the  operationsof  the  understand- 
ing are  perceptions.  Hence  any  operation,  which  is  not  a 
perception,  does  not  belong  to  this  faculty.  But  feeling  is  not 
a  perception  ;  and  volition  is  not  a  perception  ;  they  are  not, 
therefore,  operations  of  the  understanding.  Every  perception 
has  an  object.  But  a  mere  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  has  a 
cause,  but  not  an  object.  And  a  volition  is  not  a  perception, 
but  the  cause  of  some  effect.  All  these  operations  of  the  mind 
difl'er  from  each  other,  and  ought  to  be  distinguished.  By 
confounding  them,  our  views  of  the  mind  are  darkened  to  such 
a  degree,  we  know  not  what  to  affirm  or  deny  consistently  with 
truth.  One  perception  does  not  difl'er  from  another  in  any  re- 
spect whatsoever,  unless  in  such  particulars  as  these,  that  one 
is  more  distinct  and  clear,  and  another  more  confused  and  ob- 
scure. But  whether  clear  or  confused,  they  are  perceptions. 
The  objects  of  perception  may  widely  differ  from  each  other  ; 


33 

yet  this  difference  is  in  the  objects  seen,  and  not  in  the  percep- 
tions. And  as  all  those  operations  of  the  mind  called  percep- 
tions, thoughts,  or  ideas,  are  in  their  simple  nature  alike,  they 
form  one  distinct  class.  Hence  by  perceptions,  I  mean  one  dis- 
tinct class  of  operations,  as  by  animals,  is  meant  a  distinct  class 
of  beings.  These  operations  belong  to  the  understanding, 
and  to  no  other  faculty.  Every  one  will  see  there  is  no  pro- 
priety in  classing  them  with  volitions,  or  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  Whatever  operations,  therefore,  may  be  properly 
called  perceptions,belong  to  the  understanding.  They  cannot, 
without  confounding  things  which  widely  differ  from  each  oth- 
er, be  classed  with  any  other  operations,  such  as  sensations 
and  volitions  ;  nor  be  referred  to  any  other  faculty.  I  trust 
it  is  now  made  evident,  as  far  as  I  have  proceeded,  that  percep- 
tions are  the  only  operations  of  the  understanding :  that  it  is 
the  office  of  this  faculty  to  think  and  perceive  :  and  that  we 
can  no  more  account  for  perceptions  without  a  faculty  to  per- 
ceive, than  we  can  account  for  actions  without  an  agent. 


*»**#****» 


ESSAY  XXX. 

Of  the  Objects  of  Perception. 

The  individual  objects  of  perception  are  almost  innumera- 
ble. However,  most,  if  not  all  of  them,  may  be  arranged  un- 
der the  following  heads. 

1.  Simple  existence.  When  we  see  an  object,  we  perceive 
a  thing  which  is  a  real  being  or  existence.  For  if  there  were 
no  existences  around  us,  there  would  be  no  objects  of  percep- 
tion. We  must  have  a  conception  of  existences,  before  we  can 
analyse  or  Combine  them.  We  may  and  do  perceive  objects 
as  real  existences,  without  taking  into  consideration  their  pro- 
perties, relations,  or  connexions  with  other  thii:gs.  And 
viewing  an  object  as  having  nothing  more  or  less  belonging  to 
it,  than  barely  its  being,  is  what  1  mean  by  a  perception  of 
existence.     Some  may  say  we  have  a  perception  of  some  oh- 


24 

jects  whiclv  have  no  real  existence,  and  are  nothing  but  crea- 
tures of  the  imagination  ;  as  a  horse,  for  instance,  with  wings. 
But  we  have  an  idea  of  a  horse  and  of  wings,  things  which 
really  exist,  before  we  place  wings  on  a  horse.  So  that  this 
creature  of  the  imagination  is  a  combination  of  things  which 
have  a  real  existence,  in  such  a  manner  as  they  are  no  where 
found  to  exist.  The  things,  horse  and  wings,  have  an  exist- 
ence, but  not  united  in  the  manner  they  are  in  tWs  particular 
instance.  All  combinations  of  objects  are  formed  of  things 
which  have  a  real  existence.  Those  objects  of  perception, 
which  are  only  mere  existences,  are  very  numerous. 

2.  The  properties  of  which  all  existences  are  possessied,  arc 
objects  of  perception.  All  primary,  &,  wiiat  some  call  second- 
ary', and  others  occult,  qualities,  whether  of  matter  or  spirit, 
are  objects  of  perception.     These,  also,  are  very  numerous. 

4.  Relations  are  objects  of  perception.  The  relations  of 
cause  and  effect,  of  things  with  respect  to  time  and  place,  and 
all  other  relations,  come  under  this  head.  A  relation  is  an 
object  of  perception.  We  see  the  relation  one  thing  bears  to 
another.  And  there  is  no  other  way  by  which  we  can  obtain 
a  knowledge  of  relations,  but  by  perception. 

Relations,  such  as  cause  and  effect,  time  and  place,  resem- 
blance, contrast,  contiguity,  or  any  other  which  can  be  named  ; 
these  relations,  as  well  as  the  things,  are  objects  of  perception. 
This  is  all,  which  is  necessary  to  my  purpose  ;  for  it  is  not 
designed  to  discuss  these  several  relations  ;  or  show  how  one 
suggests  another  in  a  train  of  thoughts,  or  to  attend  to  the 
laws  of  association  or  suggestion.  This  would  lead  into  a 
wide  field,  far  beyond  the  limits  proposed.  All  which  is  re- 
quisite, to  answer  the  end  herein  aimed  at,  is,  for  the  reader  to 
notice,  that  however  numerous  and  various  the  objects  of 
perception  are,  yet  the  perceptions  of  them  are  alike.  Wheth- 
er we  see  a  being,  or  its  properties,  or  relations,  our  percep- 
tions are  as  similar  in  their  nature,  as  numerous  drops  of  wa- 
ter arc  similar.  Hence  perceptions  of  the  relations  of  objects 
Coiym  one  generic  class  of  operations  of  the  undersl^iding. 

4.  Truth  and  falsehood  are  objects  of  perception.  We  per- 
ceive the  agreement  or  disagreement  between  the  subject  and 
predicate  of  a  proposition.  When  it  is  affirmed  that  snow  is 
white,  wc  clearly  perceive  this  quaKty  belongs  to  snow.  This 
is  a  perception  of  truth.  But  if  it  be  affirmed,  that  snow  h 
black,  as  we  perceive  no  such  quality  belonging  to  snow,  we 


25 

see  the  affirmation  is  a  falsehood. — Every  affirmation,  and  ev- 
ery denial,  is  triie  or  false.  For  whatever  is  affirmed  of  any 
subject,  is  true  or  false.  Whether  it  be  true  or  false,  we  learn 
by  perception.  Hence  truth  or  falsehood  are  objects  of  per- 
ception. 

5.  The  right  and  wrong  of  actions  are  objects  of  perception. 
The  right  and  wrong  of  actions  imply  some  prescribed  rule  of 
duty.  Those  actions  of  moral  agents,  whether  internal  or  ex- 
ternal, which  agree  with  the  rule  of  duty,  are  right ;  and  those, 
which  do  not  agree  with  it,  are  wrong.  When  actions  are  com- 
pared with  the  rule  of  duty,  we  perceive  they  agree  or  disagree 
with  it  ;  and  this  is  a  perception  of  right  and  wrong.  The 
rule  of  duty,  the  action,  and  their  agreement  or  contrariety, 
are  each  of  them  objects  of  perception. 

6.  Good  and  evil,  both  natural  and  moral,  are  objects  of  per- 
ception. Our  ideas  of  good  and  evil  are  relative.  Whatever, 
in  the  natural  and  moral  Avorld,  tends  to  happiness  ultimately, 
is  good. — Now  all  things,  which  can  be  viewed  in  relation  to 
happiness  or  misery  ultimately,  tend  to  on?  or  the  other  ;  and 
may  therefore,  with  propriety,  be  termed  good  or  evil.  When 
we  say  a  thing  is  good  or  evil,  the  meaning  is,  it  tends  to  happi- 
ness, or  misery.  Hence  a  perception  of  the  tendencies  of 
things,  is  a  perception  of  good  and  evil. 

I  am  not  certain,  that  all  the  objects  of  perception  are  in- 
cluded under  these  general  divisions.  But  1  think  of  no  others 
at  present.  Some,  perhaps,  will  say,  the  objects  mentioned 
under  one  head,  are  included  in  another  ;  there  was,  therefore, 
no  need  of  so  many  divisions.  This  may  be  true.  Yet,  per- 
haps, on  more  mature  consideration,  these  divisions  will  noi  be 
thought  too  numerous. 

Whether  our  knowledge  of  all  objects  is  obtained  by  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  or  not,  is  not  my  design  to  determine.  Be- 
cause it  is  not  necessary  to  elucidate  the  subjects  principally 
aimed  at  in  these  essays. — Mankind  frequently  say,  they  have 
a  knowledge  of  such  and  such  objects.  Now  Vvhatis  intended 
by  the  knowledge  of  an  object  ?  Any  thing  more  than  a  per- 
ception of  it  ?  Feeling  or  sensation  is  not  knowledge.  By 
sensation  we  may  acquire  a  knowledge  of  many  objects.  Yet 
sensation  is  one  thing,  and  knowledge  another.  And  no  one 
willpretend  that  acts  of  the  will  constitute  any  part  of  our  knowl- 
edge. Acts  of  the  will  may  be  objects  of  knowledge,  but  not 
knowledge  itself — Of  course  a  perception  of  objects  comprises 


26 

ail  our  knowledge.  Whatever,  then,  is  known,  is  perceived  j 
and  whatever  is  an  object  of  knowledge,  is  an  object  of  percep- 
tion. We  have  a  knowledge  of  existence,  of  the  properties  of 
beings,  of  their  relations,  of  truth  and  falsehood,  of  right  and 
wrong,  of  good  and  evil.  And  are  there  any  other  objects  of 
knowledge,  which  are  not  included  under  one  or  the  other  of 
these  divisions  i*  If  not,  then  these  contain  all  the  objects  of 
perception.  But  if  there  be  other  things,  which  are  not  in- 
cluded under  either  of  these  general  heads,  yet  if  they  are 
known,  they  are    only  objects  of  perception. 

This  essay  may  now  be  concluded  with  a  brief  recapitulation 
of  a  few  ideas.  Perceptions,  we  have  seen,  form  one  general 
class  of  the  operations  of  the  mind.  These  belong  to  the  un- 
derstanding, &  to  no  other  facult}'.  The  understanding  acts, 
or  operates.  Perceptions  are  its  operations.  And  the  objects 
on  which  they  terminate,  or  which  are  perceived,  have  been 
briefly  arranged  under  several  heads.  When  I  say  the  under- 
standing acts,  I  do  not  mean,  it  produces  its  own  exercises. 
But  I  speak  in  this  manner,  to  conform  to  the  common  use  of 
words. 

It  is  hoped  the  reader  will  carefully  observe,  that  it  is  not 
designed  in  this  work  to  show  how  external  objects  aflect  the 
bodily  senses  of  seeing,  hearing,  smelling,  tasting,  and  feel- 
ing ;  or  in  what  way  by  these  senses  the  mind  is  impressed  or 
affected  ;  or  in  what  manner  sensations  are  produced  in  the 
mind,  by  the  operation  of  objects  on  the  bodily  organs.  That 
sensations  are  produced,  we  know  is  a  fact  by  experience. 
But  the  manner  in  which  objects  affect  the  mind,  is  an  inquiry 
foreign  from  my  present  design. 


»*•#**>*#■»»» 


ESSAY  IV. 

Of  the  Blemory. 

Some  consider  memory  as  a  distinct  faculty.  Whether  it  is 
or  not,  depends  on  the  nature  of  its  operations.  No  one  will 
suppose,  that  sensations,  or  affections,  or  volitions,  are  acts  or 
operations  of  the  memory.  But  the  latter  are  perceptions  ;  &: 
on  that  account  may  be  called  operations  of  the  understanding. 
They  either  have  only  a  specific  difference  from  other  opera- 


27 

tions  of  the  understanding,  and  so  belong  to  that  faculty  j  or 
they  have  a  generic  difference,  and  ought  to  form  a  distinct 
class  of  operations.  Whether  they  differ  generically,  or  only 
specifically,  from  the  operations  of  the  understanding,  is  the 
inquiry  to  which  I  shall  give  immediate  attention. 

A  few  days  since,  as  I  passed  along,  I  saw  a  house  of  a  cer- 
tain form,  dimensions,  colour  and  situation.  No  one  will  sup- 
pose the  eye  can  see.  It  is  only  an  organ,  or  medium,  through 
which  the  mind  sees  external  objects.  It  was,  therefore,  my 
mind,  which  perceived  the  house  at  that  time.  What  other 
name,  beside  seeing,  or  perceiving,  shall  we  give  to  this  act  of 
the  mind  ?  Whether  we  call  it  seeing,  perceiving,  conceiving, 
or  by  any  other  name,  yet  the  act  or  operation  is  the  same. 
Names  do  not  alter  things.  This  operation  of  the  mind,  I 
have  hitherto  called  a  perception.  I  give  it  this  name,  because 
I  know  of  no  other  word,  by  which  it  can  be  more  properly 
designated.  At  this  moment  I  i-emember  that  I  saw  the  above 
house.     I  recollect  its  form,  dimensions,  colour,  and  situation. 

It  will  be  granted,  that  remembering  is  an  operation  of  the 
mind.  What  is  the  difference  between  this  operation  of  the 
mind,  and  the  one  I  had,  when  I  first  saw,  and  had  a  direct 
view  of  the  house  ?  The  object  is  the  same.  The  house  was 
the  object,  when  I  saw  it  ;  it  is  the  object  now,  when  I  remem- 
ber it.  Then  I  saw  it ;  and  now,  when  I  remember  it,  I  see 
it.  Remembering,  then,  when  considered  as  an  act  of  the 
mind,  is  seeing  or  perceiving.  Here  are  two  operations  of  the 
mind  ;  one  respects  a  present,  the  other,  a  past  object.  Where- 
in do  they  differ  ?  It  is  believed  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  any 
man,  to  show  any  difference  between  these  two  operations,  un- 
less it  be  this ;  one  is  more  clear,  the  other  more  indistinct. 
Each  is  a  perception  of  a  house.  And  this  is  true  respecting 
all  the  operations  of  the  memory.  There  is  a  difference  with 
respect  to  the  objects.  The  object  I  now  perceive  before  me, 
is  present.  When  remembered,  it  hpast.  An  interval  of  time 
has  passed,  between  the  first  and  the  second  perception  of  the 
same  object.  And  when  an  object  is  recollected,  it  may  be 
attended  with  a  full  persuasion,  that  it  is  the  same  object  I 
once  saw  ;  that  I  am  the  same  person  now  I  was  then  ;  and 
that  a  period  of  time  has  intervened.  Yet  that  operation,called 
remembering,is  die  same  in  kind  with  the  one  I  had,when  the  ob- 
ject was  present  to  the  mind.  Both  are  perceptions  of  the  same 
object.     But  with  relation  to  the  object, and  the  two  perceptions 


^8 

of  it,  there  is  the  difference  of  past  and  present.  Though  an 
interval  of  time,  a  day,  a  month,  a  year,  has  passed,  between 
my  first  seeing  an  object  and  remembering  it,  yet  the  object  is 
tiie  same,  and  each  perception  of  it  is  the  same  in  kind.  Also 
there  may  be  this  difference,  that  when  the  object  is  present, 
the  perception  of  it  is  more  clear  and  distinct,  than  when  it  is 
remembered.  But  a  perception  is  the  same  operation  in  kind, 
whether  it  be  clear  and  distinct,  or  obscure  and  indistinct. 
This,  however,  may  be  true  of  perceptions  of  present  objects, 
as  well  as  those  which  are  past.  Again,  I  now  see  a  house. 
A  year  hence  I  travel  the  same  way  and  see  it  again. 
Would  any  suppose  there  is  any  difference  between  the  first  and 
second  perception  I  have  of  that  house,  because  an  interval  of 
a  year  has  intervened  ''  Surely  not.  Yet  there  is  no  more 
difference  between  my  seeing  a  house  yesterday,  and  recollect- 
ing it  to  day,  than  between  seeing  it  a  year  since  when  I  passed 
it,  and  again  to  da},  when  I  pass  it  again.  For  in  both  cases 
a  portion  of  duration  has  succeeded,  between  the  first  and  se- 
cond perception  of  the  same  house.  Indeed,  the  more  this 
subject  may  be  examined,  the  more  obvious  it  will  appear,  that 
remembering,  considered  as  an  operation  of  the  mind,  is  a  per- 
ception of  an  object.  And  this  perception  differs  no  more 
from  any  other  perception,  than  any  two  perceptions  differ 
from  each  other.  They  are  individual  operations  of  the  sam.e 
kind,  and  may  be  numbered  first,  second,  and  third,  as  they 
succeed  each  other.  Two  or  more  individual  things  may  be 
similar,  and  for  this  reason  be  called  by  the  same  name,  as  is 
the  case  with  the  same  sort  of  ra3's  of  light. 

Though  all  the  operations  of  the  mind  are  perceptions  of 
objects,  and  being  alike  ought  to  be  classed  together ;  yet  on 
account  of  a  difference  attending  the  objects,  they  are  subdi- 
vided into  several  distinct  species  of  operations.  And  to  each 
division  a  name  is  given,  by  which  it  may  be  ever  after  de- 
signated and  known. — Present  and  past  constitutes  a  difference 
between  objects  now  seen,  and  those  remembered.  This  is  one 
difference.  An  object,  which  is  now  seen,  is  present  to  the 
mind.  I  look,  not  back,  nor  forward,  but  directly  at  it. 
When  I  recollect,  I  look  back  ;  the  object  is  not  present  before 
me.  An  object  remembered  is  attended  with  a  belief  of  person- 
al identity  ;  a  present  object  is  not.  On  account  of  these 
differences  between  the  objects  remembered  and  those  which 
are  not,  all  these  perceptions  of  past  objects  are  formed  into  a 


29 

» 

distinct  class,  and  to  this  class  or  division  the  name  memory  n, 
given. 

Hence  it  is  as  unphllosophical  to  say  remembering  is  not 
perceiving  objects,  as  to  assert  that  a  horse  is  not  an  animal. 
And  we  may  as  consistently  say,  that  horse  is  not  the  name 
of  one  class  of  animals,  as  say  that  memory  is  not  the  name  of 
one  class  of  the  operations  of  the  understanding.  And  hence 
it  is  not  philosophical  to  consider  memory  a  distinct  faculty. 
For  there  is  no  ground  to  believe  there  are  any  more  faculties 
belonging  to  the  mind,  than  there  are  classes  of  operations  of 
different  kinds.  It  is  agreed,  that  loving,  hating,  choosing, 
refusing,  are  operations  of  different  kinds — so  different,  that 
the  faculty,  which  perceives,  cannot  love  and  hate.  This  is  the 
reason,  which  has  induced  philosophers  to  admit  the  existence 
of  two,  if  no  more,  distmct  faculties,  which  they  call  under- 
standing &;  will.  But  is  it  not  as  easy  for  the  same  faculty  to 
perceive  past,  as  present  objects  ?  If  it  is,  what  necessity  is 
there  of  supposing  two  faculties,  understanding  and  memory, 
to  account  for  a  perception  of  present  and  past  objects  ?  Even 
such  a  supposition  will  not  account  for  it.  It  is  a  fact,  that 
we  perceive  the  objects  which  are  before  us,  and  those  which 
are  past.  But  hoiv  we  perceive  either,  no  person  can  tell. 
We  maj',  then,  conclude,  there  is  no  sufficient  reason,  nor  any 
necessit3',for  considering  memory  to  be  a  distinct  faculty.  We 
ought  to  view  memory  only  as  a  name  given  to  one  class  of 
the  operations  of  the  understanding.  If  any,  however,  choose 
to  consider  the  memory  as  3.poioer  of  the  understanding,  I  have 
no  objection  to  it.  For  by  it  nothing  more  can  be  meant,  as 
far  as  I  can  conceive,  than  the  ability  of  the  understanding  to 
perceive,  or  recal  past  objects.  That  it  has  a  power,  or  abil- 
ity, or  can  recall  or  remember  them,  is  granted.  For  it  is  a 
fact,  it  does  recollect  them  ;  and  what  it  in  fact  does,  it  can  or 
has  power  to  do. 

It  may  be  inquired,  if  remembering  is  perceiving,  what  is  the 
object  ?  I  answer,  the  object  recollected  is  the  same  object 
perceived,  when  first  presented  to  the  mind.  If  it  be  asked, 
where  is  the  object,  when  remembered  ?  Answer,  where  it 
was,  when  we  first  obtained  a  knowledge  of  it.  If  any  ask, 
how  we  remember  or  recall  past  objects .''  Answer,  1  know 
not.  I  know  It  is  a  fact,  but  cannot  describe  the  manner  of  it. 
I  cannot  tell  how  we  perceive  present  oljects.  These  are  in- 
quiries beyond  my  reach. 


30 

Having  made  it  evident,  that  the  operations  of  memory  are 
only  perceptions,  and  the  diffei'cnce  between  them  and  other 
perceptions  are  such  circumstances  as  present  &t  past,  and  not 
the  perceptions  themselves  except  the  relation  of  time  ;  hav- 
ing shown  the  dissimilarity  of  the  circumstances  attending  the 
objects,  as  the  reason  why  they  form  a  distinct  class  to  which 
the  name  memory  is  given  ;  &  that  this  class  of  operations  are 
operations  of  the  understanding,  and  of  course  there  is  no  rea- 
son or  necessity  for  considering  and  calling  the  memory  a  dis- 
tinct faculty,  the  principal  objects  of  this  essay  are  answered. 
Many  other  things  which  might  be  observed  respecting  the 
memory,  as  they  do  not  come  within  the  design  of  these  essays, 
receive  here  no  particular  attention. 

It  is  granted,  that  several  relations  between  objects  afibrd 
great  aid  to  the  memory.  One  object  suggests  another  ;  and  a 
present  object,  by  a  relation  of  resemblance,  or  place,  or  some 
other  relation,  suggests  a  past  object,  or  revives  in  the  mind  a 
perception  of  an  object,  which  had  been  previously'  received. 
Hence  it  is  granted,  that  the  various  relations  of  objects  are  of 
great  use  in  recollecting,  or  reviving  past  objects,  or  objects 
which  had  been  previously  seen.  But  when  we  consider  the 
perception  of  a  present,  and  the  perception  of  the  same  object 
at  another  time,  those  perceptions  or  operations  of  the  mind  are 
similar ;  and  for  this  reason  are  operations  of  the  same  faculty. 


ESSAY  V. 

Of  Judgment  and  Reason. 

.Judgment  and  reason  are  distinguished  by  sojue  writers, 
and  considered  as  different  operations  of  the  mind.  It  is  ap- 
prehended that  the  difference,  if  any,  is  very  small.  Judgment 
is  agreed  to  be  an  act  of  the  mind.  It  is  that  act  by  w  hich  one 
thing  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  another  ;  or  it  is  an  assent  to  the 
truth  of  a  pi'oposition.  And  this  assent  to  the  truth  or  false- 
hood of  a  proposition  is  an  act  of  the  mind. 


But  what  act  or  operation  of  the  mind  is  it  ?  Is  it  a  sensa- 
tion, or  a  voHtion  ?  This  is  never  pretended.  It  must  then 
be  a  perception.  For  we  experience  no  other  operations  than 
perceptions,  sensations,  and  vohtions.  All  our  operations 
may  be  included  in  one  or  the  other  of  these  general  classes. 

That  the  act  of  the  mind,  which  is  called  judgment,  is  only 
a  perception,  will  be  evident  from  a  further  attention  to  the  sub- 
ject. Man  is  a  rational  being.  This  is  a  proposition.  For 
it  has  a  subject,  copula,  and  predicate.  Man,  which  is,the  sub- 
ject, is  an  object  of  perception.  And  rationality,  which  is  the 
predicate,  is  an  object  of  perception.  I  perceive  that  the  affir- 
mation is  true  ;  which  is  only  perceiving  the  agreement  between 
the  subject  &;  predicate  of  this  proposition.  If  we  were  to  at- 
tend to  a  hundred  propositions,  we  should  find  an  assent  to- their 
truth  or  falsehood  is  only  a  perception  of  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement between  their  subjects  and  predicates.  Hence, 
judgment  is  nothing  more  or  less,  than  the  perception  of  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  a  proposition. 

In  the  next  place,  what  is  reason  ?  It  is  a  power  of  the  un- 
derstanding to  infer  one  proposition  from  another.  This  pro- 
cess of  inferring  one  thing  from  another  is  called  reasoning. 
There  is  no  necessity  of  adducing  proof  of  this,  because  it  is 
granted.  The  only  question  is,  what  acts  of  the  mind  are  em- 
ployed in  reasoning  ?  /  think.  From  this  I  infer  another 
proposition,  which  is,  /  exist.  For  I  clearly  see  non-entity 
cannot  think  or  operate.  But  as  I  do  in  fact  think,  it  is  cer- 
tain, the  being  intended  by  the  pronoun  I'm  the  proposition  has 
existence.  The  operations  of  the  mind  are  limited.  From 
this  I  infer,  that  mankind  do  not  know  or  comprehend  all 
things.  For  if  men  knew  all  things,  as  God  does,  their  minds 
would  not  be  limited.  This  inferring  one  proposition  from 
another,  is  reasoning.  In  this  process  of  the  mind  none  of 
its  operations  are  employed,  but  perceptions.  As  perceiving 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  predicate  of  a  proposition 
with  its  subject,  is  termed  judgment ;  so  perceiving  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  one  proposition  with  another  is  rea- 
soning. When  I  perceive  the  truth  of  this  proposition,  Ithink, 
or  the  mind  of  man  is  limited,  I  clearly  perceive  other  propo- 
sitions must  be  true  ;  that  I  do  exist,  and  that  mankind  do  not 
know  all  things.  Of  course,  reasoning  is  perceiving  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  one  proposition  with  another. 

With  a  self  evident  proposition  another  is  connected.     All 


32 

propositions,  which  are  true,  are  connected  as  links  In  a  chain. 
And  when  we  attend  to  a  self  evident  j)roposition,  we  perceive 
the  connexion  between  it  and  another,  and  between  this  last  and 
another  ;  and  so  on  in  a  regular  prop;ression.  The  mind  acts 
by  perceiving  the  connexion  between  one  proposition  and 
another,  is  all  that  can  be  meant  by  inferring  or  deducing  one 
truth  from  another.  And  it  must  be  evident  to  any  attentive 
mind,  that  in  this  process,  which  is  called  reasoning,  there  is 
only  a  perception  of  the  agreement,  relation,  or  connexion  of 
one  truth  with  another.  Perceiving  these  agreements,  relations, 
or  connexions,  is  reasoning.  By  perceiving  these  agreements, 
the  mind  is  advancing  in  knowledge,  and  there  is  room  for  it  to 
proceed  in  discovering  truth  in  an  endless  progression.  For 
the  field  of  science  is  unlimited.  And  from  this  view  of  the 
subject  it  is  obvious,  if  there  were  no  self  evident  propositions, 
there  would  be  an  end  to  all  reasoning.  The  mind  would  have 
no  where  to  begin.  If  it  could  not  directl}^  and  intuitively  per- 
ceive the  truth  of  one  proposition,  it  could  never  perceive  any 
to  be  true,  and  must  forever  remain  in  a  state  of  doubt  and  un- 
certainty. All  conclusive  reasoning  is  founded  on  self  evident 
propositions,  of  the  truth  of  which  we  are  convinced  by  intui- 
tion or  direct  perception. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  for  us  to  attend  to  those  things, 
which  constitute  an  agreement  and  a  difference  between  judg- 
ment and  reason.  For  in  some  respects  they  agree,  and  in 
others  they  differ.  They  agree  with  respect  to  their  object. 
Truth  and  falsehood  are  their  objects.  When  one  thing  is  af- 
firmed of  another,  the  affirmation  is  true  or  false.  Perceiving 
the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  affirmation,  is  that  act  of  the  mind 
called  judgment.  For,  judging  a  proposition  to  be  true,  is 
perceiving  the  agreement  of  the  predicate  with  the  subject,  or 
the  truth  of  the  proposition.  And  judging  a  proposition  to  be 
false,  is  nothing  but  a  perception  of  its  falsehood. 

Judgment  respects  particular  propositions, and  the  agreement 
of  a  predicate  with  its  subject,  or  its  disagreement.  But  in 
reasoning,  two  propositions  are  taken  into  view.  By  compar- 
ing them  we  perceive,  that  if  this  proposition  be  true,  /  think, 
the  other  must  be  true,  that  I  exist.  Perceiving  the  agreement 
between  one  and  another  proposition,  is  reasoning.  This  is  in- 
ferring one  truth  from  another.  In  this  process  there  are  two 
acts  ofthe  judgment.  We  perceive  the  truth  of  the  first  and 
of  the  second  proposition.    Hence  in  reasoning,  two,  three,  or 


33 

wore  jiidc^ments  are  united.  The  rlifierence  between  jndg- 
meni  and  reason  is  tliis.  Judgment  is  an  individual  art.  ol'tlie 
mind;  itrtspccts  the  truth  ol'onepropositioi' only.  But  in  rea- 
sonin<j,  several  acts  of  the  mind  are  connected.  One  judg- 
ment or  perception  of  the  truth  of  a  proposition,  is  a  neces>ary 
help  to  discern  the  truth  of  another.  In  reasoning,  there  is  a  suc- 
cession of  perceptions.  The  mind,  from  viewing  one.  passes  to 
the  contemplation  of  another  proposition  ;  and  in  its  progress 
perceives  the  truth  of  the  several  propositions,  and  their  con- 
nexion and  agreement  with  each  other,  let  in  judging  and 
reasoning,  vo  acts  of  the  mind  are  emplo\cd,  but  those  per- 
ceptions, or  tliose  operations  which  belong  to  the  understand- 
ing. 

It  is  true,  bther  operations  are  connected  with  our  percep- 
tions. For  instance,  the  will  confines  the  attention  to  a  sub- 
ject ;  and  when  truth  is  perceived,  and  new  discoveries  made, 
the  heart  is  pleased,  and  emotions  are  excited.  Yet  every 
person  must  know,  that  those  volitions  and  the  pleasure  we 
experience,  are  not  perceptions  of  truth  or  falsehood.  A  pleas- 
ant or  paip.fnl  sensation  is  not  a  perception  ;  and  volitions  are 
not  perceptions.  This  's  evident  to  every  person  who  has 
given  attention  to  the  oper;;lions  of  his  own  mind.  Though 
aflections  and  volitions  may  accompany  perceptions,  yet  it  is 
]>y  the  latter  we  obtain  a  knowledge  of  truth  and  falsehood. 

Whether  or  not  all  truths  are  contingent  or  necessary,  ac- 
cording to  the  division  made  by  some,  is  not  my  object  to  de- 
termine. It  is  the  great  object  of  these  essays  to  describe  the 
differirnce  between  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  and  class 
them  according  to  their  differences,  and  present  them  in  a 
systematic  order  to  the  reader's  view.  In  order  to* this,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  attend  to  the  objects  of  perception,  any  further 
tlian  to  show  the  ground  and  reason  of  the  several  classes  into 
which  the  operations  of  the  mind  ought  to  be  divided.  And 
though  there  may  be  a  difference  between  contingent  and  ne- 
cessary truths,  yet  each  of  them  is  an  object  of  perception.  In 
a  projjosition,  where  there  is  no  necessary  connexion  V'Ctween 
its  subject  and  predicate,  still  th^  latter  may  agree  with  the 
former  ;  and  when  this  is  perceived,  we  judge  the  affamation 
to  be  true.  And  when  I  affnm  that  two  and  two  are  ec,ual  to 
four,  though  this  is  necessari!}'  true,  yet  it  is  tlic  understand- 
ing which  perceives  it.  Hence  co»uingeut  as  well  as  necessa- 
ry truths,  are  objects  of  perception  only. 

It 


84 

Now  objects  of  perception  diflVr  in  certain  reppecls  from 
earli  otluT.  This  (iifrc'rence  is  the  reason  offorminu;  thcni  in- 
to distinct,  specific  classes.  Accordingly,  those  operations  of 
the  niuh'r.-tanding  \Ahich  have  for  their  object  the  tmth^r  fal:-e- 
liood  of  particular  propositions,  onyht  to  be  classed  to^ith.cr  J 
and  this  class  oin;ht  to  have  a  name,  which  is  con)nionly 
known  by  the  tern)  jiidgment.  And  those  operations  of  the 
•luiderstanding,  which  are  employed  in  deducing  one  truth 
from  anullicr,  form  another  class,  which  is  called  reason.  So 
the  terms  judgment  and  reason  ought  to  be  user',  as  the  nan  es 
by  which  those  perceptions  are  designated,  which  have  the 
truth  and  falsehood  of  propositions  for  their  object. 

Hence  judgment  and  reason  are  not  faculties  of  the  mind. 
They  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  faculties  unless  their  (  p- 
crations  gciicrically  differ  from  perceptions.  But  we  have  seen 
there  is  no  such  diflerence.  Forjudging  is  only  perceiving  the 
truth  of  a  proposition  ;  and  reasoning  is  onl}'  inferring  one 
proposition  from  another.  In  this  process,  \^!;en  the  truth  of 
one  proposition  is  perceived,  the  truih  of  another  in.mrdiately 
connected  with  it,  is  perceived.  Each  act  of  the  mind  in  judg- 
ing and  reasoning  is  a  pcrceptiov).  And  between  one  percep- 
tion and  another,  there  is  no  difurence  As  life,  or  motion,  is 
the  same,  though  it  be  predical(d  of  a  thousand  individuals 
called  animals  ;  so  perceptions,  however  numerous,  belong  to 
the  understanding.  For  this  is  the  only  faculty  which  perceives. 
Yet,  as  the  objects  of  perception  dlfl'er  in  particular  respects, 
they  are  divided  into  several  classes,  to  designate,  and  rdnir/d 
OS  of  tliis  difierence.  When  the  word  remen.bering  is  used,  I 
know  the  objects  recollected  li;!ve  been  seen,  but  now  are  past. 
And  the  words,  judgment  and  reason,  remind  me.  that  the  truth 
and  falsehood  of  propositions  are  contemplated.  Hence  the 
reason,  why  difierent  names  arc  given  to  the  same  cperations 
of  the  understanding,  is  not  because  they  difiVr  in  tl^eir  Kind 
or  nature  ;  but  because  the  objects  of  those  operations  difi'er 
fi(no  each  other. 

Ha\ing  snid  surtlcient  to  make  tliis  subject  plain,  we  may 
now  proceed  to  another  class  of  operations,  \\hich  beloiig  t» 
the  understLinuing." 


ESSA?  VX. 
On  Conscience. 

Various  are  the  opinions  rpspectinpc  conscience.  Some  niel- 
aphysiciaiis  term  it  a  moral  faculiij,  a  moral  sense  ;  while  oth- 
ers consider  it  syRonymous  with  the  dictates  of  reason,  or  the 
judf^ment  we  form  ofour  moral  conduct.  Amidst  such  a  con- 
flict of  opinions,  it  becomes  us  to  examine  this  subject  with 
candor  and  impartiality. 

And  1.  It  is  not  the  immediate  and  direct  office  of  conscience 
to  teach  us  truth,  or  falsehood.  Truth  and  falsehood  are  not 
the  objects  of  conscience,  any  farther  than  is  necessary  to  as- 
cerfaiu  their  moral  qualitie>.  Conscience  is  not  employed  in 
dctermininti'  what  propositions  are  true,  or  false  ;  this  belongs 
to  tlie  province  of  reason. 

But  2.  Conscience  judpres  of  the  moral  qualities  ofact'ons. 
Our  actions  are  either  right  or  wroufr,  g"Ood  or  bad.  And  i.t 
is  '.he  oflice  of  conscience  to  Hisiinguisih  these  qualities.  But 
to  determine  the  qualities  of  our  actions,  we  are  to  compare 
them  with  some  general  rule  or  principle.  Self  evident  propo- 
sitions of  the  moral  kind,  are  general  principles  by  \\hich  we 
determine  moral  qualities.  Some  actions  ought,  and  others 
ought  not,  to  be  performed.  When  we  do  what  ought  to  Le 
done,  our  conduct  is  right  ;  but  whrn  we  do  what  ought  not 
to  be  done,  our  conduct  is  evil.  It  is  a  self  evident  proposi- 
tion, that  1  ought  to  do  by  another,  as  he  ought  to  do  by  mf ,  in 
similar  circumstances.  From  this  I  infer,  that  if  my  neighbor 
ought  to  love  me,  I  ought  to  love  him.  Although,  from  self 
evident  principles,  we  may  draw  many  just  conclusions,  yet  in 
many  things  we  are  liable  to  err.  Through  the  strength  of 
corrupt  inclinations,  the  influence  of  prejudice,  and  the  want  of 
light,  we  may  judge  amiss,  respecting  what  we  ought,  or  ought 
not  to  I  erform.  We,  tlierefore,  need  some  infillible  rule  for 
our  guide.  The  moral  law  supplies  an  infallible  rule.  This 
is  prescribed  b3'  our  Maker  who  cannot  err  The  moral  law 
makes  nothing  right  or  wrong  ;  but  is  founded  on  eternal  prin- 
ciples of  right.  Our  hearts  and  actions  are  either  right  or 
wrong,  antecedent  to  the  consideration  of  the  written  law  of 
God.  God  knows  without  the  possibility  of  error,  how  we 
ou'jlit  to  feel  in  all  cases,  and  how  we  oucht  to  'ive  in  all  the 
relations  we  sustain.  And  whatever  we  ought  to  do,  that  God 
requires  of  us  ;  and  whatever  we  ought  not  to  do,  ikat  God 
proiiibits.  Thf  moral  law,  considered  as  r.  rule  of  conduct,, 
contains  nothing  but  requirements  and  prohibitions.     iVs  these 


86 

are  6;\von  us  by  onr  IMaker,  who  cannot  err,  the  moral  law  is 
an  iiilUllible  rule,  or  guide,  conformably  to  which  we  ought  al- 
wa\s  to  reel  and  live.  This  is  our  teatlier.  'J  his  is  the  rule, 
with  which  we  ought  to  compare  our  hearts  and  our  lives.  If 
our  hearts  and  uur  actions  agree  with  this  rule,  ihey  are  right; 
but  if  they  disagree,  they  are  wi'ong.  If  any  thing  is  waulmg 
in  the  heart,  which  ought  to  be  there,  as  love  to  God,  there  is 
a  defect,  whicli  is  a  transgression  ofthe  law.  And  if  any  thing 
be  luund  in  the  heart,  which  ought  not  to  exist  there,  as  hatred 
to  God,  there  is  an  excess,  which  the  law  prohibits.  1  hen  the 
moral  law  is  an  infallible  rule,  by  which  we  are  to  judge  of  our 
conduct. 

3.  Conscience  compares  our  liearts  and  actions  with  this 
rule,  and  judges  of  tliem  according  to  their  agreement  or  disa- 
greement with  it.  This  comparing  implies  two  things  ;  first 
a  perception  ofthe  rule  ;  2.  A  perception  of  the  things  to  be 
compared  with  it.  Or  in  other  words,  it  implies  a  knowl- 
edge of  each.  We  must  have  a  knowledge  of  those  things  sev- 
erally, which  we  compare  together.  A  knowledge  ofthe  law 
as  a  rule  of  dut}',  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  clear  and  dis- 
tinct perception  of  its  requirements  and  prohibitions.  The 
law  then,  as  a  rule  of  duty,  is  an  object  of  perception.  The 
heart  and  its  actioiis  aie  to  be  compared  with  this  rule.  And 
a  knowledge  of  these,  is  a  perception  of  them.  So  far  as  we 
have  a  distinct  perception  of  the  heait  and  its  exercises,  or  af- 
fections, we  have  a  knowledge  of  them. 

Now,  when  we  clearly  see  what  the  law  requires  and  forbids, 
and  distinctly  perceive  the  objects  to  be  compared  with  the  law, 
then  we  can  compare  the  latter  with  the  former.  V*  hen  the 
comparison  is  made, we  cannot  avoid  perceiving  an  agreement  or 
disagreement.  For  our  hearts  and  their  operations  do  agree  or 
disagree  with  ihe  rule  of  duty.  And  this  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment can  be  known  b}'  perception  only.  And  it  is  the  olfice 
of  conscience  to  judge,  whether  our  hearts  and  actions  arc 
riglit  or  wrong,  good  or  evil.  In  this  case  conscience  judges. 
But  what  is  intended  bv  the  judgment  of  conscience  .''  This 
judgment  is  certainly  an  act  of  the  mind,  and  it  is  that  act  b}' 
which  we  aflirm  or  deny.  By  whi(  h  we  say,  our  characters 
and  conduct  do,  or  do  not,  agree  with  the  rule  of  duty,  and 
thus  ^  pronounce  them  right  or  wrong.  But  this  act  of  con- 
scieiu'e,  which  is  styled  its  jiulgmcnt,  is  nothing  but  a  distinct 
perception  of  the  agreement,  or  disagreement,  of  our  hearts 


SI 

and  lives  with  tht  rule  of  duty.  Suprome  love  to  God  i^  a 
ricrlit,  a  holy  allection  ;  and  supreme  love  to  the  world  is  idol- 
atry, a  sinful  afTtTtioii.  This  is  the  judgaii-nt  of  conscience. 
But  this  judgment  of  consuience  is  no  more,  than  a  clear  per- 
ception^ tliat  supreme  iovc  to  God  is  a  holy  allection,  and  su- 
preme love  to  the  world  is  a  sitifui  aff  ction.  If  any  person 
will  attend  carefully  to  this  judginc:  of  right  and  wrong-,  he  will 
find  he  can  make  nothing'  more  of  it,  than  percL-iving-  right  and 
wrong.  The  terms  right  and  wrong-,  good  and  evil,  holy  and 
siuful,  are  adjectives,  which  denote  the  qualities  of  our  hearts 
and  actions.  Two  or  three  propositions  may  convince  us,  tiiat 
conscience  is  nothing,  but  the  Judgment  we  pass  upon  our 
conduct;  and  this  judgment  is  nothing,  but  a  perception  of  the 
agreement,  or  disagreement  of  a  predicate  witlt  its  subject. 

Solomon  wxs  wise.  1  perceive  the  affirmation  agrees  with 
the  subject.  This  is  judo^ing  the  proposi  i»>n  to  be  true.  Sol- 
omon was  benevolent.  God  is  good.  Nut!)ing  is  affirmed  of 
these  subjects,  but  what  I  perceive  to  be  true.  Tliis  percep- 
tion is  judging  the  proposition  to  be  a  truth.  But  when  we 
perceive,  or  judge,  that  Solomon  was  benevolent,  and  that  God 
is  good,  we  only  see  or  judge,  that  their  characters  are  right 
or  holy.  The  qualities  affirmed  of  tlu-ni  are  right  and  holy, 
conjequentlj'  they  are  woriliy  of  approbation.  Satan  hates 
God.  Here  I  perceive  what  is  affirmed  of  Satan  to  be  true. 
This  is  judging  him  to  be  a  sinful  being.  Then  perceiving  the 
wickedness  of  any  being,  Hx\d  judging  liira  to  be  o-icked,  is  one 
and  the  same  thing.  And  perceiving  the  rigliteousness  of  any 
being,  is  the  same  thing  with  judging  him  to  be  a  good,  a  ho!j 
being.  There  has  ever  been  a  distinction  maintained  between 
natural  and  moral  attributes.  God  is  powerful .  In  this  pro- 
position, power,  a  natural  attribute,  is  ascribed  to  Deity.  God 
is  benevolent.  Here  a  moral  attribute  is  ascribed  to  him. 
Then  we  may  distinguish  propositions  into  two  kinds,  natural 
and  moral.  In  propositions,  where  nothing  but  a  natural  at- 
tribute is  ascribed  to  the  subject,  all  we  have  to  do  is  to  judge, 
whether  the  affirmative  be  true,  or  false.  But  this  determines 
nothing  respecting  the  moral  character  of  the  subject.  When 
I  say,  God  is  powerful,  and  perceive  what  is  affirmed  to  be 
true,  yet  this  does  not  determine  his  moral  character.  A  pow- 
erful being  may  be  either  sinful  or  holy.  But  when  I  say 
God  is  benevolent,  a  perception  of  t'le  truth  of  this  proposition, 
determines  his  moral  character.     Ndlural  propocitions  are  true 


3S 

or  {nhe  ;  but  determine  nothin.f^  resppcting-the  morni  charac- 
ter of  the  subject.  I\Iorpl  propositions  are  true  or  false. 
Tliey  also  deteruine  t!)  ^  iiMral  character,  wh-^ther  it  be  ri.ht 
or  vvronp:,  hol\'  or  sinful.  In  each  of  these  two  kinds  of  prop- 
ositions, it  is  the  business  of  the  mind  to  judjje,  whether  they 
are  true  or  false.  Judging,  we  have  already  seen,  is  nothinof 
but  a  perception  oft!)e  aa^reement  or  disagreement  of  the  pre- 
dicate with  its  subject.  Then  those  acts,  which  are  called  our 
judgments,  and  those  acts,  wiiich  are  termed  conscience,  are 
the  same  kind  of  acts.  For  they  are  nothing  more,  nor  less, 
than  perceptions  of  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  propositions. 
Whereiii  then,  does  conscience  difler  from  judgment,  or  rea- 
son ?  When  we  consider  the  operations  of  conscience,  jud:^- 
inent,  and  reaso'n,  as  acts  of  the  mind,  they  do  not  difler.  But 
the  otjjects  perceived  differ.  Truth  and  fa'sehood  are  the  ob- 
jects of  reason.  Right  and  wrong  are  the  objects  of  con- 
sciciice.  They  also  differ  with  respect  to  the  sensations  they 
produce  in  the  heart.  A  perception  of  truili  affords  pleasure. 
A  perception  of  right  conduet  gives  greater  pleasure.  From 
the  consideration,  that  a  perception  of  right  and  wrong  is  at- 
tended with  a  more  strong  and  lively  sensation  of  heart,  than  a 
perception  of  trutii  and  falsehood,  many,  probably,  have  been 
led  to  believe  that  conscience  is  a  sense;  and  that  itsopi-rations, 
considered  »s  acts  of  the  mind,  are  differcr*  in  their  kind  from 
the  operations  of  reason.  It  is  generally  agreed,  that  the  of- 
fice of  consci  M5ce  is  to  teach  us  what  is  right,  and  what  is 
wrong  ;  what  we  ought  to  do,  and  what  we  ought  not  to  do. 
B3'  what  acts  of  the  mind,  beside  ttiose  called  perceptions,  can 
we  determine  what  is  right,  or  what  is  wrong  in  our  characters 
and  conduct  .''  Can  we  determine  by  our  feelings  or  aflec- 
tions  ?  A  pleasant  or  painfid  sensation  is  a  feeling.  If  a  per- 
son's conduct  pieases  me,  is  it  certaiidy  right  .'*  If  we  make 
our  feelings  the  standard  by  which  to  judge  of  the  characters 
and  conduct  of  moral  agents,  we  shall  find  the  same  character 
and  conduct,  at  tlie  same  time,  both  rigiit  and  v.rong.  For  it 
is  not  u.ifrequent,  tiie  same  character  and  conduct  please  one 
person,  and  disgust  another.  The  divine  character  aflbrds 
pleasure  to  saints,  but  pain  to  sinners.  If  feelings  be  the  cri- 
teria, saints  will  say,  the  character  of  God  is  holy  and  good. 
But  sinners  will  say,  it  is  evil,  and  hateful.  Both  cannot  be 
tr",e.  Our  feelings,  then,  arc  no  correct  standaid  by  which 
we  can  determine  vriiat  is  riglit,  and  what  is  wrong,     (.^an  vvs 


39 

asrertnin  whnl  is  riglit,  tind  what  is  wrong,  by  our  affections  ? 
Love  and  hatred  are  afl't  rtions. 

Is  it  certain,  because  I  love  a  character,  that  that  character  is 
worthy,  holy  and  good  ?  Or  because  1  hate  a  character,  does 
tliat  determine  the  character  to  he  evil,  sinful,  and  featel'id  ? 
G  )a  1  c!)aracter3  are  often  hated,  an  1  evil  characters  arc  often 
lo^ed.  We,  therefore,  can  deterniine  nothiiicr  concerning  the 
gro'ulness,  or  wickedness  of  characters  or  coiiduct,  bf  our  af- 
fections. And  no  one  will  preteiu',  that  by  willing  or  choos- 
ing, we  can  ascertain  w  hat  is  right,  c  ;•  u  ha;,  is  wrong.  Surely 
our  refusing  any  thing  does  not  determine  that  thing  to  be 
evil  ;  nor  does  our  choosing  a  thing  determine  it  to  be  good. 
For  bad  characters  are  often  preferred  to  good.  Sinners  pre- 
fer wicked  character?  to  that  of  Christ.  Perceptions,  feelings, 
alTections  and  volitii>ns,  are  operations  of  the  miiul,  of  which 
we  are  conscious.  We  know  we  liave  them.  And  tho.^e  in- 
clude all  the  operations  of  which  we  have  any  consciousness. 
B  It  neither  feelings,  affections,  nor  volitions  constitute  what 
we  term  conscience.  We  do  not,  by  these,  judge  one  thing  to 
be  right,  and  another  wrong,  as  we  have  already  seen.  It 
then  follows,  that  perceptions  constitute  conscience.  Indeed, 
a  view  of  right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  is  antecedent  to  any 
feeling,  affection,  or  volition,  excited  by  a  conviction  of  right  or 
wrong.  G')od  qualities  can  neither  please,  or  disgust  ;  be 
loved  or  hated  ;  chosen  or  rejected,  until  they  are  perceived, 
or  we  have  a  knowledge  of  them.  When  we  learn  by  the  dic- 
tates of  conscief>ce,  that  the  character  and  conduct  of  a  moral 
agent  are  verv  evil,  then  we  may  feel  a  disgust  and  hate  tiiem. 
And  when  we  are  informed  by  conscience  that  a  cluiracter  is 
holy  and  good,  then  we  may  be  pleased,  and  love  it.  Then 
every  person  must  see,  that  conscience  performs  its  office,  and 
informs  us  what  is  right,  and  what  is  wrong  in  characters,  be- 
fore they  give  us  any  pleasure,  or  p"in,  or  excite  any  lo\e,  or 
hit-ed,  or  preference.  Then  perceptions  must  constitute  cor- 
science.  Because  its  operations  are  antecedent,  in  the  order 
of  nature,  if  not  of  time,  to  all  our  feelings,  affections  and  voli- 
tions ;  and  must  be  distinct  from  thetn. 

Ht;re  it  is  well  to  observe,  that  conscience  resoects  owr  con- 
duct,  and  not  the  conduct  or  characters  of  others.  When  we 
say  we  cannot  in  conscience  do  certain  things,  we  do  not  mean, 
that  otiicrs  cannot  in  conscience  do  them.  For  the  dictate  of 
ih^ir  conscience   may  greatly  dlillr  from  ours,  respecting  the 


same  thinj^.  ^VHicii  we  see  wickedness  in  others  and  condemn 
them,  it  is  not  common  to  say  our  conscience  condemns  them  j 
but  om*  reason.  Thoua^h  in  approving  or  condemning  others, 
tlie  same  operations  of  the  mind  are  implied,  as  in  approving 
or  condemiiinjj:  ourselves  ;  yet  with  relation  to  the  former  wc 
say,  our  reason  condemns  them  ;  but  with  respect  to  the  latter 
it  is  common  to  say,  our  conscience  condemns  us.  This  shows 
that  conscience  and  reason  coiitain  the  same  operations  of  the 
mind.  But  to  these  operations  we  do  not  crivc  the  name  of 
conscience,  oidy  «  hen  our  conduct  is  approved  or  condemned. 
Hence  the  operations  of  the  mind,  or  of  tiie  understanfling,  when 
our  conduct  is  to  be  judged,  approved  or  condemned,  are  call- 
ed oar,  conscience  ;  but  wiien  the  conduct  oC others  is  approv- 
ed, or  disapfiroved  they  are  stiled  reason.  Hence  conscience 
in  judging  of  mora!  conduct  is  restricted  to  our  actions,  and 
does  not  extend  to  the  actions  of  others. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  conscience  is  a  moral  sense.  If  it 
be  a  sense,  what  are  its  operations  I  Do  ue  by  lliis  sense  per- 
ceive the  qnalllies,  which  are  denominated  right  and  wrony, 
good  and  evil  ?  Then  its  operations  are  perfectly  similar  to 
those  of  the  understanding.  ^^\yy  then  is  it  not  precisely  the 
same,  to  say  and  believe  that  the  understanding  perceives  mor- 
al qualities,  as  to  say,  a  moral  sense  perceives  them  ^  If  the 
operations  of  the  understanding,  and  ofthis  moral  sense,  are  tiie 
same  ;  are  nothing  but  perceptions  of  moral  qualities  ;  then 
the  understanding  and  this  moral  sense  do  not  di/ler,  but  arc 
perfectly  similar.  If  by  a  moral  sense,  some  persons  would 
imply  a  faculty  diderent  in  its  nature  from  the  understanding, 
they  use  the  term  without  any  meaning.  If  the  operations  of 
this  moral  sense  are  perceptions,  then  the  moral  sense  and  the 
understanding  are  the  same  farnlty.  The  question  then  returns, 
wliat  are  the  operations  of  this  moral  sei^se  .'*  Are  they  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  and  pain  .'*  Are  tiiey  afleclions  or  volitions  ? 
We  have  already  s^een,  that  by  operation*  of  this  kind,  we  can 
never  ascertain  the  naltire  of  moral  qualities.  If  these  are  the 
operations  of  a  moral  sense,  this  sense  is  wholly  inadequate  to 
the  purposes,  for  which  its  inventors  designed  it.  But  :i<  all 
the  operations  of  the  mind,  of  v.'h;o!i  we  have  any  knowledge, 
arc  included  either  in  tiie  class  of  perceptions,  or  in  the  class  of 
feelings  and  a/Tections,  or  in  tiie  class  of  volitions  ;  and  as  th*» 
two  latter  classes  »lo  not  contain  the  operations  of  this  moral 
sense  ;  it  follows,  that  perceptions  nir«st  be  tl:o  operations  <il' 


41 

this  moral  sense.  Then  this  moral  sense  and  the  understand- 
ing are  the  same  faculty  ;  or  the  word  has  no  meaning  in  our 
language. 

The  word  sense  denotes  feeling.  To  have  a  sense  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  a  feeling  of  them,  are  the  same,  considered  as 
operations  of  the  mind.  A  feeling  is  either  a  pleasant  or  pain- 
ful sensation.  Surely  where  there  is  no  pleasure  or  pain,  there 
is  no  feeling.  So  that  feeling  is  a  pleasant  or  painful  sensa- 
tion. If  a  moral  sense  is  a  feeling,  it  is  either  a  pleasant  or 
painful  sensation.  And  if  such  feelings  judge  what  is  right 
and  wrong,  then  we  shall  pronounce  our  conduct  to  be  right, 
if  it  is  agreeable  ;  and  wrong,  if  disagreeable  to  us.  In  this  way 
we  shall  often  reverse  the  decisions  of  the  divine  law.  This 
is  one  reason  why  men  so  often  err  in  judging  their  moral  con- 
duct ;  they  are  influenced  by  their  feelings  to  approve  what  is 
agreeable  to  them,  and  to  disapprove  what  is  unpleasant.  If, 
then,  by  a  moral  sense  is  meant  a  feehng,  it  is  the  most  unsafe, 
erroneous  standard  of  moral  conduct,  which  can  be  invented. 
For  this  plain  reason,  that  nothing  is  more  commonly  wrong 
in  man,  than  his  feelings. 

If  a  moral  sense  is  not  a  feeling,  which  very  few  will  pretend 
on  a  close  examination,  what  do  the  advocates  for  it  mean  by 
the  terms  .'*  Do  they  mean  by  it  an  intuitive  perception  of 
right  and  wrong  in  moral  conduct  ?  So  that  without  com- 
paring our  conduct  with  any  rule,  we  perceive  intuitively  the 
moral  quahty  of  every  action,  as  we  suppose  is  the  case  with 
God  in  judging  of  moral  conduct  ?  We  suppose  he  sees  intui- 
tively what  is  right  and  wrong.  Now  suppose  he  has  given  to 
men  the  same  faculty,  which  some  call  conscience  ;  some  call 
it  a  moral  sense,  and  many  say  it  is  his  vicegerent  in  men,  teach- 
ing them  intuitively  the  moral  qualities  of  their  acts.  Concern- 
ing this,  I  remark,  1 .  If  it  be  true,  mankind  would  never  err,  or 
difter  in  their  judgment  of  moral  conduct.  But  this  is  not  the 
fact.  The  same  person  has  judged  differently,  concerning  the 
same  conduct  in  himself  at  different  times.  Numerous  facts 
might  be  mentioned  to  verify  this.  How  often  has  the  same 
person  one  day  judged  certain  amusements  to  be  innocent, 
right  and  lawful ;  and  the  next  day  utterly  condemned  them. 
And  mankind  often,  in  fact,  differ  in  their  judgment  of  the  same 
conduct,  one  pronouncing  it  right,  and  the  other  wrong. 
These  are  facts.  And  they  prove  that  men  often  err,  in  their 
judgment  of  moral  conduct  in  themselves  and  others.     This  is 

F 


42 

sufficient  toprove,  that  mankind  have  no  faculty  by  which  they 
can,  in  all  cases,  judge  intuitively  what  is  right  and  wrong. 
There  is  no  such  vicegerent  implanted  in  them.  2.  Judging- 
intuitively  always  respects  self  evident  propositions  j  and  no 
other.  I  am  not  against  granting,  that  some  moral  actions  are 
self-evidently  sinful,and  others  holy.  All  who  admit  there  is  a 
God,  who  ought  to  be  the  supreme  ruler  of  the  universe,  must  see 
rebellion  against  him  is  wrong,&t  obedience  rrght,as  soon  as  they 
hear  the  terms  pronounced.  No  process  of  reasoning  is  neces- 
sary, to  produce  conviction  of  such  moral  truths.  And  with 
respect  to  a  great  part  of  our  moral  conduct,  the  moral  pro- 
perties of  our  actions  are  so  nearly  self  evident,that  a  very  short 
process  of  reasoning  is  sufficient  to  convince.  With  respect 
to  some  parts  of  moral  conduct  a  regular  process  of  reasoning 
is  necessary.  Seeing  that,  in  some  cases,  a  very  brief  process 
is  sufficient,  many  persons  have  embraced  the  notion  of  a  moral 
sense,  or  power  of  judging  in  all  cases  instantly  and  intuitively. 
3.  Whether  we  judge  intuitively  or  not  concerning  moral  con- 
duct, we  ought  to  inquire  what  operations  of  the  mind  are  con- 
cerned or  employed  in  judging.  If  any  proposition,  whether 
natural  or  moral,  is  self  evident,  we  know  it  by  perception. 
We  immediately  perceive  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  natural, 
or  the  right  or  wrong  of  the  moral  proposition.  In  this  case 
we  do  not  judge  by  our  feelings,  but  hy  perceiving  the  fact. 
If  any  moral  propositions  are  not  self  evident,  but  a  shorter  or 
longer  process  of  reasoning  is  necessary  to  come  to  a  final 
judgment  ;  through  the  whole  process  of  reasoning  perfiepftons 
only  are  concerned.  We  perceive  the  action  to  be  judged  ;  the 
intermediate  propositions  by  which  we  at  last  perceive  its 
agreement  or  disagreement  with  the  rule  of  duty.  The  oper- 
ations of  the  mind  employed  in  the  train  or  series  are  percep- 
tions ;  perceptions  of  the  rule  of  duty,  of  the  actions  to  be 
Judged,  and  their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  the  rule. 
Hence,  when  this  moral  sense  is  examined,  we  see,  in  this  last 
sense  of  the  terms,  they  contain  no  other  operations  of  the  mind, 
but  the  perceptions  o^  \he  understanding. 

We  have  now  considered  this  moral  sense  as  Ti  feeling  ;  also 
as  a  faculty  by  which  it  is  said  we  perceive  intuitively  what  is 
wrong  or  right.  We  have  seen  in  the  first  sense  of  the  terms, 
it  cannot  be  true  ;  and  in  the  last  sense,  they  imply  no  opera- 
tions but  perceptions.  And  I  cannot  invent  any  third  sense, 
in  which  tije  terms,  moral  5ense,can  be  used.     And  as  the  terras, 


43 

in  the  sense  in  which  they  are  perhaps  generally  used,  contain 
no  operations  of  the  mind  but  perceptions  j  it  follows  that  a 
moral  sense  has  the  same  meaning  with  the  term  conscience. 
It  is  another  n^ne  denoting  the  same  operations  with  con- 
science, or  signifying  the  same  thing.     Hence  a  moral  sense, 
if  it  mean  any  thing,  is  synonimous  with  conscience  as  I  use  it. 
We  will  now  return  and  give  some  further  attention  to  the 
operations  of  conscience.     When  a  person  has  a  clear  percep- 
tion of  the  excellency  of  God's  character,  he  distinctly  sees 
why  he  ought  to  love  him  supremely.     He  clearly  perceives 
that  supreme  affection  is  due  from  him  to  his  Maker.     A  per- 
ception of  what  is  due  from  him  to  God,  is  the  same  thing  with 
a  dictate  of  conscience.     Conscience  dictates  such  love,  which 
is  perceiving  such  love  is  due  to  God.     He,  also,  at  the  same 
time,  clearly  perceives,  that  hating  God  is  a  sinful  affection. 
Perceiving  this,  and  remonstrating  against  it,  is  the  same  thing. 
When  a  person  hates  God,  perceiving  this  hatred  is  condemn- 
ing, censuring,  and  blaming  himself.     And  perceiving  that  he 
loves  God,  is  justifying,  approving  and  assenting  to  his  wor- 
thiness of  love.     Then  condemning,  censuring,  remonstrating, 
considered  as  acts  of  the  mind,  are  only  perceptions  of  wrong 
affections  and  conduct  in  a  moral  agent. 

Again,  the  law  saith,  thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery  ;  and 
Christ  saith,  if  a  man  lust  after  a  woman  in  his  heart,  he  hath 
in  his  heart  committed  adultery  with  her  already.  Now  when 
I  compare  the  lust  or  desire  with  the  law,  I  clearly  perceive 
lust  is  prohibited,  and  that  our  Lord's  assertion  is  true.  If  a 
person  commits  adultery,  and  perceives  his  sin,  he  condemns, 
censures  and  blames  himself.  Thus  conscience  operates. 
But  blaming,  condemning,  censuring,  and  the  like,  are  acts  of 
the  mind.  And  when  considered  as  acts  of  the  mind  they  are 
only  perceptions  of  a  wrong  heart  and  conduct  in  the  moral 
agent,  who  has  committed  the  sin. 

It  must  now  appear  abundantly  evident,  that  the  operations 
of  conscience  are  perceptions,  and  do  not  differ  in  their  nature 
from  other  perceptions,  which  are  operations  of  the  understand- 
ing. But  the  objects  perceived,  are  different.  Right  and 
wrong,  good  and  evil,  or  moral  qualities,  are  the  objects  of 
those  perceptions  called  conscience.  Now  these  perceptions, 
which  have  moral  qualities  for  tlieir  object,  are  classed  togeth- 
er. And  this  class  of  operations  of  the  understanding  are 
called  conscience. 


44 

As  terms  are  used  to  express  the  views  of  the  mind  in  rela- 
tion to  moral  actions,  of  a  diflerent  meaning  from  those  in 
common  use  with  respect  to  truth  or  falsehood,  it  may  reflect 
further  light  on  the  subject  to  notice  them.  Because  diflerent 
terms  are  used,  many  judge  they  express  diflerent  operations 
of  the  mind,  and  in  this  way  deceive  themselves. 

With  respect  to  conscience,  we  say  it  approves  and  disap- 
proves, accuses  and  condemns.  Reason  we  s^y perceives,  judg- 
es, determines,  and  pronounces  one  proposition  to  be  true  and 
another  false.  As  such  diflerent  terms  are  used,  we  conceive 
they  express  very  diflerent  operations  of  the  mind.  Let  us 
now  examine  the  meaning  of  the  terms. 

When  reason  judges  and  pronounces  one  proposition  true 
and  another  false,  it  is  generally  agreed,  that  this  means  no 
more,  than  perceiving  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  one 
proposition  with  another,  or  of  the  predicate  with  its  subject. 
And  this  perception  is  an  operation  of  the  understanding.  In 
judging  what  is  true  or  false,we  compare  the  subject  predicate 
of  propositions,  and  one  proposition  with  another.  And  per- 
ceiving their  agreement  or  disagreement  is  judging  them  to  be 
true  or  false. 

But  moral  actions  are  compared  with  the  law,  the  rule  of 
right  and  wrong.  Perceiving  the  agreement  of  our  actions 
with  the  rule,  is  approving  them  ;  they  are  judged  to  be  good, 
or  right.  Perceiving  the  disagreement  of  our  actions  with  the 
rule,is  disapproving,  and  condemning  them,  or  judging  them  to 
be  wrong.  It  is  believed  a  person  cannot  aflix  any  other  mean- 
ing to  the  terms  approving,  acquitting,  or  disapproving,  accus- 
ing and  condemning.  These  terms  then,  mean  no  more  than 
■a. perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  actions 
with  the  rule  of  duty.  I  know  there  are  other  operations  con- 
nected with  this  perception,  to  which  attention  will  be  soon 
given. 

We  also  read  oi^pure  conscience.  The  conscience  is  pure, 
when  it  does  not  accuse  and  condemn,  but  acquit  and  justify 
us.  A  pure  conscience  then,  implies  no  more  than  a  clear 
perception  that  our  conduct  is  right.  And  a  defiled  conscience 
is  a  clear  perception  of  actions  as  wrong. — A  conscience  void 
of  oflence  is  the  same  ;  it  does  not  condtmn  ;  it  perceives 
nothing  wrong.  A  good  and  evil  conscience  is  nothing  more 
than  a  perception  of  good  or  evil  in  our  conduct.  And  other 
expressions  of  a   similar  meaning  in    relation  to  conscience 


45 

ought  to  have  the  same  meaning  affixed  to  them.  Of  this 
every  one  may  be  convinced  by  giving  proper  attention  to  two 
things. — 1.  That  all  the  operations  of  the  mind,  which  we  ever 
experience,  are  included  in  three  general  classes — as  percep- 
tions of  objects,  feelings  or  affections,  and  volitions.  Every 
operation  belongs  to  one  or  the  other  of  these  classes.  As 
there  are  three  distinct  clases  of  operations,  it  is  evident  the 
mind  is  composed  of  three  distinct  properties,  or  faculties. 
The  understanding  perceives,  or  sees  ;  the  heart  or  taste /ge/^, 
or  has  affections  ;  the  will  chooses,  or  has  volitions. — And  cer- 
tainly there  is  no  occasion  for  more  faculties,  than  there  are 
distinct  classes  of  operations, operations  different  in  their  nature. 
Hence,  2.  Conscience  is  not  a  faculty.  If  we  consider  it  a 
faculty,  we  must  predicate  of  it  operations  different  from  oth- 
ers m  their  nature.  But  we  must  say  it  perceives.  For  we 
cannot  have  a  knowledge  of  right  and  wrong,  but  by  compar- 
ing our  conduct  with  the  known  rule  of  duty.  This  compar- 
ing certainly  implies  a  perception  of  the  rule,  and  a.  perception 
of  actions  ;  and  when  actions  are  compared  with  the  rule,  then 
there  is  d^ perception  of  their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  it. 
Thus  far  the  operations  of  conscience  are  the  same  with  those 
of  the  understanding.  Then  if  we  say,  that  conscience  also 
feels  ;  has  aflections,  which  are  sinful  or  holy  ;  we  attribute 
to  it  operations  different  in  their  nature  from  perceptions.  In 
this  way  we  make  the  same  faculty  capable  of  operations  dis- 
tinct, and  different  in  their  nature.  But  we  know  a  faculty  is 
a  simple  property,  so  cannot  be  defined.  Now  can  a  simple 
property  have  operations  so  different  in  their  nature  a.?,  percep- 
tions, z.\\d  feelings  or  affections  ?  Can  the  same  simple  pro- 
perty see  and/ee^?  To  suppose  this  is  irrational,  and  unphi- 
losophical.  For  if  its  simple  nature  is  to  perceive,  it  cannot 
feel  ;  and  if  its  simple  nature  is  to  feel,  it  cannot  percejve. 
For  a  simple  property  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  operations 
difl'erent  in  their  nature. 

Now  we  see,  that  conscience  does  perceive  ;  it  therefore  does 
not  feel.  As  it  perceives,  if  we  call  it  k faculty,  it  is  the  same 
with  the  understanding.  But  of  what  use  is  it  to  have  two 
perceiving  faculties?  So  if  we  sa}^  it  is  the  nature  of  con- 
science to  feel,  to  love  and  hate ;  then  it  cannot  perceive. 
And  if  its  nature  is  to  feel,  it  is,  if  ^faculty,  the  same  with  the 
heart  or  taste.  And  of  what  use  is  it  to  attribute  to  the  mind 
two /eeZw^  faculties  .''     These  observations,  I  hope,   are  suffi- 


40 

cieut  to  satisfy  every  one,  that  there  is  no  propriety  in  viewing 
conscience  as  a  distinct  facuhy.  As  it  is  not  a  distinct  faculty  ; 
then  the  terms  approve,disapprove,pure,defiled,&,  those  of  a  sim- 
ilar import,  mean  no  more  than  a  clear  perception  of  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  our  actions  with  the  rule  of  duty.  When 
we  perceive  that  our  actions  agree  with  the  rule,  we  say  con- 
science is  pure,  undefiled,  without  offence  ;  it  approves,  in- 
stead of  accusing  and  condemning  us  as  polluted,  guilty  crea- 
tures. This  approving  is  also  peace  of  conscience.  When 
conscience  accuses  and  condemns,  there  is  no  peace. 

Having  shown  what  conscience  is,  we  shall  now  attend, 
4.  To  the  feelings  it  excites  in  the  heart.  This  is  necessary,  in 
order  to  show,  that  the  operations  of  conscience  and  the  feel- 
ings they  excite  are  operations  of  a  different  kind,  and  ought 
never  to  be  blended.  We  may  now  give  attention  to  a  class  of 
feelings,  which  always  attend  on  the  operations  of  conscience. 
— These  are  feelings,  which  are  either  ^/e«san^  or  painful. 

When  a  person  has  committed  theft,  and  reflects  on  his  con- 
duct, he  clearly  perceives  he  has  transgressed  the  laws  of  God, 
and  of  men.  He  then  sees  he  is  exposed  to  disgrace,  shame, 
and  punishment ;  that  he  may  in  this  world  be  detected,  and 
punished  ;  and  will  certainly  have  his  guilt  exposed  to  the 
view  of  an  assembled  universe  at  the  judgment  day,  and  re- 
ceive the  punishment  his  crime  deserves.  His  conscience 
condemns  him  as  a  transgressor  ;  the  crime,  the  disgrace,  the 
danger  of  punishment,  all  combine  to  wound  him  deeply,  and 
excite  strong  wishes  that  he  had  never  done  the  deed. 

Such  pains  and  desires  are  the  operations  of  the  heart  or  taste. 
And  these  feelings  are  expressed  by  different  terms  ;  such  as 
remorse,  regret,  compunction,  and  stings  of  conscience.  If  he 
is  so  hardened,  that  his  conduct  does  not  give  him  much  pain, 
fcis  conscience  is  said  to  be  deceived,  blinded,  stupified,  seared, 
or  dead.  Such  expressions  are  figurative  ;  they  ascribe  to 
conscience  the  feelings  of  the  heart ;  or  the  feelings  conscience 
produces  in  the  heart  are  predicated  of  conscience  itself.  As 
when  we  say,  reason  loves  the  truth,  and  hates  deception  and 
error  ;  we  do  not  mean,  that  love  and  hatred  are  operations  of 
reason  ;  but  they  are  connected  with  it,  and  produced  by  it  in 
the  heart.  When  reason  discovers  truth,  the  heart  loves  it  ; 
and  hates  error,  when  detected  by  reason.  The  feelings  con- 
nected with  reason,  though  they  belong  to  the  taste,  are  figura- 
tively ascribed  to  reason.— So  the  painful  feelings  excited  in 


47 

the  heart  on  account  of  sin,  are  ever  connected  with  a  perception 
of  wrong  conduct  in  ourselves.  And  because  they  are  connected 
with  the  operations  of  conscience,  they  are  figuratively  attri- 
buted to  conscience. 

Hence,  when  a  person's  conduct  agrees  with  the  law  of  God 
and  he  perceives  it,  pleasant  feelings  are  excited  in  the  heart. 
*rhus  he  has  peace  of  conscience  ;  it  not  only  approves  of  his 
conduct,  but  his  conscience  is  said  to  rejoice^  to  have  joy  in  the 
holy  Ghost. 

Hence,  to  understand  the  operations  of  the  mind  distinctly, 
we  must  attend  to  them  carefully,  and  refer  each  operation  to 
its  proper  faculty.  And  though  operations  follow  each  other, 
and  are  connected  in  a  train  ;  yet  we  ought  not  to  view  all  those 
thus  connected  as  operations  of  the  same  faculty.  But  we 
ought  to  distinguish  them  according  to  their  natures,  and  re- 
fer them  to  the  classes  and  faculties  to  which  they  belong  ;  and 
not  suffer  ourselves  to  be  imposed  upon  by  figures  of  speech. 
When  we  say  reason  delights  in  demonstrating  truth,  and  loves 
the  truth,  and  hates  deception  ;  here  we  ought  to  distinguish 
between  the  operations  of  reason,  and  the  feelings  connected 
with  it.  Reason  itself  is  nothing  but  a  train  of  perceptions, 
which  have  for  their  object  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  proposi- 
tions. But  those  perceptions  are  attended  with  pleasant  feel- 
ings, which  do  not  belong  to  reason,  but  the  heart. 

So  the  proper  operations  of  conscience  are  only  perceptions, 
which  have  for  their  object  a  rule  of  duty,  actions^  and'their 
agreement  or  disagreement  with  the  rule.  These  perceptions 
are  always  follewed  by  pleasant  or  painful  feelings  in  the  heart, 
with  their  attendant  desires.  And  these  feelings,  sometimes 
the  strongest  we  ever  experience,  belong  properly  to  the 
heart,  though  we  often  ascribe  them  figuratively  to  the  con- 
science. In  strict  propriety  of  speech,  therefore,  we  should 
say  conscience  includes  operations  both  of  the  understanding 
and  the  heart.  It  cannot,  however,  be  considered  a  distinct 
faculty. 

Benevolence  is  a  most  amiable  quality.  When  we  perceive, 
or  have  a  knowledge  of  this  quality  In  another,  if  our  hearts 
are  right,  they  are  pleased.  They  delight  in  such  a  charac- 
ter, approve  it,  and  commend  it.  Sucli  feelings  are  excited, 
whenever  we  perceive  amiable  and  virtuous  quaHties  in  any 
moral  agent.  But  those  feelings  constitute  no  part  of  con- 
science ;  for  a  perception  of  those  qualities  is  antecedent  to 
those  feeUngs,  and  is  the  cause  which  produces  them.     And 


48 

those  feelings  are  as  difierent  in  their  nature  from  the  percep- 
tions of  moral  qualities,  as  any  other  operations  whatever  ; 
yet  they  attend  all  the  operations  of  conscience.  But  this  is 
no  evidence  that  they  constitute  any  part  of  conscience.  For 
operations,  totally  difierent  in  their  nature,  may  accompany 
each  other,  and  be  closely  connected  in  point  of  time. 

Vices  are  hateful  qualities.  When  a  person  has  committed 
murder,  and  we  obtain  a  perception  or  knowledge  of  his  crim- 
inality, displeasure  and  indignation  are  immediately  excited. 

These  feelings,  which  accompany  our  knowledge  of  crimes 
committed  by  others,  have  their  seat  in  the  heart.  There  is 
no  similarity  between  them  and  perceptions  of  moral  qualities  ; 
consequently  they  are  not  operations  of  conscience,  but  strong 
feelings,  produced  by  a  perception  of  criminal  conduct  in  oth- 
ers. Thus  distinguishing,  as  we  ought,  between  the  opera- 
tions of  conscience,  and  the  strong  and  lively  feelings  or  affec- 
tions they  produce,  whether  pleasant  or  painful,  sinful  or  holy, 
is  of  great  importance  to  a  correct  notion  of  conscience. 

That  we  may  have  accurate  views  of  conscience,  we  pro- 
ceed to  consider  three  things,  the  objects  of  conscience  ;  its 
operations,  considered  as  acts  of  the  mind ;  and  the  effects 
they  produce.  Right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  are  predicat- 
ed of  our  hearts  and  conduct.  The  heart  is  an  object ;  its 
affections  are  objects  ;  and  our  actions  are  objects.  When 
these  objects  are  viewed  as  subjects,  right  and  wrong,  good 
and  evil,  are  predicated  of  them. 

These  words,  good  and  evil,  denote  the  nature  or  qualities 
of  these  objects.  And  these  qualities  too  are  objects.  For 
the  predicate,  as  well  as  the  subject  of  a  proposition,  is  an  ob- 
ject of  perception.  Then  our  hearts  with  their  operations^ 
and  all  our  actions,  with  their  qualities,  are  the  objects  which 
conscience  regards.  These  objects  constitute  what  we  term 
duty.  The  word  ought  implies  the  idea  of  duty.  We  say, 
we  ought  to  have  a  right  heart,  right  affections,  and  right  ac- 
tions. And  so  far  as  our  hearts,  affections  and  actions  are  right, 
duty  is  performed.  And  our  hearts  and  conduct  ought  not  to 
be  wrong,  evil  or  sinful.  But  if  they  are  wrong,  duty  is  not 
performed,  we  are  transgressors.  As  it  is  the  office  of  con- 
science to  inform  us  of  our  duty,  it  must  inform  us  what  is  right 
and  what  is  wrong.  And  it  is  evident,  we  cannot  ascertain 
what  is  duty,  when  it  is  not  self  evident,  but  by  comparing  our 
hearts  and  conduct  with  self  evident  truths,  or  some  infallible 


49 

rulenf  rifrht  and  wronc^.  By  comparing  our  afftctionsand 
actions  with  a  self  evident  duty,  or  witii  the  moral  law,  we  as- 
certain what  is  duty.  Then  duty,  or  our  hearts  and  conduct 
tvith  their  qualities,  are  the  objects  which  conscience  takes  into 
view.  This  will  clearly  show,  that  tht  operations  of  conscience 
are  perceptions.  For  there  are  no  other  operations  of  the  mind, 
by  which  objects  can  be  seen,  or  known.  We  do  not  learn  the 
nature  of  hearts  and  conduct  by  ftelincs,  or  affections,  or  voli- 
tions. It  is  solely  by  our  perceptions.  A  perception  of  an  object 
fc  its  moral  quality,  is  a  knowledge  of  what  ought,or  ought  not 
to  be.  Then  perceptions  are  the  operations  of  conscience.  These 
perceptions  produce  pleasure  or  pain.  These  sensations  are 
the  effects  of  conscience  on  the  heart  ;  and  they  are  as  differ- 
ent from  perceptions,  as  effects  are  from  their  causes.  For  w6 
have  already  shown,  that  sensations  are  not  the  operations,  but 
the  effects,  of  conscience.  And  they  oucht  to  be  viewed  wholly 
different  in  iheir  nature,  and  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
them. 

Then  our  conrlnsion  is  this :  that  those  perceptions  of  the 
Understanding,  which  have  the  right  or  wrong  of  our  hearts 
and  conduct,  or  in  a  word  our  duty,  for  their  object,  are  class- 
ed together,  and  called  conscience.  Or  conscience  may  be 
thus  defined  :  it  is  the  understanding  itself,  when  it  takes  cog- 
jnizance  of  our  own  motives  and  actions,  compares  them  with 
fce  standard  of  duty,  and  then  acquits  or  condemns. 


•!?«*«**»i-F& 


sssAY  vzr, 

Hecapituluiion. 

The  object  of  this  essay  is  to  recapitulate  the  principal  ideas 
eontained  in  the  preceding  essays,  in  a  brief  manner,  that  the 
reader  may  see  them  in  a  narrow  compass.     And 

1.  The  understanding  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind.  This  facul- 
ty is  a  property  of  the  mind.  Understanding,  heart,  will,  arr 
tvords,  which  express  different  properties  ol  the  nii..d~ 


55 

2.  A  faculty  is  a  prpparedness,  a  fitiipss,  an  a^aptednes«i  f>t' 
the  mind,  to  be  ilit-  Mihject  of  definite  oprralioiis.  The  same 
property  does  not  prepare  the  mind  to  !?ee,  feel,  and  choose. 
Tiiere  is  no  \va>  to  account  for  operations  so  different  in  their 
nature,  but  by  supposing  the  mind  to  bt  possessed  of  different 
properties,  or  fa(  nlties. — Hence  the  different  operations  of  the 
mind  have  led  pinlosophers  to  consider  it  as  having  distinct 
faculties,  or  properties. 

3.  A  faculty  is  as  distinct  from  its  operations  as  a  body  is 
distinct  from  its  m  )tions.  Hence  a  faculty  is  antecedent  to  il6 
operations,  and  the  foundation  of  them. 

4.  The  construction  of  all  langcuages  is  a  direct  proof  of  the 
existence  of  faculties.  All  languages  have  verbs  ;  and  every 
verb  has  a  nominative  case.  The  nominative  case  is  the 
agent ;  and  the  verb  expresses  the  action  of  the  agent.  T  per- 
ceive. It  is  certain  themird  docs  not  perceive  objects  by  the 
same  faculty,  by  wnich  it  feels  ;  nor  by  that,  by  which  it  pre- 
fers one  thing  to  another.  It  is  by  the  understanding  only  that 
the  mind  perceives.  Accordingly  we  say,  the  understanding  is 
a  perceiving  f  iculty.  That  mankind  have,  from  time  immemo- 
rial, considered  the  mind  possessed  of  this  faculty,  is  evident 
from  the  construction  of  all  languages.  Indeed  it  is  a  truth  so 
evident,  the  words  we  use  in  talking  and  writing  prove  we  have 
id^as  of  faculties,  and  believe  in  the  real  existence  of  such  pro- 
perties. It  is  a  self-evident  truth.  If  any  deny  it,  they  must 
be  left  to  themselves.  For  it  is  vain  to  reason  with  persons, 
to  convince  them  of  the  truth  of  self-evident  propositions.- 

5.  The  word  perccptio7i  IS  used  to  signify  all  the  operations 
of  the  understanding.  I  use  this  word  in  this  sense,  because  I 
I\n:>w  of  no  other,  which  will  more  aptly  express  the  operation* 
of  this  faciihy.  Perception  is  an  act  of  the  understanding. 
Tiie  acts  of  the  understanding  may  be,  a;.d  often  are,  called 
ideas,  thoughts,  notions,  and  the  like  ;  but  perception  appears 
to  me  to  be  as  proper  a  name  of  every  act  or  operation  of  this 
faculty,  as  any  that  can  be  used.  And  perception  is  the  namc 
I  give  to  every  operation  of  the  understanding. 

6.  Perceptions,  which  are  operations  of  the  understanding, 
are  very  numerous.  S;inple  apprehension  as  an  act  of  the 
minfl,  or  the  perception  of  an  object.  Conception  is  an  act  of 
the  understanding.  Memory,  reason,  judgment,  and  con- 
science, as  we  have  shown,  are  operationsof  this  faculty.  This 
Ts  true  with  respect  to  imagination  j  which  is  a  perception  of 


61 

9bjec*s  combined  in  surli  a  mnnner  as  to  an'wpr  the  design  of 
the  agent.  Apprehension,  conception,  ji  ilj:;ment,  reason, 
memory,  conscience,  imajrination,  fanc\,  whith  are  words 
abundantly  used  by  philosophers  who  treat  upon  the  intellec- 
tual powers  of  the  mind,  are  names  by  which  the  act«oroper- 
at  o;js  of  the  understanding  are  desipn  ited.  For  h'  under- 
Jtanding  is  the  only  intellectual  faculty  heloni^ing-  to  the  ni'n  1, 
And  when  we  attend  to  the  meaning  of  these  words,  as  appli- 
ed to  acts  of  the  mind,  it  is  obvious  they  cannot  designate  any 
other  operations, than  those  which  I  call  perceptions.  If  persons 
will  take  tlie  trouble  of  aiten.iing  to  the  meaning  of  the  above 
words,  he  will  find  they  diflVr  very  much  from  the  words  feel- 
ings, sensations,  affect  ons,  or  volition>.  They  are,  then,noth-!» 
ing  more  or  less,  than  those  acts  call^^d  perceptions,  thoughts, 
or  ideas.  An  act  of  the  mind  i«  a  simple  operation.  It  canuot  be 
defined.  Seeing,  thinking,  apprehending,  conceiving,  remem- 
bering, reasoning,  judging  and  the  like,  express  acts  of  the 
understanding.  These  acts  are  not  affections,  desires,  or  vo- 
litions. These  acts  are  perceptions.  Seeing  an  object,  con- 
ceiving of  an  object,  remembering  an  object,  and  so  on,  is  per- 
ceiving it.  When  perceptions  are  considered  as  acts  of  the 
mind,  though  called  by  different  names,  yet  they  are  alike.  It 
is  not  possible  to  point  out  any  difference  between  one  percep- 
tion and  another,  considered  as  acts  or  operations  of  the  mind. 
Being  similar,  of  the  same  kind,  they  constitute  one  ffeneral 
class  of  operations.  As  all  creatm'es,  who  have  life,  are  classf  d 
together  and  called  animals,  so  all  those  individual  operations 
of  the  same  kind  are  classed  together,  and  called  perceptions. 
But 

7.  This  general  class  is  subdivided  into  several  distinct  clas- 
ses, to  each  of  which  a  name  is  given.  Tliough  all  the  opera- 
tions of  the  understanding  are  of  the  same  kind,  for  which 
reason  the}' constitute  but  one  cliss  ;  yet  their  objects  differ. 
V^  here  there  is  a  perception,  there  is  something  perceived. 
Tiiis  something,  whether  it  be  a  substance,  a  projjerty,  a  qual- 
ity, a  mode,  or  relation,  is  the  object  of  perception.  And  i!ie 
individual  objects  are  as  numerous  as  the  perceptions.  The 
objects  are  not  of  the  same  kind  ;  they  differ  from  each  other 
in  a  variety  of  respects  and  circumsta,iCL\s.  Those  diilbrcnces 
among  the  objects,  is  the  ground  and  reason  of  dividing  oup 
perceptif>ns  into  several  classes.  Some  objects  have  been  sf^cn^ 
and  are  past ;  when  ueeii  again,  they  are  recoilected.     Theec 


82 

perceptions  constitute  a  class  by  themselves ;  and  this  class  of~ 
perceptions  is  called  memory. 

Truth  and  falsehood  constitute  another  class  of  objects. 
These  are  object-  of  perception.  For  we  know  what  truth  is, 
when  we  perceive  it.  Those  perceptions,  therefore,  which 
have  truth  and  falsehood  for  their  object,  constitute  another 
class,  which  is  known  by  the  name  of  reason  and  judgment. 
Right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  form  another  class  of  ob- 
jects. And  those  perceptions,  which  have  the  right  and  wrong^ 
of  our  own  conduct  for  their  object,  constitute  another  class, 
which  is  called  conscience. 

All  the  operations  of  t!)e  understanding  form  one  general 
class  called  perceptions.  This  general  class  of  operations  is 
divided  into  several  specific  classes.  And  each  specific  class 
has  soine  name  given  it,  by  which  it  is  known  ;  as  simple  per- 
ception, memory,  judgment,  reason  and  conscience.  And  the 
difference  among  the  objects  of  perception,  is  the  reason  why 
our  perceptions  are  formc^d  inio  distinct  classes.  As  those  di- 
visions are  necessary  in  order  to  have  a  clear,  distinct,  and 
systematic  view  of  the  mind,  so  to  facilitate  the  commiuiication 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  mind  to  others,  it  is  necessary  to  give 
those  several  classes  distinct  names. 

This  mode  of  attendnjg  to  the  operation*;  of  the  mind,  ap- 
pears to  me  far  preferable  to  that  generally  adopted  by  meta- 
physicians. They  generally  begin  by  dividing  the  mind  into 
two  faculties,  understanding  and  will ;  and  say,  those  are  the 
only  faculties  belonging  to  it.  Then  they  proceed  to  talk 
about  the  memor}^,  judgment,  reason,  and  conscience ;  and 
frequently  call  each  of  these  a  faculty.  Then  the  reader  is 
confused  ;  he  asks  himself,  does  the  writer  mean,  as  he  first 
said,  that  the  mind  has  but  two  faculties  ;  or  that  it  has  six  or 
seven.''  For  he  calk  judgment,  reason,  memory,  conscience, 
imagination,  and  the  like,  faculties  also.  What  does  he  mean  ? 
Then  when  they  write  concerning  the  operations  of  these  facul- 
ties, are  these  only  one  kind,  or  very  different  kinds  of  opera- 
tions ,''  This  he  cannot  determine  from  their  manner  of  writ- 
ing. Of  course,  he  is  left  in  the  dark  respecting  the  nature  of 
the  operations  of  these  several  faculties,  as  they  are  pleased  to 
call  them. 

And  after  he  has  gone  ihrouglj  a  long  treatise  of  philosophy 
un  the  human  mind,  though  he  has  acquired  many  useful  ideas, 
yet  he  has  obtained  uo  systematic  knowledge  of  the  mind.    The 


5$ 

ideas  he  h<\s  acquired  have  no  proper  arrangement ;  neither- 
dees  he  see  their  connexion  with  first  principles.  Hence  the 
reader  has  acquired  only  an  indistinct  and  confused  notion  of 
the  mind,  and  its  operations.  One  great  object  here  is,  to  give 
the  reader  a  clear,  and  systematic  vie»v  of  the  mind.  Whether 
J  have  done  it,  as  far  as  I  have  proceeded,  he  must  judge. 

I  would  observe  one  thing  more,  and  close  this  essay.  If  any 
one  should  prefer  considering  memory,  reason  and  conscience 
difl'erent  poi^^ers  of  the  understanding,  I  will  not  contend  with 
him.     If  he  says  the  understanding  has  a  power  of  perceiving, 
or  recollecting  past  objects ;  and  a  power  of  perceiving  truth 
and  inferringone  truth  from  another;  and  a  power  of  perceiving 
the  right  and  wrong  of  actions  ;  still  all  the  operations  of  these 
powers  are  perceptions.     And  of  course,  ihese  several  powers 
only  designate  the  several  classcS  into  which  the  operations  of 
the  understanding  are  divided.     One  power  denotes  one  class, 
and  another  power  another  class  of  operations.     Hence,  wheth- 
er we  consider  memory,  for  instance,  as  a  power  of  the  under- 
standing, or  as  the  name  given  to  one  class   of  perceptions  ; 
still  it  is  either  the  perception  of  past  objects,  or  the  power  of 
perceiving  them.     So  we  consider  all  the  operations  of  the  un- 
derstanding as  similar  in  their  nature  ;   and    divisible  into  as 
many  classed,  iluo  more,  as  are  above  enumerated  audspecift* 

,€!d* 


tm******^. 


BSSAIT  VZZX. 

Of  Taste, 

Taste  is  another  faculty  of  the  mind,  distinct  from  the  under- 
standing, and  also  from  the  will.  There  are  several  consider- 
ations, to  which  our  attention  must  be  directed  for  the  elucida- 
tion of  this  subject.  The  reader  who  wishes  to  examine  it 
impartially,  is  requested  to  suspend  his  judgment,  till  he  has 
W3ightd  ilie  considerations  here  presented,  and  seen  the  relation 
»nd  eenutXiOn  of  the  several  parts  with  each  other. 


54 

1.  Tiste,  like  the  understanding:,  is  iindofTnable,  beinj?  <i 
jimple  property.  It  can  be  explained  only  by  using  other  terms 
ol"  nearly  the  same  import.  It  is  that  preparedness,  adapted- 
ness,  or  dispv)sitioii  of  the  mind,  by  which  the  mind  is  aflecied 
Agreeably  or  disagreeably  when  objects  are  presented  to  it. 
"We  know  it  is  a  fact,  th  it  some  objects  please, and  others  disgust 
lis.  It  is  a  fact,  that  we  are  conscious  of  sensations  or  emotions, 
which  are  sometimes  agreeable,  sometimes  painful.  These 
cinottons  belong  to  the  mind.  They  must  have  a  cause. 
Those  things  which  produce  pleasure  or  pain,  v\hether  they  are 
Diaterial  or  immaterial,  are  the  objects  that  aflect  us.  These 
objects  operate,  and  thus  occasion  seisations  or  emotions. 
■Tlieir  operation  necessarily  implies  a  subject.  Taste  is  the 
fiubject  operated  upon,  when  objects  aftbrd  us  either  pleasare 
cr  pain.  The  understanding  is  not  the  subject  on  which  they 
operate  :  for  that  has  perceptions,  but  not  emotions ;  it  is  a 
perceiving,  but  not  a  feeling  faculty'. — To  say  the  mind  is  the 
subject,  is  not  satisfactory.  Whai  is  the  mind  .'*  Is  it  a  simple 
existence  without  prop-rties  .^  An  existence  simple  in  its  na- 
ture cannot  be  tlu'  subject  of  operations  so  elifl'erent  in  their 
kind,  as  perceptions,  pleasant  and  painful  sensations,  and  voli- 
tions. 

How  the  same  simple  nature  can  see,  feel  ?Lnd produce  effectXj 
h  to  us  unaccountable.  Philosophers  have,  therefore,  been 
led  to  view  the  mind,  like  all  other  substances,  as  possessed  of 
dilferent,  distinct  properties,  or  faculties.  Operations  of  ditfer- 
cnt  kinds,  which  we  experience,  have  led  them  generally  to 
make  two  facalties,  called  iinderstandmg  and  will.  The  same 
reason  which  induces  them  to  admit  t'vo  faculties,  will  reqiiire 
them  to  acknowledge  three  ;.  which  we  dcbign  to  make  evident 
in  its  proper  place.  It  will  appear  further  on,  that  we  h^ve  as 
jniich  reason  to  view  the  taste  as  a  faculty,  as  we  have  cither 
ihe  understanding  or  the  will.  And  taste  is  that  faculty  by 
i\'hich  the  mind  is  pleased  or  disgusted  by  the  objects  which 
i\i\c\A  it.  Tiiis  faculty  is  the  subject  on  which  they  operate, 
wlien  we  experience  agreeable  or  painful  sensations  or  emo- 
tions. These  sensations  do  not  belong  to  the  understanding, 
lior  to  the  wiil  ;  as  I  sliull  show  hereafter.  I'aste  is  the  facul- 
ty to  which  all  operations  of  this  kind-  ''jclong.  If  we  had  not 
the  bodily  sense,  which  is  called  taste,  food  would  neither 
j>!ease  or  disgust  us. 

By  a  m-'uta!  taste,  the  mind  is   pleased   or  displeased  wit^? 


55 

t!1  objects  with  wblch  it  is  conversant.  Tliereisa  trreat  simi- 
larity between  iliat  bodily  sense,  called  taste,  and  this  mental 
faculty,  by  means  of  which  all  dhjects  affect  us  in  an  ap-reea* 
ble  or  disagreeable  manrer.  On  account  of  this  similaril}', 
this  mental  faculty  is  called  the  taste.  1  know  of  no  other 
word,  which  will,  according  to  its  common  acceptation,  more 
fully  express  the  nature  -of  this  ficulty.  And  for  this  reason  I 
use  it.  The  word  of  God  calls  this  facuhy,  the  heart.  And 
whenever  I  may  use  the  word  heart  to  signify  a  faculty  of  the 
mind,  I  mean  the  same  thing  by  it,  I  do  by  the  word  taste* 
Can  tlie  mind  perceive  .'*  Then  its  nature  and  construction 
are  sucli,  that  it  is  prepared  for  this  kind  of  operations.  Can  it 
feel,  or  be  the  subject  of  painful  and  pleasant  sensations.^ 
Then  its  nature  is  such,  that  it  is  prepared  to  be  the  subject  of 
this  kind  of  operations.  Do  we  infer,  from  our  perceptions, 
the  faculty  which  is  caPed  the  understanding  ^  Then,  from 
our  feelings,  we  as  safely  infer  the  faculty  we  call  taste, 
©r  the  heart.  And  to  suppose  there  may  be  perceptions  and 
sensations,  without  any  subject  to  which  (hey  belong,  is  ab- 
surd. And  to  suppose  a  subject,  which  has  not  different  pro- 
perties, but  is  simple  in  its  nature,  can  perceive  objects,  and  a!s» 
be  pleased  or  disgusted  with  them,  is  equally  aburd.  The 
different  faculties,  whuh  belong  to  the  mind,  prepare  it  foi* 
operations  of  different  kinds.  This  is  as  evident,  as  it  is  that 
the  different  construction  of  material  bodies  prepares  them  fop 
different  operations. 

2.  The  taste,  or  the  heart,  is  a  feeling  facult}'.  Although 
this  has  been  noticed  already,  yet  it  deserves  a  further  and 
distinct  consideration.  Both  pleasant  and  painful  sensations 
Sire  feelings.  Every  one  knows  what  pain  is,  and  what  plea- 
«ure  is,  by  experience.  Pain  is  a  sensation,  and  pleasure  is  a 
sensation  ;  pain  is  also  a  feeling,  and  pleasure  is  a  feeling. 
Pain  and  pleasure  are  simple  operations,  which  cannot  be  de- 
fined. Yet  all  persons  are  acqu;Mnted  by  experience  with  the 
meaning  of  these  terms.  The  terms  pleasure  and  pain,  sensa- 
tion and  feeling,  when  applied  to  acts  of  the  mind,  are  applied 
to  the  same  class  of  operati(m:t.  When  I  am  pleased  or  dis- 
gusted, I  feel ;  I  have  a  sensation  or  emotion  excited.  And  the 
tMSte  it  the  onl}'  feeling  facuhy,  which  belongs  to  the  mind. 
And  material  objects,  when  perceived  through  the  medium  of 
our  senses  ;  and  all  the  oper.itions  of  .he  mind,  when  they  are 
objects  of  perception  or  reflection,  either  please  or  disgust  us. 
The  heart  is  never  in  a  perfect  state  of  iutlifferencc.     Objects, 


56 

iffhcn  seen,  always  affect  -f,  more  or  less.  Yet  the  feelinp^s  of' 
pleasure  and  pain  excited  by  objects  are  often  so  faint,  so  fee- 
ble, that  ue  do  not  observe  them.  In  this  state  we  say  we  are 
iiiditrerent.  It  is  true  that  we  ma}  be  very  nigh  to  a  state  of 
indifference  ;  yet,  at  the  same  time,  we  liave  some  feehng. 
This  facuhy  is  i:i  the  highest  degree  sensible.  Its  nature  is  so 
lender,  so  hvely,  so  susceptible,  tliat  every  object  we  perceive 
must  affect  it.  And  our  being  in  such  a  slate,  that  we  do  not 
know  we  have  any  feehng,  is  no  certain  evidence  we  do  not 
feel.  It  is  pleasant  to  behold  the  light.  But  ask  a  person, 
whether  the  light  of  the  sun  excites  in  him  an  agreeable  sensa- 
tion ;  and  he  will  often  be  at  a  loss  for  an  answer.  Yet  reason 
informs  him,  if  his  senses  are  not  disordered,  that  it  is  always 
a  source  of  more  or  less  pleasure.  We  seldom  reflect  on  the 
pleasure  we  receive  from  those  objects  which  are  the  most  con- 
stantly in  view  ;  and  for  this  reason  are  apt  to  say,  we  are  in- 
different towards  them.  We  are  apt  to  think  we  are  indifferent 
towards  all  objects,  which  do  not  excite  so  li' ely  sensations  of 
pleasure  or  pain,  as  to  gain  our  particular  attention.  Yet  there 
are  sufficient  reasons  to  conclude,  that  mankind  are  never  in  a 
state  of  perfect  indifference,  or  totally  without  any  feeling.  If 
tiot,  then  all  objects  affect  us  more  or  less. 

Again  ;  all  our  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain,  however  dif- 
ferent the  objects  are  which  excite  them,  are  operations  of  the 
same  faculty.  Many  seem  to  suppose,  that  the  mind  has  a9 
many  feeling  faculties  or  powers,  as  there  are  differences  in  the 
liinds  of  objects  which  affect  us.  But  there  is  no  ground  for 
such  an  hypothesis.  The  reason  why  objects  of  different  kinds 
may  and  do  affect  the  same  faculty,  will  be  attended  to  in  the 
next  essay.  Here  I  shall  attempt  to  show  we  have  but  one 
faculty  which  is  capable  of  feeling.  It  will  be  agreed  by  all, 
that  our  bodily  senses  neiiher  perceive,  or  feel  any  thing.  The 
eye  does  not  see  the  light ;  the  ear  dues  not  hear  sounds  :  but 
the  nnderstandirijcr,  through  the  mediinn  of  the  senses,  perceives 
liuht,  sound,  and  every  other  object  of  sense.  It  is  iriie,  we 
ofien  ascribe  to  our  senses,  those  operations  whicl-  belong  only 
to  the  mind.  We  say  the  eye  sees,  the  ear  hears,  the  palate 
tastes.  But  these  are  figurative  expressions.  Seeing,  hearings 
smelling,  and  the  like,  are  operations  of  the  mind,  not  of  the 
senses.  The  bodily  senses  are  mediums  through  which  the  un- 
derstanding becomes  acquainted  with  external  objects.  They 
are  necessary  mediums,  in  liic  present  state^to  the  perceptiofij. 


57 

Gf  material,  external  objects.  Hence  the  deaf  have  no  percep- 
tion of  sounds  ;  and  the  blind  have  no  perception  of  light,  or 
of  colours.  Does  itfollo\v,because  different  senses  are  neces- 
sary to  a  knowledge  of  external  objects,  that  we  must  have  as 
many  perceiving  mental  faculties  as  there  are  bodily  senses  ? 
Is  it  by  one  faculty  of  the  mind  that  we  perceive  light  and  col- 
ours, by  another  sound,  by  another  odours  ?  This  is  not  pre- 
tended by  any  philosophic  writer,  with  whom  I  am  acquainted. 
Seeing,  hearing,  and  the  like,  are  operations  of  the  same  fac- 
ulty. Through  the  eye,  the  understanding  perceives  light 
and  colours  ;  through  the  ear,  sounds  ;  and  through  the 
other  senses,  all  the  other  objects  of  the  senses. 

In  like  manner,  neither  the  eye,   or  ear,  or  any  other  bodily 
sense,  is  the  subject  of  pleasant,  or  painful    sensations.     It  is 
the  faculty  of  taste,  which  is  pleased  with  light,  with  colours, 
with  sounds,  and  other  objects  of  sense  ;  or  which  is  disgust- 
ed with  them.     The  senses  are  only  mediums,  through  which 
external  objects  excite  agreeable  and  disagreeable  sensations. 
And  to  suppose  we  have  as  many  feeling  faculties,  as  there  are 
different  kinds  of  objects  which  affect  us,is  an  hypothesis  with- 
out evidence  to  support  it,  or  end  to  be  answered  by  it.     Most 
philosophers  treat  of  a  power  of  the  mind,  they  call  taste  ?  the 
objects  of  which   are  beauty,  novelty,   and  grandeur.     These 
objects  produce  agreeable  sensations.     So,  also,  light  and  col- 
ours, melodious  sounds,  honey,  and  a   thousand  other  objects, 
produce  agreeable  sensations.     And  what  is  the  difference  be- 
tween one  agreeable  sensation  and  another,  or  one  painful  sen- 
sation and  another,  when  we  view  them  as  acts  or  operations 
of  the  mind  ?     There  is  evidently  no  difference  in  their  nature. 
One  may  be  more  lively,  strong,  or  greater  in  degree,  than 
another.     Still,   each  operation  of  this  kind  is  a  sensation. 
Though  the  objects  may  be  of  various  and  different  kinds,  yet 
the  pleasure  or  disgust  they  give  us,  considered  as  operations 
of  the  mmd,  are  nothing  but  sensations.     An  excellent  charac- 
ter pleases  us;  a    bad  character   may  discust  us.     Natural 
beauty,  and  moral  beauty,  may  each  afford  us  much  pleasure. 
And  every  operation  of  the  mind,  when  it  is   an  object  of  per- 
ception, or  reflection  as  some  call  it,  will  please  or  offend  us. 
But  as  every  emotion  excited  is  either  a  pleasing  or  painful 
sensation,  they  are  all  operations  of  a  similar  nature. 

And  when  nothing  is  taken  into  view  but  the  sensations  them- 
selves, we  can  discern  no  difference  in  their  natures.     In  der 
H 


58 


sensation,   than   ™"  '"  ,  aiffercncc  among 

It    'y::  »:•.:!?.  ir'aT:c:that'object.  ho«evo,.  me,- 
erhavlthl  same  efl'ect  on  tl,e  mind  ;  they  euher  please  of 

■^X  *;:;  -X,"-  the':bjS'aich  afect  „s    we  lean. 

feeUngs  themselves.  '';*;^''^.7"„/ consideration.     When 

1,^  vfew  them   n  no  other  light,  than  merely  as  operations 
we  can  view  Uicm  m  t  .^  ._^  .^^  ^^^^^^^^  ^  ,,. 

"'  -r  "C^  s  no  St  b^etwej;,  the  essence  of  one  drop 

quid.      •^'>'='X°idered  merely  as  a  liquid.     Yet  liquids 
and  another  «  en  considerea  y  ^^4  ^^.^^^^ 

produce  very  '»  ««^»"  ^^^  ,\  „,      „  erate.     Yet  liquids  have 

duce  we  1-™  '^"J.i^f 'Xd    ensations,  however  diflerent  the 

the  ^a^'^.'iX^dt'  themrov  however  difterent  their  tendencies, 

"''•''  oritl  mo,"  norlS  *an  sensations,  when  viewed  only 
are  nothing  moie  nor  ^^         for  those  numerous 

as  acts  of  the  mmd.     To  accot  it  ,  j^  ;^  „„, 

feelings  f  l'':-;:,:tCe  a    "mber  of  distinct,  individual 

rTrfocult  es"^  FoTthat  faculty,  which  can  be  pleased  or 
teehng  tacu  t  es.     r  o  Effected  in  the  same  manner 

disgus^d  -''• -«  "tlTaXn  silfd,  I  ..-US.,  'o  .-•-  it  evi- 
by  millions.  EJS  '  ';;;^„d  i,,^  l.-^  operations  of  the  same 
dent,  that  all  on  P"=ff  Y'^,  "".  ^,„  .„  hea",.,.  The  manner  in 
faculty,  which  IS  called  *^^,'*;'^  °^  '3\„y  ability  to  des-  , 

''^"''°T„tf:ss"o  tt^tea  qlVhtted^with  th'e  modus  operan-  I 
*"  3    Show  that  taste  is  the  spring  of  action  in  all  moral  agents. 


59 

Ingly  or  disgustfiilly  affected  by  them,  they  would  remain  hi  a 
state  of  rest,  or  inaction.  For,  in  this  case,  they  have  no  in- 
citement to  action  ;  no  motive  to  influence  them  in  the  least  de- 
gree. There  is  no  object,  which  pleases  them,  to  be  sought  ; 
nor  any,  which  disgusts  them,  to  be  avoided.  For  they  are 
totally  destitute  of  any  feelings  ;  nothing  affects  them,  they 
are  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference.  If  they  could  perceive 
the  good  and  evil  qualities  of  objects,  *as  tliey  now  do,  yet 
they  would  have  no  idea  that  they  could  profit  or  harm  them, 
in  any  possible  way.  If  they  are  crushed  under  the  weight 
of  mountains,  they  suffer  no  harm,  because  they  feel  no  pain. 
As  it  is  evident,  if  we  were  as  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain 
as  stones  are,  that  we  should  be  inactive  beings  ;  it  follows, 
that  feelings  give  rise  to  all  the  actions  of  moral  agents.  It 
follows,  that  the  taste  is  the  primnrij principle  of  action  in  them. 
For  this  is  the  only  feeling  faculty  they  possess.  Pleasure 
stimulates  to  action,  to  obtain  the  agreeable  object ;  and  pain 
excites  actions,  to  avoid  disgustful  objects.  And  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  moral  agents  to  experience  daily  pleasure  and  pain, 
and  continue  in  a  state  of  inactivity.  Where  there  is  feeling, 
there  will  be  action.  When  there  is  no  feeling  in  bodies,  they 
are  inert ;  they  never  move,  only  when  acted  upon  by  some 
foreign  agent.  The  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  constitute 
the  only  active  principle,  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  in 
any  beings  in  the  universe.  Hence  the  faculty  of  taste  is  not  an 
inactive,  dormant  principle.  It  is  the  most  operative,  ener- 
getic, active  principle  in  the  universe,  that  has  ever  come  with- 
in our  knowledge.  This  is  the  primary  principle  of  action  in 
God,  and  all  intelligent  creatures.  His  feelings  gave  rise  to 
the  grand  fabric  of  the  universe  ;  they  give  rise  to  all  the 
works  of  providence.  For  vve  are  expressly  informed,  that  all 
things  were  created  for  his  pleasure  ;  that  is  to  gratify  the 
feelings  of  his  heart. — Hence,  then,  in  this  faculty  we  find  the 
primary  spring  of  action.  This  principle  is  always  operating  ; 
hence  tiie  reason  why  moral  agents  are  always  acting. 

4.  Taste  is  a  moral  faculty.  Here  is  the  fountain  of  all 
vice  and  virtue.  Eveiy  moral  agent  is  sinful,  or  holy,  ac- 
cording to  his  character  ;  and  his  character  is  good  or  bad 
according  to  the  nature  ayd  temper  of  his  heart.  If  the  heart 
be  good,  the  fruit  will  be  good  ;  but  if  the  heart  be  evil,  the 
fruit  will  be  of  the  same  nature.  This  truth  is  taught  by  our 
Saviour.     "  The  good  man,  out  of  the  good  treasure  of  the 


60 

heart,  bnng-eth  forth  prood  things  ;  and  the  evil  man,  out  ot  the 
evii  treasure  ol'  his  i)tart,  bnngeth  forth  evil  things."  It  is 
generally  agreed  that  action  is  necessary  to  vice  and  virtue  ; 
that  any  existence,  destitute  of  active  principles,  is  not  an  agent, 
of  course  vice  and  virtue  cannot  be  attributed  to  him.  Nei- 
ther is  he  a  proper  subject  of  praise  and  blame.  But  if  an  ac- 
tive principle  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  being  a  proper  agent, 
and  a  proper  subject  of  praise  and  blame,  then  this  principle 
is  either  vicious  or  virtuous.  All  the  moral  good  and  evil,  be- 
longing to  a  moral  agent,  must  consist  in  the  active  principles 
wliich  govern  him.  Otherwise,  the  power  of  action  is  not  es- 
sential to  vice  and  virtue.  A  ball,  when  in  motion,  is  operat- 
mg  or  acting.  For  in  its  course  it  produces  many  efi'ects  ;  and 
among  others,  puts  an  end  to  a  man's  life.  Yet  we  do  not 
consider  it  a  proper  agent,  or  guilty  of  murder,  or  deserving 
of  blame.  And  why  ?  One  reason  is,  it  has  no  inherent  prin- 
ciple of  action,  and  did  not  put  itself  m  motion.  Hence  we 
attribute  the  evil  it  produced,  to  the  agent  who  put  it  in  motion. 
This  makes  it  evident,  that  in  order  for  any  being  to  be  vi- 
cious or  virtuous,  he  must  be  an  agent  ;  and  to  be  an  agent, 
he  must  possess  an  active  principle ;  and  from  this  principle 
all  the  good  or  evil  he  ever  does  proceeds.  This  active  prin- 
ciple, then,  is  either  a  good  or  evil  fountain,  which  contains  in 
itself  all  the  streams,  whether  sinful  or  holy,  which  flow  from 
it.  This  principle,  therefore,  comprises  all  vice  and  virtue. 
But  we  have  shown,  that  the  heart,  or  faculty  of  taste,  is  the 
primary  principle  of  action  in  moral  agents  ;  and  is,  therefore, 
either  vicious  or  virtuous  ;  or,  in  one  word,  a  moral  faculty. 
But  this  is  a  particular,  to  which  it  is  not  my  design  to  give 
much  attention  in  this  place  ;  as  it  will  come  under  considera- 
tion, v/hcn  1  treat  of  moral  good  and  evil. — The  particulars  to 
which  we  have  attended  in  this  essay  show  us  clearly,  tliat 
there  is  a  wide  difference  between  this  faculty  and  the  under- 
standing. The  understanding  is  2i  perceiving  faculty,  but  is 
never  the  subject  of  sensations.  Itnever/ce/s  any  thing.  The 
faculty  of  taste  is  a  feeling  faculty.  It  never  perceives  any 
object.  Perception  does  not  belong  to  it  ;  but  it  is  very  sus- 
ceptible of  feeling.  It  is  the  subject  of  all  our  pleasures  and 
pains.  The  understanding  is  not  a  ^loral  faculty  ;  because  it 
is  not  the  spring  or  principle  of  action.  But  the  heart  is  a 
moral  faculty.  It  is  active  in  its  nature,  and  the  primary  prin- 
ciple of  action  in  moral  agents.     It  comprises  in  itself  all  vice 


61 

and  virtue.  These  are  evident  and  essential  difierences  be- 
tween the  understanding  and  the  taste  ;  and  show  us  that  they 
are  totally  distinct  faculties,  from  which  operations  of  a  diflVr- 
ent  nature  proceed. 


#*»»*#*>•* 


ZiSSAY  IX. 

Of  Appetites. 

The  appetites  constitute  a  subject  as  difficult  to  understand 
and  explain  as  any  one,  perhaps,  that  appertains  to  the  human 
mind.  A  patient,  and  careful  attention  is  necessary  in  the 
reader,  while  examining  this  intricate  and  important  subject. 
With  it  is  connected  several  interesting  truths.  And  an  un- 
derstanding of  it  is  requisite  to  a  knowledge  of  human  nature. 
For  the  appetites  comprise  every  principle  of  action,  and  con- 
stitute the  faculty  of  taste  of  which  we  have  taken  only  a  gen- 
eral view. 

When  we  attend  to  the  numerous  objects,  which  either  please, 
or  disgust  us,  we  find  great  difierences  among  them.  Light, 
and  colours,  food,  and  drink,  sounds  of  every  lone,  odours  of 
ever}'  species,  solidity,  extension,  and  all  the  objects  of  the 
senses,  are  very  dissimilar.  Though  they  may  have  a  simili- 
tude to  each  other  in  some  respects,  yet  in  many  others  they 
widely  differ.  Truth  and  falsehood,  good  and  evil,  beauty 
and  deformity,  amiable  and  odious  characters,  are  objects, 
which  differ  from  eachother,aud  from  the  objects  of  sense.  Yet 
such  varieties  of  objects  please  or  displease  us.  How  can  we 
account  for  this  .'' 

We  know  the  blind  never  experience  any  sensations  from 
light  and  colours,nor  the  deaf  from  sounds.  ]3y  the  eye  we  can- 
not distinguish  sounds,  nor  by  the  car  light.  From  this,  if 
from  no  other  source,  we  may  safely  infer,  that  the  senses  are 
diftcrently  constructed,  and  suited  to  the  nature  of  the  objects 
from  which  the  mind  derives  difi'erent  sensations.  All  the  sen- 
ses are  necessary  to  the   existence  of  those  internal  feelings. 


62 

which  we  experience.  By  one  sense  only  we  become  acquaint- 
ed with  but  lew  objects.  All  the  five  senses  are  necessary  to 
the  knowledge  we  now  have  of  external  thinp;s,  and  the  sensa- 
tions they  produce  in  our  hearts.  Something  similar  to  our 
bodily  senses  must  belong  to  the  heart,  or  we  can  never  ac- 
count for  the  numerous  sensations  we  experience  from  objects 
dissimilar  in  their  kind  and  nature.  Will  the  same  internal 
sense,  which  is  pleased  with  light,  and  colours,  delight  also 
in  sounds,  both  grave,  acute,  lively,  and  solemn  ?  Will  the 
same  internal  sense  be  pleased  with  both  vice  and  virtue  .''  If 
all  mankind  have  but  one  internal,  feeling  sense,  how  comes  it 
to  pass,  that  objects,  which  please  one,  disgust  another  ?  How 
can  this  phenomenon  in  the  moral  world  be  accounted  for  ? 
It  is  a  known  fact,  that  objects  which  are  agreeable  to  one  per- 
son, displease  another.  This  is  not  owing  to  the  bodily  sen- 
ses. For  these  senses  are  not  the  subjects  of  either  pleasure  or 
pain.  The  heart  is  the  only  subject  of  agreeable  and  painful 
sensations.  The  bodily  senses  are  only  mediums,  through 
which  the  heart  is  aflected. 

God  has  so  constructed  the  heart,  or  the   faculty   of  taste, 
there  is  a  preparedness  or  adaptedness  in  it  to  be  pleased  with 
objects  of  one  kind,  and  a  preparedness  to  be  pleased  with  ob- 
jects of  a   diflerent  kind.     That  objects   very    different   from 
each    other  do  please  us,  is   a  fact.     From  this  fact  we   may 
safely  infer,  the  heart  is  adapted  in  its  nature  to  be  pleased  with 
objects  of  different  kinds,  as  different  as  vice  and  virtue,  sounds 
and  colours.     A  preparedness  to  be  pleased  with  a  definite  class 
of  objects,  is  what  I   mean   by  an   appetite.     One   person   is 
prepared  to  be  pleased  with  virtue.     This  is  an   appetite  for 
virtue.     Another  has  not  this  adaptedness  in  his  heart,  he  has 
not,  therefore,  an   appetite    for  virtue.     This  is    the    reason, 
one  person  is  delighted  with  virtue,  and  another  is  not.     This 
particular  preparedness  of  the  heart  to  be  pleased  with  a  defi- 
nite class  of  objects,  is  the  sense  in  which  I  shall  use  the  word 
appetite.     Using  it    in   this  sense,  I  give  it  a  more  extensive 
meaning,  I  graxit,  tlian  writers  commonly  do.     For  this  reason 
it  is  conceived  necessary  to  be  somewhat  particular, in  explain- 
ing tJie  meaning  ]  afiix  to  the  term.     Attention  to  the   opera- 
tions of  the  heart  leads  us  necessarily  to  view  it  as  endued  with 
such  distinct  fitnesses  to  be  pleased  witlv  objects  of  different 
kinds.     To  this    pnrticular  fitness   I  give  the  name  appetite, 
bixause  1  know  of  no  other  word  in  the  English  language  by 


63 

which  it  can  with  greater  propriety  be  called.  If  any  would 
prefer  the  word  sense,  or  relish,  if  thev  use  them  to  mean  the 
same  thing,  I  have  no  objection.  I  may  sometimes  use  them 
to  avoid  a  frequent  repetition  of  the  same  word.  But  when  I 
do,I  shall  mean  by  them  the  same  thing  the  word  appetite  sig- 
nifies. 

When  I  have  attended  to  an  enumeration  and  illustration  of 
some  of  our  appetites,  I  will  then  attempt  to  show  the  differ- 
ence, between  them  and  the  faculty  of  taste.  Our  appetites 
are  either  natural,  or  acquired.  Some  of  those  with  which  we 
are  born  are  the  following. 

1.  An  appetite  for  food.  When  born,  we  are  prepared  to 
take  more  or  less  satisfaction  in  the  diflerent  kinds  of  food, 
which  are  suited  to  nourish  the  body.  An  appetite  for  food  is 
called  hunger,  and  an  appetite  for  water  is  termed  thirst. 
When  we  analyze  hunger,  we  find  an  uneasy  sensation,  with  a 
desire  for  food,  that  it  may  be  removed,  ever  attends  it.  This 
sensation  and  desire  are  the  operations  of  this  appetite.  The 
appetite,  and  its  operations,  are  distinct  objects  of  considera- 
tion. Care  ought  to  be  taken  never  to  confound  them.  Be- 
tween all  our  appetites  and  their  operations,  this  distinction 
ought  to  be  made.  If  the  taste  was  not  prepared  to  be  pleas- 
ed with  food,  we  might  use  it,  yet  we  should  never  experience 
the  sensation  of  pleasure  in  eating,  nor  a  desii'e  to  enjoy  it. 
An  appetite  is  antecedent  to  all  its  operations,  and  is  the  sub- 
ject of  them.  It  has  a  being,  when  its  operations  are  not  ex- 
perienced. The  heart,  therefore,  is  always  prepared  to  be  the 
subject  of  those  operations,  which  belong  to  the  appetite  of 
hunger.     For  this  preparedness  is  the  appetite  itself. 

This  appetite  is  attended  with  an  uneasy  sensation,  what 
some  would  call  a  hankering,  and  a  desire  for  something  to 
remove  it.  Food  is  the  object,  which  will  remove  the  uneasy 
sensation.  As  soon  as  we  have  learned  this  fact,  then  food  is 
the  particular  object  of  desire.  When  we  eat,  food  not  only 
removes  the  uneasiness,  but  affords  us  pleasure.  This  appe- 
tite, then,is  attended  with  three  distinct  operations ;  uneasiness, 
desire,  and  pleasure. 

This  uneasy  sensation  is  a  feeling  of  the  appetite.  When 
(his  exists,  it  feels,  it  hankers,  it  desires  food,  it  longs  for  it. 
Its  desires  are  strong  or  weak,in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  the 
utieasy  sensation.  This  feeling  will  produce  all  the  actions 
necessary  to  obtain  food.      It  is,  therefore,  an  active  principle. 


64 

an  original  spring  to  those  actions  necessary  to  get  food,  which 
is  the  only  object  that  can  afford  gratification.  In  like  man- 
ner, each  individual  appetite  belonging  to  tlie  heart  is  a  prin- 
ciple of  action.  They  are  the  primary,  self-moving,  exciting 
causes  to  all  the  actions  requisite  to  tlie  attainment  of  those 
objects,  wliich  will  gratify  them.  When  an  appetite  is  gratifi- 
ed, it  ceases  to  operate,  until  uneasiness  begins  again  to  arise. 
The  great  design  of  God,in  implanting  in  the  heart  this  ap- 
petite of  hunger,is  very  obvious.  The  design  of  it  is  the  pres- 
ervation of  life.  Food  is  necessary  to  the  life  of  the  body. 
And  this  appetite  is  the  only  active  principle,  which  will  move 
us  to  get  and  eat  the  food  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  life. 
In  this  view  it  is  an  important  principle,  and  answers  a  most 
valuable  purpose. 

What  has  been  said  respecting  hunger,  is  true  in  relation  to 
thirst.  These  are  distinct  appetites.  For  we  may  be  hun- 
gry, without  thirst;  and  be  thirsty,  without  hunger.  Hence  an 
appetite  for  food  will  not  prompt  us  to  seek  for  water. 
Though  they  are  distinct,  yet  the  same  operations  belong  to 
each  of  them,  and  each  of  them  is  a  principle  of  action.  I 
need,  therefore,  give  no  further  attention  to  the  appetite  of 
thirst. 

2.  The  natural  affections  constitute  a  distinct  appetite. 
These  include  the  parental,  filial,  and  fraternal  affections.  The 
propensity  to  exercise  them  may  be  called  a  particular  and 
distinct  appetite. 

It  is  a  fact,  that  all  parents  have  a  feeling  for  their  offspring, 
which  they  never  experience  towards  the  children  of  other  pa- 
rents. Their  own  children  afford  them  pleasant  sensations. 
From  this  feeling  arise  desires  and  exertions  to  preserve  their 
lives,  their  health,  and  to  provide  for  them,  and  promote  their 
prosperity  and  happiness.  These  are  facts. — And  those  we 
consider  and  call  our  offspring,  include  that  class  of  objects, 
with  which  this  appetite  is  pleased.  This,  like  the  other,  is  a 
feeling  appetite  ;  it  is  an  internal,  active  principle  ;  and  anoth- 
er law  of  our  nature  by  wliich  we  are  daily  governed.  And 
those  possess  it,  who  are  not  as  yet  parents  ;  and  it  will  oper- 
ate as  soon  as  they  have  any  offspring. 

And  the  design  of  God  in  giving  to  men  this  appetite  is  ob- 
vious. It  is  the  principle,  which  will  stimulate  them  to  take 
a  watchful  care  of  their  children  in  infancy,  and  to  do  all  they 
can  to  render  them  useful,  and  respectable  in  this   world. 


65 

Hence  it  is  a  tiecessary,  and  very  useful,  active  principle,  as 
long  as  our  race  is  to  inhabit  the  eai'th. — The  same  general  re- 
marks will  apply  to  the  other  natural  affections. 

3.  The  prospensity  of  the  different  sexes  for  social  inter- 
course is  another  appetite  ;  an  active  principle,  a  law  of  our 
nature,  implanted  in  man  for  the  propagation  and  continuance 
of  the  human  race,  until  time  shall  be  no  more.  What  has 
been  said  coficerning  the  other  appetites,  is  applicable  to  this 
law  of  our  nature. 

4.  Another  appetite  Implanted  In  the  heart  is  generally  call- 
ed pity-  V/e  find  it  is  a  fact,  which  all  experience  more  or  less, 
that  when  we  see  any  of  our  fellow  mortals  in  a  state  of  pain 
and  distress,  and  Unable  to  heJp  themselves,  an  uneasy  sensation 
is  excited.  Their  distress,  misery,  and  helpless  condition,  ex- 
cite in  us  a  painful  sensation.  We  find  the  ready  way  to  re- 
move the  pain  we  feel,  is  to  afford  them  help  and  relief  De- 
sires arise  at  once  to  aflbrd  them  assistance,  and  exertions  are 
made  for  this  purpose.  And  as  soon  as  they  are  relieved,  and 
freed  from  the  miseries  they  suffered,  the  pain  we  felt  is  remov- 
ed. Ther  Ave  have  no  more  feeling  for  them,  than  for  others, 
who  need  not  our  help. 

The  object  of  this  appetite  Is  the  distress  and  misery  of  man- 
kind. Experience  teaches,  tliat  it  is  a  very  active  principle, 
and  a  law  of  our  nature,  like  other  appetites.  And  the  design 
of  God  In  giving  it,  is  evident ;  to  stimulate  us  to  afford  help  to 
the  helpless.  Were  it  not  for  this,  man}'  would  die  in  extreme 
miser V,  who  now  are  preserved  alive. 

5.  An  appetite  to  be  pleased  with  novelty  Is  Implanted  in  us. 
Mankind  are  much  pleased  with  new  things  ;  with  new  discove- 
ries and  improvements  in  the  arts  and  sciences.  This  disposi- 
tion to  be  pleased  with  objects  which  are  new  to  us,  is  an  active 
principle  in  us,  exciting  us  to  every  exertion  of  mind  and  body 
necessary  to  make  new  discoveries.  This  is  the  principle, 
which  stimulates  mankind  to  exertion  to  improve  the  mind,  to 
acquire  knowledge,  and  make  advances  In  the  fields  of  art  and 
science.  Deprive  men  of  this  stimulus,  they  would  sink  down 
into  a  state  of  ignorance,  and  mental  darkness,  and  remain  con- 
tented in  it.  So  far  as  a  mind  imjirovos,  new  objects  are  dis- 
covered. These  new  discoveries  are  one  source  ofoui*  enter- 
tainment and  happiness  in  this  world.   . 

6.  Another  appetite  with  which  Adam  was  created  is  termed 

I 


6<^ 

henevQlent.  The  character  of  God,  the  happiness  of  intelti-' 
geiU  beings,  divine  truths  and  doctrines,  hohness,  the  law  and 
service  of  God,  are  the  class  of  objects  with  wliich  this  appetite 
is  pleased.  This  is  lost  by  our  apostacy  from  God.  Hence 
the  reason  why  men  in  a  natural  state  are  not  pleased  with  this 
class  of  objects. 

If  all  men  had  this  appetite,  perfect  both  m  kind  and  degree^ 
so  as  to  be  always  under  its  influence  ;  then  all  the  other  appe- 
tites mentioned  would  be  innocent,  and  would  require  indul- 
gence only  in  agreement  with  the  divine  commands.  Br.t  it 
was  the  pleasure  of  our  Maker  that  the  others  should  remain, 
even  after  this  v/as  lost ;  for  the  preservation  of  our  race,  and 
for  our  sustenance  and  comfort.  In  all  those  persons  who  are 
born  again,  to  whom  the  love  of  holiness  is  restored,  the  other 
appetites  are  again  brought  into  subjection  ;  though  they  have 
awarfare  while  they  remain  on  earth.  In  heaven,  the  use  of 
their  animal  appetites  having  ceased,  the  appetites  themselves 
wll  cease  also.  Their  benevolence  will  be  perfect,  and  will 
forever  be  their  only  active  principle,  as  it  is  in  Jehovah.  God  is 
love  ;  and  all  his  ransomed  will  become  like  him. 

Whether  these  are  all  the  appetites  implanted  in  us  by  ouj- 
Maker,  or  not,  I  will  not  affirm.  These  appear  to  be  the  prin- 
cipal, if  not  the  Avhole. — There  are  some  appetites  which  are 
acquired,  commonly  called  habits  ;  as  the  love  of  labour,  intem- 
perance, and  the  like  ;  but  as  those  are  not  natural,  I  shall  give 
no  further  attention  to  them. 

All  the  appetites,  which  have  been  enumerated,  may  by  use 
and  cultivation,  be  increased  ;  they  may  also  in  certain  ways 
be  diminished.  For  instance  the  appetite  for  novelty,  by  use 
and  cultivation,  may  be  increased,  and  become  more  vigorous  ; 
and  it  may  be  almost  eradicated  by  certain  indulgences  ;  and 
it  may  prompt  men  more  to  one  kind  of  discoveries,  than  anoth- 
er. And  here  we  might  go  into  a  discussion  of  numerous 
things,  which  would  in  many  ways  reflect  more  light  on  this 
subject.  Still,  however  strong  a  propensity  may  be  felt  to 
explore  a  field  so  widely  extended,  it  must  be  restrained  and 
denied.  Because  the  design  of  these  essays  is  only  to  give  a 
general  view  of  the  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind,  with- 
out following  any  one  main  branch  in  its  various  ramifications 
to  their  extremities.  The  general  view  proposed  will  occupy 
sufficient  time  ;  and  present  a  clearer  description  of  humaa 


67 

powers  and  exertions,  than  would  be  obtained  by  attending  to 
almost  innumerable  particulars. 

II.  I  shall  now  adduce  joroo/ of  the  theory  advanced. 

1.  It  is  a  fact,  that  appetites  maybe  lost  and  restored,  with- 
out aflecting,  in  the  least,  those  which  remain.  This  proves  that 

the  appetites  are  distinct  from  each  other,  like  the  bodily  senses. 
For  instance  :  Adam  was  created  with  a  benevolent  appetite 
or  relish.  This  prepared  him  to  delight  in  that  class  of  objects 
called  holy  and  divine.  The  character  of  God,  of  Christ,  of 
saints  and  angels  ;  the  holy  law  of  God,  his  service,  the  doc- 
trines of  the  gospel  ;  these  objects  form  one  class,  which  afford 
delight  and  satisfaction  to  a  benevolent  relish.  They  are  not 
a  source  of  pleasure  to  any  other  appetite  of  the  heart.  Adam 
lost  this  appetite  at  the  fall ;  and  his  posterity  are  born  without 
it.  This  is  the  reason  why  this  class  of  objects  are  not  relish- 
ed or  loved  by  men. 

Still,  the  loss  of  it  did  not  affect,  impair,  or  destroy  the  other 
appetites  with  which  Adam  was  created,  and  with  which  his  pos- 
terity are  born.  In  regeneration,  this  is  again  restored  ;  yet 
this  does  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  other  appetites  ;  any  more 
than  giving  eyes  to  the  blind  alters  the  nature  of  the  other  bod- 
ily senses. 

Again  ;  our  offspring  affords  pleasure  and  gratification,  to 
the  appetite  known  by  the  name  of  parental  affection.  This 
may  be  lost.  The  word  of  God  informs  us,  there  are  some  pa- 
rents without  natural  affection  ;  and  there  are  some,  who  in 
fact  appear  to  be  wholly  destitute  of  it.  Yet  when  this  is  lost, 
all  the  appetites  and  their  operations  remain  the  same. 

As  persons  may  be,  and  in  fact  have  been,  deprived  of  one 
and  another  appetite,  vv^ithout  affecting  or  altering  the  nature 
and  operations  of  those  which  remain  ;  we  have  sufficient  evi- 
dence that  they  are  as  distinct  from  each  other,  as  our  bodily 
senses  are.  Were  not  this  the  fact,  the  loss  of  one  would  des- 
troy the  others. 

2.  It  is  evident  that  different  and  distinct  appetites  belong  to> 
the  heart,  from  this  consideration  :  that  if  this  were  not  a  fact, 
the  loss  of  an  appetite  would  be  the  destruction  or  annihilation 
of  the  faculty  of  taste. 

To  illustrate  this  truth,  it  may  be  observed  :  Solidity  is  an 
essential  property  of  matter  ;  and  so  connected  with  other  pro- 
perties, that  deprive  matter  of  this  property,  extension,  form, 
and  impenetrability  are  destroyed  ;    in  a  word  matter  is  an- 


68 

niliilaied.  Aho  feeling  \s  essential  to  every  bodily  sense.  And 
if  the  senses  were  not  so  distinct  and  difterent,  that  the  loss  of 
one  sense  would  not  aiiect  the  others  ;  depriving  a  person  of 
one  sense  would  desti'oy  all  bodily  feeling  ;  the  body  would 
have  no  more  feeViaa,  than  lifeless  matter  has. 

To  apply  these  remarks  ;  we  are  to  remember  the  heart  is 
Si  feeling  facnlt}',  the  subject  of  pleasant  and  painful  sensations. 
And  if  the  appetites  were  not  so  diiTerent  and  distinct,  that  the 
loss  of  one  would  not  impair  another,  the  loss  of  one  would  an- 
nihilate all  feeling  in  us ;  we  should  not  be  the  subjects  of  plea- 
sure and  pain,  any  more  than  dead  matter  is. 

Observe  further  ;  animal  i?  a  generic  term;  it  includes  all 
beings  which  have  life  and  a  principle  of  action,  or  loco-motion. 
Life  and  motion  are  common  to  all  t^e  individuals  belonging 
to  each  species.  Now,  if  the  several  species  were  not  so  differ- 
ent and  distinct,  that  destroying  one  species  would  not  be  des- 
troying another  ;  the  annihilation  of  one  species  would  anni- 
hilate every  other,  or  destroy  the  genus.  But  the  fact  is,  by 
the  loss  of  an  appetite  we  sustain  no  injury,  only  this  ;  that  the 
class  of  objects,  which  had  been  a  source  of  pleasure,  no  longer 
delight  Its.  As  when  a  person  loses  his  sight,  light  and  colour's 
are  no  more  objects  of  pleasure  ;  but  his  hearing  aixl  other  sen- 
ses remain  the  same. 

One  appetite  prepares  us  to  be  pleased  with  one  particular 
class  of  objects  ;  as  benevolence,  for  instance,  prepares  us  to  be 
delighted  with  that  class  of  objects  called  rlimne  ;  hunger  is  an 
appetite  which  prepares  us  to  be  pleased  with /oorf  ;  parental 
affection  is  an  appetite,  which  prepares  us  to  be  gratified  with 
our  offspring  ;  an  appetite  for  novelty  prepares  us  to  be  de- 
lighted with  new  discoveries  ;  and  so  with  respect  to  each  of 
our  appetites.  Accordingly,  divide  all  the  objects,  which  have 
ever  pleased  or  disgusted  mankind,  into  distinct  classes  ;  we 
shall  then  find  that  mankind  have  impla)ited  in  them  distiiKt 
appetites,  which  prepare  them  to  be  affected  pleasantly  or  pain- 
fully with  all  objects,  which  ever  come  within  the  range  of 
their  perceptions  or  knowledge.  And  these  apj)etites,  con- 
jointly viewed,  constitute  the  faculty  termed  taste  or  the  heart. 

3.  As  further  proof  of  this  theory  it  may  be  observed,  it  is 
the  only  theory  which  agrees  with  the  word  of  God. 

God  is  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  human  mind,  with  its 
faculties  and  operations.  For  he  is  the  Creator  of  the  soul. 
And  though  it  is  not  his  design  in  his  word  to  give  us  a  thco- 


69 

retic  oescriptlon  of  it ;  yet  he  has  not  revealed  any  thivig-, 
which  does  not  perfectly  agree  with  its  real  and  true  theory . 
Hence,  when  any  sentiment  is  advanced  concerning  the  mind, 
which  does  not  agree  with  what  the  bible  teaches,  it  ought  to 
be  rejected  as  false. — This  is  the  case  with  the  greater  part  of 
all  the  theories,  which  have  been  hitherto  published.  They 
contain  sentiments,  which  can  never  be  reconciled  with  bible 
doctrines  ;  and  especially  the  sentiments  advanced  concerning 
the  heart,  or  will,  or  active  powers,  as  they  are  commonly  call- 
ed, are  most  at  variance  generally  with  the  word  of  God,  and 
for  this  reason  should  be  rejected. 

According  to  what  God  teaches  in  his  word,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  fact,  that  appetites  may  be  lost,  and  restored,  with- 
out any  infringement  of  moral  agency.  If  the  loss  of  any  appe- 
tite would  desti'oy  our  agency  and  accountability,  it  would  be 
the  loss  of  a  benevolent  appetite.  For  the  loss  of  this  affects 
us  more  than  the  loss  of  any  other  could  do.  Yet  God 
informs  us  that  Adam  lost  it ;  all  his  posterity  are  born  desti- 
tute of  it  ;  and  when  any  person  is  born  again,  this  appetite  is 
created  in  him.  Still,  under  these  changes  we  are  the  same 
moral  accountable  agents,  and  are  so  treated  by  our  Maker. — 
The  theory,  then,  advanced  in  these  sheets  agrees  with  the 
word  of  God.  And  it  is  the  only  theory,  it  is  believed,  which 
can  be  made  to  agree  with  it. 

According  to  the  theory,  man  at  the  fall  did  not  sustain  the 
loss  o(  wny  faculty  ;  and  when  born  again,  no  new  faculty  is 
created.  Nothing,  but  an  appetite,  is  lost  and  restored. — But 
according  to  the  theories  generally  advanced,  the  mind  has  but 
two  faculties,  the  understanding  and  the  will ;  and  the  latter  is 
simple  in  its  nature,  without  any  appetite  belonging  to  it.  It 
is  considered  as  simple  as  volition  itself.  Hence  those  who  say 
the  will  and  its  operations  are  distinct,  to  be  consistent,  must 
say  that  Adam  at  the  fall  lost  the  faculty  called  the  will  ;  and 
that  when  a  man  is  born  again,  that  faculty  is  again  created. 
For  that  which  is  simple  in  its  nature,  if  any  part  of  it  is  des- 
troyed, is  wholly  destroyed.  And  if  the  will  is  nothing  but  a 
succession  of  volitions,  as  some  say  ;  then  if  holiness  is  lost, 
and  total  depravity  ensue,  Adam  after  the  fall  had  a  will  en- 
tirely different  in  its  nature  from  the  will  he  had  in  a  state  of 
iimocence.  But  not  to  dwell  on  this  here,  the  view  which 
has  been  given  of  the  faculty  of  taste  agrees  with  the  word  of 
G  od,  with  facts,  and  with  the  daily  experience  of  mankind. — 


70 

Fjr  they  find  they  have  such  appetites  as  have  been  described. 
iMl  know  they  have  hunger,  and  thirst,  natural  affection,  a 
relish  for  novelty,  and  all  the  other  appetites  named. 

The  understanding  perceives,  but  never  feels  ;  the  heart  feels, 
but  ne\cr  perceives  any  thing.  Seeing  objects,  and  the  feelings 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  are  very  different  operations.  These 
appetites  are  active  principles,  and  the  laws  of  our  nature  by 
which  all  men  are  governed.  Go  through  the  world,  and  you 
will  find  every  person  actively  employed,  in  pursuit  of  the  ob- 
jects which  are  most  agreeable  to  his  appetites ;  and  there  is 
no  way  to  produce  a  change  in  the  conduct  of  mankind,  but  by 
effecting  an  alteration  in  those  active  principles.  Hence, 
though  the  motives  to  live  a  holy  life  far  outweigh  the  motives 
to  idolise  the  world  ;  yet  no  person  will  lead  a  holy  life  until 
a  new  and  benevolent  appetite  is  created  in  him.  And  though 
mankind  can  never  alter  the  nature  of  their  appetites  ;  yet  they 
may  be  improved  and  corrected,  by  education  and  proper  cul- 
tivation. The  more  the  taste  for  beauty,  novelty  and  gran- 
deur, is  improved  in  correctness  and  delicacy,  so  much  the  more 
all  the  appetites  are  refined  from  those  vulgar,  immoral,  and 
degrading  acts,  and  keep  men  within  the  limits  of  decency  and 
propriety.  Here,  did  it  comport  with  my  design,  much  might 
be  said  on  the  subject  of  cultivating,  restraining,  and  improving 
the  taste  and  its  appetites  ;  in  order  to  adorn  a  character  as  far 
as  it  can  be  without  the  ornaments  of  grace.  But  this  pertains 
rather  to  rhetoric  than  metaphysics. 

It  is  much  more  important  to  form  correct  views  of  this  fac- 
ulty, than  of  any  other  belonging  to  the  mind,  because  this 
governs,  in  many  respects,  the  understanding  and  will,  and  puts 
all  the  wheels  of  active  life  in  motion  ;  it  is  the  primary  cause 
of  all  the  happiness  and  misery,  of  which  men  are  the  authors  ; 
and  when  viewed  in  the  deity,  it  is  the  first,  efficient  cause, 
which  has  given  being  to  every  thing  which  exists  through  the 
universe.  It  is  also  the  fountain  of  all  moral  good  and  evil ; 
and  the  endless  felicity  or  misery  of  intelligent  creatures  de- 
pends on  its  nature.  Hence  too  much  attention  cannot  be 
given  to  it.  Thus  far  we  have  only  attended  to  the  taste  as  a 
faculty  of  the  mind,  to  give  a  general  view  of  its  nature ;  as 
the  only  faculty  capable  of  pleasant  and  painful  sensations  ; 
the  only  active  and  moral  principle  in  man,  with  a  general  des- 
cription of  its  appetites  or  propensities.     I  have  said  nothing 


71 

concerning  its  operations.      This  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next 
essay. 


HimiHHHUHIH 

ESSAY  X. 

Of  the  Operations  of  Taste. 

Having  given  a  general  description  of  the  taste  as  a  faculty, 
with  the  several  appetites  which  belong  to  it  ;  its  operations 
now  claim  our  attention.  The  method  proposed  is  to  explain 
and  give  a  distinct  view  of  them  j  and  then  divide  them  into 
their  several  cla.ses. 

I.  Explain  the  operations  of  this  faculty. 

The  affections  axid  passions  comprise  all  the  operations  of  this 
faculty.  The  affections  and  passions  do  not  differ  in  their  na- 
ture. The  real  difference  is  circumstantial.  When  any  emo- 
tion is  suddenly  excited,  and  is  strong  and  vivid,  and  is  soort 
moderated,  it  is  called  ctpassioA.  And  those  sensations,  which 
gradually  increase,  which  continue  and  abide,  are  termed  affec- 
tions.  For  example  ;  anger  is  commonly  called  a  passion^ 
This  is  suddenly  excited,  operates  with  greater  or  less  violence 
and  soon  subsides.  If  it  continues  a  long  time,  it  is  then  geu- 
erally  designated  by  another  name. 

Love  is  generally  viewed  as  an  affection.  This  emotion  be- 
gins, and  increases  gradually.  It  seldom  becomes  very  viofent 
or  strong  ;  and  is  commonly  lasting.  But  if  it  is  ever  sud- 
denly excited,  and  is  very  strong  and  violent  in  its  operation, 
it  is  then  considered  a  passion  ;  and  is  very  apt,  after  a  short 
time,  to  subside,  or  cool  down  into  a  moderate  flame.  A  simi- 
lar difference  between  other  emotions  would  be  evideit  on  a 
particular  examination.  A  sudden  excitement ;  streigth  or 
violence  of  operation  ;  and  short  continuance  ;  and  sidden  a- 
batement  of  an  emotion,  are  the  particular  circumstances  at- 
tending a  passion.  And  this  difference  between  somt  emotions 
of  taste  and  others,  is  distinguished  by  the  words,  afection  and 
passion.     As  the  nature  of  each  i«  the  same,  it  is  uot  very  im- 


•TJ" 


^. 


72 

ortant  to  sj^end  much  time  on  these  particular  diilercnceS* 

c  may  now   proceed  to  an  analysis  of  tlie  aflbctions. 

Love  is  an  affection.  It  implies  two  distinct  operations. 
The  first  is  a  pleasant  sensation,  and  then  a  desire  for  the  en- 
joyment of  the  object,  or  for  its  prosperity  and  happiness,  if 
capable  of  it.  This  every  person  knows  by  experience.  Se- 
lect any  object  y  ou  love,  and  then  attend  to  your  own  feelings  ; 
and  you  will  say,,  there  is  something  in  it  pleasing  and  agreea- 
ble, and  you  feel  a  desire  to  possess  and  enjoy  it.  This  desire 
will  be  fervent,  oi'  faiat,  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  pleasure 
it  affords. 

Hatred,  the  opp  osite  of  love,  is  an  affection.  Here  the  sen- 
sation excited  is  pvinfal.  The  object  is  unpleasant  and  disa- 
greeable. The  feeling  is  often  expressed,  by  saying  of  the  ob- 
ject it  is  deformed,  and  odious.  Then  arises  a  desire  to  shun 
the  object,  to  have  i.t  removed  from  your  sight.  The  only  dif- 
ference, therefore,  between  love  and  hatred  as  operations  of 
taste  is,  the  sensation  implied  in  the  former  i?  pleasant,  in  the 
latter  it  is  painful  ;  in  the  former  the  desire  is  to  enjoy  the  ob- 
ject ;  in  the  latter  to  a\'oid  it.  These  definitions  include  all  our 
affections  and  passions.  The  operations  they  imply  are  either 
pleasant  sensations,  with  a  desire  to  enjoy  the  object,  and  oth- 
er desires  friendly  to  it  ;  or  painful  uneasy  sensations,  with  a 
desire  to  shun  the  object,  that  the  pain  it  occasions  may  be  re- 
moved. So  sensation  and  desire  belong  to  every  affection.  On 
particular  examination,  every  one  will  find  that  anger,  en\y, 
revenge,  joy,  delight,  sorrow,  grief,  or  any  other  affection, 
€ontains  nothing  more  or  less  than  pleasant  or  painful  sensa- 
tions, with  correspondent  desires.  It  is,  then,  an  object  of  m- 
qitiry,  why  all  the  operations  called  affections  are  not  designa- 
ted by  the  same  name.  Why  are  not  all  the  affections,  hi 
which  the  sensations  are  pleasant,  termed  love  ;  and  those 
■whete  the  sensations  are  painful,  hatred  .''  If  sensations  and 
ilesii-cs  are  the  ingredients  in  every  affection  and  passion,  why 
^o  we  call  them  by  so  many  different  names  ;  as  hatred,  anger, 
envy,  iove,  joy  and  delight  ? 

The  reasons  are  two.  One  is,  to  distinguish  the  difference 
in  tbd^  ohjects  of  the  affections.  The  other  is,  to  mark  the  dif- 
ferent circumstances  attending  them.  This  will  be  best  explain- 
ed by  examples. 

Envy  a»id  revenge,  whether  called  affections  or  passions,  are 
tineasy,  pai  nful  sensations  with  their  attendent  desires.     The 


7.1 

»bject  of  envy  is  superiority  m  a  rival.  The  object  of  revenge 
is  recompense  for  some  injury  received.  Their  operation  is- 
different.  The  design  of  one  is  to  retaliate,  and  of  the  other 
to  deprive  a  person  of  his  superior  merit.  To  mark  such  dif- 
ferences, one  is  called  revenge,  and  the  other  envy.  Then  if 
we  understand  their  meaning,  we  see  the  difierence  between 
them. 

Take  anger  and  revenge  for  another  example.  Anger  is  a 
painful  sensation,  with  a  desire  to  injure  its  object.  And  re- 
venge is  the  same.  The  painful  sensations  of  each  are  excit- 
ed by  some  injury  ;  and  the  desire  of  each  is  to  retaliate,  or 
repay  the  injury.  The  difference  between  them  is  this  ;  anger 
is  an  emotion  suddenly  excited,  operates  openly  and  violently, 
and  is  soon  spent  and  subsides.  Revenge  continues,  perhaps 
for  months  and  years,  operates  more  slowly  and  privately,  and 
cannot  be  satisfied,  until  the  injury  is  repaid.  When  sudden 
anger  becomes  rooted,  abiding,  and  inveterate,  it  is  then  called 
malice  or  revenge.  As  there  are  these  diflerences  between  them, 
they  are  designated  by  different  names. 

So  when  we  hear  a  person  is  very  angry,  we  expect  he  will 
soon  become  cool  and  calm.  When  we  are  informed  a  persort 
is  full  of  revenge  towards  another,  we  expect  it  will  continue 
until  retaliation  is  effected.  Anger  is  like  a  violent  storm, 
which  is  soon  over ;  revenge  like  a  slow,  but  sure  poison,  which 
sooner  or  later  destroys  life. 

Love  and  hatred  are  sensations,  with  their  attendant  desires. 
In  one  the  sensation  is  pleasant ;  in  the  other,  painful.  The 
desire  of  one  is  the  good  of  the  object ;  the  aim  of  the  other  is 
to  injure  it.  In  such  respects  they  difier  ;  and  to  mark  the  dif- 
ference, one  is  called  love,  the  other  hatred.  Yet,  viewed 
as  operations  of  the  heart,  love  is  a  sensation  and  desire  ;  and 
hatred  is  the  same. 

Pride  is  a  pleasant  sensation.  Elevation  or  distinction  is 
the  object,  which  excites  it.  Desire  attends  it,  which  is  to  rise. 
to  the  pleasant,  exalted  station.  Humility  is  a  pleasant  sensa- 
tion. The  object  which  excites  it,  is  self-abasement.  Its  de- 
sire is,  to  take  a  low  place.  But  no  person  knows  by  experi- 
ence what  humility  is,  unless  he  is  born  again.  To  the  unre- 
newed this  definition  will  appear  strange  ;  because  their  abase- 
ment ever  excites  painful  sensations.  In  them  it  is  merely  the 
mortification  of  pride. 

Grief,  sorrow,  repentance,  are  painful  sensations,  atteftderf 


74 

with  desires  for  the  removal  of  their  causes.  Sin,  now  hateJ, 
is  the  cause  of  these  sensations  in  real  christians  ;  and  they  are 
commonly  attended  with  otiier  sensations,  wliich  are  agreea- 
ble. Joy  is  a  pleasant  emotion,  united  with  a  desire  for  its  in- 
crease and  continuance. 

But  enough  has  been  said,  to  give  every  one  a  clear  and 
distinct  view  of  the  operations  of  taste.  And  all  know  by  ex- 
perience, that  some  affections  operate  with  more  strength  or 
vivacity,  than  others  ;  and  that  the  same  afl'ection  is  more  live- 
ly at  one  time  than  another.  Here,  also,  it  is  proper  to  ob- 
serve, that  tlie  affections  are  not  under  the  control  of  the  will. 
My  meaning  is,  it  does  not  depend  on  a  person's  will,  whether 
objects  shall  please  or  disgust  him  ;  whetiier  the  taste  of  hon- 
ey shall  be  sweet,  or  bitter.  The  seasations  which  objects  will 
excite,  depend  on  the  nature  of  our  appetites,  and  of  the  ob- 
jects which  surround  us.  Though  the  first  emotions  produced 
are  not  under  the  control  of  the  will  ;  yet  both  reason  and  the 
will  may  enable  us  to  regulate,  restrain,  and  govern  them. 
But  as  it  is  not  the  design  of  these  essays  to  attend  to  the  re- 
straint and  government  of  the  affections,  we  may  observe,  that 
they  difier  much  in  their  strength  and  vivacity.  Sometimes  the 
affections  are  very  cool  and  calm  ;  and  sometimes  towards  ob- 
jects of  great  importance  mankind  seem  to  be  almost  indiffer- 
ent. At  other  times,  they  operate  with  great  force  and  activi- 
ty. This  variation  is  produced  by  different  circums,tances,  as 
they  occur  from  time  to  time,  which  will  be  passed  by  without 
investigation. 

It  may  here  be  observed,  that  mankind  are  always  governed 
by  their  feelings,  or  affections.  The  appetites  are  the  only 
principles  of  action  implanted  in  our  nature  ;  and  by  these  ac- 
tive principles  our  conduct  must  and  will  be  governed.  Hence 
the  afl'ections,  which  are  the  operations  of  the  taste,  will  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  men.  It  is  as  impossible  for  mankind  to 
act  in  opposition  to  their  strongest  feelings  at  the  time,  as  for 
matter  to  move  in  opposition  to  the  laws  of  attraction  and  grav- 
itation. 

Again,  all  the  aflections  tend  to  either  ^g^oo^  or  evil.  Active 
principles  always  have  a  tendency  to  some*  end  ;  and  this  ten- 
dency must  be,  either  to  promote  or  destroy  happiness  ;  and 
is  therefore,  to  either  good  or  evil. — These  observations  give 
a  general  view  of  the  affections,  which  are  the  operations  of 
the  faculty  called  taste. — The  next  object,  which  claims  atten- 
tion, is  a  divisioa  of  the  aflections  into  their  distinct  classes. 


76 

It  will  be  remembeted,  that  the  afiectlons  contain  two  parts ; 
sensations,  either  pleasant  or  painful  in  difl'erent  degrees,  and 
desires  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  agreeable,  or  avoidance  of  the 
disagreeable  objects.  As  all  the  aflections  are  composed  of 
the  same  operations,  sensations  and  desires,  they  form  one  gen- 
eral class.  Being  entirely  distinct  in  the'irnature  from jpercej)' 
tions,  they  cannot  be  operations  of  the  same  facult)'.  The 
general  class  called  perceptions,  are  the  operations  of  the  un- 
derstanding. But  the  affections  are  so  different  in  their  nature, 
they  must  belong  to  some  other  faculty  or  property  of  the 
mind,  which  is  called  taste.  Hence  there  is  as  much  reason  to 
believe  the  mind  is  endued  with  this  faculty,  as  the  one  termed 
the  understanding. — In  order  to  see  clearly  the  ground  of  di- 
viding this  general  class,  the  affections,  into  several  distinct, 
specific  classes,  it  is  necessary  to  observe, 

1.  The  operations  of  the  heart  in  infancy. 

If  we  proceed  on  the  belief  that  to  the  taste  belong  the  several 
appetites, which  have  been  illustrated,we  are  led  to  notice  in  the 
first  place  the  one  called  hunger.  An  infant  is  born  with  this 
appetite.  We  might,  then,  expect  to  find  the  infant  pleaded 
with  food,  and  manifest  a  desire  after  it.  And  this  we  find  is 
the  fact.  The  infant  is  evidently  pleased  with  food,  and  espe- 
cially such  as  is  best  suited  to  its  nature.  Its  desire  for  it  is 
evident  from  its  crying  for  it,  and  being  immediately  pacified 
on  receiving  it.  These  operations  of  hunger  are  some  of  the 
first  visible  in  an  infant  ;  and  thus  far  verify  the  theory  which 
has  been  advanced. 

The  appetite  also,  called  filial  affection,  operates,  and  mani- 
fests itself  in  an  infant ;  and  becomes  more  evident  as  it  in- 
creases in  years.  A  child  is  more  pleased  with  its  parents, 
than  with  other  persons  ;  and  manifests  a  strong  desire  after 
them,  when  they  are  absent.  Such  feelings  are  some  of  the 
first,  visible  in  children.  They  become  more  evident  through 
infancy  and  childhood,  for  several  years  ;  but  commonly  de- 
crease, when  they  arrive  to  the  age  in  which  they  become  pa^ 
raits  themselves. 

The  appetite  for  novelty  operates  in  infants.  Those  objects 
which  are  new  to  them  gain  their  attention,  and  excite  strong 
desires  to  obtain  them.  As  new  objects  are  sources  of  plea- 
sure to  them,  they  are  fond  of  hearing  and  reading  stories^ 
novels,  and  plays.  As  such  pursuits  are  generally  luirtful,  it 
is  desirable  that  their  attention  be  early  turned  to  the  study  of 


76 

ihc  arts  and  scieuces,  where  new  objects  will  be  daily  unfold- 
ing to  their  view.  This  study  strengthens  the  niind,  stores  it 
with  useful  knowledge,  and  good  habits  are  formed,  instead 
of  bad.  And  A\henever  the  young  and  tender  mind  is  highly 
pleased  with  new  discoveries,  and  manifests  so  strong  desires 
after  them,  as  to  occupy  its  powers  in  a  close  investigation  of 
snbjects,  we  may  expect  such  persons  will  make  great  advan- 
ces in  the  field  of  knowledge,  and  become  eminent,  respectable, 
and  useful. 

The  operations  of  the  appetite  of  pity  will  not  be  visible 
so  early  in  life  ;  because  more  or  less  knowledge  and  expe- 
rience are  necessary  to  give  opportunity  for  its  exercise.  But 
young  children  will  suffer  pain,  when  they  see  others  in  dis- 
tress ;  if  they  do  not  so  early  in  life  exert  themselves  to  relieve 
them.  They  do  not  yet  know  by  experience,  that  this  is  the 
ready  way  to  remove  the  pain,  which  the  distress  of  others  ex- 
cited.— And  according  to  the  theory  advanced,  we  shall  not 
discover  any  of  the  operations  of  a  benevolent  appetite  in  in- 
fants, or  children,  or  any  others,  until  born  again ;  because 
they  are  born  without  this  appetite.  Hence  the}'  never  mani- 
fest any  pleasure  in  religion,  or  divine  objects,  or  in  any  acts 
of  spiritual  devotion  ;  or  any  sincere  desires  after  communion 
with  their  Maker.  On  the  contrary,  they  show  an  aversion  to 
religious  exercises  ;  the  reason  of  which  will  appear  in  its  pro- 
per place. 

Enough  has  now  been  said  to  show,  that  the  first  operations 
of  taste  in  infants  and  children,  are  those  of  the  appetites  above 
mentioned. — And  to  understand  this  part  of  the  subject  more 
clearly,  it  is  needful  to  remark,  that  the  several  classes  of  the 
objects,  which  are  presented  to  the  appetites,  afford  pleasure 
on  their  own  account.  To  illustrate  this  observe,  that  food  is 
in  itself  agreeable.  No  reason  can  be  given,  why  it  gives  us 
pleasure.  To  say,  it  is  because  food  suits  us,  is  no  reason. 
For  the  words  agreeable  and  suitable,  have  the  same  meaning. 
So  we  may  say  an  object  is  agreeable,  because  it  suits  our  na- 
ture ;  and  it  suits  our  nature,  because  it  is  agreeable.  \y^e 
find  it  is  a  fact,  that  some  objects  are  so  suited  in  their  nature 
to  our  nature,  that  they  please  us  ;  and  we  can  assign  no  oth- 
er reason,  why  they  do  please.  Hence  we  say  of  all  such  ob- 
jects, that  they  arc  in  themselves,  on  their  own  account  or  na- 
ture, sources  of  pleasure  to  us.  And  in  the  same  sense  some 
ijkbjects  are  in  their  nature  disagreeable,  sources  of  pain.     And 


77 

we  can  give  no  reason  why  it  is  thus,  but  that  God  has  so  or- 
dained it.  And  were  it  not  thus,  we  could  never  arrive  at  any 
first  principles,  and  could  never  attain  any  real  knowledge. 
If  there  were  no  sell-evident  truths,  there  would  be  no  point  at 
which  to  begin  to  reason  ;  it  would  be  no  matter  where  we  be- 
gan, or  whether  we  traced  things  backward  or  forward  ;  we 
should  never  arrive  at  njirst  cause,  oy  final  end.  So  if  there 
were  nothing  in  itself  good  or  evil,  we  could  never  arrive  at 
any  first  source  of  good  or  evil  ;  or  at  any  final  end  or  state  of 
enjoyment  or  sufiering.  But  God  has  so  formed  us,  and  objects 
around  us,  that  some  of  them  are  in  their  very  nature  agreea- 
ble, and  others  disagreeable.  We  here  learn  by  experience, 
as  well  as  the  word  of  God,  how  we  must  conduct  to  obtain 
happiness  and  avoid  misery. 

And  the  first  sensations,  experienced  by  persons  in  their  ear- 
ly infancy,  are  produced  by  objects  in  themselves  agreeable, 
or  disagreeable.  Hence  mankind  soon  learn  what  will  render 
them  comfortable  in  this  life,and  what  will  make  them  unhappy. 
This  we  could  never  know,  were  not  some  objects  in  their  na- 
ture agreeable,  and  others  disagreeable.  This  being  the  case, 
we  seek  the  one,  and  avoid  the  other.  These  sensations,  and 
the  desires  we  have  to  enjoy  the  objects  which  produce  them, 
are  the  first  operations  of  taste  mankind  experience.  These  op- 
erations, to  distinguish  them  from  others,  form  a  class,  which 
are  properly  styled  ^n'mari/  affections  ;  because  they  are  the 
first  affections  mankind  have  after  they  are  born.  If  you  now 
have  a  distinct  view  of  this  class  of  auctions,  you  see  they  are 
affections  produced  in  us  by  objects  in  their  nature  agreeable 
or  disagreeable.  And  the  objects,  which  produce  this  class  of 
aft'ections,  are  not  so  numerous,  as  those  which  belong  to  the 
next  class  to  be  considered. 

Even  young  children  learn,  that  they  can  purchase  such 
articles  as  they  love,  with  money.  Then  money  is  an  object, 
which  gives  them  pleasure  ;  but  not  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  an 
object  in  itself  agreeable.  They  can  give  a  good  reason  why 
they  love  it ;  because  they  can  buy  with  it  food  and  other  plea- 
sant things.  This  shows  more  clearly  what  is  meant  by  ob- 
jects in  themselves  agreeable,  and  those  which  are  not.  With 
respect  to  the  former,  no  reason  can  be  given  why  the}'  please  ; 
in  relation  to  the  latter,  we  can  always  give  good  reasons  why 
they  please  us. 
In  like  manner,  as  persons  advance  in  life,  they  find  that  with 


78 

lands,  and  flocks,  and  labour,  they  can  raise  and  procure  food, 
and  other  Objects  in  themselves  agreeable.  Then  those  ob- 
jects become  sources  of  pleasure,  and  objects  of  desire.  They 
are  pleased  with  them  and  desire  them,  because  they  can  with 
them  obtain  other  objects  in  themselves  agreeable.  Here  is 
another  class  of  affections.  Those  affections  we  have  for  ob- 
jects which  are  not  in  themselves  agreeable,  but  which  are  val- 
ued as  means  of  obtaining  those  in  their  nature  pleasant,  may 
be  called  our  secondary  affections.  They  are  a  second  class 
of  aflections,  which  mankind  have,  after  the  first  class. — The 
objects,  which  produce  this  class  of  affections,  are  very  numer- 
ous. They  include  all  the  objects,  which  are  properly  the 
means  by  which  we  purchase  or  obtain  things  in  themselves 
agreeable. — To  these  there  is  scarcely  an^'  end. — If  we  had 
not  the  first,  >ve  should  never  ha\e  the  second  class  of  affections 
just  named.  We  should  never  love  money  or  land,  if  we 
could  not  obtain  with  it  some  object  in  itself  agreeable.  Hence 
they  are  really  a  secondary  class  of  affectionsi.  There  is  only 
©ne  other  class,  which  claims  attention. 

We  often  see  children,  as  well  as  men,  manifest  anger,  hatred, 
revenge,  envy  and  malice. — If  a  child  has  any  thing  in  its  pos- 
session, with  which  it  is  much  pleased,  whether  in  itself  agree- 
able or  not ;  if  another  child  should  take  it  away,  and  refuse 
to  return  it,  anger  rises  in  the  breast  of  the  injured  child.  In 
this  case,  one  child  opposes  the  other  in  the  gratification  of  his 
primary  or  secondary  affections,  no  matter  which.  For  op- 
position to  any  of  our  primary  or  secondary  aflections,  will 
produce  the  affections  or  passions  called  anger,  hatred, revenge, 
&c. — These  passions  ought  to  be  formed  into  a  distinct  class, 
which  may  be  called  malignant.  These  passions  are  malig- 
nant in  their  nature,  the  sources  of  some  of  the  great- 
est crimes  ever  committed  by  man.  This  class  may  then  be 
said  to  comprise  the  malignant  affectio7is,  or  passions.  I  will 
now  show, that  these  passions  are  always  produced  by  opposi- 
tion made  to  our  primary  or  secondary  affections. 

Whatever  objects  are  sources  of  pleasure  to  a  man  while 
in  a  natural  state,  if  we  supply  him  with  them,  he  will  not  ex- 
perience any  dislike  to  us.  Onr  conduct  towards  him  harmo- 
nises with  all  the  feelings  of  his  heart  ;  we  act  precisely  as  he 
would  have  us.  He  has  no  ground  of  uneasiness  with  us  ;  and 
cannot  be  oflcnded,  while  we  thus  treat  him.  He  views  us  as 
friends  to  his  feelings  U  happiness.     And  be  will  feel  the  same 


79 

kind  of  afl'ectlon  for  us  he  does  for  food,  or  money,  or  any 
other  objects  of  his  primary  or  secondary  affections. 

But  if  we  alter  our  conduct,  take  from  him  objects  which  he 
loves,  or  oppose  him  in  his  plans  to  obtain  them  ;  and  are  dai- 
ly crossing,  disappointing,  and  opposing  his  feelings  and  pur- 
suits ;  he  will  then  view  us  as  his  enemies,  and  anger,  and  other 
malignant  passions  will  begin  to  operate.  All  this  is  verified 
by  innumerable  facts  from  day  to  day.  And  these  facts  fully 
prove,  that  malignant  passions  are  excited  by  opposition  m 
some  way  made  to  our  primary  or  secondary  a&ctions. — 
Hence  the  reason  wh}'  mahkiifl  live  together  in  peace,  so  long 
as  they  treat  each  other  in  a  friendly  manner,  and  their  inter- 
ests do  not  clash  together.  But  when  they  thwart,  cross,  and 
oppose  each  other  in  their  feelings  and  pursuits,  anger,  feuds, 
quarrels,  and  wars  ensue. 

While  God  gives  men  fruitful  seasons,  and  his  providences 
are  gratifying  to  their  feelings,  they  speak  well  of  their  Maker, 
and  extol  him  for  his  goodness  and  mercy.  But  when  his  pro- 
vidences are  crossing  and  afflictive,  they  begin  to  muimur, 
and  view  him  as  a  hard  master.  Hence  the  reason  why  the 
Jews  sang  praises  to  God  in  such  sublime  and  animated  strains 
at  the  red  sea,  and  in  a  few  days  after  murmured,  and  com- 
plained, and  rebelled  against  his  authority.  Hence  the  reason 
why  sinners,  in  a  state  of  security,  do  not  feel  any  opposition 
rise  in  their  hearts  against  God  ;  but  under  convictions  of  truth, 
often  have  their  enmity  strongly  excited.  In  security,  they 
seldom  reflect  enough  on  his  character,  or  law,  or  government, 
to  realise  that  they  are  all  arrayed  against  them  as  sinners. 
Of  course  no  opposition  arises  in  their  heai'ts.  But  under 
real  convictions  of  truth,  they  clearly  see  his  character,  law, 
and  government  are  such,  that  they  must  reform  or  perish. 
They  often  feel  as  a  stubborn  criminal  does,  when  the  law 
condemns  him  for  his  crimes.  He  is  angry  with  the  law,  with 
his  judges,  and  with  all  who  take  the  side  of  order  and  justice. 
He  is  angry,  because  they  are  so  opposed  to  him  ;  because  he 
IS  not  suffered  to  live,  perpetrating  crimes  with  impunity,  as  he 
wishes. 

This  is  a  sentiment,to  which  Christ's  ministers  ought  to  give 
a  careful  attention.  Some  from  the  sacred  desk  will  teach  the 
unrenewed,  that  their  hearts  are  full  of  hatred  and  opposition 
to  God  ;  and  this  they  apply  to  all  sinners,  both  the  stupid,^ 
secure,and  unawaken«d,as  well  as  those,  who  are  under  strong 


60 

conviction.  The  careless,  secure  sinner  says,  this  prcacliing 
is  not  true.  I  do  not  hate  and  oppose,  and  fight  against  God. 
He  knows  this,  because  he  has  never  felt  or  experienced  any 
i5«ch  hatred  and  opposition. 

The  truth  is  this.  Sinners  are  born  wholly  destitute  of  love 
to  God  ;  and  of  this  they  may  be  convinced.  But  they  may 
not,  for  many  years,  have  any  positive  hatred  and  opposition 
to  him.  They  have  the  seeds  from  which  hatred,  murmuring, 
and  opposition  will  spring  up,  whenever  events  favor  their 
growth.  Till  such  events  take  place  as  excite  opposition, 
tliey  pursue  the  objects  which  suit  their  appetites,  and  treat 
God  with  indifference  and  neglect.  They  seldom  reflect  on 
his  character  or  government,  and  have  very  erroneous  ideas  of 
his  real  character.  God  is  not  in  all  their  thoughts.  And 
they  are  willing  He  should  do  his  pleasure,  if  he  will  permit 
them  to  do  as  they  please  with  impunity,  and  grant  them  the 
prosperity  they  desire.  Thus  they  live  without  feeling  any 
opposition  in  their  hearts  to  God.  So  far  are  they  from  this, 
that  if  they  prosper  in  worldly  blessings,  &;  meet  with  no  cross- 
ing events,  they  experience  what  is  called  natural  gratitude  ; 
and  will  speak  of  God  as  a  very  good  and  kind  being,  worthy 
of  love,  and  thankfulness  and  service.  Indeed  they  will  talk 
in  a  way  which,  as  far  as  professions  go,  manifests  much  love 
and  gratitude,  as  though  they  were  his  real  friends.  And 
from  this  flow  of  feelings  and  affections  within,  which  are  ex- 
cited entirely  by  their  prosperity,  they  often  make  themselves 
believe  they  do  love  God,  and  are  real  christians. 

At  the  same  time,  if  providential  events  cross  and  oppose 
their  desires,  and  hedge  up  their  way,  then  a  complaining, 
murmuring  and  rebellious  disposition  is  excited.  Also  if  their 
consciences  are  enlightened,  and  they  have  so  much  convic- 
tion of  truth  as  to  see  that  the  holy  character  of  God,  his  law 
and  government,  are  directly  against  them  as  sinners,  and  that, 
if  they  do  not  repent,  and  turn  to  God,  they  must  be  forever 
miserable  ;  then  all  their  inward  desires  are  opposed,  and  cross- 
ed. For  their  desire  is,  to  live  as  tliey  wish  with  impunity. 
And  when  they  see  this  cannot  be,  that  if  they  live  in  sin  they 
must  suffer  eternal  death  ;  then  their  opposition  will  rise  a- 
gainst  God.  And  when  by  conviction  they  further  see  they 
are  wholly  dependant  on  God  for  that  new  heart,  which  is  ne- 
cessary to  life ;  and  of  course  their  eternal  state  is  suspended 
«n  his  holy,  and  soverei^  pleasure  ;  they  then  have  views, 


81 

which  are  in  all  respects  against  them  and  opposed  to  every 
desire  of  their  hearts.  With  this  light  their  hearts  rise,  often, 
to  a  fearful  height  of  opposition.  They  look  on  God  as  a 
hard  master,  a  cruel  tyrant  ;  and  they  would  in  their  rage  de- 
throne Him,  if  they  had  power.  And  abundant  experience 
teaches,  that  there  is  nothing  which  will  excite  so  great  enmi- 
ty and  opposition  to  God,  as  his  absolute  sovereignty.  When 
this  is  held  up  to  view  in  the  doctrines  of  decrees  and  election  ; 
and  when  seen  and  realized  by  a  sinner,  his  heart  swells  with 
enmit}'  and  rage.  The  reason  is,  there  is  nothing  so  perfectly 
opposed  to  a  sinner's  heart,  as  his  entire  dependance  on  the 
pleasure  of  God,  to  be  lost  as  a  transgressor,  or  be  saved  by 
grace. 

Hence  there  are  but  two  conditions,  in  which  real  hatred  and 
opposition  of  heart  to  God  will  arise.  One  is,  when  providen- 
tial events  cross  and  oppose  their  primary  or  secondary  desires. 
The  other  is,  when  sinners  are  under  a  real  conviction  of  truth. 
But  so  long  as  all  providential  events  harmonize  with  a  sinner's 
desires  ;  and  so  long  as  they  do  not  see,  or  realize  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  divine  character  and  government  to  their  selfish 
and  perverse  inclinations  ;  so  long  they  are  free  from  the  oper- 
ations of  positive  hatred  to  God  ;  although  the  seeds  of  enmi- 
ty are  latent  in  their  hearts,  and  only  wait  for  occasions  of  be- 
ing elicited,  and  manifested  to  themselves  and  their  fellow  men, 
as  they  are  now  manifest  to  the  eye  of  God. 

Our  primary  affections  form  one  class  of  the  operations  of 
our  taste  ;  secondary  affections,  a  second  ;  and  our  malignant 
passions,  a  third.  These  three  classes  include  all  the  operations 
of  this  faculty.  It  is  presumed  no  one  can  name  any  affection 
or  passion,  which  is  not  clearly  contained  in  one  or  another  of 
the  classes  I  have  named. 

These  are  the  active  principles,  the  laws  of  our  nature,  which 
put  every  wheel  in  motion  ;  and  from  which  have  proceeded 
all  the  evils,  and  crimes,  which  have  been  committed  in  this 
world.  In  scripture  they  are  called  lusts.  So  when  the  ques- 
tion is  asked,  from  whence  come  wars  and  fightings  ;  the  an- 
swer is,  from  the  lusts  which  war  in  our  members. 

These  principles  are  sufficient  to  explain  the  conduct  of 
men.  By  them  it  is  easy  to  account  for  all  the  actions  of 
moral  agents,  and  assign  the  reasons  of  their  conduct  in  eve- 
ry condition  of  life.  -If  a  person  makes  the  accumulation  of 
property,  or  high  stations  of  honor,  or  scenes  of  pleasure,  hi§ 

K 


8-2 

great  and  principal  object ;  if  he  defrauds,  commits  theft,   or 
murder;  or  if  he  is  moral,  kind,  liberal,  and  performs  acts  of 
charity  and  benevolence  ;  it  is  easy  to  show,  that  such  and  all 
his   other  actions  proceed  from  these  principles  or  aflcctions. 
Tiie  principles  here  advanced  agree  with  facts,  and  with  the 
observation  and  experience  of  all  men.     Is  not  every  one  sure 
and  certain,  that  he  perceives  objects,  not  only  their  existence, 
but  their  properties,  modes,  and  relations  ?     Is  he  not  sure, 
that  he  perceives   truth  and   falsehood,  good  and   evil,  right 
and  wrong  ?     Can  he  doubt  wliethcr  he  is  a  feeling  being,   a 
subject  of  pleasure  and  pain;  or  whether  he  has  desires  to  obtain 
some  objects,  and  to  shun  others  ;  or  that  he  has  aflections  and 
passions  ?     Can  he  doubt  whether  his  feelings  excite  him  to 
action  ?     And  if  he  were  to  make  it  an  object  of  inquiry,  what 
principles  and  motives  governed  him  in  any  of  his  particular 
pursuits  in  life,  could  he  not  ascertain  them  ?  And   he  would 
always  find  that  his  actions  proceeded  from  these  inward,    ac- 
tive principles,  which  he  knows  operate   within  him.     Upon 
these  principles,  we  may  reason  as  correctly  and  safely  concern- 
ing phenomena  in  morals,  as  we  can  on  the   first  principles  in 
natural  philosoph}-  concerning  the  phenomena  in  the  material 
world.     We  should  find  some  facts  more  difficult  to  account 
for,  than  others  ;  and  some,  perhaps,  inexplicable.     This  is  to 
be  expected  in  every  science.     With  respect  to  men,  I  see  no 
great  difficulty  in  accounting,  on  the  principles  advanced,  for 
their  actions  and  conduct  in  the  several  grades  and  stations  of 
life.     And  the  profession  of  a  minister  is  such,  it  is  one   part 
of  his  study  to  account  for  the  conduct  of  mankind.     In  this 
way   he  explains  their  characters,  shows  them  what  they  are, 
and  opens  to  their  view  the  inward  springs  of  action,  and  the 
external  effects  they  will  produce,  so  clearly,  that  persons  often 
think    that  some   one  has   informed  him  of  their  feelings  and 
conduct.     To  mc  it  appears  impossible  for  a   minister  to   ex- 
plain the  character  and  conduct  of  man  in  the  most  convincing 
manner,  unless  he  is  acquainted  with  tiiose  internal,  active  prin- 
ciples, which  govern  all  men.     Before  I  had  any   clear,  dis- 
tinct view  of  them,  many  things  appeared  dark,  and  mysterious, 
which  now  are  as  obvious  as  day  light.      On  the  application  of 
those  principles,  in  explaining  and  accounting  for  the  actions 
and  conduct  of  mankind,  I  will  detain  you  no  longer   at  this 
time.      For  their  truth  and  application  will  appear  more  clear 
^nd  evident,  as  we  pass  on  to  other  subjects,  and  especially  to 


83 

explain  the  operations  of  the  will,  and  the  nature  of  liberty, 
and  the  motives  by  which  all  are  influenced.  For  the  sake 
of  assisting  the  memory,  I  shall  conclude  this  essay  by  a  brief 
repetition  of  the  leading  ideas,  and  those  most  important  to 
be  remembered,  which  have  been  explained  concerning  taste. 

The  taste  or  heart  is  a  distinct  property  or  faculty  of  the 
mind,  which  prepares  it  for  tiiose  operations  called  the  afl'ec- 
tions  and  passions.     To  this  faculty  belong  several  distinct  ap- 
petites, such  as  hunger,  pit}^  natural  propensities  or  aflections, 
and  love  of  novelt}',  implanted  in  us  by  God  for  our  preserva- 
tion, comfort,  improvement,  and  well  being,  while  in  the  pres- 
ent state  of  existence.     This  is  di  feeling  faculty,  the  subject  of 
all  our  pleasant  and  painful  sensations ;  the  primary  spring,  or 
principle   of  action.     It   constitutes  agency  ;  is    the    seat   of 
all  vice    and    virtue  ;  and    is   of  course  a  moral   faculty. — 
Without  it,  mankind  would  be  inactive  beings,  like  all  existen- 
ces incapable  of  feeling. 

Each  affection  and  passion  contains  two  operations  ;  a  sen- 
sation either  pleasant  or  painful  ;  and  a  desire  to  obtain  the 
object,  if  agreeable,  or  to  avoid  it,  if  disagreeable.  These  two 
operations,  sensation  &;  desire,  combine  to  form  every  aflfection 
and  passion.  Hence  all  the  aflections,  in  their  nature  simply, 
are  similar  ;  though  they  difier  much  in  vivacity  and  strength. 
Sensations  and  desires  are  the  only  operations  of  this  faculty ; 
&,  being  perfectly  similar,  they  form  another  moral  class  of  op- 
erations of  the  mind,  termed  the  aflections  and  passions.  And 
as  this  class  is  totally  difl'erent  in  its  nature  from  the  class  call- 
ed perceptions,  there  is  no  way  to  account  for  them  but  on  this 
ground,  that  the  mind  is  endued  with  the  property  denominat- 
ed taste. 

The  general  class  of  operations  called  the  aflections  is  di- 
vided into  three  distinct  classes.  The  first  operations  experi- 
enced by  a  human  being  in  infancy  and  childhood,  are  for  ob- 
jects in  their  nature  agreeable  or  disagreeable.  These  being 
the  first  experienced,  are  classed  together,  and  called  our  pri- 
mary  affections.  When  aflections  are  excited  by  objects  which 
are  indiflerent  in  themselves,  but  w  hich  are  regarded  as  neces- 
sary means  of  gratifying  other  desires,  they  form  another  class, 
denominated  secondary  affections.  They  are  the  second  oper^ 
ations  which  we  feel,  and  arise  from  the  preceding  or  primary 
class.  And  when  men  have  their  primary  or  secondary  aflec- 
tions crossed  and  disappointed,  either  by  God   or  man,  the 


84 

sensations  of  hatred,  aucjer,  malice,  envy,  or  revenge,  are  ex- 
cited. -  These  form  a  third  class,  called  the  7nalignant passions. 
The  appetites,  from  which  these  classes  of  operations  arise, 
are  distinct  laws  of  onr  nature  by  which  all  men  are  invariably 
governed.  And  by  a  proper  application  of  them,  all  the  ac- 
tions and  branches  of  conduct  in  men,  in  their  various  pur- 
suits, may  be  accounted  for  and  explained.  When  these  are 
understood  aright,  then  we  have  a  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
and  not  till  then  ;  I  mean  a  knowledge  of  the  principles,  which 
govern  men. 


•(****«****■ 


ESSAV  XZI. 

Of  the  Will,  and  its  Operations. 

Scarcely  any  writer,  that  T  now  recollect,  has  considered  the 
heart  and  will  to  be  distinct  faculties.  Tiny  have  generally 
been  treated  as  one  and  the  same.  Yet  I  hope  to  make  it  ap- 
pear that  they  are  distinct  faculties,  and  ought  not  to  be  blend- 
ed with  the  understanding. — The  want  of  this  distinction  has 
occasioned  much  confusion  in  the  discussions  of  this  subject. 

The  will  and  its  acts  areas  different  as  the  subject  and  pre- 
dicate of  a  proposition.  Accordingly  the  will  is  considered 
as  a  subject,  and  volitions  arc  the  operations  predicated  of  it. 
We  therefore  say,  the  will  chooses  and  refuses.  And  volun- 
tary exertions  are  the  only  operations,  which  properly  belong 
to  the  will.  There  is  certainly  a  preparedness  or  adaptcdne.>s 
in  the  mind,  for  operations  of  this  particular  kind.  If  there 
wpre  not,  it  never  could  choose  or  refuse.  For  the  mind  can- 
not have  those  operations,  to  which  it  has  no  adaptedness.  A 
square  body  is  not  adapted  to  that  kind  of  motion  called  roll- 
ing. There  is  no  adaptedness  in  matter  for  the  operations  of 
thinking,  and  feeling.  And  if  the  mind  were  not  prepared  to 
be  the  subject  of  those  operations  termed  perceptions,  feelings, 
and  volitions,  it  could  no  more  perceive,  feel,  and  choose,  than 
i^^atter  itself  can.     But  the  mind  does  think,  feel,  and  choose. 


85 

These  are  facts,  which  prove  undeniably,  that  it  is  prepared 
for  these  several  operations.  And  a  particular  preparedness, 
fitness,  or  adaptedness  for  that  kind  of  operations  called  voli- 
tions, is  what  I  mean  and  understand  b}'  the  term  will,  consid- 
ered as  a  faculty  of  the  mind.  Some  will  say,  this  is  no  defini- 
tion. 1  grant  it  is  not.  It  is  impossible  to  define  simple  ideas. 
Can  any  one  define  pain,  or  pleasure  .''  If  I  were  to  say,  the 
will  is  a  power  to  choose  and  refuse,  or  a  capacity  for  volun- 
tary exertions,  as  man}'  do  ;  yet  I  might  be  requested  to  define 
power,  and  capacity.  For  these  as  reall}'  need  defining,  as 
the  term  will  itself.  The  truth  is,  no  one  can  give  a  logical 
definition  of  any  simple  thought,  or  existence.  They  can  be 
illustrated  by  other  words,  which  are  better  understood,  if  such 
words  can  be  found.  The  will,  then,  is  a  preparedness  of  the 
mind  for  voluntary  exertions. 

We  may  now  take  into  consideration  the  operations  of  this 
faculty.  Those  I  call  volitions.  Every  volition  has  an  ob- 
ject. When  we  choose,  there  is  some-thing  chosen.  And  the 
thing  chosen,  is  what  I  mean  by  the  object  of  volition.  The 
immediate  object  of  volition,  is  generally  the  motion  of  the 
whole  bod}',  or  some  one  of  its  members.  When  I  make  a 
voluntary  exertion  to  move  my  hand,  the  motion  of  the  hand 
is  the  immediate  object  of  this  exertion.  I  move  my  hand  to 
take  my  pen.  I  keep  it  in  motion,  that  my  pen  may  continue 
to  move  in  making  letters,  and  words.  This  is  done  to  answer 
further  purposes  and  ends.  I  may  move  my  hand  to  take  a 
sword,  to  put  it  in  motion  for  my  defence,  or  to  produce  some 
other  effect.  If  an  end  is  to  be  obtained,  and  a  number  of  ef- 
fects are  necessary  to  obtain  it,  these  are  produced  by  volitions, 
or  voluntary  exertions.  The  first  eflect  produced  is  some  bod- 
ily motion.  This  is  necessary,  in  order  to  produce  the  next 
eflect  in  the  arrangement  ;  and  this  in  order  to  the  next  in 
succession,  until  the  desired  end  is  attained.  The  motion  of 
the  body,  or  some  of  its  members,  is  the  first  eflect  produced 
by  tlie  exertions  of  the  will.  Then  the  other  efiects,  necessary 
to  the  end,  follow  each  other  in  a  regular  succession.  This 
motion  of  the  body,  or  first  efl>ct  produced,  is  what  I  mean  by 
the  immediate  object  of  volition.  Other  effects  produced,  inter- 
vene between  the  first  and  the  last,  which  puts  us  in  possession 
of  the  object  or  end  sought.  The  last  eflect  is  the  uliimate  ob- 
ject o{  voWuon.  And  those  efl'ects,  which  intervene  between 
the  first  and  the  last,  are  its  intermediate  objects. 


86 

Whenever  the  will  makes  exertions  to  produce  bodily  motion, 
the  motion  follows,  unless  prevented  b}  superior  force.  And 
all  the  eflects  willed  follow,  unless  superior  strength,  or  resist- 
vxnce  of  some  kind,  prevent  them.  And  all  these  eflects  which 
God  has  connected  with  our  voluntary  exertions,  are  in  our 
power  ;  and  no  others.  If  God  had  established  the  same  con- 
nexion between  volimtary  exertions  and  flying,  as  he  has  be- 
tween them  and  walking,  we  could  move  from  one  place  to 
another  by  flying,  as  easily  as  we  now  can  by  walking.  And  ten 
thousand  eflects,  such  as  stopping  the  earth  in  its  orbit,  or  over- 
turning the  Chinese  empire,  are  eflects,  which  we  could  as  ea- 
sily produce  by  one  single  exertion,  if  God  had  connected 
them  with  it,  as  we  can  now  walk  or  speak.  When  the  con- 
nexion between  the  will  and  the  motion  of  the  hand,  is  destroy- 
ed by  a  paralytic  stroke,  we  can  no  more  move  the  hand,  than 
create  a  world.  Hence  thoseeflects,  and  those  only,  which  are 
connected  with  our  volitions,  are  in  our  power.  Whatever  is 
connected  with  the  will,  we  can  do  ;  and  whatever  is  not,  is 
beyond  our  reach.  The  body  and  its  members  are,  in  general, 
under  the  controul  of  the  will ;  and  every  other  thing,  as  far 
as  is  necessary  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  moral  agency. 

Not  only  the  body,  but  the  understanding,  is  more  or  less 
in  the  power  of  the  will.  We  find  by  experience  we  can  turn 
our  thoughts  from  one  object  or  subject  to  another.  We  can 
confine  our  attention  to  any  particular  subject ;  and,  if  it  wan- 
der, call  it  back  again.  Our  thoughts  are  evidently  under  the 
control  of  the  will.  The  will  can  turn  them  in  any  direction  ; 
recal  them,  when  they  wander  ;  and  confine  them  to  the  inves- 
tigation of  subjects,  whenever  necessary.  If  our  thoughts 
were  not  in  our  power,  we  should  make  very  slow,  if  any  ad- 
vances, in  scientific  knowledge.  We  should  also  be,  in  a  great 
measure,  incapable  of  acting,  and  attaining  the  objects  of  our 
desire.  At  best,  we  should  be  ver}'  imperfect  agents.  But 
this  will  be  more  particularly  considered  in  another  place. 
This  we  know  is  true  by  experience,  that  the  direction  of  our 
thoughts,  and  the  motions  of  the  body,  as  far  as  is  necessary, 
are  connected  with  the  will  ;  each  of  them  is  subjected  to  its 
power.  Yet  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  human  power  is 
very  limited.  There  are  many  things  to  which  we  are  utterly 
incompetent.  God  has,  however,  given  us  as  much  power  as 
is  necessary  for  us,  in  the  grade  of  existence  which  we  occupy. 
We  have  suflicient  power,  if  the  heart  were  rightly  inclined, 


87 

to  avoid  every  thing  wiiich  is  proiiibited,  and  do  every  thin^ 
required  of  us,  by  our  Lord  and  master.  We  have  sufficient 
power  to  be  good  and  faithful  servants  unto  the  death.  And 
more  power  than  this  we  do  not  need. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  show  the  difl'crence  between  the  op- 
erations of  the  heart,  and  those  of  the  will.  Here  let  it  be  re- 
memberedjthat  pleasant  and  painful  sensations,  and  the  desires 
which  accompany  them,  are  the  operations  of  the  heart.  And 
volitions  are  the  exertions  of  the  will,  to  produce  the  effects 
necessary  to  gratify  the  feelings  of  the  heart.     Hence, 

1.  It  must  be  evident  to  any  reflecting,  candid  mind,  that 
neither  a  pleasant  or  painful  sensation  is  a  volition.  Is  the 
exertion  a  person  makes  to  move  his  hand  to  take  an  orange, 
the  same  thing  with  the  pleasure  it  gives  him  ^  Is  the  pain  v 
person  has,  when  his  teeth  ache,  the  same  operation  in  kind 
with  the  exertion  he  makes  to  extract  them  ^  Every  person's 
experience  teaches  him,  that  sensations,  and  exertions  to  move 
the  body,  are  operations  generically  difl'erent.  He  must  know, 
if  unbiassed,  that  volitions,  which  have  the  motion  of  some 
part  of  the  body  for  their  object,  are  neither  agreeable  or  pain- 
ful sensations.  He  must  know  it  to  be  a  fact,  that  pleasure 
and  pain  produce  no  visible,  external  effects.  A  person  may 
contemplate  distant  objects  with  great  pleasure,  for  days  and 
weeks,  without  one  motion  towards  them.  But  if  he  makes 
exertions  to  attain  such  agreeable  objects,  bodily  motion,  and 
other  effects  immediately  follow.  He  cannot  make  an  exertion 
to  move  his  hand,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  it  at  rest.  But 
objects  may  please,  and  displease  him,  3  et  he  remain  at  rest. 
This  is  a  fact.  Hence  bodily  motions  and  other  effects,  which 
are  connected  with  the  will,  have  no  immediate  connexion  with 
our  sensations,  either  pleasant  or  painful.  If  sensations  and 
volitions  were  operations  of  the  same  kind  ;  if  a  sensation  were 
a  volition,  the  former  would  produce  the  same  effects  the  latter 
produces.  But  this  we  know  is  not  a  fact.  We  know,  that 
an  exertion  to  move  the  hand  is  followed  by  its  motion.  But 
an  object  may  please  me,  and  no  motion  or  effort  to  attain  it, 
follow.  Experience  then  teaches,  that  sensations  and  volitions 
are  totally  different  operations. 

2.  Volitions  and  desires  are  not  operations  of  the  same  facul- 
ty»  I  have  already  observed,  that  the  immediate  object  of  vo- 
lition is  bodily  motion,  some  action,  to  produce  some  effect. 
Now,  though  desire  has  an  object,  yet  its  object  is  not  an  aq- 


88 

tion,  or  an  f'Uect.  Therefore  the  objects  of  volition  and  desire 
are  not  the  same.  I  desire  meat,  or  drink.  But  meat  and 
drink  are  not  actions.  To  obtain  tliose  objects  many  eflccts 
may  be  nece«;-;ary.  Tlicse,  if  connected  with  the  will,  are  thf 
objects  of  volition.  Now  if  desire  and  volition  were  the  same. 
their  objects  would  be  the  same.  But  we  know  it  is  a  fact  that 
they  are  diiferent.  I  may  desire  meat  or  drink,  and  yet  not 
one  effect  follow  necessary  to  obtain  them.  But  when  1  will 
these  eflects,  they  follow,  they  are  produced. 

We  may  desire  what  we  do  not  will.  A  man,  who  is  thirs- 
ty, desires  drink  ;  yet,  for  certain  reasons,  may  not  make  one 
exertion  to  obtain  it.  The  drink  may,  at  the  same  time,  be  be- 
fore him,  and  within  his  reach.  If  he  makes  an  exertion  to 
take  it,  the  motion  nercssary  follows,  and  the  drink  is  broug^ht 
to  his  mouih.  If  desire  and  volition  were  the  same  thing,  if  a 
desire  is  a  volition,  his  desire  for  the  drink  would  bring  it  to 
his  mouth.  We  might  proceed  to  notice  this  difference  in  a 
hundred  other  particular  instances.  But  it  is  not  necessary. 
For  every  person,  who  is  inritnately  acquainted  with  the  oper- 
ations of  his  own  mind,  must  know,  that  many  objects  may 
be  desired,  yet  no  exertioiss  may  be  made  to  obtain  them. 
Hence  a  desire  is  not  a  volition.  If  it  were,  the  effects  neces- 
sary to  obtain  the  objects  of  desire  would  follow,  as  soon  as  it 
existed.  For  the  moment  Ave  make  exertions  to  move  the  hand 
or  foot,  and  produce  other  effects,  these  motions  and  effects 
follow.  This  is  a  decisive  proof  that  a  desire  is  not  a  volition. 
And  everv  person's  experience  daily  decides  this  dispute.  Do 
not  all  persons  know  they  frequently  have  desires  to  visit 
friends  and  neighbors,  yet  make  no  exertions  to  accomplish 
the  object  .'*  Yet  if  a  desire  is  a  volition,  the  moment  they  have 
such  a  desire  the  exertion  is  made,  and  the  visit  would  soon 
be  accomplished.  It  appears  then  that  those  persons,  who 
consider  desires  to  be  volitions,  have  never  given  much  atten- 
tion to  the  operations  of  their  own  minds. 

3.  Whether  objects  shall  please  or  disgust  us,  does  not  de- 
pend on  any  thing  in  us,  except  our  nature  ;  but  whether  they 
siiall  be  chosen  or  not,  depends  on  our  pleasure.  Our  nature, 
and  ihe  nature  of  objects,  are  such,  they  will  please  or  displease 
us.  Does  it  depend  on  our  pleasure  to  say,  whether  beautiful 
colors,  and  melodious  sounds  shall  give  us  pleasure  .''  Or  whe- 
ther discordant  sounds,  and  fetid  scents  shall  offend  us,  or  not? 
Pleasure  and  pain  are  not  produced  by  choice  :  neither  can 


89 

'tlibice  prevent  them.  Whether  we  will  or  not,  some  objects 
will  please  us,  and  others  will  disgust  us.  But  whether  they 
are  chosen  or  rejected,  depends  on  our  pleasure.  Many  ob- 
jects, which  are  agreeable,  are  rejected ;  and  many,  Avhich  are 
disgustful,  are  chosen.  For  instance,  sometimes  food,  which 
is  agreeable  to  the  taste,  is  refused,  and  disgustful  medicines 
are  chosen  and  received.  Though  these  things,  and  many 
others,  will  be  agreeable  or  disgustful  to  our  taste,  and  it  is 
not  possible  for  us  to  prevent  it  ;  yet  we  can  choose,  or  reject 
them.  This  shows,  that  our  voluntary  exertions  depend  on  our 
pleasure  ;  but  our  pleasures,  pains,  and  desires  do  not  depend 
on  the  will.  Or  in  other  words,  the  operations  of  the  will  are 
nnder  the  government  of  the  heart,  but  the  operations  of  the 
heart  are  not  under  the  government  of  the  will.  But  if  our 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  desires,  (which  are  the  oper- 
ations of  the  heart,  or  taste,)  are  volitions,  then  our  volitions 
are  governed  by  our  volitions  ;  which  is  absurd. 

The  will  is  influenced  and  governed  by  the  heart.  Our  de- 
sires give  rise  to  volitions.  When  I  come  to  a  right  and  left 
hand  path,  for  certain  reasons  I  may  desire  to  take  one,  and 
for  other  reasons  desire  to  travel  the  other  ;  &  the  strongest  de* 
sire  will  finally  prevail.  My  choice,  which  moves  my  body  in 
either  path,  is  determined  by  my  strongest  desire.  And  as  the 
will  never  determines  itself,  fcis  influenced  by  the  strongest  de- 
sire, desire  is  not  an  operation  of  the  will.  For  that,  which  deter- 
mines the  will,is  no  tan  act  of  the  will.  And  as  our  feelings  Side- 
sires  govern  and  determine  the  will,  they  are  not  acts  of  the 
will,  but  antecedent  to  them.  But  this  argument  will  be  set 
in  a  more  clear  and  forcible  light,  when  we  attend  to  the  influ- 
ence of  motives,  and  consider  what  it  is  that  determines  the 
will.  The  evidence  of  its  truth  will  appear  with  increasing 
strength  from  several  subjects,  which  will  be  discussed  in  their 
proper  place.     I  shall  now 

4.  Observe,  that  vice  and  virtue  have  their  seat  in  the  heart, 
not  in  the  will.  This  constitutes  an  essential  diflerence  be- 
tween these  two  faculties. 

When  the  divine  character  is  clearly  exhibited  to  the  view 
of  an  attentive  mind,  and  a  person  has  a  consistent  knowledge 
of  it,  and  is  filled  with  joy,  is  not  this  a  holy  joy  .''  What  is 
holy  joy,  but  a  true  dt  light  in  ihe  character  of  God  ?  Wiicn 
he  contemplates  the  government  of  God,  and  rejoices  that  (he 
Lord  reigns,  is  not  this  a  holy  rejoicing  ?  This  joy  is  attend- 
ed with  ardent  desire  for  the  increasing  displays  of  ihe  glorj' 

L 


90 

of  God.  He  may  liave  an  ardent  desire,  that  sinners  might 
submit  to  the  will  and  government  of  God.  Are  not  these  ho- 
ly desires  .'*  But  this  joy  is  only  an  emotion  of  pleasure,  ex- 
cited by  the  character  and  government  of  Jehovah.  These 
holy  desires  are  those  which  attend  such  agreeable  sensations. 
And  this  delight  in  God,  and  this  desire  for  the  glory  of  his 
name,  are  the  ingredients  of  that  affection  called  love  to  him^ 
and  his  government. 

When  a  person  of  this  character  has  a  knowledge  of  himself, 
and  sees  that  he  has  sinned  against  a  holy  God,  his  heart  is 
broken  and  contrite  for  sin.  He  has  What  the  scriptures  call 
repentance,  and  godly  sorrow.  These  feelings  of  his  heart 
are  attended  with  earnest  desires  to  overcome  all  remaining 
wickedness,  to  be  delivered  from  the  dominion  and  pollution 
of  sin,  and  be  holy  as  God  is  holy.  Is  not  this  sorrow  for  sin 
a  holy  sorrow,  and  these  desires  holy  desires  .'' 

Another  person,  when  he  has  a  clear  view  of  God's  charac- 
ter and  government,  is  filled  with  pain.  He  has  strong  desires 
to  dethrone  God,  or  rise  above  him,  that  he  ma)'  sin 
with  impunity.  Are  not  these  operations  sinful  affections  ? 
Who  can  deny  it  ,''  Have  not  these  two  persons  hearts  totally 
different  in  their  nature  ?  Are  not  their  feelings  as  different 
as  sin  and  holiness  .''  But  their  feelings  are  nothing  but  affcc" 
iions  ;  which  are,  as  I  have  shown,  the  operations  of  the  taste 
or  heart.  These  affections  exist,  antecedently  to  those  vol- 
untary exertions,  which  they  make  in  order  to  gratify  their 
desires.  Hence  holy  and  sinful  affections  exist  antecedently 
to  volitions,  which  are  the  only  operations  of  the  will.  For 
persons  may  have  all  thc'^e  affections,  without  making  one  exer- 
tion to  move  the  body  or  to  produce  any  otlnr  effects.  Such 
exertions,  by  which  I  mean  volitions,  are  not  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  these  affections.  And  if  voluntary  exertions  were 
made  to  produce  such  affections,  it  would  avail  nothing ; 
for  the  heart  is  not  under  the  power  of  the  will.  A  person 
by  willing  can  no  n'O'e  produce  love  to  God  in  his  heart,  than 
he  can  produce  a  world  by  willing  it.  If  any  reader  is  not 
convinced  of  this  truth,  he  may  convince  himself  by  making 
the  trial. 

A  person  injures  his  neighbor.  The  injury  the  latter  has 
received  excites  revenge  in  his  heart.  It  gives  him  pain, 
wiiich  is  attended  with  a  desire  to  be  revenged,  the  first  oppor- 
tunity, by  takings  his  neighbor's  life.     I  ask,  does  not  this  feci* 


91 

ing,  called  revenge,  constitute  the  crime  termed  murder  ?  Oar 
Lord  says,  if  a  man  look  on  a  woman,  aud  lust  after  her,  he 
hath  committed  adultery  with  her  in  his  heart  already.  What 
is  this  lust,  but  a  desire  for  the  commission  of  the  sinful  act  ? 
This  our  Lord  calls  adultery.  Indeed,  the  more  any  person 
attends  to  this  subject,  the  more  he  will  be  convinced,  that  no 
operations  of  the  mind  are  sinful  or  holy,  but  those  which  are 
termed  the  affections  and  passions.  And  these,  it  has  been 
shown,  are  the  operations  of  the  heart.  They  have  a  full  and 
complete  existence,  antecedent  to  those  operations  which  1  call 
volitions. 

Of  course  our  volitions  cannot  be  considered  as  vicious  or 
virtuous,  any  more  than  the  operations  of  the  understanding 
can  be  viewed  in  this  light. 

There  are  two  reasons,  why  vice  and  virtue  are  seated  in  the 
heart  or  affections,  and  not  in  volitions.  1.  The  heart  or 
taste  with  its  affections  are  the  primary  principle  of  action- 
All  the  actions  may  be  traced  back  to  the  heart,  as  the  prima- 
ry fountain  from  which  they  proceed  ;  and  they  cannot  be  tra- 
ced back  any  further,  or  to  any  antecedent  principle  of  action 
in  a  moral  agent.  From  the  heart  all  good  and  evil  proceed. 
The  moral  character  of  man,  then,  is  just  what  his  heart  is. 
2.  The  will  is  only  an  executive  faculty.  It  is  no  more  than  a 
servant  to  the  heart,  to  execute  its  pleasure.  The  will  is  no 
primary  principle  of  action  ;  its  office  is  to  obey  the  commands 
of  the  heart.  Accordingly,  for  all  the  good  or  evil  produced 
by  the  will,the  heart  only  is  praise  or  blame  worthy  ;  or  every 
moral  agent  is  to  be  blamed  or  praised,  on  account  of  the  good 
or  evil  heart  in  him. 

Hence  no  one  need  be  surprised  at  the  sentiment  advanced. 
For  the  more  he  reflects  upon  it,  the  more  he  will  be  convinced 
it  is  correct,  and  accords  with  the  word  of  God. 

This  will  appear  more  evident  to  any  candid  person,  if  he 
duly  considers  the  end  to  be  answered  by  our  voluntary  exer- 
tions. These  exertions  are  made  to  gratify  the  feelings,  or 
affections  of  the  heart.  The  man,  who  has  revenge  or  murder 
in  his  heart,  makes  exertions,  and  employs  his  bodily  powers, 
to  put  an  end  to  the  life  of  his  victim.  What  is  the  design  of 
all  those  motions  and  effects,  produced  by  the  will,  but  to  grat- 
ify his  revenge  ?  This  is  the  great  design  of  all  our  volitions, 
to  produce  those  external  effects  necessary  to  gratify  our  affec- 
tions and  passions. 


92 

Now  is  there  not  q  generic  difiVrence,  between  those  opera? 
tions  which  are  sinful  or  hol^^,  and  those  whicli  are  neither  vi- 
cious or  virtuous  ''  There  can  be  no  operations  of  the  mind, 
between  which  there  is  a  more  essential  diflerence  in  their  very 
nature  or  kind.  And  it  is  perfectly  unphilosophical,  and  serves 
only  to  confuse  us  in  our  investigations,  to  class  tBose  opera- 
tions together,  which  have  a  generic  diflerence.  Our  voli- 
tions then  are  operations,  which  cannot  be  classed  with  the 
aftections,  nor  be  considered  as  operations  of  the  heart.  They, 
therefore,  form  a  third  genei-al  class  of  operations.  They  are 
not  operations  of  the  understanding  ;  for  there  is  no  likeness 
between  them  and  perceptions.  And  for  the  same  reason,  they 
cannot  be  considered  as  the  operations  of  the  taste  or  heart. 
They  must,  therefore,  be  referred  to  the  will.  Volitions  are 
the  operations  of  this  faculty,  and  of  no  other.  This  general 
class  does  not  admit  of  any  subdivisions  into  specific  classes. 
For  every  volition  is  designed  to  answer  the  same  purpose ; 
which  is,  the  production  of  those  eflects,  which  are  necessary 
to  obtain  the  objects  of  the  affections.  The  will  is  a  servant 
to  the  heart.  It  is  given  to  execute  its  wishes,  and  put  it  in 
possession  of  those  objects,  which  gratify  and  satiate  its  feel- 
ings. As  every  voluntary  exertion  answers  the  same  purpose, 
one  volition  does  not  specifically  differ  from  another.  Of 
course  this  general  class  of  operations  is  not  divisible  into  any 
specific  classes. 

Some  have  attempted  to  account  for  the  manifest  difference, 
which  exists  between  our  aflcctions  and  volitions,  by  making  a 
distinction  between  immanent  and  imperate  acts  of  the  will. 
By  immanent  acts  they  mean,  if  I  understand  them,  what  I  call 
the  affections  and  passions.  And  by  imperate  acts,  those  oper- 
ations which  I  call  volitions.  They  therefore  consider  those 
immanent  and  imperate  acts  to  be  operations  of  the  same  facul- 
ty, called  the  will.  But  from  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evident, 
this  is  classing  those  operations  together,  which  genericaliy  dif- 
fer from  each  other. 

Why  do  not  philosophers  consider  all  the  operations  of  the 
understanding,  and  the  affections,  as  constituting  but  one  gen- 
eral class  of  operations,  and  as  belonging  to  one  faculty  ?  The 
reason  is,  they  see  no  similarity  between  intellectual  percep- 
tions and  aftections.  A  perception  is  not  a  feeling  either  of 
pleasure  or  pain,  nor  a  desire.  And  pleasure  and  pain,  and  de- 
sires, they  clearly  see,  are  not  perceptions.     Hence   classing 


93 

them  together  would  be  improper,  and  create  confusion.     It 
would  be  confounding  things  which  difler,  and  destroying  all 
those  distinctions  which    are  necessary   to   the  acquirement  of 
scientific  knowledge.     For   a  person  has  no  more  than  a  con- 
fused  notiim  oi"  things,  who  does  not  make  distinctions,  where 
there  are  difterences  ;  or  point  out  the  difference   between  one 
thing  and  another.     As  perceptions  and  affections  generically 
differ,  philosophers  have  distinguished  them,  and  formed  them 
into  distinct  classes  ;  and  so  they  have  admitted  the  existence 
of  two  faculties.     And  for  the  same  reason  they   admit  two, 
they  ought  to  grant  there  are  three  faculties.     For  when  we  at- 
tend to  the  affections  and  to  volitions,  it  is  evident  there  is  a 
generic  difference  between  them.     It  is  evident  that  pain,  plea- 
sure, and  desires,  are  not  volitions  ;  and  have  no  similarity  to 
those  voluntary  exertions,  which  produce  effects  on  the  body, 
and  in  other  things  around   us.     For  these  affections  do  not 
immediately   produce    any  external  effects ;  they    are  effects 
themselves  produced  by  the  heart,  and  are  either  virtuous    or 
vicious.     For  it  has  been  shown,  that  vice  and  virtue  belong 
to  the  heart  only,  and  its  operations,  or  affections.     There  is, 
therefore,  no  more  propriety  in  classing  the  affections  and  vo- 
litions together,  than  in  making  but  one  class  of  the  affections 
&i  perceptions.    The  affections  fc  volitions  so  widely  differ,  that 
they  naturally  divide  themselves  into  two  distinct,  general  clas- 
ses.    Of  course,  they  cannot  belong  to  the  same  faculty  ;  and 
the  distinction  concerning  immanent  and  imperate  acts,  is  in- 
consistent and  useless.     Those  who   make  this  distinction,  di- 
vide the  affections  and  volitions  into  two  general  classes  ;  for 
the  difference  between  them  is  so  great,  the}'  cannot  avoid  ad- 
mitting it.     But  to  grant  it,  and  then  refer  both  classes  to  the 
same  faculty,  is  unphilosophical,  and  creates  confusion  of  ideas. 
But  the  importance  of  admitting  that  the  mind    has  three 
faculties,  will  appear  more  clearly  and  fully  in  some  of  the 
subsequent  essays.     I  have   now  finished   wliat  I   intended  to 
say  on  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  and  their  respective  opera- 
tions.    The  numerous  operations  of  the  understanding  I  have 
called  by  one  geperal  name, perceptions.     I  thli.k  1  have  made 
it  evident,  that  every  operation  of  this  faculty  is  a  perception. 
Those  perceptions  are  divided  into  distinct,  specific  classes, 
termed  reason,  memorj^,  conscience,  judgment,  imagination. 
And  the  numerous  operations  of  the  taste  or  heart,  are  known 
by  the  name  of  ajfections.     This  general  class  is  divided  int<> 


94 

several  specific  classes,  termed  primary,  secondary,  and  malig* 
nant  ailections.  And  the  numerous  operations  of  the  will  arc 
known  by  the  term  volitions.  This  class  does  not  admit  of  any 
divisions.  These  three  general  classes,  perceptions,  affections^ 
and  volitions,  include  all  the  operations  of  the  mind.  It  is 
presumed  no  person  can  name  an  operation,which  is  not  includ-, 
ed  in  one  or  the  otlier  of  these  classes.  As  these  several  clas- 
ses generically  differ,  for  the  same  reasons  that  two  faculties^ 
have  been  admitted  to  belong  to  the  human  mind^ it  is  ne- 
cessary to  admit  a  third. 


*»MHIHHHfM^ 


ESSAY  XZXZ. 

General  Observations  on  Moral  Agency. 

Very  different  opinions  concerning  moral  agency  and  liber- 
ty, have  prevailed  among  the  learned.  This  has  occasioned 
very  warm  disputes,  and  numerous  treatises.  Of  the  different 
theories  which  have  been  advanced,  very  few,  if  any,  agree 
wholly  with  facts  and  experience.  The  different  opinions 
which  have  been  embraced  are  included,  1  believe,  either  in 
the  Arniinian  scheme,  or  the  Calvinistic.  Each  of  these 
schemes  has  been  warmly  defended  bj-  the  ablest  pens.  Though 
the  parties  have  widely  differed,  yet  on  some  points  they  have 
been  agreed.  In  this  essay  it  is  my  design  to  show  how  far 
they  are  agreed,  and  in  what  particulars  they  differ  ;  which 
will  prepare  the  way  for  a  more  distinct  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject in  the  next  essay. — The  great  dispute  has  been,  and  is  still, 
what  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  being  a  real  agent,  and  prop- 
er object  of  praise  and  blame,  and  a  proper  subject  of  rewards. 
To  constitute  such  a  being  it  is  agreed, 

1.  That  he  must  be  an  agent.  It  is  agreed  on  both  sides, 
that  a  being,  who  is  not  an  agent,  is  not  a  proper  object  of 
praise  or  blame.  But  what  is  agency  ?  Respecting  this, 
different  opinions  have  prevailed.  And  here  is  the  proper 
place  to  discuss  this  subject.     The  words  cause,  agency,  effi^ 


95 

eiency,  acHon,  are  used  in  so  many  different  senses,  and  their 
meaning  is  so  ambiguous,  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  explain 
their  meaning.  This,  however,  I  shall  attempt,  so  far  as  is 
necessary  to  understand  the  subject  under  consideration. 

Whatever  begins  to  exist  is  an  effect,  and  must  have  a  cause. 
And  in  things,  which  do  exist,  many  changes  and  alterations 
take  place.  All  such  changes  are  effects,  which  must  have  a 
cause.  And  the  causes  must  be  adequate  to  the  production  of 
such  effects,  or  they  could  not  have  an  existence.  These  are 
'first  principles,  which  no  candid  person  will  deny.  To  the 
production  of  an  effect  a  cause  must  operate,  must  act.  For 
it  does  not  appear  to  be  possible  for  an  inoperative,  inactive 
Cause,  if  it  may  be  called  a  cause,  to  produce  any  effect.  A 
proper  cause  then  is  something,  which  is  in  its  nature  operative 
and  active.  The  operation  of  a  cause  is  what  we  mean  by 
action,  and  by  activity,  energy  and  efficiency.  This  implies  a 
distinction  between  the  thing,  which  is  a  cause,  and  its  action^ 
or  operation.  If  the  nature  of  a  thing  is  such,  that  it  will  op- 
erate and  act,  and  produce  effects,  whenever  there  is  an  oppor- 
tunity for  it,  it  is  a  proper  cause ;  it  is  an  active,  efficient  cause. 

If  any  being  has  a  principle  in  him  of  this  nature,  a  princi- 
ple which  is  active  and  operative,  he  is  an  agent.  This  active 
principle  constitutes  agency.  In  this  active  principle  his  agen- 
cy consists.  All  things  which  exist  either  act,  or  are  acted  up- 
on ;  they  are  either  active  agents,  ox  passive  subjects.  And 
perhaps  there  is  nothing  in  existence,  of  which  both  action  and 
passion  may  not  be  predicated.  A  ball,  when  put  in  motion 
by  some  impulse,  is  acted  upon.  It  is  passive,  or  suffers  the 
force  of  the  impulse.  But  when  we  view  it  in  motion,  and  in 
relation  to  some  effect  it  produces,  it  acts  and  is  the  cause  of 
effects.  Motion  is  the  action  of  the  ball.  And  the  effect  it 
produces  is  greater  or  less,  in  proportion  to  its  weight,  magni- 
tude, and  velocity.  In  receiving  an  impulse,  it  is  passive  ;  in 
moving  and  producing  effects,  it  is  active.  These  observations 
are  true  with  respect  to  all  inanimate  existences.  But  though 
such  kinds  of  existence,  viewed  in  one  relation,  maybe  consid- 
ered as  acting,  and  as  causes  of  effects ;  yet  they  are  uot  agents^ 
according  to  the  sense  in  which  this  word  ought  to  be  used, 
when  we  treat  on  the  subject  of  moral  agency.  Because  their 
motion  does  not  proceed  from  any  operative  principle  inherent 
in  them. 

Some  say  a  cause  is  only  an  antecedent,  and  an  effect  the  con- 


96 

sequence  of  this  antecedent ;  and  that  this  is  all  we  know  crtn* 
cerninp:  what  we  call  causes  and  effects.  They  seem  to  ex- 
clude all  idea  of  enerj^y,  activity,  or  efficiency,  as  belonging 
to  the  nature  of  a  cause;  If  they  would  admit,  that  energy^ 
activity,  or  something  of  this  nature,  is  inherent  in  some 
causes,  there  would  be  no  ground  of  objection  to  their  view  of 
causes  and  effects.  But  if  all  energy  or  efficiency  is  denied, 
as  existing  in  any  cause,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  can  ac- 
count for  the  existence  of  any  effect,  or  what  they  call  a  con- 
sequence. And  if  it  is  granted,  that  God  is  an  efficient  cause  ; 
that  in  him  is  energj-,  activity,  which  constitutes  Him  an  ac- 
tive agent  ;  why  may  not  man  be  endued  with  the  same  prin- 
ciple, so  as  to  make  him  an  active  agent  ?  His  being  depend- 
ent, and  his  powers  limited,  are  no  objection  of  any  weight 
against  viewing  him  an  active  agent.  If  God  can  create  a  de- 
pendent, limited  being,  why  can  he  not  endue  him  with  an  ac- 
tive^ dependent,  limited,  principle  of  action  ?  I  see  no  objection 
of  weight  against  this,  and  of  course  prefer  viewing  a  moral 
agent  as  really  having  in  his  heart  the  same  active,  energetic 
principle,  as  we  suppose  God  possesses.  It  is  granted  this  ac- 
tive principle  in  man,  which  renders  him  an  agent,  is  depend- 
ent and  limited.  So  is  his  being  ;  yet  he  is  a  real  being,  dis- 
tinct from  God. 

Mankind  possess  an  internal  principle  of  action.  They 
have  one  property,  which  is  active  in  its  nature.  This  proper- 
ty or  quality  we  call  the  heart,  or  the  faculty  of  taste.  Its 
natureJs  such  that  all  objects  will  please  or  disgust  it,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree.  It  is  true,  the  pleasure  and  pain  are 
often  so  feeble  as  to  be  wholly  unnoticed,  and  we  are  prone 
to  say,  that  we  feel  nothing.  We  pay  no  attention  to  feel- 
ings, which  are  very  feeble  aiul  lalnt.  When  they  are  strong 
and  lively,  they  gain  our  attention.  Yet  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe  we  are  perfectly  indifferent,  or  without  an}'  feeling  in 
the  view  of  objects,  at  any  time.  But  we  are  not  apt  to  con- 
sider any  feeling  a  real  pleasure,  or  pain,  unless  so  lively  and 
strong  as  to  gain  our  attention.  Feelings,  which  pass  unno- 
ticed, we  are  apt  to  say  are  no  feelings  ;  and  of  course  are 
indifferent  towards  objects,  which  make  such  slight  impres- 
sions. But  we  have  reason  to  conclude  from  the  nature  of  the 
heart,  that  every  object  makes  some  impression,though  pei  haps 
feeble.  It  must  be  obvious  to  an}'  person  of  reflection,  that  an 
existence,    which  hag  no  feeling  quality,  or  is  incapable  of 


97 

pleasure  and  pftin,  has  no  internal  principle  of  action.  And 
this  is  one  essential  difference  between  active,  and  inactive  be- 
ings. The  former  are  endued  with  feeling,  the  latter  are  not. 
This  constitutes  one  essential  difference  between  material  and 
spiritual  substances.  It  is  presumed  that  if  matter,  which  is 
now  inert,  were  endued  with  feeling,  it  would  immediatel3' 
discover  appearances  of  activity.  If  it  were  the  subject  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  it  could  not  remain  in  a  state  of  rest.  Such 
feelings  would  put  it  in  motion.  Mankind,  when  their  feelings 
of  pleasui*e  or  pain  are  very  faint,  find  no  difficulty  in  contin- 
uing in  a  state  of  almost  total  rest,  and  inactivity.  But  when 
their  feelings  are  very  acute  and  strong,  they  find  it  is  impos- 
sible to  remain  inactive.  How  animated  and  active  a  person  is 
when  filled  with  joy.  How  active  and  spirited,  when  he  is  an- 
gry. With  what  zeal  and  life  the  avaricious,  the  proud,  the 
ambitious,  the  voluptuous,  pursue  their  respective  objects- 
But  whence  arises  all  this  activity  ?  From  the  pleasure  they 
feel,  in  view  of  the  objects  of  their  pursuit,  or  expect  to  derive 
from  them,  when  attained.  With  what  speed  persons  flee  from 
danger,  when  they  apprehend  it  ;  and  with  what  zeal  they  use 
means,  when  in  distress,  to  gain  relief.  What  is  the  cause^ 
which  excites  them  to  action  in  such  cases  ?  It  is  pain. 
Hence  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  springs  of  action  in  moral 
agents.  Deprive  mankind  of  this  feeling  principle  ;  let  them 
become  as  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain,  as  rocks  are,  and 
they  would  be  as  inactive.  Motives  would  have  no  influence 
upon  them.  There  would  be  no  spring  to  action  in  them  ; 
nothing  to  excite  them  to  seek  one  thing,  or  avoid  another. 
We  might  multiply  facts  to  prove,  that  a  quality,  or  faculty, 
susceptible  of  pleasure  and  pain,  is  the  only  active  principle  in 
the  universe.  It  is  the  primary,  original  cause  of  all  existen- 
ces, and  of  all  the  changes  which  they  undergo.  And  the 
more  any  person  attends  to  this  subject,  the  more  he  will  be 
convinced  of  its  truth. 

Hence  the  heart,  or  the  faculty  of  taste,  being  the  only  pro- 
perty of  the  mind  wliich  is  susceptible  of  pleasure  and  pain,  is 
the  principle  of  action  in  moral  agents.  We  have  once  distin- 
guished between  a  cause,  and  its  operations  or  actions.  The 
heart  is  a  cause  ;  its  operations,  such  as  pleasure  and  pain,  and 
their  attendant  desires,  are  its  actions.  The  heart,  when  it  i$ 
pleased  or  displeased,  and  has  desires  to  avoid  disgustful  ob- 
jects, or  to  enjoy  those  which  are  pleasing,  is  operating:,  andl 

M 


98 

produces  the  eflccts  designed.  The  first  and  immediate  effects 
it  produces  are  volitions  ;  and  by  means  of  these  and  bodily 
motions,  it  produces  all  the  effects  necessary  to  reach  the  ends 
desired.  This,  then,  is  in  man  the  primary  and  original  cause 
of  all  his  actions,  and  motions,  the  source  from  which  they  all 
proceed.  The  heart  constitutes  human  agenc}',  and  efficien- 
cy. This  is  the  only  primary,  active,  operative  cause  belong- 
ing to  his  nature,  The  will,  it  is  granted,  operates  and  acts. 
But  it  is  not  a  primary  principle  of  action.  Its  operations  and 
acts  are  effects  produced  by  the  heart.  This  brings  more 
clearly  into  view,  what  I  aimed  to  prove  in  the  preceding  es- 
say, a  generic  difference  between  the  heart  and  the  will. 
The  actions  of  the  will  do  not  proceed  from  any  activity  in  it- 
self. They  are  the  effects  of  a  prior  cause,  which  is  the  heart. 
The  heart,  then,  is  an  active  principle  ;  the  will  is  not,  any 
more  than  a  ball,  when  in  motion.  Like  the  ball,  it  is  put  in 
motion,  or  derives  its  activity  from  the  heart,  the  prccetling 
cause.  This  is  true,  if  a  being  incapable  of  feeling  would  be 
inactive.  For  if  men  did  not  feel,  the  will  would  never  act. 
Hence  feelings  are  antecedent  to  volitions,  and  the  cause  of 
them.  This  shows,  that  the  heart  and  will  are  distinct  facul- 
ties ;  so  different,  that  one  is  an  active  principle,  and  the  oth- 
er'is  not. 

Ai\d  beings,  who  are  endued  with  an  active  principle,  are 
agents  ;  but  those  destitute  of  m\y  such  principle,  are  not,  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  agents  ;  they  are  only  the  in- 
struments, which  agents  use  in  the  accomplishment  of  their 
wishes. 

Objects  impress,  or  act  on  the  heart.  And  while  objects 
are  impressing  it,  the  heart  is  constantly  operating,  and  pro- 
ducing effects.  If  objects  could  not,  and  did  not,  impress  the 
heart,  motives  would  have  no  influence.  For  their  influence 
consists  wholly  in  the  impressions  they  make.  When  they 
please  or  displease,  they  impress  us.  If  they  did  not  have  this 
effect,  we  should  be  neither  pleased  nor  offended  ;  and  of 
course,  should  never  act  at  all.  But  objects,  or  motives,  are 
not  agents  ;  they  are  only  a  means  of  action.  They  are  not 
endued  with  any  principle  of  action.  They  are  not  the  sub- 
jects of  pleasure  or  pain.  But  they  are  necessary  means,  or 
occasions  of  action,  or  of  the  operation  of  what  we  call  active 
causes. 

In  the  sense  explained  it  appears,  that  the  Deity  is  acted  up- 


d9 

en.  The  ultimate  end  of  all  bis  operations,  is  something  m 
itself  agreeable  to  his  benevolent  heart.  This  end  gives  him 
pleasure.  By  pleasing  him  it  acts  upon  his  iieart,  or  impress- 
es it,  and  b3'  thus  impressing  it  influences  him  to  p  irsue  the 
plan  necessary  to  attain  his  ultimate  end.  But  thee  id,  which 
influences  him,  is  not  an  agent  ;  is  not  the  cause,  which  gave 
existence  to  this  world,  and  the  events  of  providence.  His 
heart  is  the  primary,  original  cause  of  the  existence  of  all 
things. 

As  T  observed  in  the  beginning  of  this  essay,  it  is  agreed  on 
all  sides,  that  man  must  be  an  agent  to  be  a  proper  object  of 
praise  and  blame  ;  yet  they  differ  with  respect  to  the  thing  in 
which  agency  consists.  Some  say  it  consists  in  a  self-deter- 
mining power.  Different  persons  have  entertained  different 
notions  concerning  that  kind  of  agency,  which  is  requisite  to 
praise  and  blame-worthiness.  I  grant  that  if  man  is  not  an 
agent,  he  is  not  a  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame.  Because 
nothing  could  be  imputed  to  him  as  his  act.  For  no  actions 
are  properly  his,  but  those  which  proceed  from  an  active  prin- 
ciple inherent  in  him.  What  this  active  principle  is,  which 
constitutes  the  agency,  and  efficiency  of  man,  as  well  as  of 
God,  I  have  laboured  to  prove  and  illustrate  under  this  first 
particular  head.  I  now  hope  it  is  evident  to  every  unbiassed 
mind,  that  the  heart,  which  is  the  only  feeling  faculty,  is  the 
primary  original  cause  in  man  of  all  his  actions.  This  con- 
stitutes him  an  agent ;  an  active  being.  It  also  appears,  that 
he  has  the  same  kind  of  agency,  that  his  Maker  possesses. 
The  difference  between  the  divine  and  human  agency  is  this  ; 
one  is  derived,  the  other  is  not ;  one  is  dependent,  the  other  is 
independent ;  one  is  finite,  the  other  is  infinite.  Yet  men  are 
complete  agents ;  for  they  are  endued  with  a  principle  of  ac- 
tion. And  many  of  those,  who  say  the  will  is  the  only  active 
principle  in  man,  grant,  that  if  men  had  not  a  capacity  for  plea- 
sure and  pain,  they  could  not  be  moral  agents  ;  because  hav- 
ing nothing  to  influence  them  to  act,  they  would  not  act  at  all. 
If  they  had  not  this  capacity,  no  object  would  ever  please  or 
displease  them.  We  should,  therefore,  be  forever  in  a  state  of 
indifference,  in  which  state  it  would  be  impossible  to  act.  This 
is  the  manner  in  which  many  Calvinistic  divines  reason,  who 
at  the  same  time  say,  that  the  will  constitutes  human  agency. 

But  when  they  say  this  capacity  is  necessary  to  action,  is  it 
not  the  same  as  to  allow  it  is  the  primary  original  principle  of 


I 


100 

action,  and  that  principle  which  constitutes  agency  ?  If  they 
do  not  mean  this,  their  words,  in  my  view,  have  no  meaning* 
For  saying-,  without  this  capacity  men  would  never  act,  or  be 
moral  agents,  is  the  same  as  to  assert,  that  this  capacity  is  the 
primary  spring  of  action,  and  constitutes  human  agency. 
Their  capacity,  therefore,  for  pleasure  and  pain,  is,  as  far  as  I 
can  see  any  meaning  in  the  thing,  the  very  same  thing  with 
what  I  call  the  heart,  or  faculty  of  taste.  Hence  persons  of 
this  sentiment  have  no  ground  to  object  against  the  scheme 
advanced  in  these  essays,  if  they  will  be  consistent  with  them- 
selves. 

Again.  If  by  a  self-determining  power  Arminians  mean 
some  cause  in  man  which  determines  the  will,  or  produces  voli- 
tions, the^'  have  no  ground  to  object  against  what  has  been 
advanced  in  this  essay.  And  furthermore,  if  they  will  be  con- 
sistent with  themselves,  they  must  embrace  the  scheme  hitherto 
illustrated.  For  I  have  endeavoured  to  prove,  that  there  is  a 
cause  in  man,  which  determines  the  will,  and  gives  rise  to  eve- 
ry voluntary  exertion.  Though  motives  have  influence,  yet 
they  are  not  the  causes,  or  agents,  which  produce  volition. 
So  that  when  we  say  motives  determine  the  will,  we  do  not 
mean  they  are  agents  ;  or  have  an}'  active  principle  ;  or  do 
any  thing  more,  than  merely  as  means  influence  us  to  act,  or 
give  an  opportunity  for  the  active  principle  in  man  to  operate. 
The  real,  active  cause,  which  determines  the  will,  or  gives  rise 
to  volition,  is  in  man,  and  a  property  of  his  nature.  In  this  sense 
a  person  may  be  truly  said  to  determine  his  own  will.  His 
heart  has  power  over  the  will,  and  does  determine  all  its  acts. 
If  this,  then,  is  all  that  is  meant  by  a  self-determining  power, 
mankind  truly  possess  it.  Of  course  in  this  particular  Armini- 
ans and  Calvinists  may  be  agre  ?d. 

We  may  now  inquire,  why  that  agency,  which  is  granted  to 
be  necessary  to  praise  and  blame,  is  called  moral.  It  may  be 
observed  here,  that  many  other  beings,  as  well  as  men,  are  rep- 
resented as  acting.  Hence  we  say,  the  sun  sets  and  rises  ;  the 
moon  chaijges  ;  the  water  runs  ;  the  wind  blows  ;  and  of  al- 
most every  thing  which  exists,  action  is  predicated.  They  are 
represented,  in  the  construction  of  all  languages,  as  possessing 
principles  of  action.  What  original  notions  gave  rise  to  such 
modes  of  expression,  is  foreign  to  my  design  to  inqtiire.  Such 
expressions  are  common  in  all  languages.  Yet  we  know,  in- 
animate  existences  have   no  inherent-  principles  of  action. 


101 

Hence,  when  they  arc  called,  or  represented  as  agents,  it  is  iii 
a  figurative  sense  only.  Beings,  which  are  not  agents,  in  the 
literal  and  proper  sense  of  the  word,  we  know  are  not  objects 
of  either  praise  or  blame.  Hence  the  modes  of  expression  in 
all  languages  direct  us  to  two  different  kinds  of  agents.  One 
kind  is  worthy  of  praise,  and  blame  ;  the  other  kind  is  not. 
To  distinguish  one  from  the  other,  we  call  one  a  moral,  the 
other  a  natural  agent.  When  those  words  are  used  to  qualify 
the  term  agent,  they  mean,  that  the  moral  agent  is  a  proper  ob- 
ject of  praise  or  blame  ;  the  natural  agent  is  not.  They  there- 
fore are  used  to  denote  what  beings  are,  and  what  beings  are 
not,  deserving  of  praise  or  blame.  To  communicate  my  idea 
readily  to  another,  that  man  is  worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  I 
only  say,  he  is  a  moral  agent  ;  and  for  the  same  purpose  I  say 
of  another  being,  it  is  a  natural  agent,  neither  deserving  of 
praise  nor  of  blame.  I  grant,  when  I  call  any  thing,  which 
has  no  principle  of  action,  an  agent,  the  word  is  used  in  a  figur- 
ative sense. 

Having  now  shown,  what  agency  in  man  is,  and  why  he  is 
called  a  moral  agent,  I  proceed  to  add, 

2.  That  it  is  agreed  on  all  sides,  that  a  moral  agent  is  a 
proper  object  of  praise  and  blame. 

Few,  if  any,  deny  that  men  are  agents.  The  dispute  is  not, 
whether  men  are  agents  ;  but  as  it  respects  this  point,  in  what 
does  their  agency  consist  .'*     To  this  we  have  already  attended. 

It  is,  also,  generally  granted,  that  men  are  proper  objects  of 
praise  and  blame ;  deserving  of  approbation,  or  disapproba- 
tion, according  to  their  good  or  bad  condcct.  Still  it  is  a 
matter  of  some  debate,  what  is  necessary  to  render  man  a  prop- 
er object  of  praise  and  blame  ?  What  kind  of  agency  is  ne- 
cessary .''  Whether  an  understanding  and  knowledge  are  requi- 
site ?  Tlien,  if  they  agree  that  certain  properties  are  necessa- 
ry to  constitute  a  proper  moral  agent,  it  is  disputed,  why  they 
are  necessary.     Some  assign  one  reason,  and  some  another. 

3.  It  is  in  general  agreed,  that  a  moral  agent  is  a  proper 
subject  of  rewards.  This  but  few  deny.  But  the  inquiry  is, 
what  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  being  a  proper  subject  of  re- 
wards .''  Some  assert  one  thing,  and  some  another.  Respect- 
ing this  question  they  dispute  with  great  warmth. 

4.  Also,  it  is  agreed  generally,  that  liberty  is  necessary  to 
render  man  a  complete  moral  agent.  But  what  is  liberty  .''  Is 
it  consistent  with  necessity,  and  why  is  it  requisite  .''  These 
several  subjects  have  not  been  settled  to  universal  satisfaction. 


102 

It  is  a  matter  of  some  importance  to  learn,  with  respect  to  a 
subject  which  has  caused  almost,  endless  disputes,  how  far  the 
parties  are  agreed,  and  in  what  views  they  disagree.  One 
great  object  of  this  essay  has  been  to  show  how  far  parties  are 
agreed. 

It  appeari  on  examination,  that  they  generally  admit,  that 
man  is  an  agent,  a  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame,  and  a 
proper  subject  of  rewards.  And  it  also  appears,  that  the  fol- 
lowing points  are  yet  subjects  of  debate — what  is  agency  ? 
Why  is  it  necessary,  and  what  other  properties  are  requisite, 
and  why,  to  constitute  a  person  a  |it  object  of  praise  and  blame 
and  a  fit  subject  of  rewards  ?  Ascertaining  the  points  of  agree- 
ment and  disagreement,  prepares  the  way  for  terminating  such 
uncomfortable  disputes.  In  the  next  essay,  I  shall  prosecute 
the  inquiry,  with  a  hope  of  contributing  to  such  a  result. 


#**##«#*»* 


ESSAY  XZV. 

Particular  reasons  given,  ichy  certain  properties  arc 
necessary,  to  constitute  a  being  a  proper ^  and  com- 
plete  moral  agent. 

It  is  agreed,  1.  That  agency  is  necessary  to  constitute  a 
moral  agent.  2.  That  a  moral  agent  is  a  proper  object  of 
praise  and  blame.  3.  That  he  is  a  proper  subject  of  rewards. 
The  great  inquiry  is,  what  is  requisite  to  constitute  such  a  be- 
ing ?  And  when  we  see,  why  the  different  properties  in  suc- 
cession are  necessary,  we  can  answer  the  general  question  ; 
can  determine  what  is  needful  to  render  a  being  a  complete 
and  entire  moral  agent.  For  a  being,  who  has  every  quality 
requisite  to  action,  and  to  make  him  a  fit  object  of  praise  and 
blame,  and  a  proper  subject  of  rewards,  is  a  complete  moral 
agent.     I  shall,  therefore, 

I.  Show  why  the  faculty  called  the  understanding  is  necessa- 
ry, to  constitute  a  being  of  the  above  description.  When  we 
sec  why,  then  we  shall  see  it  is  necessary. 


108 

1 .  The  understanding  is  necessary  to  agency.  The  under- 
standing is  not  an  active  principle,  yet  it  is  necessary  to  action. 
Some  things  are  necessary  to  the  operation  of  active  powers 
or  principles,  so  that  without  them  they  cannot  act. 

The  heart  is  an  active  principle,  and  the  understanding  is 
necessary  to  its  operation  generally,  ifnot  universally. — Plea- 
sure, pain,  and  desires,  are  the  operations  of  the  heart.  By 
these  every  effect  is  produced,  which  is  attributable  to  the 
agency  of  man.  But  in  order  for  objects  to  please  or  offend 
us,  they  must  be  perceived  or  known.  Objects  of  which  we 
have  no  knowledge,  do  not  affect  us.  And  so  long  as  we  re- 
main ignorant  of  them,  they  are  not  objects  of  our  desire  or 
pursuit.  The  only  way  objects,  considered  as  motives,  influ- 
ence us  to  act,  is  by  pleasing  or  disgusting  us.  But  they  can- 
not in  this  manner  influence  us  to  act,  unless  they  are  seen. 
Objects,  which  might  have  a  powerful  influence,  can  have  none, 
so  long  as  we  have  no  knowledge  of  them.  We  hence  see, 
that  a  perception,  or  knowledge  of  objects,  is  necessary  to  ex- 
cite desires  in  us  ;  and  this  is  requisite  to  action.  For  we  shall 
never  act,  only  when  there  is  something  influencing  us.  And 
the  only  way  by  which  they  influence  us  to  act,  is  by  pleasing 
or  ofl'ending  us  ;  and  as  they  do  not  give  us  either  pleasure  or 
pain  unless  they  are  seen  or  known,  it  is  evident  knowledge  is 
necessary  to  the  operation  of  the  heart. 

Knowledge  of  every  kind  belongs  to  the  understanding. 
Hence,  without  this  faculty,  man  would  not  be  a  complete 
agent ;  because  his  active  principles  would  have  no  opportu- 
nity to  operate.  This,  then,  is  one  reason  why  the  under- 
standing is  necessary  to  an  entire  agent.  For  to  this  end,  man 
must  not  only  be  an  agent ;  but  there  must  be  opportunity 
for  the  operation  of  his  active  powers. 

2.  Without  the  faculty  of  understanding  mankind  could  not, 
generally,  obtain  the  objects  which  please  them,  or  avoid  those 
which  disgust  them. 

To  the  attainment  of  ends,  plans  of  operation  are  requisite. 
The  means  necessary  to  any  particular  end  must  be  discover- 
ed, arranged,  and  connected.  When  this  is  done,  a  plan  of 
operation  is  formed.  The  way  is  then  prepared,  for  the  heart 
to  obtain  the  object  of  its  desire. 

But  what  faculty  of  the  mind  devises  means  and  v,ays  to  ac- 
complish our  ends,  and  forms  plans  of  operation  ^  None, 
certainly,  but  a  perceiving  faculty.     It  is  the  office  of  the  un- 


104 

derstanding  to  show  the  heart,  how  it  can  attain  the  ends  it 
wishes.  It  is  the  eye  of  tiie  mind  to  guide  the  heart  in  the 
way,  whicli  will  lead  it  to  the  end  or  object  it  wishes  to  enjoy, 
and  from  the  object  it  wishes  to  avoid.  Suppose  a  man  had  a 
heart,  but  no  understandinp;.  He  could  feel,  if  an  object  were 
presented  ;  but  he  could  see  nothing.  Suppose  it  possible 
that  an  object  could  affect  him  ;  he  could  see  no  way  to  at- 
tain what  he  loved,  or  to  avoid  what  he  hated.  He  could  not 
act  by  aim  or  desicrn  ;  for  he  would  see  nothing  to  aim  at. 
He  could  not  devise  means  for  accomplishing  any  purpose  } 
he  would  grope  in  uncertainty  and  darkness. 

If  a  man  can  perceive  objects,  and  in  this  way  be  affected 
and  influenced  by  them  to  act ;  if  he  can  perceive  and  devise 
the  means  requisite,  to  direct  his  actions  to  the  end  desired  ; 
he  is  thus  far  a  perfect  and  complete  agent.  For  this  purpose, 
the  faculty  of  understanding  is  necessary.  If  man  could  act 
without  an  understanding,  3  et  he  would  be  a  very  imperfect 
agent.  These  reasons  show,  why  the  understanding  is  neces- 
sary to  constitute  man  a  complete  and  proper  agent. 

3.  The  understanding  is  necessary  to  render  man  an  object 
worthy  of  praise  and  blame,  and  a  proper  subject  of  reward. 

If  we  had  not  this  faculty,  we  should  have  no  knowledge  of 
vice,  or  virtue  ;  nor  any  conception  of  the  meaning  of  the 
words,  censure,  blame,  approbation,  praise,  and  rewards.  If 
blamed  or  praised,  we  should  not  know  why,  or  for  what  cause. 
If  we  were  rewarded  with  good,  or  with  evil,  we  could  not 
know  why  we  were  thus  treated  ;  nor  have  any  idea  of  the 
righteousness  of  our  judge,  from  whose  hand  we  receive  re- 
wai'ds.  For,  if  we  had  not  an  intellectual  faculty,  we  should 
have  no  conception  or  knowledge  of  any  thing  whatever.  But 
is  a  being  a  proper  object  of  censure,  or  approbation,  for  any 
of  his  actions,  who  has  no  idea  of  vice  and  virtue  ;  and  who 
consequently  cannot  know  what  is  intended  by  censure  and 
praise  .''  Is  a  being  a  fit  subject  of  rewards,  who  has  no  con- 
ception of  good  and  ill  desert,  or  of  the  justice  and  propriety 
of  his  conduct  who  distributes  rewards  ?  Earthquakes,  tem- 
pests, pestilential  disorders,  are  great  evils  in  the  natural  world. 
But  we  never  think  of  blaming  and  punishing  them.  The  sun, 
rain,  and  fruitful  seasons,  are  great  blessings  in  the  natural 
world.  But  we  have  no  thought  of  praising  and  rewarding 
them.  One  reason  why  we  do  not  is,  we  know  they  can  have 
110  luiderstanding  of  the  things  implied  in  censuring,  praising, 


105 

ai>d  rewarding  them.  Hence  no  end  would  be  answered  by 
treating  them  in  such  a  manner. 

It  is  then  very  evident,  that  beings  which  have  no  intellect, 
and  are  incapable  of  acquiring  knowledge,  are  not  proper  ob- 
jects of  either  praise  or  blame  ;  or  fit  subjects  to  be  rewarded 
with  good  or  evil.  Beings,  which  have  not  the  faculty  of  un- 
derstanding, are  incapable  of  knowledge  ;  and  therefore  they 
are  not  suitable  objects  to  be  censured  or  praised,  or  fit  subjects 
to  be  rewarded.  Hence  they  are  not  proper  and  complete 
moral  agents.  Accordingly',  this  faculty  is  necessary,  for  the 
reasons  given,  to  constitute  any  being  such  an  agent  as  is  in- 
tended by  the  terms  moral  agent. 

I  now  proceed  to  show, 

II.  Why  the  faculty  of  taste,  or  the  heart,  is  necessaay  to 
form  a  complete  moral  agent. 

1.  It  is  necessary  to  constitute  an  intelligent  being  an  agent. 
Agency,  and  the  primary  spring  of  action,  ai-e  the  same  thing- 
It  will  be  generally,  if  not  universally,  agreed,  that  our  intellec- 
tual faculty  is  never  the  subject  of  either  pleasure  or  pain  ;  or 
it  is  not  a  feeling  faculty.  But  as  we  are  in  fact  the  subjects 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  it  follows,  that  the  heart  is  the  only  feel- 
ing facult}'  belonging  to  the  human  mind.  Suppose  a  person 
had  an  intellectual  faculty,  but  had  no  heart,  or  faculty  of  feel- 
ing ;  would  he  ever  act .''  Those,  who  have  ever  given  much 
attention  to  this  question,  are  ready  to  answer,  he  would  remain 
inactive,  unless  moved  by  some  external  force.  And  any  one 
may  be  convinced  of  this  truth,  by  a  little  attention.  For 
though  this  person  might  perceive  objects,  yet  they  would  not 
aftect  him  ;  he  would  be  and  continue  in  a  state  of  perfect  indif- 
ference. And  the  impossibility  of  acting  in  such  a  state,  has 
been  so  clearly,  and  demonstratively  shown  by  several  authors, 
it  is  needless  for  me  to  spend  time  in  proving  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  impossible  for  a  being,  who  is  pleased  or  displeased 
with  objects,  to  remain  in  a  state  of  rest,  or  inaction.  When 
his  pleasures  and  pains  are  faint  and  feeble,  he  will  not  act 
with  much  force.  Yet  the  nature  of  man  is  such,  he  cannot  con- 
tinue long  in  a  state  of  feeble  effort.  For  inaction  begets  un- 
easiness ;  and  action  becomes  necessary  for  the  removal  of  the 
pain,  occasioned  by  inaction.  Also,  if  he  did  not  act,  his  ap- 
petites must  remain  ungratified.  In  this  state,  their  cravings 
and  hankerings  would  increase,  and  render  his  condition  very 
painful.     By  creating  this  uneasiness,  they  ever  incite  man  to 

N 


106 

action  to  obtain  the  objects,  which,  by  satisfying  their  craving.*, 
remove  their  uneasiness.  E\cn  when  the  body  is  at  rest,  the 
heart  of  man  will  keep  his  mind  employed,  and  devising  means 
to  gratify  his  desires.  And  the  activity  of  the  heart  is  as  real- 
ly displayed,  in  turning  the  attention  of  the  mind  from  one  ol)- 
ject  to  another,  and  in  confining  it  to  the  investigation  of  sub- 
jects, as  in  moving  the  body,  and  producing  external,  visible 
effects.  When  all  these  things  are  duly  considered,  it  is  evi- 
dent the  heart  is  always  acting,  either  on  the  mind,  or  the  body  ; 
and  producing  effects  of  some  kind  or  other.  The  heart, 
then,  is  the  primary  principle  of  action  in  moral  agents.  In 
this  the  agency  of  man  consists.  It  is  an  inherent  principle  of 
action  in  man  ;  a  property  and  law  of  his  nature.  Hence  all 
the  actions  of  men  are  their  actions  ;  the  operations  of  a  prin- 
ciple of  action,  which  is  a  property  of  their  nature,  and  constit- 
uent part  of  their  being.  So  that  the  actions  of  men  cannot 
be  attributed  to  any  being,  but  themselves. 

As  this  faculty  constitutes  agency,  if  man  were  destitute  of 
it,  he  would  not  be  an  agent. 

2.  This  faculty  is  necessary  to  constitute  man  worthy  of 
praise  and  blame.  It  is  granted,  that  vice  and  virtue  are  not 
predicable  of  the  understanding.  It  will  also  be  granted,  that 
a  being,  who  is  neither  virtuous  nor  vicious,  is  not  deserving 
of  censure  or  praise.  He  is  not  a  proper  object  of  approbation 
or  disapprobation.  It  has  also  been  shown,  in  the  essays  on 
taste  and  its  operations,  that  vice  and  virtue  arc  not  predicable 
of  any  faculty  of  the  mind,  but  the  heart.  And  the  reason  is, 
no  other  faculty  is  a  principle  of  action.  It  is  not,  therefore^ 
necessary  here  to  prove,  that  vice  and  virtue  have  their  seat  in 
the  heart,  this  having  already  been  done.  It  therefore  follows, 
that  as  vice  and  virtue  belong  to  tiie  heart,  and  are  essentially 
necessay  to  render  a  being  worthy  of  praise  and  blame,  if  men 
did  not  possess  this  faculty,  they  would  not  be  proper  objects 
of  either  censure,  or  approbation.  This  faculty  then  is  essen- 
tially requisite,  for  the  reason  now  assigned,  to  constitute  a 
moral  agent. 

3.  This  faculty  is  necessary  to  render  men  rewardable. — Fu- 
ture misery  is  the  i-eward  of  the  wicked,  and  happiness  the  re- 
ward of  tlie  righteous.  Wickedness  of  heart  prepares  the  for- 
)ner  for  eternal  death  ;  holiness  fits  the  latter  for  eternal  life. 
Beings,  therefore,  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain,  cannot  be 
rewarded.     They  cannot  be  made  either  miserable  or  happy. 


107 

We  never  think  of  rewarding  or  punishing  inanimate  things, 
however  useful,  or  hurtful.  We  know  they  are  incapable  of 
rewards,  because  they  are  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

And  as  the  heart  is  the  only  feeling  faculty  belonging  to  man, 
deprive  him  of  this,  he  is  then  incapable  of  receiving  rewards. 
With  this  faculty,  he  can  be  rewarded  with  good  or  evil,  ac- 
cording to  the  defect  of  his  character.  But  without  it,  he  is  no 
more  rewardable,  than  any  part  of  the  inanimate  creation. 
But  a  being  incapable  of  rewards,  is  not  a  complete  moral 
agent. 

This  faculty,  then,  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  man  a  proper 
moral  agent.  For  the  first  reason  assigned,  it  is  requisite  to 
make  him  an  agent.  For  the  second  reason  given,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  render  him  a  fit  object  of  praise  and  blame.  And  for 
the  third  reason,  it  is  needful  to  render  him  capable  of  future  re- 
wards. It  is,  therefore,  absolutely  requisite  to  constitute  him 
a  proper  moral  agent.  This  is  the  most  essential,  and  impor- 
tant facidty  belonging  to  the  subject  of  moral  agency  ;  and  the 
most  difficult  of  any  to  be  understood  clearly  and  distinctly. 

III.  The  will  is  a  necessary  faculty  in  moral  agency.  If 
a  wheel  is  wanting  in  a  clock,  it  is  imperfect.  It  is  not  prepar- 
ed to  answer  the  end  for  which  it  was  made.  It  was  the  design 
of  God  in  the  formation  of  man,  to  make  him  capable  of  ac- 
complishing his  wishes,  af  manifesting  his  real  character,  and 
serving  his  Maker.  That  he  might  be  qualified  for  these  ends, 
that  faculty  termed  the  will  was  necessary.  The  will  is,  there- 
fore, necessary, 

1.  To  render  us  capable  of  gratifying  our  appetites,  and  de- 
sires. Here  let  it  be  remembered,  that  volitions  are  the  opera- 
tions of  the  will  ;  and  by  volitions,  I  mean,  those  voluntary 
exertions  with  which  bodily  motions,  and  the  direction  of  the 
understanding  are  immediately  connected  ;  and  by  which  those 
other  external,  and  visible  effects  are  produced,  which  are  ne- 
cessary to  obtain  or  avoid  the  objects  at  which  we  aim.  These 
are  necessary,  to  gratify  our  wishes  and  appetites.  When  the 
heart  desires  the  enjoyment  of  an  object,  and  the  understanding 
has  formed  a  plan  for  its  attainment ;  unless  the  plan  is  carried 
into  execution,  the  heart  cannot  be  gratified,  or  accomplish  its 
wishes. 

For  instance,  a  person  wishes  to  visit  a  friend  at  a  distance. 
To  eflbct  this,  measures  must  be  concerted  and  pursued.  To 
concert  a  scheme  agreeable  to  the  desires  of  the  heart,  is  the 


108 

office  of  the  understandintij.  When  the  plan  is  formed,  the  un- 
derstanduig  has  done  its  duty  ;  for  it  is  only  a  servant  to  the 
heart.  To  execute  the  plan,  many  thinj^s  must  be  put  in  motion, 
and  a  train  of  efiects  must  be  produced.  It  is  the  office  of  the 
will  to  produce  them.  And  by  exertions,  which  are  called  voli- 
tions, they  are  produced.  The  plan  is  executed  ;  the  heart 
obtains  its  end,  and  is  gratified.  When  the  plan  is  executed,  the 
will  has  performed  its  dut}' ;  for  it  is  only  a  servant  to  the  heart. 
Thus  the  will  is  an  executive  power.  By  this  power,  the  heart 
gratifies  its  appetites  and  desires,  obtains  whatever  it  esteems 
good,  and  avoids  whatever  it  esteems  evil,  as  far  as  God  sees  it 
best  to  prosper  our  exertions.  Is  man  a  complete  agent,  is  he 
such  an  agent  as  he  would  wish  to  be,  unless  he  is  able  to  reach 
his  desired  ends  ?  If  he  had  not  this  faculty,  he  would  be  inca- 
pable of  performing  any  external  actions.  However  strong  his 
desires  might  be,  he  must  remain  in  a  state  of  rest,  and  never 
obtain  the  ends  desired.  To  constitute  a  perfect  agent,  two 
things  are  necessary.  First,  a  principle  of  action  ;  a  primary, 
operative  cause,  inherent  in  his  nature.  Secondly,  this  ac- 
tive principle  must  be  able  to  produce  all  the  effi?cts,  necessary 
to  obtain  its  desired  ends,  and  the  ends  for  which  it  is  created. 
Such  a  principle  constitutes  complete  agency.  And  in  order  for 
this  agent  to  be  thus  efficient,  two  other  things  are  necessary. 
First,  an  understanding,  to  form  plan»of  operation  ;  and  sec- 
ondly, a  will  to  execute  them.  And  each  of  these  faculties  inust 
be  under  the  command,  control,  and  direction  of  the  heart. 
If  they  are,  then  the  heart,  which  is  an  active  principle,  is  «6/e, 
its  agency  is  sufficient,  to  accomplish  all  its  desires  and  ends,  as 
far  as  God  sees  best,  on  whom  all  created  beings  are  de- 
pendent. Hence  we  see,  that  unless  man  had  a  will,  and  unless 
his  will  had  been  subjected  to  the  command  of  the  heart,  he 
would  not  have  been  a  perfect  agent.  He  would  \\o\.  have  been 
able  to  carry  any  plan  into  execution,  or  to  gratify  any  of  his 
appetites  and  desires.  And,  unless  he  had  been  able  to  do  this, 
his  agency  would  not  have  been  complete.  So  the  will  is  ne- 
cessary to  a  perfect  agent.  Some  may  here  ask,  why  God,  in 
forming  men,  did  not  immediately  connect  bodily  motions,  and 
other  external  actions  and  effi^cts,  with  the  desires  of  the  heart  ? 
Why  was  it  necessary,  that  this  power,  called  the  will,  should 
interfere,  between  the  heart  and  external  visible  actions  ^  An- 
swer, why  men  were  not  made  difierently,  does  not  belong  to 
us  to  determine.     God  knew  what  was  necessary,  to  constitute 


A 


109 

such  a  being  as  man  perfect  in  his  kind.  Such  a  being 
he  has  made  him.  To  say  he  might  have  been  made  diflerent- 
ly,  and  answer  the  end  of  his  being  as  well,  is  dictating  to  our 
Maker,  and  exalting  ourselves  above  him.  Our  only  business 
in  our  investigations  is,  to  get  a  clear  knowledge  of  man,  as 
he  is  made  ;  and  the  perfect  adaptedness  of  his  being  to  the 
end  for  which  he  was  created.  It  does  not  belong  to  a  child  to 
dictate  to  a  clock  maker.  But  when  the  machine  i^  finished, 
he  may  examijie  it,  and  learn  its  perfect  adaptedness  to  the  end 
for  which  it  was  designed.  And  we  find  the  will  is  a  necessary 
faculty,  in  beings  formed  as  we  are. 

2.  The  will   is  necessary,  to  a   full  performance  of  all  the 
duties  enjoined  us  by  our  Maker. 

We  are  servants  of  God.  And  if  we  have  every  thing  neces- 
sary to  perform  faithfully  the  services  required  of  us,  in  case 
the  heart  is  right,  we  are  qualified  for  the  station  we  fill.  The 
divine  commands,  in  general,  respect  two  things  ;  the  temper  of 
the  heart  we  ought  to  have,  and  the  actions  we  ought  to  per- 
form. The  temper  of  the  heart  they  require  is  that,  which  is 
implied  in  love  to  God  and  our  neighbour.  These  two  com- 
mands comprise  all  the  divine  requirements  and  prohibitions,  as 
far  as  they  respect  the  heart.  But  external  actions,  as  well  as  a 
right  internal  temper,  are  required  of  us.  For  instance,  we 
are  required  to  remember  the  sabbath,  to  keep  it  holy.  All  the 
external  actions  implied  in  this  command,  we  are  bound  to  per- 
form. We  are  also  required  to  clothe  the  naked,  and  feed  the 
hungry.  And  all  the  external  actions,  necessary  to  the  per- 
formance of  this  duty,  are  implied  in  the  command.  So  that 
commands,  generally  speaking,  respect  the  heart  and  our  outr 
Avard  actions.  So  far  as  outward  actions  are  required,  the  will 
is  necessary  to  the  performance  of  them.  For  it  is  by  the  will 
only,  that  these  actions  are  performed.  Hence,  without  this 
faculty,  we  could  not  obey  the  commands  of  God  so  far  as  they 
respect  our  outward  conduct.  We  might  have  the  temper  of 
heart  required  ;  but  could  not,  w  ithout  the  help  of  the  will,  per- 
form the  external  part  enjoined.  The  will,  therefore,  is  a  neces- 
sary qualification  to  the  performance  in  full  of  the  duties  requir- 
ed. Without  this,  we  should  labour  under  a  natural  inability. 
And  without  an  understanding  to  learn  and  know  the  will  of 
God,  we  should  be  under  a  natural  inability  to  obey  his  com- 
mands.    But  an  understanding  sufficient  to  know  his  pleasure, 


no 

nnd  a  will  to  pmform  evorv  external  duty  required,  eonstitule 
M  nalmal  ability  to  ser\e  tlie  Lord. 

o.  The  will  is  necessary  to  manifest  ihc  nature  and  cfiaracter  of 
thr  heart.  A  person,  who  has  a  holy  character,  ouj;ht  to  he 
praised  by  his  fellows,  and  treated  well  by  his  Maker.  If  his 
character  be  bad,  he  deserves  the  censme  of  his  fellow  men, 
and  the  disapprobation  of  JiisJudffe.  Now  the  heart  of  man  con- 
stitutes his  uioral  ciiaracter.  Every  person's  heart  is  virtuous 
or  vicious;  and  therefore,  in  a  moral  sense,  is  good  or  evil,  de- 
servini;'  of  approbation  or  censure.  Put  men  cannot  be  ac- 
quainted with  each  other's  hearts,  or  characters,  oidy  by  exter- 
nal signs  or  actions.  These  are  the  indices  of  tiie  heart,  the 
t^igns  and  interpreters  of  its  nature.  As  by  the  fruit  a  tree 
bears,  we  learn  its  nature  ;  so  by  these  external  fruits,  we  ob- 
tain a  knowledge  of  each  other's  characters.  \Vithout  this 
knowledge,  we  could  not  make  proper  distinctions  in  our  treat- 
ment of  men.  But  it  is  the  will,  which  produces  those  extern- 
al fruits  from  which  we  learn  the  characters  of  men.  Hence, 
without  this  faculty  we  could  have  no  knowledge  of  men's  char- 
acters, and  could  not  see  the  righteousness  of  God  in  the  final 
distribution  of  rewards.  Vov  a  knowledge  of  every  person's  de- 
sert is  necessary,  to  see  his  righteousness  in  rewarding. 

These  are  the  I'aculties  requisite  to  constitute  a  moral  agent. 
I  have  also  assigned  the  reasons,  why  they  are  necessary ;  and 
have  made  it  evident,  1  trust,  that  if  either  of  them  were  want- 
ing, man  would  be  an  imperfect  aaent.  I>ut  these  properties 
render  him  a  complete  agent.  He  has  all  the  agency  and  ef- 
ficiency juHHlful,  to  all  the  pin-poses  of  a  fmite,  dependent  be- 
ing. They  render  him  also  a  proper  object  of  praise  and 
blame,  and  a  rightful  subject  of  rewards.  For  a  being  of  the 
description  I  have  given,  will  lorever  appear  to  us  to  deserve 
praise  or  blame,  and  a  good  or  evil  reward,  according  to  the 
nature  of  his  character. 

•  An  inlant,  when  born,  has  the  faculty  called  the  understand- 
ing-, which  qualities  him  for  an  endless  improvement  in  knowl- 
edge. He  has,  also,  the  faculty  termed  the  taste,  or  heart, 
which  prepares  him  to  be  the  subject  of  agreeable  and  painl'ul 
s.ensations,  and  all  those  desires  which  attend  them.  He  is  en- 
dued with  a  principle  of  action,  which  will  never  cease  to  act 
throuuh  interminable  aces.  He  has,  moreover,  the  facultv  call- 
ed  the  will,  which  prepares  him  to  perform  any  actions,  and 
produce  any  elfects,  necessary  to  gratify  his  appetites  and  de« 


Ill 

sires,  as  far  as  Infinite  wisdom  may  see  best.  He  has?  tlie  faculty 
necessary  to  devise  means  and  form  plans  for  the  accomplisli- 
ment  of  iiis  desires.  He  lias  the  j'acidt}'  recjuisite  to  carry 
them  into  execution.  lie  has  the  faculty  or  principle  of  action, 
which  puts  every  thing  in  motion.  It  can  turn  the  under- 
standing from  object  to  object;  and  confine  its  attention,  when 
and  where  it  will.  It  can  employ  the  will  in  executing  its  wish- 
es and  purposes.  Such  an  infant,  then,  is  thus  far  an  entire  and 
perfect  moral  agent.  It  is  prepared  for  action  and  improve- 
ment. 

But  one  thing  more  is  wanting  to  render  man  a  finished,  com- 
plete? and  perfect  agent;  that  is  liberty.  What  that  liberty  is, 
wiiich  is  considered  as  essential  to  moral  agency,  and  why  itis 
necessary,  and  other  inquiries  connected  with  these,  will  be  the 
subject  of  the  next  essay. 


tltntHtnnnmn 


ESSAir  XV. 

Of  Lihcrly  ;  and  the  reasons  ichy  it  is  necessary  io 
form  a  complete,  perfect,  moral  agent. 

This  essay  will  comprise  a  discussion  of  two  questions  : 
What  is  liberty  ^ — and.  Why  is  it  necessary  to  a  perfect  mor- 
al agency  .''  To  prepare  the  way,  I  shall  inquire,  Whether 
nny  poiver  or  operation  of  the  mind  is  liberty  .'* 

1.  It  will  be  granted,  thai  our  intellectual  faculty  does  not 
constitute  liberty.  Liberty  is  never,  unless  figuratively,  predica- 
ted of  the  understanding,  or  of  any  of  its  operations.  No  au- 
thor, that  I  recollect,  considers  perception,  or  reason,  or  mem- 
ory, or  judgment,  or  conscience,  as  constituting  liberty.  It 
will  be  granted,  that  liberty  does  not  belong  to  the  understand- 
ing, or  any  of  its  t)perations. 

2.  Is  the  pleasure  or  the  pain,  which  in  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree we  derive  from  objects,  liberty  ?  Is  liberty  the  same 
thing  as  being  pleased,  or  disgusted  ?  Is  any  person  at  liber- 
ty to  say,  whether  objects  shall  please  or  disgust  him  ?     If  so, 


112 

tlien  we  liaVe  power  to  create  our  own  happiness  and  misery. 
And  if  men  have  this  power,  why  do  they  groan  under  exquis- 
ite pains  for  days,  for  montlis  and  for  years  ?  Is  any  person  at 
liberty  to  determine,  wlieiher  a  bodily  disease  shall  give  him 
pain  or  not  ;  or  whether  natural  objects,  or  divine  objects, 
shall  please,  or  disgust  him  ?  When  we  consider  how  averse 
all  mankind  are  to  pain,  and  how  ardently  they  seek  happi- 
ness, if  it  depended  on  their  determinations  whether  they  should 
be  happy  or  miserable,  we  have  reason  to  conclude  that  all 
misery  would  immediately  be  banished  from  this  world.  But 
mankind  know  that  happiness  and  misery  do  not  depend  on 
their  determinations.  Or  it  does  not  depend  on  their  determi- 
nations, whether  objects  shall  please  or  displease  them.  It  is 
true,  they  can  by  prudent  conduct  avoid  many  causes  of  pain, 
and  render  their  circumstances  more  comfortable.  Still,  wheth- 
er the  object  they  have  shunned,  or  the  one  they  have  attained, 
shall  give  them  pleasure  or  pain,  does  not  depend  on  their 
determinations.  When  I  have  purchased  an  orange,  it  does 
not  depend  on  me  to  say,  whether  I  shall  relish  or  disrelish  it. 
Our  pleasures  and  pains  depend  on  our  nature,  and  the  nature 
of  objects  with  which  we  are  conversant.  All  we  can  do  is  to 
avoid  those,  which  we  know  are  disgustful,  and  get  possession 
of  those,  which  we  learn  by  experience  are  agreeable,  as  far  as 
our  power  extends.  Therefore,  a  pleasant  feeling  is  not  libert}', 
neither  is  a  painful  sensation  liberty  ;  nor  are  we,  in  any  sense, 
free  to  determine  whether  objects  shall  please  or  ofl'end  us. 

3.  Do  our  desires  constitute  liberty  .'*  If  a  desire  to  obtain 
or  shun  an  object,  is  liberty;  then,  so  far  as  we  have  desires,  we 
have  liberty.  But  it  no  more  depends  on  us  to  say,  whether 
we  shall  desire  to  obtain,  or  avoid  objects,  than  to  say,  wheth- 
er they  shall  please  or  disgust  us.  If  an  object  disgust  us,  a 
desire  will  arise  to  avoid  it ;  and  if  it  please  us,  and  is  attaina- 
ble, we  shall  desire  the  enjoyment  of  it.  Desires  will  attend 
our  sensations.     We  cannot  prevent  it. 

Again,  if  a  desire  of  the  heart  is  liberty,  then,  when  persons 
have  desires,  they  are  free.  But  when  a  person  is  bound  with 
chains,  he  may  desire  to  walk.  But  is  he  at  liberty  to  walk, 
when  his  feet  are  bound  with  fetters  ?  It  will  be  granted  that, 
in  this  situation,  he  has  not  liberty  to  walk.  Yet  he  may,  and 
persons  often  have,  in  such  a  condition,  desires  to  walk.  And 
if  desires  are  liberty,  then  persons  have  liberty  to  walk,  when 
their  feet  are  bound  with  cords  ;  or  they  have  liberty,  and  at 


iia 

the  same  time,  have  none.  This  is  a  direct  contradiction  ;  and 
makes  it  evident,  that  a  desire  is  not  liberty.  Whatever  liber- 
ty is,  it  is  something  totally  distinct  from  sensations  and  desires. 
And  hence  liberty  does  not  consist  in  any  of  the  operations  of 
the  heart,  or  taste. 

4.  Does  liberty  consist  in  volitions  ?  Are  volition  and  lib- 
erty synonlmous  terms  .'*  If  so,  then  a  person  is  free,  as  far  as 
he  has  voluntary  exertions.  But  in  the  case  just  mentioned, 
where  a  person  has  his  feet  bound  with  fetters,  he  has  at  that 
time  no  hberty  to  walk  ?  Yet  he  may  make,  and  persons  in 
such  a  condition  often  do  make,  powerful  and  voluntary  exer- 
tions to  walk.  If  such  exertions  constitute  liberty,  persons  have 
it,  and  exercise  it.  But  1  believe  it  will  be  granted,  that  in 
this  condition  they  have  no  liberty  to  walk.  Hence  volitions 
are  not  liberty,  unless  contradictions  may  be  true. 

It  may  be  said,  though  volition  is  not  liberty,  yet  persons 
may  have  liberty  to  will,  or  make  voluntary  exertions.  They 
may  be  free  to  make  such  exertions,  even  when  bound.  This 
is  readily  granted  ;  but  it  does  not  determine  what  freedom  is. 
It  is  not  volition,  nor  any  antecedent  sensation  or  desire.  What 
then  is  mea;nt  bj'  this  liberty  to  will,  to  choose,  or  refuse  .'' 

Though  very  few,  if  any,  expressly  say  that  volitions  are  lib-' 
erty  ;  yet  many  assert,  that  liberty  is  as  essential  to  volition  as 
fluidity  is  to  water.  What  is  the  moaning  of  such  an  expres* 
sion  ?  We  say,  water  is  a  fluid.  Do  they  mean,  then,  that  a 
volition  is  liberty  .''  We  have  seen  this  idea  implies  a  contra- 
diction,, as  soon  as  we  view  it  in  relation  to  some  given  eflect. 
By  the  fluidity  of  water,  may  be  meant  its  adaptedness  to  run 
or  move  towards  the  centre.  Do  they  mean,  then,  when  they 
say  volitions  are  free,  there  is  an  adaptedness  in  them  to  some 
eflect  ?  Is  an  adaptedness  in  volition  to  move  the  hands  or 
feet,  the  thing  intended  by  liberty  ?  I  believe  few  will  assert 
this.  Do  they  mean  by  the  expression,  that  volitions  are  free, 
as  we  say,  water  is  fluid  .''  What  are  they  free  to  do  ?  When 
a  person  is  bound,  are  his  volitions  free  to  produce  walking.?* 
No.  For  this  would  imply  a  contradiction.  Do  they  mean, 
persons  are  free  to  choose,  to  will  ?  This  makes  liberty  consist 
in  something  antecedent  to  volition,  and  fah-ly  gives  up  the  idea, 
that  volitions  are  free.  For  to  sa},  volitions  are  free,  and  to 
say  we  are  free  to  choose,  are  very  diflerent  things. 

When  I  am  bound  with  fetters  of  iron,  am  I  at  liberty  to  make 
Toluntary   exertions  to  break  my  fetters  ?     I  am.     No  man 

O 


114 

can  deprive  me  of  this  liberty.  No  man  can  prevent  my  will' 
ing,  or  choosing.  Men  cannot  bind  the  will.  But  are  my  vol- 
untary exertions  at  liberty  to  loosen  the  chains  on  my  Icet  ? 
They  certainly  are  not.  I  do  not  enjoy  the  liberty  necesssary 
to  produce  the  effect  aimed  at.  It  is  agreed,  that  in  this  con- 
dition 1  am  not  at  liberty  to  walk.  Hence  it  may  be  said,  I  am 
at  liberty  to  make  ecceriions  to  walk  ;  but  I  s.m  not  at  liberty  to 
walk,  or  io produce  this  effect.  All  that  is  contained  in  the 
last  sentence,  the  distinction  it  presents  to  view,  it  is  presumed, 
will  be  readily  granted.  And  according  to  this  distinction,  I 
am  free,  antecedent  to  willing.  I  am  at  liberty  to  choose  ;  to 
make  voluntary  exertions.  1  am  in  this  state  of  liberty  ante- 
cedent to  choosing.  Were  this  not  true,  it  would  be  as  impos- 
sible for  me  to  make  these  exertions,  as  it  is  to  arise,  and  walk. 
I  cannot  walk  ;  because  1  do  not  enjoy  the  liberty  necessary 
to  this  event.  And,  if  I  did  not  enjoy  liberty  to  choose,  I  could 
not  make  one  exertion  with  a  view  to  walking. 

Now  everyone  may  see,  liberty  and  walking  are  not  the  same 
thing.  For  a  liberty  to  walk  is  antecedent  to  the  event.  And 
volition  and  liberty  ire  not  convertible  terms.  For  a  liberty  to 
make  exertions  to  walk  is  antecedent  to  making  ihem.  Hence 
it  is  obvious,  that  liberty  and  volition  are  not  the  same  thing. 

5.  Is  liberty  some  power,  which  the  mind  possesses  .''  Some 
'say,  liberty  is  a  power  to  act  or  not  to  act.  This  notion  of  lib- 
erty many  have  labored  to  support. 

In  this  definition  of  liberty  it  i§  important  to  know  what  is 
meant  by  action.  Choice  is  an  action,  or  exercise.  It  is  an 
act  of  the  will.  And  bodil}'  motions  are  called  actions.  All 
those  visible,  external  effects,  which  moral  agents  produce,  are 
stiled  their  actions.  While  they  are  talking,  travelling,  labor- 
ing, they  are  acting.  Every  vohtion,  and  all  the  effects  which 
volitions  produce,  are  the  actions  of  moral  agents.  The  action 
they  intend,  is  to  be  understood  in  one  or  both  of  these  senses. 
Hence,  when  they  say  liberty  is  a  power  to  act  or  not  to  act, 
they  mean  it  is  a  power  to  will  or  not  to  will  ;  or  a  power  to 
perform,  or  not  perform  external  actions.  They,  therefore, 
make  the  same  distinction  between  j)oiver  and  action,  as  is  com- 
monly made  between  a  cause  and  effect.  Their  power  is  a  cause, 
and  action  is  the  effect  it  produces.  Having  explained  what 
appears  to  be  their  meaning  of  the  phrase,  "  liberty  is  a  pow- 
er to  act  or  not  to  act,"  let  us  examine  it  with  respect  to  external 
actions. 


i 


115 

External,  visible  actions  are  effects,  and  must  have  a  ca«9e» 
But  what  is  the  cause  of  these  external  actions?  Volitions  cer* 
tainly.  Willing  to  walk,  produces  walking.  In  like  manner, 
willing,  or  voluntary  exertion,  produces  every  other  external  ef- 
fect, which  can  be  attributed  to  us  as  agents.  Their  power,  then, 
to  perform  or  not  perform  these  external  actions,  is  volition. 
For  volition  is  the  power,  that  produces  those  effects  or  ac- 
tions. Hence,  as  liberty  is  a  power  to  act,  or  produce  such  exter- 
nal effects,  and  it  is  our  volitions  which  produce  them,  then  vo- 
lition is  liberty.  For  we  see,  this  power  is  volition  ;  and  they 
say,  this  power  is  liberty.  Of  course,  liberty  and  volition  are 
the  same  thing.  That  this  is  not  a  just  notion  of  liberty,  vfc 
have  already  shown. 

We  may  now  examine  their  power  in  relation  to  the  acts  of 
the  will.  Here  we  are  to  view  volitions  as  effects,  and  the 
power  of  which  they  speak  is  the  cause  of  them.  Here  the 
difficulty  is,  to  learn  what  they  mean  by  power.  We  will  grant 
there  is  such  a  power  as  thej'  contend  for  ;  and  our  object  now 
is,  to  ascertain  what  it  is.  A  power,  and  its  operations, 
are  objects  of  distinct  consideration.  For  a  power,  if  it 
do  not  operate,  if  it  remain  in  a  dormant  state,  will  never  pro- 
duce any  effect.  It  is  by  operating  that  it  produces  effects. 
Now  the  question  is,  what  will  put  this  power  in  operation  ? 
Some  antecedent  power  .''  What  will  put  that  in  operation  .'' 
Some  other  antecedent  power  ?  We  see  this  is  only  running 
back  ad  infinitum,  without  ever  arriving  at  a  first  power.  To 
ascertain  what  they  must  mean  by  this  power,  if  they  mean  any 
thing,  the  following  self-evident  propositions  demand  attention. 

1.  If  mankind  were  as  incapable  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  as  rocks  are,  they  would  be  as  inactive.  And  if 
they  have  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain,  yet — 2.  If  there 
were  no  objects  in  existence,  they  would  still  remain  inactive. 
And,  3.  If  objects  did  exist,  yet  if  they  were  never  in  the  least 
degree  to  give  them  any  pleasure,  or  pain,  they  would  still  re- 
main inactive.  Three  things,  then,  are  absolutely  necessary  to 
action.  1 .  A  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain.  2.  Objects  to 
please  and  disgust  us.  3.  Real  pleasure,  or  pain,  excited  by 
those  objects.  Each  of  these  is  so  essential  to  action,  if  either 
is  wanting,  no  action  will  exist ;  the  universe  would  never  have 
had  any  existence.  And  these  propositions  appear  to  me  to  be 
self-evident.     The  first  is  certainly  a  self-evident  truth.     And 


116 

if  any  should  say  the  other  two  arc  not,  they  must  admit,  they 
are  necessary  inferences  from  the  first  proposition.  If  men  had 
no  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain,  they  would  be  as  inactive 
as  rocks.  For  they  would  be  as  destitute  of  any  active  princi- 
ple as  inanimate  matter.  Thei-e  is  no  excitement  to  action,  in 
a  being  whici)  has  no  feeling.  For  feeling  is  the  only  internal 
excitement.  Hence  if  no  objects  to  aifect  him  existed,  he  would 
not  feel,  or  be  the  subject  of  pleasure  and  pain.  And  if  ob- 
jects do  exist,  yet  do  not  impress  hin),  as  tliose  dQ  not  which 
are  not  seen,  or  come  in  contact  with  our  bodily  senses,  or  be 
presented  in  some  other  way  to  the  mind,  still  he  has  no  feel- 
ing. And  where  there  is  no  feeling,  there  is  no  excitement  to 
action  ;  and  where  there  is  no  excitement,  actions  can  never 
have  existence.  Whether  these  remarks  render  the  three  first 
propositions  above  stated  any  more  evident,  is  a  doubt  in  my 
mind.  If  they  have  been  made  more  evident,  it  is  because  I 
have  stated  them  in  diflerent  words  ;  and  not  because  the  illus- 
trations are  clef^r.n-  than  the  propositions  ihemseh  es. 

This  conclusion  now  follows  ;  that  if  a  power  to  act  or  not 
to  act  means  any  thing,  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain  must 
be  the  thing  intended  by  it.  Because,  without  such  a  capaci- 
ty existing  some  where,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  actiou 
ii]  the  universe.  For  powers  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain 
will  never  act.  They  have  no  excitement  in  their  nature  to  ac- 
tion. They  are  incapable  of  being  put  in  operation,  by  any 
quality  inherent  in  them. 

Hence,  according  to  the  definition  of  liberty  we  are  now  ex- 
amining, it  is  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain.  But  is  this  the 
true  idea  of  liberty  .''  Is  any  man  at  liberty  to  say,  whether 
objects  shall  please  or  disgust  him  or  not  ?  This  notion  of 
liberty  has  been  already  refuted. 

From  the  whole  that  has  been  said  in  this  essay,  it  appears, 
that  liberty  does  not  consist  in  any  power,  or  operation  of  the 
mind.  Neither  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain,  nor  sensations 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  nor  desires,  nor  volitions,  constitute  lib- 
erty. Hence  libcrt}'  is  not  a  quality  of  the  mind,  or  of  a  mor- 
al agent  ;  unless  we  consider  a  privilege  a  quality.  We  may 
now  proceed  to  show  what  liberty  is. 

The  unlearned  define  liberty  in  difierent  words ;  yet  their 
definitions  amount  to  the  same  thing.  And  their  definition  is 
the  result  of  their  feelings  and  experience  ;  and  of  course  is  as 
just  as  any  given  by  the  learned.     They  commonly  say,  to  act 


117 

as  ihey  please  is  liberty.  So  far  anJ  so  long  as  they  can  act 
as  they  please,  or  as  they  have  a  mind  to  act,  they  enjoy  all  tho 
liberty  tliey  can  conceive  of,  and  all  the}'  desire.  Pcrhr.ps  a 
better  definition  than  this  cannot  be  given  of  liberty.  Let  us 
now  attenclfto  the  things  implied  in  it. 

1.  What  do  they  mean  by  action  ?  By  this  they  lUKiOubt- 
edly  mean  two  things  ;  willing,  and  the  cjj'ects  which  are  con- 
nected with  the  will.  Thej",  therefore,  would  distinguish  be- 
tween liberty  of  ivill,  and  liberty  of  action.  For  they  niight 
enjoy  the  one,  and  not  the  other. 

2.  What  do  they  mean  by  pleasure  ?  ^hcy  say  they  arc 
free,  when  they  can  act  according  to  their  pleasure.  They 
mean  their  wishes,  or  desires.  If  objects  please  them,  it  is 
their  wish  to  obtain  them  ;  if  they  disgust  them,  they  with  to 
avoid  them.  It  is  their  pleasnre  to  obtain  whatever  pleases, 
and  shun  whatever  oflends  them  ;  which  is  no  more  than  say- 
ing, it  is  their  desire  to  enjoy  the  former,  and  avoid  the  pain  the 
latter  gives  them.  These  are  the  only  ideas  of  importance  to 
be  attended  to,  In  their  definition  of  liberty.  Accordingly^ 
when  they  have  desires  to  get  possession  of  an  object, 
which  pleases  them,  they  wish  to  have  every  act  exist  necessa- 
ry to  their  end.  The  first  act  is  volition.  Their  desire  prompts 
them  to  a  voluntary  exertion,  which  is  the  first  thing  necessary  to 
their  end.  If  any  thing  should  restrain,  or  prevent  their  putting 
forth  the  voluntary  exertion  to  which  their  desires  prompt  them, 
they  would  say  they  are  not  free,  their  liberty  of  choosing  ac- 
cording to  their  pleasure  is  abridged.  And  if  any  thing  should 
constrain,  or  oblige  them,  to  choose  or  will  anything  contrary 
to  their  desire,  they  would  view  their  libert}'  of  choice  dctroy- 
ed.  If  two  objects  were  before  a  person,  one  of  which  was  very 
pleasing,  and  the  other  ver}'  di?f}ustful  to  him  ;  if  he  was  eflec- 
tually  restrained  from  choosing  the  agreeable,  &,  vva.s  constrained 
to  choose  the  disagreeable  object,  I  ask,  would  he  not  fi  el  and 
say,  that  his  liberty  of  will  was  abridged,  and  destioyed.^  In  this 
case  a  person  is  restrained  from  choosing  agreeably  to  his  de- 
sire, and  constrained  to  will  in  oppos.tion  to  it.  If  this  were  a 
law  of  our  nature,  obliging  us  to  Aviil  in  direct  opposition  to  our 
feelings  and  desires,  w  ould  not  mankind  be  in  a  most  niihappy 
condition  .''  Let  any  one  reflect,  how  he  must  feel  in  such  a 
state,  to  have  his  will  always  crossing  and  opposing  his  desires  ; 
he  must  at  once  be  convinced,  such  a  condition  would  be  most 
unhappy  and  afflictive. 


118 

On  the  other  hand,  if  he  never  finds  any  thing  preventinp  of 
hindering  his  choosing  objects  according  to  his  wish,  does  he 
not  enjoy  all  the  liberty  of  will  he  can  desire  ?     With  respect 
to  liberty  of  will,  what  more  can  a  person  desire,  ^an  to  will 
nccording  to  his  wishes  ?     Or,  than  to  have  the  acts  of  his  will 
subject  to  his  pleasure  ?     This  is  the  highest  liberty  of  will,  of 
which  it  is  possible  to   form  any  conception.     The  will  oper- 
ates, or  acts,  free  from  the  influence  of  any  restraint,  or  con- 
straint.    There  is  no  power,  which  does  or  can  restrain  men 
from  willing  as  they  desire,  or  constrain  them  to  will  contrary 
to  it,  except  the  divine  power.     Between  the  strcmgest  desire  of 
the  heart,  and  choosing  the  object  of  that  desire,  God  has  es- 
tablished an  intallible  connexion.     He  certainly  will  not  exert 
his  power  in  o|iposition  to  his  own  appointment.     Hence  he 
will  never  oblige  men  to  exert  their  wills  in  opposition  to  their 
desires.     And  no  other  power  in  the  universe  can   destroy  a 
connexion,  which  he  iias  established.     Accordingly  the  liberty 
of  the  will  never  will,  and  never  can,  be  abridged.     Hence 
mankind  do,  and  ever  will,  enjoy  the  privilege  of  willing  agree- 
ably to  their  desires,  or  pleasure.  This  privilege  is  liberty.    And 
this  privilege  is  made  sure  and  certain  to  men,  by  the  unaltera-- 
ble  determination  of  Jehovah. 

When  I  say,  we  are  at  liberty  to  will  according  to  our  desires, 
my  meaning  is,  according  to  the  strongest  desire,  at  the  time  we 
make  our  choice.  Mankind  often  have  desires,  each  of  which 
cannot  be  gratified  at  the  same  time.  When  desires  contend, 
the  strongest  will  prevail,  and  determine  the  will.  We  have  now 
explained  what  is  intended  by  liberty  of  will.  Our  state  and 
condition  is  such,  that  we  enjoy  uninterruptedly  the  privilege  of 
choosing  according  to  our  strongest  desires.  No  power,  which 
operates  as  a  restraint  or  constraint,  can  deprive  us  of  this  priv- 
ilege. 

Liberty  of  action  is  a  privilege  of  acting,  externally,  agreea- 
bly to  our  voluntary  exertions.  When  a  person's  feet  are  bound 
with  cords,  he  is  not  at  liberty  to  walk.  If  he  exerts  himself 
for  this  purpose,  a  superior  force  operates  against  him,  and  de- 
prive, him  of  the  privilege  of  acting  agreeably  to  his  exertions. 
This  force  is  a  restraint ;  it  prevents  the  existence  of  the  action 
willed.  And  when  a  person  is  carried  by  a  superior  force  to 
prison,  contrary  to  his  will,  his  liberty  is  destroyed.  This  con- 
straining force  produces  eflects  contrary  to  what  he  wills,  and 
deprives  him  of  the  privilege  of  acting  according  to  his  choicesi 


119 

Thus  liberty  of  action  may  be,  and  sometimes  is,  abridged, 
God  has  established  a  general,  but  not  a  universal  connexion 
between  voluntary  exertion,  and  the  action,  or  effect,  willed.  Ac- 
cordingly mankind  generally,  though  they  do  not  always,  act 
according  to  their  choice.  This  liberty  may  be  destroyed  by  re* 
straining  diwd  constraining  forces.  And  when  we  are  made  to  act 
contrary  to  our  wills,  the  actions  are  not  ours ;  as  agents,  we 
do  not  produce  them,  and  of  course  are  not  answerable  for  them. 

Can  any  person  desire  any  other  or  greater  liberty,  than 
to  act  as  he  wills .''  When  those  actions  follow,  which  his  will  is 
exerted  to  produce,  what  more  can  he  desire  ?  But  this  privilege 
God  has  granted  to  mankind,  and  made  the  enjoyment  of  it, 
generally,  sure  to  them  by  his  unalterable  determination.  Hence 
he  has  given  to  man  all  the  liberty,  which  it  is  best  for  him  to 
enjoy. 

That  I  have  given  a  just  idea  of  liberty,  may  appear  more 
evident  by  attending  to  first  principles  in  relation  to  action. 

1.  If  we  were  as  incapable  of  pleasure  and  pain  as  inanimate 
matter  is^  we  should  never  be  the  subjects  of  desires.     In  this 
unfeeling  stale,  we  should  not  have  any  idea  of  good  or  evil. 
No  person  cai  >  ot  first,  get  an  idea  of  pleasure  and  pain,  with- 
out knowing  liiem  by  experience.     And  till  he  knows  what 
pleasure  and  pain  are,  he  cannot  have  a  notion  of  relative  good 
and  evil.     If  men  could  perceive,  as  they  now  do,  and  at  the  same 
time  had  no  more  feeling  than  lifeless  matter,  they  would  not 
know  what  ideas  the  terms  pleasure  and  pain,  good  and  evil, 
convey.     As  well  might  a  man  born  blind  know  what  is  meant 
by  light  and  colors  ;  or  a  deaf  man,  what  is  meant  by  sounds^ 
This  is  too  evident  to  be  denied.     But  if  mankind  had  no  feel- 
higs,  and  no  idea  of  good  and  evil,  desires  could  not  possibly 
have  an  existence.     For  good  and  evil  are  the  only  objects  of 
dssire.     Whatever  is  agreeable,  we  desire  to  attain  ;  and  what- 
ever is  disgustful,  we  wish  to  avoid.     But  are  objects  ever  de- 
sired by  us,  however  good  or  evil  in  reality,  if  they  are  un- 
known to  us  .''      When  we  have  once  felt  pleasure  and  pain, 
whatever  we  apprehend  will  give  us  pleasure  is  desired  ;  and 
whatever  in  our  view  will  give  us  pain,  we  feel  an  aversion  to 
it.     Hence  if  we  had  no  feelings,  we  should  have  no  idea  of 
good  and  evil,  and  no  desire  for  one  object  or  aversion  to  anoth- 
er.    Accordingly,  that  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  are  ne- 
cessary to  the  operations  of  desire,  is  a  first  principle,  which  all 
•ught  to  admit. 


120 

2.  If  mankind  had  no  feelings  and  desires,  they  wonld  uev- 
fer  act ;  or,  in  other  words,  tliey  wonld  never  seek  one  thinp:,  or 
avoid  another.  For  they  would  exist  in  a  state  of  perfect  in- 
diflerence.  If  no  ohjects  are  desired,  none  will  he  sought. 
Tliis  is  a  truth  so  evident,  nothinti^  can  make  it  plainer. 

3.  In  a  state  in  which  mankind  have  nothing  to  seek,  voli- 
tions and  external  actions  are  needless.  For  in  every  volition 
and  external  action,  the  attainment  or  avoidance  of  some  object 
is  aimed  at.  But  in  a  state  of  perfect  indi/1'erence,  we  should 
never  aim  at  any  thing.  Of  course,  there  would  be  no  occasion 
or  use  for  voluntary  exertions,  and  external  actions. 

4.  Liberty,  therefore,  would  be  a  useless  privilege.  Is  it  a 
privilege  to  be  at  liberty  to  act  according  to  our  pleasure,  when 
actions  are  needless,  and  when  we  have  no  pleasure  to  gratify? 
Is  a  freedom  to  act  as  our  pleasures,  desires,  or  inclinations, 
Avould  dictate,  of  any  worth,  where  such  operations  have  no  ex- 
istence .'' 

Keeping  these  things  in  view,  we  may  easily  see  what  llbert}' 
is,  and  how  the  idea  of  it  is  first  acquired.  Children  are  very 
fond  of  play  things.  Atop  afiords  them  much  pleasure.  They 
have  strong  desires  to  amuse  themselves  with  it.  Whilst  play- 
ing with  it,  without  the  least  hindrance  or  opposition  from  any 
quarter,  they  enjoy  liberty.  The}'  follow  their  inclinations, 
v/ill  and  act  as  their  desires  prompt  them,  without  any  opposi- 
tion. But  if  a  restraint  could  be  laid  on  their  minds,  so  as  to 
prevent  those  voluntary  exertions  which  are  necessary  to  put 
their  bodies  in  motion,  they  would  then  experience  an  opposi- 
tion to  willing.  This  would  give  ihem  uneasiness,  and  excite 
complaints.  Because  they  cannot  will  as  they  wish.  There 
are  hindrances  and  obstacles  in  the  way.  It',  also,  they  should 
will  to  run,  and  some  person  were  to  hold  them  and  prevent  the 
actions  willed,  then  they  experience  opposition.  This  would 
give  them  uneasiness,  and  excite  complaints. 

Now  they  have  experienced  two  very  different  conditions. 
The  first  in  which  they  acted  agreeably  to  their  wishes,  without 
opposition  or  hindrance  ;  tl.e  other,  in  which  they  experience 
such  opposition  as  wholly  prevents  their  acting  as  their  inclina- 
tions prompt  them.  Tiiese  two  conditions  they  will  compare 
together,  and  discern  a  great  difference  in  them.  The  ideas 
they  have  of  this  difference  they  cannot  communicate  without 
words.  That  condition  in  Avhich  they  act  without  any  hin- 
drance, is  called  a  state  of  freedom  or  liberty  ;  a  state  in  which 


121 

they  act  freely.  In  this  state  they  enjoy  what  is  called  liberty 
or  freedom.  And  what  is  this,  but  the  privilege  of  willing  and 
acting  according  to  their  wishes  and  inclinations  ;  or  pursuing 
the  objects  of  their  desire  without  any  hindrance  ?  They 
might  call  the  other  condition,  in  which  opposition  pi'events 
their  acting  as  they  wish,  a  state  of  bondage  ;  a  state  in  which 
they  do  not  follow  their  own  inclinations,  but  are  obliged  to 
act  contrary  to  their  desires,  and  as  other  agents  dictate.  Hence 
liberty  implies  a  state  or  condition,  in  which  moral  agents  act 
as  they  please :  a  state  in  which  they  experience  no  hindrance, 
no  opposition,  and  meet  no  obstacle  to  prevent  their  going  the 
way  their  hearts  lead  them. 

This  teaches,  that  all  our  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and 
our  desires,  are  antecedent  to  the  need  or  use  of  liberty.  For 
If  we  did  not  experience  these  operations,  there  would  be  noth- 
ing to  prompt  us  to  will,  or  act,  in  any  sense.  There 
would  be  no  end  for  us  to  answer  by  any  exertion,  because 
there  is  nothing  which  we  have  the  least  inclination  to  seek. 
But  when  we  experience  these  desires,  then  we  wish  to  act 
without  any  hindrance.  The  privilege  of  gratifying  the  feel- 
ings of  the  heart,  without  any  hindrance,  without  meeting  any 
opposition  to  pi-event  the  actions  which  are  necessary,  is  an  ob- 
ject earnestly  desired.  This  privilege,  or  liberty  of  acting, 
is  highly  valued  by  every  moral  agent.  So  that  liberty  is  a 
precious  privilege,  rather  than  a  quality  or  property,  or  any 
operation  of  the  mind.  Liberty  does  not  consist  in  any  action 
or  operation  of  the  mind  ;  but  is  a  privilege  of  acting  without 
anj^  obstacle  to  prevent.  It  is  an  absurdity,  to  say  that  liber- 
ty and  voluntary  action  are  the  same  thing.  If  voluntary  ex- 
ertion is  an  action,  and  this  action  is  liberty,  then  liberty  is  ac- 
tion of  action.  Liberty  of  action  is  a  very  common  phrase. 
And  if  liberty  and  voluntary  exertion  are  the  same  thing,  and 
voluntary  exertion  is  also  an  action,  then  liberty  and  action  are 
convertible  terms.  Use  the  word  action  instead  of  liberty,  then 
the  liberty  of  action  is  nothing  but  the  action  of  action.  Those 
who  assert  that  liberty  is  nothing  but  voluntary  exertion,  have 
no  way  to  avoid  this  absurdity.  But  if  liberty  is  the  privil- 
ege of  acting  according  to  our  wishes  and  inclinations,  without 
any  thing  to  restrain  us,  this  absurdity  is  avoided.  When 
mankind  will  and  act  agreeably  to  their  wishes  and  desires, 
without  experiencing  any  restraint  or  constraint,  do  they  noi 


122 

act  freely  ?  Do  they  not  enjoy  perfect  liberty  •*  Can  they 
conceive  of  any  greater  liberty  than  this  ?  Is  there  any  other 
kind,  which  they  would  prefer  to  it  ? 

I  know  many  in  answer  to  these  interrogations  would  say, 
they  wish  for  liberty  to  fly,  to  create,  to  gratify  all  their  desn-es 
by  a  single  act  of  the  will.  This,  they  might  say,  is  a  higher 
and  more  desirable  kind  of  liberty,  than  any  which  mankind 
now  enjoy.  This  statement,  I  would  observe  in  reply,  con- 
tains a  fallacy.  The  thing,  which  they  call  liberty,  is  power.  And 
by  giving  the  thing  a  wrong  name,  they  deceive  themselves. 
B}'  liberty  to  fly,  to  create,  and  the  like,  a  power  is  the  thing  in- 
tended. Ifby  power  is  meant  volition,  then  a  liberty  to  fly,  for 
instance,  is  only  willing  this  event.  This  is  making  an  act  of 
the  wHI  and  liberty  the  same  thing ;  which  we  have  already  seen 
cannot  be  true.  And  ifby  power  is  intended  ^.connexion  between 
an  act  of  the  will  and  the  thing  willed,  so  that  the  latter  shall 
follow  the  former,  then  by  a  liberty  to  fly  they  mean  no  more 
than  this  connexion.  Whether  power  is  an  act  of  the  will,  or  a 
connexion  between  willing  and  the  thing  willed,  still  liberty  and 
power  are  not  the  same  thing.  This  has  already  been  proved. 
But  to  illustrate  this  fallacy  more  fully,  let  it  be  observed, 

1.  A  moral  agent  aims  at  some  end  in  every  action.  When 
he  is  sick,  health  is  an  object  or  end  desired. 

2.  To  the  attainment  of  ends,  means  are  necessary.  Means 
must  be  used  to  recover  health  ;  for  this  is  the  appointment  of 
Jehovah.  God  works  by  means  in  the  attainment  of  his  ends. 
And  according  to  his  ordination  men  cannot  obtain  their  ends, 
only  hy  using  the  means  adapted  to  them.  If  God  had  seen  fit, 
ends  might  have  been  connected  immediately  with  the  Avill. 
Then  nothing  would  have  been  necessary  to  obtain  health, 
when  we  are  sick,  but  to  will  it.  But  the  determination  of  God 
is  such,  we  cannot  attain  our  ends,  except  by  the  intervention 
and  use  of  means. 

Now  a  person,  when  sick,  is  at  liberty  to  use  means  to  re- 
cover his  health.  He  is  at  liberty  to  will,  and  to  act.  He  en- 
joys this  liberty,  this  privilege,  and  is  using  it.  He  has  not 
power  to  recover  health  by  a  single  act  of  his  will,  nor  to  give 
efficacy  to  the  means  he  uses.  Hence  mankind  enjoy  liberty, 
and  use  it  in  pursuit  of  their  ends  ;  when  at  the  same  time  thej?^ 
have  not  power  to  attain  them.  Does  a  person's  inability  to 
recover  his  health  abridge  his  libei'ty  ?  Surely  not  ;  he  may 
act  with  perfect  freedom,  as  long  as  he  has  life.     Do  not  man- 


m 

itind  act  freely,  ds  their  inclinations  lead  them,  when  laboring 
in  the  field,  and  attending  to  other  pursuits  of  life  f  Yet  it  is 
not  in  their  power,  in  innomerable  instances,  to  obtain  their  ends. 
This  shows  there  is  a  plain  and  obvious  distinction  between  lib- 
erty and  power.  Men  may  act  freely  in  pursuit  of  their  endsj 
yet  not  have  power  to  obtain  them.  If  liberty  and  power  were 
the  same  thing,  and  if  men  have  not  power  to  arrive  at  the  ends 
they  seek,  they  have  no  liberty.  This  notion  of  liberty  contra- 
dicts facts.  Because  we  know  by  experience  it  is  a  fact,  that 
%ve  are  acting  freely  in  numerous  instances,  where  we  have  not 
power  to  attain  what  we  seek,  and  so  finally  fail  of  it^  Hence 
to  say,  a  power  to  attain  our  ends  is  liberty,  is  to  assert  we  are 
not  free,  while  acting  fx'eely  ;  which  is  a  manifest  absurdity. 

To  bring  these  remarks  to  a  point,  attention  to  the  following 
things  is  necessary.  I  have  a  strong  desire  to  visit  a  friend,  who 
lives  west  from  this  place.  A  volition,  which  would  move  my 
body  westerly,  would  accord  with  my  desire.  If  some  pow- 
er should  constrain  me  to  will  an  opposite  motion  of  the  body, 
the  will  would  act  contrary  to  my  desire.  In  this  case  I  do  not 
enjoy  liberty  of  will.  For  liberty  of  will  is  a  privilege  of  willing 
as  my  desires  dictate.  And  if  I  will  to  have  my  body  move  to 
the  west,  yet  some  force  carries  it  to  the  east,  then  liberty  of  ac- 
tion, in  this  instance,  is  destroyed.  For  actions  directly  con- 
trary to  those  willed  take  place.  But  so  long  as  the  will  obej's 
the  heart,  and  actions  are  obedient  to  the  will,  I  am  free.  I  will 
and  act  agreeably  to  my  desire..  I  enjoy  the  liberty  of  willing 
as  I  wish,  and  of  acting  as  I  wish,  and  in  the  exercise  of  this 
liberty  I  visit  my  friend.  At  the  same  time  I  have  not  power 
to  visit  him  by  flying  over  the  distance  he  is  from  me.  Hence 
our  object,  when  we  wish  for  liberty  to  fly,  is  power,  not  liberty. 

We  may  wish  to  have  liberty  extended  ;  to  have  a  thousand 
events  connected  with  the  will,  which  are  not.  To  have  this 
wish  gratified,  our  power  must  be  enlarged.  If  God  had  con- 
nected flying,  or  the  creation  of  a  world,  with  an  act  of  the  will;, 
as  he  has  the  motion  of  our  hands,  we  could  as  easily  fly,  and 
create,  as  we  now  can  move  our  hands.  This  enlargement  of 
our  power  is  an  object  ardently  desired  by  many.  By  an  in- 
crease or  enlargement  of  our  power  in  this  way,  our  liberty 
would  be  extended  beyond  its  present  limits.  But  if  our  liber- 
ty was  extended  by  an  increase  of  power,  it  is  still  the  sam^ 
kind  of  liberty — a  hberty  to  will  and  to  act  as  we  please.  Our 
liberty  is  not  greater,  unless  its  extension  is  the  thing  meant. 


124 

If  it  be  extended,  this  does  not  alter  its  nature.  And  it  is  by  us- 
ing the  words  power  and  liberty  as  synonimous,  that  men  de- 
ceive themselves,  when  they  plead  for  a  different  kind  of  liberty. 
And  this  fallacy  is  now  detected  by  distinguishing,  as  we  ever 
ought,  between  liberty  and  power. 

Liberty  of  action  is  extended,  as  far  as  external  actions  or 
events  are  connected  with  the  will.  A  greater  number  of  events 
might  have  been  connected  with  the  will,  than  now  are,  if  God 
had  seen  fit.  But  connecting  other  events  with  the  will,  is  not 
altering  the  nature  of  the  liberty  of  action  ;  it  is  only  extending 
it  further,  or  rendering  it  less  limited.  We  may  therefore  sa}', 
that  mankind  cannot  conceive  of  any  kind  of  liberty,  preferable 
to  that  which  they  enjoy  ;  nor  can  they  have  any  greater  liber- 
ty, unless  the  extension  of  it  is  greater  liberty.  But  they  may 
desire  more  power  ;  and  no  degree  of  power  short  of  omnipo- 
tence will  satisfy  the  unrenewed  heart. 

G.  We  may  now  inquire,  whether  liberty  is  consistent  with  ne- 
cessit3\  It  is  the  opinion  of  many,  that  every  kind  of  necessity 
is  inconsistent  with  liberty.  For  a  clear  elucidation  of  this 
part  of  the  present  subject,  the  word  iiecessity  must  be  defined. 
It  is  not  my  design,  however,  to  explain  all  the  senses  in  which 
the  words  necessary,  necessity,  impossible,  unable,  and  the  other 
like  terms,  are  used.  I  shall  define  the  word  necessity,  so  far  as 
is  requisite  to  a  conclusion,  whether  any  kind  of  necessity  is 
inconsistent  with  liberty. 

A  certain  and  infallible  connexion  between  causes  and  their 
efiects  is  one  thing  meant  by  necessity.  If  a  cause  might  oper- 
ate, and  its  effect  might  be  prevented  at  one  time,  and  be  pro- 
duced at  another,  the  effect  is  not  necessary.  And  in  this  case, 
there  is  no  certain  connexion  between  the  cause  and  the  efiect. 
For  the  connexion  is  not  infallible,  it  may  be  destroyed.  But 
^'here  the  connexion  between  causes  and  effects  is  certain,  there 
the  efiect  is  necessary.  Water  will  run  towards  the  centre. 
Between  this  motion  of  water  towards  the  centre,  and  the  cause 
which  produces  this  motion,  there  is  an  infallible  connexion. 
This  motion  of  water  is  a  necessary  effect.  When  force  is  used 
to  destroy  this  connexion,  ineffectually,  we  say  it  is  impossible 
to  overcome  it.  The  meaning  is,  no  force  applied,  in  this  in- 
stance, is  equal  to  the  force  of  the  cause.  In  this  sense  the  word 
•unable,  and  many  others  of  the  same  import,  are  used.  In  such 
instances,  causes  operate  without  producing  the  intended  effect. 
We  may,  therefore,  to  prevent  a  needless  circumlocution  in  con- 


125 

veying  our  ideas,  divide  necessity  into  natural  and  moral.  Tliis- 
distinction  is  not  founded  on  any  difference  there  is  in  the  con- 
nexion between  causes  and  effects,  where  the  connexion  is  cer- 
tain and  infallible  ;  but  on  the  difference  there  is  in  the  terms 
related,  or  connected.  Hence  the  certain  connexion  between 
moral  causes  and  their  effects,  is  what  I  mean  by  a  moral  ne- 
cessity. And  the  infallible  connexion  there  is  between  natural 
causes  and  effects,  is  what  I  mean  by  a  natural  necessity.  These 
are  the  only  kinds  of  necessity  which  come  into  consideration, 
■when  it  is  to  be  determined,  whether  necessity  is  inconsistent 
with  liberty.     We  may  inquire, 

1.  Whether  natural  necessity  is  inconsistent  with  liberty. — 
Nothing,  as  I  have  already  observed,  can  destroy  liberty  of  will; 
as  will  appear  clearly,  when  we  attend  to  moral  necessity.  I  shall 
therefore,  under  this  particular,  consider  natural  necessity  in  re- 
lation to  liberty  of  action.  Here  it  is  granted,  that  natural  ne- 
cessity is  inconsistent  with  liberty  of  action.  For  instance,  if  a 
person  wills  the  motion  of  his  hands  or  feet,  and  the  motion 
does  not  follow,  liberty  of  action  is  destroyed  at  this  time.  Some 
cause  in  this  particular  instance  operates,  which  is  more  power- 
ful than  the  exertion  of  the  will ;  and  produces  rest,  an  effect  op- 
posite to  the  one  intended.  Here  the  connexion  between  the 
will  and  the  effect  willed,  is  destroyed  ;  and  the  effect,  which 
the  opposing  cause  produces,  is  necessary.  Here  it  may  be 
said,  that  the  person  was  unable  to  move  his  hands  or  feet.  It 
was  impossible  for  him  to  do  it.  The  operating  cause,  whatev- 
er it  be,  which  renders  the  act  of  the  will  ineffectual,  restrains 
him.  And  all  rcstrints,  which  prevent  the  existence  of  the  ef- 
fect willed,  destroy  liberty  of  action.  Restraints  do  not  des- 
troy liberty  of  action,  unless  they  prevent  the  effects  willed. 

Again.  If  a  person's  will  is  exerted  to  move  his  body  west- 
ward, and  it  is  moved  eastward,  here  the  connexion  between  the 
act  of  the  will  and  the  effect  willed  is  destroyed.  In  this  partic- 
ulai-  instance,  some  cause  or  other  operates  with  more  force  than 
the  will,  and  renders  its  exertion  ineffectual.  Here  the  person 
experiences  what  is  called  a  constraint.  An  effect  contrary  to 
the  one  willed  takes  place.  When  a  constraning  cause  is  suffi- 
cient to  produce  an  effect  opposite  to  the  one  willed,  liberty  of 
action,  at  that  particular  time,  is  destroyed. 

When  effects,  different  or  opposite  to  those  willed,  take  place., 
liberty  of  action  is  destroyed.  The  causes,  which  operate  in 
such  cases,  are  more  powerful  than  the  will,  and  overcome  it. 


And  such  causes  are  the  things  intended  by  restraints,  and  con->. 
strainfs.  All  restraints  and  constraints,  which  arc  suflicient  ta 
produce  efl'ects  opposite  to  those  willed,  destroy  liberty  of  ac- 
tion. This,  however,  is  but  seldom  the  case.  Generally,  the 
effects  willed  take  place.  But  when  those  efl'ects  exist,  which 
are  opposite  to  those  willed  and  intended,  we  are  not  accountable 
for  them.  They  are  not  our  actions,  but  the  efl'ects  of  the  cause 
which  produced  them.  And  we  do  not  act  according  to  our 
pleasure,  unless  the  efl'ects  follow  which  are  necessary  to  grati- 
fy our  desires. 

2.  Inquire,  whether  moral  necessity  destroys  liberty. 

Mankind  are  the  causes  of  many  efl'ects.  Thousands  of 
events  are  attributed  to  them  as  the  cause.  They  are  agents. 
They  act,  and  produce  effects.  Yet  it  may  be  well  to  observe, 
tliey  are  not  the  independent,  efficient  cause  of  one  eft'ect.  They 
are  dependent  on  God,  and  cannot  produce  any  effect  without 
the  concurrence  of  his  agency,  or  contrary  to  his  determination. 
Having  observed  this  to  prevent  mistakes,  I  may  now  say,  that 
the  feelings  and  desires  of  the  heart  are  the  cause  of  every  vo- 
lition. The  taste,  which  is  the  only  feeling  faculty  of  the  mind, 
constitutes  agency.  It  is  the  primary  cause  in  man  of  all  his  actions. 
Those  which  do  not  proceed  from  this  cause,  are  not  our  ac- 
tions, but  the  actions  of  some  other  agent.  This  internal  cause, 
by  its  operations,  produces  every  volition.  It  puts  the  will  in 
motion.  And  volitions  are  the  first  and  immediate  efl'ects  it 
produces.  Between  this  cause  and  volition,  God  has  establish- 
ed an  infallible  connexion.  No  power  but  his  own,  is  suffi- 
cient to  destroy  this  connexion  ;  and  he  will  not  destro}^  what 
he  has  determined  shall  exist.  Hence  the  reason,  why  liberty 
of  will  can  never  be  abridged.  When  there  is  nothing  to  pre- 
vent our  willing  according  to  our  desires  or  inclinations,  we  en- 
joy liberty  of  will.  Nothing  can  prevent  this,  because  God  has 
established  a  certain  connexion  between  the  strongest  desire  of 
the  heart,  and  volition.  This  connexion  is  moral  necessity. 
And  this  necessity  renders  liberty  of  will  absolutely  sure  and 
certain. 

Were  it  not  for  this  moral  necessity,  liberty  of  will  would  rest 
on  an  uncertain  foundation.  For  sometimes  we  might  will  as 
we  wish,  and  sometimes  we  might  not.  It  would  be  altogether 
uncertain,  whether  such  volitions  would  follow  as  we  might  wish. 
The  will  might  act  in  opposition  to  our  inclinations.  If  it  did, 
we  could  never  carry  our  desires  into  eft'ect.     Not  only  so,  but 


12: 

the  will  might  produce  effects  in  opposition  to  our  desires.  But 
now  it  must  be  obedient  to  the  heart.  It  must  will  the  effects 
we  wish  to  have  exist. 

Would  an}'  man  feel  contented  to  be  in  a  state,  in  which  he 
could  neither  will  nor  act  according  to  his  wishes,  nor  gratify 
any  of  his  desires  .''  But  if  there  w  ere  no  connexion  between 
the  heart  and  the  will,  no  person  would  be  able  to  will  events, 
which  it  was  his  desire  to  have  exist.  He  would  not  be  able  to 
act  according  to  his  inclinations  and  wishes.  His  condition 
would  be  very  unhappy.  And  if  there  were  a  connexion,  but  not 
certain,  then  it  would  be  a  matter  of  uncertainty  when  he  should 
and  when  he  should  not  act  as  his  inclinations  dictated.  This 
would  be  a  very  undesirable  condition  for  such  an  agent  as 
man. 

But  the  connexion  between  the  heart  and  the  will  is  certain 
and  infallible.  It  cannot  be  destroyed.  It,  therefore,  infallibly 
secures  liberty  of  will  to  every  moral  agent.  This  necessity  or 
connexion,  let  it  be  remembered,  is  not  liberty.  Liberty  is  the 
privilege  of  willing  as  we  wish.  And  this  necessity  secures  this 
privilege  to  us.  Our  liberty  of  will,  therefore,  is  certain,  as 
this  necessity  is  infalhble.  Hence  moral  necessity  is  so  far  from 
destroying  libei'ty,  that  it  is  the  foundation  on  which  it  rests. 
Takeaway  the  foundation,  and  our  liberty  is  effectually  destroy- 
ed. 

In  the  next  place,  are  liberty  of  action  and  moral  necessity 
consistent  with  each  other  ? 

The  immediate  design  of  volition  is,  to  put  the  body  or  some 
particular  member  of  it,  in  motion;  and  by  this  means  to  pro- 
duce other  external  effects,  which  are  necessary  to  obtain  the 
objects  desired.  If  1  have  a  desire  to  eat  an  apple  lying  on  the 
taljle  before  me,  by  an  exertion  of  the  will  my  hand  is  moved 
directly  to  it,  and  from  thence  to  my  mouth.  It  it  be  growing 
on  a  tree,  and  I  wish  to  enjoy  it,  the  body  must  move  to  it,  and 
by  a  stroke  of  mj'  staff  the  stem  must  be  broken,  that  it  may 
fall  to  the  ground.  Here  not  only  bodily  motions,  but  the  mo- 
tion of  other  things,  as  the  staff,  for  instance,  are  produced. 
These  are  the  effects  of  volition.  And  as  it  is  by  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  body,  that  we  produce  alterations  and  effects  in 
other  things  around  us,  the  immediate  operation  of  the  will  is 
on  the  body  And  by  means  of  the  body  every  other  effect  is 
produced,  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the  objects  of  our  de- 
>ire.     And  it  is  often  the  case,  that  a  series  of  external  effects 


128 

are  necessary  to  reach  our  desired  ends.  Accordingly,  all  the 
eflects  contained  in  such  a  series  are  the  objects  of  volition,  and 
are  produced  by  it ;  and  the  last  effect  in  tiie  series  is  the  ulti- 
mate object  of  the  will. 

It  is  therefore  easy  to  see,  when  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  the  existence  of  the  effects  willed,  that  we  enjo}'  liberty 
of  action  without  any  interruption.  If  I  make  exertions  to  walk 
directly  east,  and  nothing  prevents  my  moving  in  this  course,  I 
certainly  enjoy  all  the  liberty  of  walkingin  this  direction  which 
can  be  conceived  of,  or  desired.  But  if  by  the  operation  of 
some  cause  I  am  restrained,  or  prevented  from  walking  in  this 
direction  ;  and  at  the  same  time  am  constrained  by  some  supe- 
rior power  to  move  in  a  western  course,  m}'  liberty  of  walking 
easterly  is  destroyed.  Causes,  which  prevent  my  acting  as  I 
chose,  are  restraints ;  and  those,  which  make  me  act,  as  I  would 
not,  are  constraints.  Of  course,  both  restraints  and  constraints, 
so  far  as  they  operate,  abridge  liberty  of  action.  And  those 
effects  which  are  produced  by  extrinsic  causes  or  agents,  wheth- 
er restraining  or  constraining,  are  not  our  actions.  Because 
they  are  not  the  effects  of  our  will,  but  of  some  foreign  cause  or 
agent,  external  to  us,  which  we  have  not  power  to  resist ;  and 
we  are  not  accountable  for  them.  But  if  restraining  or  con- 
straining causes  operate  in  opposition  to  the  will,  yet  the  will 
overcomes  them,  and  produces  the  actions  intended  ;  then  the 
actions  are  our  own,  and  we  are  responsible  for  them.  Because 
ihcy  are  such  as  were  intended,  and  are  produced  by  the  oper- 
ations of  the  will.  And  so  far  as  constraints  and  restraints  op- 
pose the  will,  liberty  of  action  is  impeded,  but  not  destroyed, 
if  the  will  at  last  overcomes.  We  always  act  freely,  when  we 
do  the  thing  intended.  And  when  the  thing  intended  is  done 
without  any  impediment,  we  enjoy  the  most  perfect  liberty  of 
action.  But  so  far  as  the  will  is  opposed,  liberty  is  abridged  ; 
or  we  do  not  act  so  easily  and  freely.  It  is  now  evident,  that 
when  we  act  as  we  choose,  we  enjoy  liberty  of  action.  We  are 
now  to  inquire,  whether  necessity  destroys  liberty  of  action. 

Such  a  connexion  between  causes  and  effects,  as  renders  the 
existence  of  the  latter  absolutely  certain,  is  necessity.  Such  ef- 
fects are  always  necessary.  Accordingly  a  certain,  and  infalli- 
ble connexion  between  volition,  and  the  effect  or  action  willed, 
Is  necessity.  If  we  act  freely,  they  certainly  follow  the  exertions 
of  the  will.  Does  this  necessity  destroy  liberty  of  action  ?  So 
far  from  it,  that  without  it  we  should  be  wholly  deprived  of  lib- 


i29 

erty.  If  such  an  infallible  connexion,  between  the  will  and  the 
action  willed,  were  not  established,  the  will  might  exert  itself, 
but  no  effect  would  follow.  But  does  a  person  enjoy 
liberty  of  action,  if  the  effects  intended  and  willed  cannot  be 
produced  ?  But  if  the  actions  chosen  certainly  follow,  he  en- 
joys liberty  in  the  hiij^hest  perfection.  So  far  then  as  the  con- 
nexion between  volition  and  the  action  willed  is  certain,  liberty 
is  secured.  Accordingly,  if  any  external  cause  by  its  operation 
destroys  this  connexion,  it  takes  our  liberty  of  acting  as  we  wish 
entirely  from  us.  God  has  not  established  an  absolute  infalli- 
ble connexion,  between  every  volition  and  its  intended  effect. 
Had  he  seen  fit  to  do  this,  liberty  of  action  could  never  be  de- 
stroyed, in  any  one  instance,  any  more  than  liberty  of  will.  As 
this  connexion  is  not  universal,  does  not  extend  at  all  times  to 
every  volition,  this  is  the  reason  why  liberty  of  action  maj'  be, 
and  sometimes  is,  destroyed.  For  sometimes  external  causes, 
and  other  agents,  by  their  operations  prevent  the  existence  of 
the  actions  which  we  will.  Or,  in  other  words,  by  the  influence 
of  constraints  or  restraints  this  connexion  is  destroyed,  and  the 
actions  chosen  do  not  follow.  When  this  is  the  case,  in  every 
such  particular  instance  w^  are  deprived  of  our  liberty.  Ac- 
cordingly this  infallible  connexion  between  the  thing  willed  and 
the  will,  or  what  is  here  called  necessity,  is  essential  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  liberty.  So  far  as  this  prevails,  our  liberty  is  secured ; 
and  as  often  as  it  is  destroyed,  we  are  deprived  of  liberty.  Every 
one  must  therefore  see,  if  he  attends  candidly  to  the  subject, 
that  this  necessity  is  so  far  from  destroying  our  liberty,  that  it 
is  essential  to  the  preservation  and  enjo3'ment  of  it. 

Let  us  suppose  a  person  to  have  strong  desires  to  visit  a  friend. 
Volitions  are  necessary,  we  know,  to  accomplish  his  wishes  ; 
and  also  external  actions.  By  the  operation  of  his  desires,  vo- 
litions are  produced;  andb}'  the  operation  of  volitions,  external 
actions  are  eflected.  If  there  was  no  connexion  between  the 
desires  of  the  heart  and  volitions,  desires  would  operate  in  vain. 
For  no  volitions  would  follow.  And  if  there  were  no  connex- 
ion between  the  will  and  external  actions,  the  operations  of  the 
will  would  be  ineffectual.  Of  course  the  person  could  never 
visit  his^iend.  But  if  a  connexion  is  established,  between  his 
desires  and  volitions,  and  between  his  volitions  and  external  ac- 
tions, then  he  can  act  as  he  pleases,  and  gratify  his  heart  in  vis- 
iting his  friend. 

If  the  matter  was  left  wholly  to  man,  which  would  he  prefer, 


130 

that  condition  in  which  no  such  connexions  are  established,  oi* 
that  in  which  they  are  ?  He  would  certainly  choose  the  latter. 
And  if  the  latter,  then  the  necessity  by  which  he  acts,  corres- 
ponds with  his  own  feelings.  And  it  is  obvious,  from  what  has 
been  said,  if  no  such  connexion  had  been  established  by  our 
Maker,  his  creatures  never  would  have  enjoyed  any  liberty  of 
will,  or  liberty  of  action.  So  that  the  necessity  of  choosing  as 
we  feel,  or  according  to  our  pleasure,  and  acting  as  we  choose, 
is  essential  to  the  existence  and  enjoyment  of  liberty.  And  our 
Maker  has  granted  and  secured  this  privilege  to  us,  by  estab- 
lishing an  infallible  or  necessary  connexion  between  our  de- 
sires and  volitions,  and  bt'tween  our  volitions  and  actions. 
There  is,  tJierefore,  no  ground  to  object  against  this  kind  of  ne- 
cessity, as  being  inconsistent  with  liberty. 

One  great  reason,  why  so  many  consider  necessity  as  incon- 
sistent with  liberty,  arises  from  their  using  words  without  any 
definite  meaning.  Another  reason  is,  they  indulge  themselves 
in  a  careless,  indefinite  mode  of  reasoning.  Because  necessity 
sometimes  destroys  liberty  of  action,  they  infer  it  is  always,  and 
in  every  sense,  inconsistent  withUibert3\  This,  all  will  see,  is 
false  reasoning.  If  all  would  affix  a  definite  meaning  to  their 
terms,  and  reason  correctly,  they  would  not  so  often  reject  the 
truth,  and  embrace  errors,  as  they  now  do.  But  this  requires 
so  much  attention,  mental  exertion,  and  labor,  they  are  not 
willing  to  submit  to  it.  And  to  justify  themselves  in  the  indul- 
gence of  this  mental  indolence,  they  are  always  declaiming  a- 
gainst  metaphysicks  as  a  fruitful  source  of  error.  Yet  it  is  be- 
lieved, that  if  all  men  should  neglect  that  correct  mode  o( think- 
ing and  reasoning,  which  at  this  day  is  called  metaphysicks,  it 
would  not  be  many  ages  before  truth  on  moral  subjects  would 
be  generally  banished  from  the  world,  and  errors  universally 
prevail.  When  a  person  asserts,  that  necessity  destro3's  liberty, 
would  he  wish  to  have  it  made  certain  that  he  should  choose 
and  act  according  to  his  pleasure,  or  not  ?  If  all  men  desire* 
the  privilege  of  choosing  and  acting  according  to  their  pleasure, 
and  to  have  this  made  infallibly  certain,  why  do  they  declaim 
against  necessity  ? 

Furthermore,  if  our  pleasure  is  what  Armiriians  ilfean  by  a 
self  determining  power,  we  surely  have  it.  For  our  pleasure  is, 
to  act  according  to  the  desires  of  the  heart.  And  all  our  voli- 
tions and  actions  proceed  from  the  heart.     If  objects  please  us, 


131 

desires  arise  to  enjoy  them  ;  and  those  desires  give  rise  to  all 
the  volitions  and  actions  necessary  to  have  possession  of  them  ; 
and  in  obtaining  them  we  act  according  to  our  pleasure ;  and  when 
we  enjoy  them,  our  pleasure  is  done.  If  acting  in  this  sense 
according  to  our  pleasure  is  what  they  mean  by  a  self  deter- 
mining power,  (viz.)  that  our  pleasure  produces  our  volitions  ; 
it  is  granted  that  we  have  this  power.  But  this  power  destro}  s 
indifference,  and  is  consistent  with  necessity.  To  say  we  have 
a  power  to  produce,  and  govern  our  pleasure,  is  false  ;  but  to 
say  we  are  governed  by  our  pleasure  is  true,  and  corresponds 
with  our  wishes.  If  then  they  admit  our  pleasure,  in  the  sense 
explained,  is  a  self  determining  power,  to  be  consistent  they 
must  also  admit  our  ideas  of  liberty.  If  they  would  do  this, 
the  dispute  between  them  and  us  would  be  ended. 


«.«»»»««**« 


SSSAY  XVZ. 

Whether  liberty  is  necessary  to  vice  and  virtue;  and, 
if  not,  for  what  jjurposes  is  it  requisite,  in  moral 
agents  ? 

It  is,  I  believe,  a  general  opinion,  that  liberty  is  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  vice  and  virtue.  But  the  truth  of  this  sentiment 
may  be  questioned.  And  if,  when  examined,  it  should  not  ap- 
pear to  be  well  founded,  the  inquiry  will  be,  w  hy  is  liberty  re- 
quisite in  a  moral  agent  .'*  For  all  will  grant,  that  without  it 
mankind  would  be  very  imperfect  moral  agents.  I  shall,  there- 
fore, inquire, 

1.  Whether  liberty  is  necessar}'  to  the  existence  of  vice  and 
virtue.  According  to  the  description  given  of  liberty  in  the 
preceding  essay,  any  person  will  clearly  perceive,  it  is  not  essen- 
tial either  to  vice,  or  virtue.  For  vice  and  virtue  must  exist 
antecedent  to  the  need,  or  use  of  liberty.  For  an  illustration 
of  the  truth  in  relation  to  this  subject,  let  the  following  supposi- 
tions be  carefully  examined. 

Suppose  a  person  to  have  an  inveterate  hatred  against  h'n^ 


132 

nei|Erhbor,  which  will  lead  him  to  take  his  life  on  the  first  favor-* 
able  opportunity;  1  ask,  is  he  not  a  murderer  ?  Does  not  this 
hatred,  or  as  the  law  defines  it,  this  malice  prepense,  constitute 
the  sin,  or  crime,  denominated  murder  ?  From  the  time  this 
hatred  exists  in  his  heart,  is  he  not  a  murderer  in  the  sight  ofGod? 
Ho  says,  in  his  word,  he  that  hatetli  his  brother  is  a  murderer. 
And  if  we  had  a  knowledge  of  his  heart,  should  not  we  view  him 
in  the  same  light  ?  If  vice  and  virtue  belong  to  the  heart,  it  is 
certain  that  this  person  is  guilty  of  the  crime  called  murder. 
For  takinc-  the  life  of  a  neighbor,  is  onlv  the  fruit  or  eflect  of  a 
murderous  disposition.  Let  us  suppose  further,  that  this  person 
is  born  with  this  hatred,  not  only  to  his  neighbor  but  to  all  man- 
kind, which  will  prompt  him  to  take  the  lives  of  his  fellow  men, 
as  often  as  he  judges  he  can  do  it  with  imjHniity.  Is  he  not 
born  with  a  murderous  heart  ?  If  mankind  knew  he  had  this 
disposition,  would  they  not  have  the  same  view  of  his  heart,  they 
have  of  the  heart  of  one  who  has  committed  a  murderous  deed  .** 
Would  they  not  stand  in  fear  of  him  ?  Would  they  not  watch 
hi:ii,  and  guard  themselves  against  his  assaults  .'*  I  may  now 
ask,  is  liberty  necessaiy  to  the  existence  of  this  murderous  dis- 
position ?  The  person,  according  to  the  supposition,  is  born 
with  it.  Is  his  birth  an  effect  of  his  choice  ?  Is  this  disposition 
a  voluntary  action,  or  the  fruit  and  effect  of  his  will  ?  Is  it  an 
effect  ,  which  was  produced  b3'the  operation  of  this  person's  a- 
gency  ?  Surely  not.  And  if  not,  the  liberty  of  this  person  was 
not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  this  murderous  disposition. 

Again.  Suppose  a  person  is  born  with  a  benevolent  disposi- 
tion of  heart.  And  such  a  supposition  is  not  impossible  ;  for 
man}'  believe,  that  some  persons  are  sanctified  from  the  womb. 
Is  not  this  benevolent  innate  disposition  a  moral  virtue  ?  Does 
it  not  lay  a  foundation  in  him  to  be  pleased  with  the  divine 
character  and  government  ?  Will  it  not,  as  an  internal  active 
principle,  influence  him  to  serve  God  with  fidelity  and  delight  ? 
But  was  the  liberty  of  this  person,  in  any  sense,  necessary'  to 
the  existence  of  this  benevolent  disposition  ?  We  may  as  well 
suppose  the  exercise  of  liberty  in  an  agent  is  necessary  to  his 
vtry  existence. 

Furthermore.  Calvinistic  divines  believe,  that  all  mankind 
are  born  with  depraved,  corrupt  hearts.  And  it  is  presumed, 
they  will  not  assert,  that  the  depravity  of  heart  with  which  they 
are  born  is  produced  by  their  own  voluntary  exertions.  And 
if  they  say,  this  depravity  consists  in  voluntary  exertipns,  yet 


138 

■tliey  will  not  believe,  that  the  agent  produced  them.  For  this 
would  represent  him  as  acting  vohmtarily,  before  he  had  any  vo- 
lition, it  implies  the  same  absurdity,  which  is  implied  in  say- 
ing that  a  person  creates  himself.  It  is  obvious,  that,  with 
respect  to  those  appetites  or  dispositions  with  which  we  are  bom, 
they  are  not  produced  by  our  agency.  We  are  no  more  the 
cause  of  them,  than  we  are  of  our  own  existence.  It  is  as  in- 
consistent to  suppose,  that  we  produce  our  own  faculties,  as  our 
own  existence.  And  if  it  be  said,  we  have  no  faculties,  and  the 
mind  is  nothing  but  our  various  mental  operations  united,  still 
our  first  operations  are  not  produced  by  us.  For  if  operations 
constitute  the  mind,  till  they  exist,  there  is  no  mind  in  being  to 
operate.  Accordingly  the  Jirst  operations,  which  constitute  the 
mind,  the  mind  could  not  produce  ;  unless  it  can  act  before  it 
exists.  To  suppose  the  mind  is  nothing  but  operations  united, 
does  not  relieve  any  difficulty.  For  then  the  Jirst  ojyerations, 
which  according  to  this  scheme  must  be  called  the  heart,  con- 
stitute that  depravity  with  which  we  are,  born.  It  therefore 
clearly  follows,  that  all,  who  believe  we  are  born  with  deprav- 
ed hearts,  must  admit,  that  this  depravity  is  no  more  our  pro- 
duction, than  our  own  existence  is.  Of  course  liberty  is  no 
more  necessary  to  the  existence  of  original  depravity  than  it  is 
to  ouc  having  a  being  in  this  world.  Neither  is  it  necessary  to 
original  holiness  of  heart. 

Adam  was  created  in  the  image  of  God.  And  Calvinists  be- 
lieve he  was  created  in  the  moral,  as  well  as  in  the  natural,  im- 
age of  his  Maker.  Accordingly  he  was  created  with  a  benev- 
olent heart.  And  this  benevolence  of  heart  was  no  more  the 
effect  of  his  agency,  than  his  own  existence.  Was  his  liberty 
necessary  to  his  own  existence.''  Could  notsuch  an  agent,  as  Ad- 
am was,  be  created,  unles  she  exercised  libert}  in  his  creation  ?  If 
not,  it  was  impossible  for  such  an  agent  to  be  produced.  Forhe 
could  not  exercise  liberty,  before  he  existed.  And  the  exercise 
of  liberty  was  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  a  benevolent 
heart.  For  this  was  a  qualit}-  given  him  in  his  creation.  And 
he  could  not  act  freely  in  its  production.  For  agents  cannot 
act  at  all,  much  less  freely,  before  they  have  existence.  His 
liberty,  therefore,  considered  as  an  agent,  was  not  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  a  benevolent  heart. 

These  observations  will  apply  with  equal  force  to  prove,  that 
men  do  not  act  freely  in  that  change  wrought  in  them,  termed 


134 

iTgeneiation.  If  in  this  change  something's  created,  as  Calvln- 
ists  beheve  there  is,  it  is  not  produced  by  tlic  agency  of  man.  For 
it  is  granted,  he  has  not  power  to  create  any  thing.  As  the  vir- 
tuous disposition,  or  exercise,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  is 
not  produced  by  man  as  the  agent,  but  by  the  power  of  God,  the 
sinner  exercises  no  liberty  *n  the  production  of  it. 

Liberty  is  the  privilege  of  a  moral  agent;  a  privilege  of  act- 
ing according  to  his  pleasure,  or  as  his  feelings  dictate.    Such 
an  agent  must  exist,  antecedently  to  the  need,  or  use  of  liberty. 
And  if  he  is  a  complete  moral  agent,  he  has  moral  as  well  at  nat- 
ural faculties.     And  his  moral  faculty  must  be  vicious  or  virtu- 
ous, the  moment  it  has  existence,  as  has  been  made  evident  in 
a   previous    essay.      If  this  cannot  be   denied,  it   is    certain 
that  liberty  is  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  either  vice  or 
virtue  in  the  heart  of  moral  agents.     This  is  not  only  evident 
from  the  description  given  of  hberty  in  the  fourteenth  Essay ; 
but  it  is  true,  if  we  adopt  the  opinion  generally  received  respect- 
ing it.     Orthodox  divines  have  commonly  said,  that   liberty  is 
2ipower  of  willing.     If  the  will,  or  a  power  of  willing,  be  a  just 
definition  of  liberty,  then  the  terms  will  and  liberty  mean  the 
same  thing.     According  to  the  definition,  it  is  asked,  whether 
the  Avill  is  vicious,  or  virtuous,  or  neither  ?     If  it  be  answered, 
that  the  will  is  either  virtuous,  or  vicious,  then  nothing  is  pre- 
dicated of  the  will,  but  what  may  be  affirmed  of  liberty,  if  liber- 
ty and  will  are  the  same  thing.     It  therefore  follows,  that  the 
liberty  of  moral  agents  is  either  virtuous  or  vicious.     But  the 
will  did  not  produce  itself.     It  was  not  created  by  man,  but  by 
his  Creator.     And  as  man,  considered  as  an  agent,  did  not  exer- 
cise any  liberty  in  the  production  of  his  will,  because  he  did  not 
create  it,  yet  the  moment  it  exists,  it  is  either  vicious  or  virtuous; 
it  is  therefore  evident,  that  liberty  is  not  necessary  to  the  exis- 
tence of  vice  and  virtue  in  a  moral  agent.     For  no  agent  can 
exercise  liberty,  before  it  exists.     It  is  said  by  many,  that  the 
faculty,  or  power  of  willing,  is  liberty.     And  it  is  created  with 
the  quality  of  vice,  or  virtue.     But  the  will,  with  either  of  these 
qualities,  is  not  produced  by  man,  but  by  his  Creator.     And  the 
will,  the  moment  it  exists,  with  the  quahty  of  vice  or  virtue,  con- 
stitutes the  depravity  with  which  we  are  born.     And  as  men  do 
not  exercise  any  liberty  in  tl\e  production  of  this  depraved  will, 
their  liberty  is  not  necessary  to  its  existence  ;  and  of  course  it 
is  not  essential  to  the  existence  of  vice  and  virtue. 

Some  however  say,  that  liberty  consists  in  spontaneous,  vol- 


135 

utilary  exertion.  They  also  assert,  that  all  vice  and  virtue  con- 
sist in  voluntary  exertions,  or  exercises.  This  makes  liberty,  vo- 
lition, vice  and  virtue,  the  same  thing.  According  to  this  rep- 
resentation, the  first  volition  of  a  moral  agent  constitutes  his 
orignal  depravity.  But  who  is  the  agent  that  produces  this 
first,  depraved,  vicious  volition  ?  Is  man  the  agent  ?  If  not, 
then  there  is  no  liberty  exercised  by  him  in  the  existence  of  that, 
which  constitutes  his  original  depravity.  But  if  it  be  said,  that 
man  is  the  agent,  in  this  case,  because  voluntary  exercises  con- 
stitutes agency,  this  involves  on  absurdity.  For  it  makes  a- 
gency,  and  the  efi*ect  it  produces,  the  same  thing.  Because  it 
is  said,  that  volition  is  agency  ;  and  volition,  at  the  same  time, 
is  the  effect  it  produces.  This  cannot  be  true  with  respect  to 
the  first  original  volition  in  man,  whatever  it  may  be  in  relation 
to  those  which  are  subsequent  to  it.  Therefore,  according  to 
this  definition  of  liberty,  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
that  original  depravity  with  which  men  are  born.  For  with 
respect  to  this  first  volition,  which  constitutes  their  original  de- 
pravity, and  from  which  all  subsequent  vicious  exercises  pro- 
ceed, they  were  not  at  liberty  to  have  it,  or  not  to  have  it. 

Furthermore ;  what  is  meant  by  the  phrase,  liberty  is  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  vice  and  virtue  ?  Does  it  mean,  that 
the  original  fountain  of  either  vice  or  virtue  in  man,  is  produced 
by  himself,  and  he  is  at  liberty  to  produce  it,  or  not  f  Wheth- 
er the  original  depravity  of  man  consists  in  taste,  or  will,  or  the 
first  voluntary  operation  of  the  will,  will  any  say,  we  create  or 
produce  them  ?  We  might  with  as  much  propriety  say,  we 
create  ourselves.  For  no  man  can  create  a  taste,  or  a  will,  or 
the  first  exercise  of  his  will,  any  more  than  he  can  create  himself. 
If  not,  he  certainly  is  not  at  liberty  to  be  either  vicious,  or  vir- 
tuous, any  more  than  he  is  at  liberty  to  exist,  or  not  exist.  In- 
deed, in  whatever  light  we  may  view  the  subject,  it  is  apparent, 
that  liberty  is  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  either  vice  or 
virtue.  For  whether  we  shall  be  created  with  either  a  vicious 
or  virtuous  character,  does  not  depend  on  our  pleasure,  any 
more  than  our  being. 

Some  are  often  objecting  to  this  representation,  saying,  if  a 
sinful  inclination  does  not  depend  on  our  exertions,  we  are  not 
blameable.  This  will  be  attended  to,  under  the  subject  of  praise 
and  blameworthiness.  Here  it  may  be  observed,  that  all  who 
believe  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity,  grant  we  are  born  witfe 


136 

corrupt  hearts.     Tliese  will  admit,  that  liberty  is  not  necessary 
to  the  existence  ol'  vice  or  virtue. 

Whether  the  dealings  of  God  with  Adam,  as  especially  his  es- 
tablishing a  connexion  between  his  moral  character  and  tliat  of 
his  posterity,  was  inconsistent  with  wisdom  and  justice,  is  a 
subject  distinct  from  the  present.  We  know  it  is  a  fact,  that 
Adam'^  posterity  derive  a  depraved  heart  from  him.  And  all, 
who  believe  God  is  holy,  wise,  and  just,  will  admit  that  the  con- 
n«xion  he  did  establish  between  our  first  parents  and  their  pos- 
terity was  consistent  with  his  attributes,  whether  they  can  clear- 
ly see  the  consistency  or  not.  The  author  has  written  on  this 
subject,  and  advanced  a  theory  which  was  new  to  him,  never 
having  seen  any  part  of  it  in  print  ;  but  whether  he  will  ever 
publish  it  is  imcertain.  It  is  in  his  view  a  theory  that  avoids  the 
difficulties,  which  have  hitherto  attended  it,  and  which  agrees 
with  reason  and  facts. 

But  though  liberty  is  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  vice 
or  virtue,  yet  is  it  essential  to  render  us  worthy  of  praise  and 
blame .''  It  would  appear,  on  examination,  that  it  is  no  more 
necessary  to  praise  and  blame,  than  it  is  to  the  existence  of  vice 
or  virtue.  But  as  the  subject  of  praise  and  blame  is  discussed 
in  a  subsequent  essay,  to  prevent  repetitions,  the  reader  is  refer- 
red to  that  for  satisfaction  on  this  point.  We  may  now  con- 
sider, 

11.  For  what  ends,  or  purposes,  liberty  is  necessary  in  a  mor- 
al agent.  Though  it  is  not  essential  to  one  thing,  yet  it  may 
be  for  another.     And  it  is  requisite  for  the  following  purposes. 

1.  If  we  did  not  enjoy  the  privilege  of  choosing  as  we  wish, 
and  acting  as  we  choose,  we  should  not  be  complete  agents.  A 
complete  agent  is  capable  of  choosing  and  acting  agreeably  to 
the  desires  of  the  heart.  So  that,  if  he  has  desires  for  objects, 
yet  is  not  at  liberty  to  put  forth  those  volitions,  and  produce 
those  external  actions  necessary  to  obtain  the  objects  of  his  de- 
sire, and  avoid  the  objects  of  his  aversion,  he  is  not  a  complete 
agent.  For  a  complete  agent  Is  able  to  attain,  generally',  what- 
ever he  loves,  and  shun  whatever  he  hates.  If  God  had  not  es- 
tablished a  connexion  between  our  desires  and  volitions,  and 
external  actions,  we  might  have  desires,  but  they  would  never 
produce  any  eflects,  nor  be  able  to  reach  the  objects  which 
would  gratify  them.  In  this  case  the  agency  of  man  would  be 
very  imperfect,  and  incomplete.  Accordingly  a  liberty  to  choose 


13: 

agreeably  to  his  wishes,  and  to  act  as  he  chooses,  is  essentiaf-^ 
ly  necessary  to  complete  agency- 

2.  It  is  necessary  for  us,  in  order  that  we  may  act  out  the  in-' 
ternal  inclinations  of  the  heart.  The  desires  of  the  heart  would 
never  appear  in  any  external  acts,  if  we  had  not  tiie  liberty  of 
choosing  and  acting.  Of  course  moral  agents  could  never  have 
any  knowledge  of  each  other's  characters.  As  we  have  no  in- 
tuitive view  of  each  other's  hearts,  and  become  acquainted  with 
each  other's  characters  only  by  external,  visible  signs,  or  ac- 
tions, if  the  heart  was  incapable  of  manifesting  itself  in  this 
way,  we  must  forever  remain  ignorant  of  each  other's  de- 
serts. But  it  is  necessary,  to  answer  many  purposes  in  the 
moral  government  of  the  world,  for  creatures  to  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  each  other's  characters.  And  in  order  to  this,  liberty 
of  choosing  and  acting  is  requisite. 

3.  It  is  necessary  to  social  intercourse.  We  might  have 
strong  desires,  yet  if  we  could  not  express  them,  we  could  not 
have  any  social  intercourse  with  each  other,  nor  with  our  Maker. 
For  if  he  did  not  enjoy  the  same  liberty,  the  desires  of  his  heart 
would  not  be  manifested.  And  without  a  knowledge  of  his 
character,  we  could  never  enjoy  him.  As  true  happiness  con- 
sists in  the  enjoyment  of  God,  ana  the  social  intercourse  of  holy 
creatures  with  each  other,  liberty  is  essentially  necessary'  to  our 
present  and  future  felicity. 

4.  It  is  necessary,  in  order  for  us  to  render  unto  God  all  that, 
service,  which  he  requires  of  us.  Generally,  to  do  the  things 
required  of  us,  external  actions  are  necessary,  as  in  teaching, 
reproving,  exhorting,  and  many  other  duties.  But  if  we  had 
not  the  liberty  of  choosing  and  acting,  the  most  benevolent  heart 
could  not  perform  all  those  duties,  which  are  enjoined. 

I  now  ask,  is  a  person  a  complete  agent,  who  is  not  at  liber- 
ty to  attain  the  objects  he  desires,  or  to  manifest  the  internal  feel- 
ings of  the  heart,  or  to  have  social  intercourse  with  men,  or  per- 
form the  duties  required  of  him  ?  If  not,  then  liberty  is  neces- 
sary to  answer  ends  unspeakably  interesting  and  important. 

If  we  did  not  enjoy  the  liberty  of  choosing  and  acting  agree- 
ably to  our  inclinations  and  desires,  we  should  be  very  imper- 
fect, and  incomplete  agents.  But  our  Maker  has  established  a 
connexion  between  our  original  appetites,  or  primary  principles 
of  action,  and  all  our  subsequent  actions  ;  which  are  necessary 
to  the  accomplishment  of  our  pleasure,andthe  gratification  of  our 
desires.     This  established  connexion  secures  to  us  the  privilege^ 

R 


138 

called  liberty,  and  enables  us  to  act  as  we  please,  and  render; 
tis  complete  agents,  as  far  as  this  connexion  extends. 


**■+******* 


tlSSILY  KVtt. 

On  Motives  J  tcith  their  influence  in  determining  the 
icill. 

By  a  motive,  T  mean  any  thing  which  moves,  excites,  or  in- 
duces an  agent  to  act ;  to  choose  one  thing,  and  refuse  another. 
Motives  are  causes  of  action.  1  do  not  mean,  that  they  are  ef- 
ficient, independent  causes  ;  but  they  are,  what  are  commonly 
called  secondary  causes.  They  are  as  really  the  causes  of  our 
voluntary  actions,  as  rain,  heat,  and  the  earth,  are  causes  of  vege- 
tation. They  are  the  ground  and  reason  of  our  acting,  at  all 
times,  as  we  do  act.  Motives  may,  therefore,  be  divided  into 
two  general  classes,  internal  and  external. 

1.  By  internal  motives,  I  mean,  every  thing  in  the  heart  or 
laste,  which  stimulates  to  action.  The  appetite  of  hunger  im- 
pels, or  excites,  to  action.  The  same  is  true  with  respect  to  all 
the  appetites  witli  which  we  are  born. 

Our  aflections  and  passions  excite  to  action.  They  operate 
as  causes,  which  put  the  will  in  motion.  They  produce,  or 
give  rise  to  voluntaiy  exertions.  This  agrees  with  the  experi- 
ence of  all  men  ;  for  all  experience  t!ie  operation  of  these  inter- 
nal principles,  and  find  they  are  stimulated  by  them  to  every  ac- 
tion they  perform. 

Every  language  also  is  constructed  on  a  belief,  that  we  are 
governed  by  our  internal  appetites,  and  our  desires  to  obtain 
that  which  is  agreeable,  and  avoid  whatever  is  painful.  Hence 
arise  the  phrases,  in  every  language,  of  being  impelled  by  hun- 
ger, thirst,  and  the  passions.  Indeed  deprive  moral  agents  of 
those  internal  principles  of  action,  their  agency  would  be  de- 
stroyed, and  all  action  would  cease. 

These  internal  principles  are  antecedent  to  all  our  voluntary 
exertions.     They  move  us  to  act.     They  are  the  internal  causes. 


18^ 

)vhich  produce  volitions.  These  internal  motives  govern,  auid 
determine  the  will.  Hence  it  is  whoil\  improper  to  say,  that 
these  internal  principles  are  governed  by  motives.  They  are 
the  primary  principles  of  action  in  moral  apjents,  and  of  course 
are  not  t^overned  by  antecedent  principles  within  us  ;  for  there 
are  none,  which  are  antecedent  to  them.  Being  primary-,  they 
are  not  governed  by  any  principles  we  possess  ;  but  they  gov- 
ern, direct  and  determine  the  will.  This  faculty  is  entirely  un- 
der the  influence  of  the  heart  ;  but  the  heart  is  never  directly 
under  the  influence  of  the  will.  Having  explained  what  I  mean 
by  internal  motives,  I  shall  attend, 

2.  To  the  influence  of  external  motives.  External  motives 
include  all  objects,  which  either  please  or  disgust  us.  Every  indi- 
vidual object  which  pleases,  excites  us  to  those  actions,  which  are 
necessary  to  obtain  the  agreeable  object.  And  all  those  objects, 
which  displease,  excite  us  to  those  actions,  which  are  necessary 
to  avoid  them,  that  we  may  shun  the  pain  they  might  occasion. 
All  objects,  therefore,  of  every  kind,  whether  agreeable  or  dis- 
agreeable, when  in  view  of  the  mind,  are  motives  to  action.  I 
say,  in  view  of  the  mind  ;  because  objects,  which  are  not  per- 
ceived, or  of  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant,  can  never  please 
or  disgust.  Of  course,  till  they  are  perceived,  they  have  no  in- 
fluence.    This  will  lead  us  to  consider  the  influence  of  motives, 

How  do  external  objects  operate  on  the  mind,  and  influence 
it  to  action  ?  It  is  wholly  by  affecting  it.  And  they  never  af- 
fect it  any  farther,  than  they  excite  painful,  or  pleasant  sensa- 
tions. Agreeable  and  painful  sensations  are  feelings  ;  and  the 
only  feelings  we  ever  experience.  It  is  by  exciting  such  sensa- 
tions, that  external  objects  affect  us.  If  we  could  perceive  ex- 
ternal objects  without  experiencing  either  pleasure  or  pain,  they 
would  not  aflect  us.  In  relation  to  all  such  objects,  the  mind 
would  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  indiflerence.  For  to  be  in  a  state 
of  indifference  in  relation  to  any  object,  is  to  be  unafiected  by 
it.  But  we  are  unaffected,  if  the  object  is  neither  agreeable,  nor 
.disagreeable.  But  when  objects  either  please  or  disgust  us, 
we  are  then  no  longer  in  a  state  of  indiflerence  ;  we  are  aflect- 
ed  either  for  or  against  them.  Objects,  so  far  as  they  please 
.or  displease,  impress  us  j  and  when  they  do  neither,  they  make 
no  impression.  Hence  they  act  upon  the  mind  by  exciting 
pleasant  or  painful  sensations.  And  the  whole  influence  of  ex- 
ternal motives  consists  in  the  impression  they  make  on  the  mind. 
So  far  as  they  affect  er  impress  the  raind,  they  influence  us  to  ac- 


140 

•Ciou  ;  ami  'no  i'arther.  Here  it  is  well  to  observe,  that  as  the 
heart,  or  taste,  is  tlic  only  feeling  faculty  of  the  mind,  or  the 
only  faculty  which  is  the  subject  of  pleasure  and  pain,  it  is  the 
only  faculty,  which  is  aflected  and  impressed  by  external  ob- 
jects. And  when  objects  are  perceived  by  the  understanding-, 
they  always  affect  the  heart  agreeably  or  disagreeably,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  ;  though  they  often  affect  us  so  slightly, 
that  we  take  no  notice  of  it.  But  the  heart  is  never  in  a  state 
of  indifference  in  relation  to  any  object,  when  in  view  of  the 
mind.  When  external  objects  impress  the  heart,  they  excite  it 
to  action  ;  and  it  is  in  this  way  only,  that  motives  have  influence. 
This  may  be  more  clearly  explained  by  observing,that  three  things 
are  always  necessary'  to  action.  These  are,  as  observed  in  a  for- 
mer essay,  a  faculty  which  can  be  the  subject  of  pleasure  and 
pain  ;  objects  to  make  an  impression  upon  it  ;  and  an  impres- 
sion actually  made,  through  the  medium  of  the  understanding. 

This  shows  in  what  sense  motives,  both  internal  and  external, 
are  necessary  to  give  rise  to  volitions  ;  or,  in  other  words,  to 
determine  the  will.  Every  volition  is  an  effect,  which  must 
have  a  cause.  And  our  internal  principles  of  action,  together 
with  external  objects,  are  the  secondary  causes,  which  produce 
volitions.  And  unless  these  causes  operate  conjointly,  the  will 
would  never  be  determined.  External  objects,  by  pleasing  or 
displeasing,  excite  internal  principles  to  action,  and  by  their  ac- 
tions or  operations,  volitions  are  produced  ;  the  will  is  put  in 
motion,  and  exerts  itself  to  give  existence  to  every  subsequent 
act,  requisite  to  attain  the  objects  at  which  an  agent  aims. 

Having  explained  in  what  sense  I  use  the  word  motive,  as  in- 
cluding both  the  internal  and  external  cause  of  volitions,  and 
the  manner  in  which  external  objects  have  influence  in  determin- 
ing the  will  ;  we  may  proceed  to  consider  the  strength  of  mo- 
tives. 

These  appetites  or  propensities  of  the  heart,  with  which  we 
are  born,  are  the  primary  principles  of  action  in  moral  agents. 
Our  pleasures,  pains,  and  desires  are  the  aflections,  or  opera- 
tions of  our  appetites.  They  are  the  cause  of  our  voluntary 
exercises.  And  our  desires  are  weak  or  strong,  in  proportioji 
to  the  strength  or  weakness  of  our  appetites.  The  keener  our 
appetite  of  hunger  is,  the  stronger  is  our  desire  for  food.  And 
this  is  true  with  respect  to  all  our  appetites  and  desires.  The 
strength  of  an  appetite  is  not  always  the  same  ;  it  may  be  one 
,hour  strong,  and  the  next  weak  and  faint.     Hence  the  reason 


141 

why  our  desires  for  the  same  object  are  one  day  warm,  and  the 
uext  cool  and  languid.  And  the  strongest  appetite,  while  it  re- 
mains the  strongest,  has  the  governing  influence.  They  are 
often  operating  also  in  opposition  to  each  other.  The  drunk- 
ard, for  instance,  has  a  desire  to  gratify  his  appetite  with  spirit- 
uous liquor,  and  a  desire  to  keep  the  money  he  must  part  with 
to  purchase  it.  Both  these  desires  cannot  be  gratified,  at  the 
same  time.  There  is  a  struggle,  a  warfare  between  them.  In 
this  warfare  the  strongest  will  prevail,  and  the  weaker  will  be 
denied.  Within  a  short  period,  the  weakest  may  become  the 
strongest;  aud  when  this  is  the  case  it  will  prevail,  and  the  oth- 
er must  be  denied.  Thus  the  desires  of  the  heart  are  constant- 
ly opposing  each  other,  with  less  or  greater  strength  ;  and  by 
the  strongest  desire  we  are  always  governed.  Between  the 
strongest  desire,  and  a  choice  of  thi  object  desired,  there  is  an 
infallible  connexion.  Hence  the  strongest  desire  determines  the 
will,  and  the  will  determines  our  external  conduct.  According- 
ly the  strongest  desire  is  what  I  mean  by  the  strongest  inter- 
nal motive.  And  the  strongest  desire  is  always  strong,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  strength  of  its  appetite.  It  is  therefore  of  no  con- 
sequence, whether  we  say  the  strongest  appetite,  or  the  strongest 
desire,  determines  the  will  ;  because  both  assertions  are  true. 

This  shews  the  reason,  why  the  conduct  of  mankind  in  this 
world  is  so  changeable.  It  is  because  our  appetites  and  desires 
are  daily  gaining  the  ascendancy  of  each  other.  And  when 
an  appetite  becomes  stronger,  than  the  one  which  had  previously 
governed,  there  will  be  an  immediate  change  in  the  agent's  con- 
duct. If  the  same  appetites  and  desires  governed  us  uniformly, 
our  conduct  would  not  be  variable.  This  is  one  reason  why 
there  is  no  change  in  the  divine  conduct.  God  is  forever  influ- 
enced by  the  same  benevolent  desire.  He  is  therefore  ever  pur- 
suing the  same  measures,  and  seeking  the  same  end.  And  as 
saints  and  angels  in  heaven,  are  always  governed  by  benevolent 
desires,  their  conduct  will  be  uniformly  and  eternally  consistent. 

But  it  is  time  to  show  what  external  motive  is  the  strongest. 
By  external  motives  I  mean  all  those  objects,  which,  by  afi'ecting 
the  heart,  influence  the  will. 

It  has  been  shewn,  that  external  objects  determine  the  will,  by 
aflecting  the  heart.  When  several  objects  are  in  the  mind's  view, 
the  object  which  is  the  most  agreeable,  and  from  which  the  most 
pleasure  is  expected,  is  the  strongest  motive.  For  tlic  object, 
which  is  the  most  agreeable,  will  excite  the  strongest  desire  in 


the  heart,  with  which  the  determination  of  the  will  is  connected. 
Because  we  always  have  the  wannest  desire  for  that  object, 
which  is,  all  things  considered,  the  most  agreeable.  Hence  ihe 
most  agreeable  object  is  the  strongest  njotive  ;  and  will  have 
the  most  influence,  so  long  as  it  affords  the  most  satisfaction. 
This  is  the  object,  which  makes  the  deepest  impression  on  the 
heart,  and  excites  the  strongest  desires.  Of  course  this  object 
will  be  chosen,  or  preferred  to  others  which  are  less  pleasuig, 
at  the  time  the  will  is  determined. 

Furthermore,  objects  which  are  disgustful,  the  will  rejects. 
It  chooses  to  avoid  them.  Hence  that  object,  among  many, 
which  is  the  most  disagreeable,  has  the  greatest  strength  or  most 
influence  in  determining  the  will.  It  must  be  obvious  to  any 
one,  that  when  two  objects  are  disgustful,  if  both  cannot  be  re- 
jected, the  one  most  disagreeable  will  be  avoided  by  voluntary 
exertions.  On  the  whole,  those  external  objects  are  the  strong- 
est motives,  and  have  the  most  influence,  which  are  the  most 
agreeable,  or  the  most  disgustful ;  the  former  to  determine  our 
choice  in  favor  of  the  object,  and  the  latter  against  it. 

From  the  above  illustrations  it  is  evident,  that  internal  and 
external  motives  perfectly  harmonize  in  determining  the  will, 
For  between  the  strongest  desire  and  choice,  there  is  an  infallible 
connexion  ;  so,  also,  between  the  most  agreeable  object,  all 
things  considered,  and  choice.  To  see,  therefore,  their  united 
and  harmonious  influence,  let  it  be  carefully  observed,  that  the 
most  agreeable  object  excites  a  stronger  desire,  than  an  object 
less  agreeable  ;  and  the  strongest  desire  alwa3?s  determines  the 
will ;  and  the  most  agreeable  object  is  uniformly  chosen.  If, 
then,  we  consider  motives  as  secondary  causes  of  volition  ;  these 
internal  and  external  motives  or  causes,  of  which  an  explanation 
has  been  given,  jointly  operate  in  producing  the  same  effect,  or 
determining  tiie  will  for  or  against  the  same  object. 

It  is  foreign  from  my  object  at  this  time,  to  inquire  whatthings, 
pr  how  many,  are  taken  into  consideration,  to  render  one  object 
more  agreeable  than  another.  For  whatever  they  may  be,  stili 
it  remains  true,  that  the  most  eligible  or  agreeable  object  deter- 
mines the  will.  And  to  ascertain  what  determines  the  will,  is 
the  great  object  of  this  Essay.  I  may  not  use  words  according 
to  their  more  common  sense,  when  I  call  an  internal  principle 
of  action  a  motive  ;  yet  these  internal  principles  do  as  really 
have  influence  in  determining  the  will,  as  external  objects.  And 
i  have  wished  to  bring  into  view  every  thing,  which  in  fact  has 


143 

influence  in  the  determinations  of  the  will.  Tf  T  have  succeedeci 
in  this  respect,  my  end  is  answered.  From  wliat  has  been  of- 
fered on  this  subject  it  follows — 

1 .  That  the  heart  is  a  faculty  antecedent  to,  and  the  founda- 
tion of  a  particular  class  of  exercises  or  operations. 

The  design  of  external  objects,  considered  in  the  light  of  mo- 
tives, is,  to  excite  action.  They  can  have  no  influence  in  an- 
swering this  end,  but  by  exciting  painful,  and  pleasant  sensa- 
tions. This  is  the  first  ellect  they  produce  ;  and  unless  this  ef- 
fect is  produced,  no  exercises  will  follow.  When  these  sensa- 
tions are  produced,  desires,  and  other  exercises  follow.  If  mo- 
tives excite  pleasure  and  pain,  the}'  act  ;  not  as  agents,  but  as 
means,  or  secondary  causes.  And  there  must  be  a  subject  for 
them  to  operate  upon.  For  to  suppose  operations  without  a 
subject,  implies  the  greatest  absurdity.  It  implies,  that  they 
operate  on  nothing.  But  that  subject  is  not  the  understanding ; 
for  that  is  incapable  of  either  pleasure  or  pain.  Their  first  and 
immediate  operation  Is  not  on  the  will.  For  the  pleasure  and 
pain  they  produce  are  not  volitions,  but  the  cause  of  volition. 
There  must  be,  therefore,  another  faculty,  which  is  the  subject 
on  which  they  operate.  And  this  faculty  we  call  the  taste,  or 
heart.  Thus  by  considering  external  objects  as  motives,  which 
eXcite  us  to  act,  such  a  faculty  as  the  heart  is  proved  to 
to  exist,  which  is  antecedent  to,  and  the  foundation  of  all  its  ex- 
ercises. 

2.  It  follows,  if  there  be  no  such  faculty  as  the  heart,  distinct 
from  the  will,  motives  have  no  influence  in  determining  the  will. 
When  we  have  clear,  just  and  distinct  views  of  objects,  if  they 
aflTord  neither  pleasure  nor  pain,  we  are  in  relation  to  them  in  a 
state  of  absolute  indiflerence.  In  this  state,  we  have  no  feeling, 
no  inclination,  no  desires,  for  or  against  the  objects  we  perceive. 
It  is  self-evident,  that  a  being  in  this  state  can  never  act.  He 
is  totdlly  without  any  inducement  to  action.  It  is  impossible 
for  him  to  prefer  one  object  to  another ;  or  to  choose  or  refuse. 
Volitions,  or  acts  of  the  will,  never  can  have  existence.  This 
has  been  demonstrated  by  writers,  more  than  once  or  twice. 
They  accordingly  insist,  there  must  be  a  bias,  preponderancy, 
or  inclination,  for  or  against  an  object,  before  it  is  possible  for  it 
to  be  chosen.  The  moment  an  object  pleases,  or  appears  agrees 
able,  there  is  a  bias,  or  inclination  in  its  favor ;  and  when  an  ob- 
ject appears  disgustful,  there  Is  a  bias  against  it.  Then  the 
mind  is  no  longer  in  a  state  of  Indiflerence.     Hence  the  pleasurft 


144 

We  feel  in  view  of  an  object,  is  a  bias  in  favor  of  it  ;  and  the 
pain  we  feel  is  a  bias  against  it.  If  such  a  bias,  or  inclination 
towards  or  against  an  object  be  necessary  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
if  we  must  feel  either  pleasure  or  pain,  in  view  of  objects,  before 
choice  can  exist,  then  it  clearly  follows,  first,  that  pleasure  and 
pain  are  not  volitions,  because  these  sensations  must  exist  ante- 
cedent to  choice  ;  and  secondly,  that  this  bias,  or  pleasure  and 
pain,  are  not  operations  of  the  will,  but  of  some  other  facult}'. 
But  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands,  they  are  not  operations  of  the  under~ 
standing;  because  this  is  a.  perceiving ,  not  b.  feeling  fiiculty .  If 
it  be  said,  they  are  operations  of  the  conscience,  or  a  moral  sense; 
then  it  must  be  granted,  that  conscience,  or  a  moral  sense  is  a 
feeling  faculty  ;  and  if  a  feeling  faculty,  it  is  the  heart,  or  what 
I  mean  by  taste ;  for  this  is  a  feeling  faculty.  If  it  be  said,  these 
operations  belong  to  a  capacity  of  pleasure  and  pain,  which  is  es- 
sential to  moral  agency  ;  then  it  is  obvious  this  is  a  feeling  ca- 
pacity, and  of  course  the  very  thing  I  mean  by  the  faculty  of 
taste.  It  is  therefore  certain,  that  the  faculty  which  I  call  the 
heart  or  taste,  though  by  others  it  may  be  termed  the  conscience 
or  a  moral  sense,  or  a  capacity  of  pleasure  and  pain,  is  the 
subject  of  that  bias,  that  pleasure  or  pain,  which  is  necessarily 
antecedent  t©  the  existence  or  possibility  of  choice,  or  the  oper- 
ations of  the  will.  And  theire  is  no  way  to  account  for  the  ex- 
istence of  volitions,  only  on  the  ground  of  the  existence  of  a 
feeling  faculty,  distinct  from  the  will.  Those,  therefore,  who 
will  not  admit  the  existence  of  a  faculty  susceptible  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  distinct  from  the  will,  can  never  account  for  the  exis- 
tence of  voluntary  exercises.  And  those  who  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  faculties,  antecedent  to  the  exercises,  are  in  the  same 
predicament.  And  to  be  consistent  with  themselves,  they  must 
deny  the  influence  of  motives  wholl}' ;  or  agree  with  Armlnians, 
that  we  can  act  in  a  state  of  perfect  indlflerence  ;  or  say,  that 
volitions  are  produced  by  the  immediate  agency  of  Deity,  with- 
out the  influence  of  motives.  Then  the  warnings,  admonitions, 
threatnings,  and  promises,  presented  to  view  in  the  w  ord  of  God, 
are  wholly  useless,  and  never  can  have  the  least  influence. 

Every  candid  mind  must  be  convinced  by  its  own  reflections, 
that  motives  have  no  influence,  any  further  than  they  affect,  or 
are  agreeable  or  disagreeable  to  the  agent.  We  may  judge 
many  things  to  be  good,  useful  and  excellent,  which  are  not  a- 
greeable  to  the  heart.  Of  course  they  are  not  chosen,  however 
fitrongly  judgment  may  determine  in  their  favor.     Our  judg- 


145 

rrtent  informs  us  that  the  character  of  God  is  infinitely  excellent  j 
t>ut  it  is  not  agreeable  to  the  natural  heart  ;  and  therefore,  in 
opposition  to  judgment,  the  will  rejects  him.     The  will  never 
follows  the  dictates  of  the  understanding,  any  farther  than  they 
are  agreeable  to  the  heart.     This  is  evident  from  daily  facts. 
Hence  objects   must  be  agreeable  to  the  heart,  to  attract  the 
will.     And  agents  never  choose  objects,  unless  they  are  agreea- 
ble ;  nor  reject  them,  unless  they  are  disagreeable.     Their  a- 
greeableness  is  the  reason  why  they  are  chosen  ;  and  their  dis- 
agreeableness  the  reason  why  they  are  rejected.     But  the  rea- 
son of  choice  is  always  antecedent  to  choice.     After  volition 
exists,  no  reason,  no  motive  can  alter  it.     The  influence  of  mo- 
tives is  antecedent  to  choice.     So  far  as  objects  please,  they  in- 
cline us  to  choose  them  ;  and  so  far  as  they  disgust,  they  in- 
cline us  to  reject  them.     This  is  the  manner  in  which  they  in- 
fluence and  govern  us.     Hence  there  must  be  something  in  an 
agent,  to  be  pleased  or  disgusted,  previous  to  choice  ;  or  motives 
have  not,  neither  can  have,  the  least  degree  of adfluence.     And 
if  motives  do  not  influence  in  this  way,  what  reason  can  be  given, 
why  any  object  is  chosen  ;  or  why  one  thing  is  preferred  to  an- 
other .''     Those  therefore  who  deny  the  existence  of  such  a  fac- 
ulty as  the  heart,  distinct  from  the  will,  to  be  consistent,  must 
admit  the  Arminian  doctrine  of  indifierence  ;  and  assert,  that 
we  choose  and  refuse  objects  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifierence. 
For  if  they  admit,  that  the  influence  of  motives  is  previous  to 
choice,  and  is  the  reason  of  course  of  our  choosing  them,  they 
grant  the  very  thing  for  which  we  contend.     And  if  we  choose 
and  refuse  in  a  state  of  indifference,  then  motives  have  no  influ- 
ence ;  we  are  never  governed  by  them.    And  we  act  very  incon- 
sistently to  present  objects  to  the  view  of  an  agent,  with  a  design 
to  induce  him  to  act.     And  if  we  admit  the  influence  of  motives, 
we  must  grant  the  existence  of  that  feeling  faculty,  which  I  call 
the  heart.     But  grant  that  a  moral  agent  is  possessed  of  the 
faculties  of  understanding,  taste,  and  will,  and  the  influence  of 
motives  is  easily  discerned.     For  then,  when  external  objects 
are  in  view  of  the  mind,  the  agent's  heart  is  affected  by  them  ; 
it  is  pleased  or  disgusted,  and  desires  are  excited.     Those  de- 
sires, thus  excited,  govern  and  determine  the  will.     And  this 
shows  what  we  all  find  to  be  true,  that  the  heart  is  never  con- 
trolled by  the  will ;  but  the  will  is  always  under  the  government 
and  influence  of  the  heart.     Objects  will  please  or  disgust  us, 
and  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  will  to  prevent  it.     It  is  not  m 

S 


146 

the  power  of  the  will  to  cause  us  to  love  and  hate  ;  or  to  pre- 
vent it.  But  the  will  is  always  obedient  to  the  command  of  the 
heart.  It  is  ahvays  exerted  to  produce  those  eflects,  which  are 
necessary  to  gratify  the  cravings  and  desires  of  the  heart.  And 
as  by  motive  is  intended  every  tiling  which  is  a  secondary  cause, 
or  a  means  of  volition  ;  motives  are  properly  divided  into  two 
classes,  internal  and  external. 

Whether  we  say  the  will  is  determined  by  the  greatest  appar- 
ent good,  or  greatest  uneasiness,  or  any  other  motive,  what  is 
contained  in  this  Essay  does  not  disagree  with  such  opinions. 
For  if  objects  of  choice  are  painful,  there  is  uneasiness  ;  if  a- 
greeable,  there  will  be  uneasiness  until  the  objects  are  obtained. 
And  to  choose  according  to  the  greatest  apparent  good,  is  in 
fact  to  be  governed  by  sensations  excited,  which  are  the  most 
agreeable,  or  painful.  For  it  is  ever  most  agreeable  to  reject 
and  shun  objects  which  are  painful,  if  this  can  be  done.  We  are 
then  always  governed  by  motives,  according  to  what  is  written 
ia  this  Essay. 


XSSSAY  XVZZI. 

On  the  JVciturc  of  Good  and  Evil. 

The  division  of  good  and  evil  into  iiattiral  and  moral  is  prop- 
er. Under  these  two  divisions,  every  kind  of  good  and  evil  is 
included.  And  the  difference  there  is  among  things  called  good 
and  evil,  is  the  ground  of  this  distinction.  To  ascertain  this 
difference,  and  thereby  show  the  propriety  of  this  division,  is 
the  object  of  this  Essay.  It  is  necessary  first,  to  get  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil  in  general  ;  and 
then  proceed  to  investigate  the  ground  on  which  they  are  distin- 
guished into  natural  and  moral.  Hence  my  present  design  is, 
to  obtain  clear  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil,  both 
natural  and  moral. 

Good  and  evil  may  be  divided  into  absolute  and  relative. 
Whatever  is  good  in  itself,  or  in  its  own  nature,  is  an  absolute 


147 

good.     An  absolute  good  is  self-evident.     No  reason  can  be 
given,  whj'  we  esteem  it  a  good. 

Happiness  is  an  absolute  good.  Every  one  knows  what  hap- 
piness is  ;  what  an  agreeable  feeling  or  sensation  is.  This  all 
know  by  experience.  And  every  moral  agent  who  has  expe- 
rienced agreeable  sensations,  is  certain  that  happiness  is  a  good 
thing.  It  is  impossible  to  convince  any  one  to  the  contrary. 
Neither  can  any  moral  agent  give  any  reason,  why  he  accounts 
it  a  good  thing.  He  is  not  convinced  of  this  fact,  by  reason- 
ing ;  but  by  feeling,  or  possession.  No  proposition  is  more 
self  evident  than  this,  that  happiness  is  a  good  feeling.  We 
say,  it  is  self-evident,  that  whatever  is,  is  ;  and  that  a  whole  is 
greater  than  a  part.  It  is  equally  self-evident,  that  whatever 
is  good,  is  good;  or  that  good  is  good.  But  to  say,  that  hap- 
piness is  a  good  thing,  is  only  saying,  that  this  good,  called 
happiness, is  a  good.  For  a  pleasant  or  good  feeling,  is  happi- 
ness ;  and  happiness  is  a  pleasant  or  good  feeling. 

Some  make  a  distinction  between  pleasure  and  happiness. 
Can  we  mean  by  pleasure  any  thing  less  or  more,  than  pleasant 
sensations  ;  and  do  not  the  same  sensations  constitute  happiness  ? 
It  is  granted  the  pleasures  of  mankind,  derived  from  worldly 
objects,  are  vain  and  unsatisfying  ;  and  that  there  is  no  happi- 
ness or  pleasures,  but  in  God,  which  are  durable  and  perfectly 
satisfying.  There  is  no  other  happiness  worthy  of  the  pursuit 
of  rational  beings.  And  I  can  see  no  ground  for  any  distinc- 
tion between  them,  but  the  one  here  admitted. 

Not  only  is  happiness  an  absolute  good;  but  the  greatest  sum 
of  happiness  is  the  highest  possible  good.  For  it  is  evident,  by 
attending  to  the  ideas  the  terms  express,  that  an  absolute  good, 
increased  to  the  greatest  possible  measure,  is  the  highest  possi- 
ble good.  Greater  good  than  this  cannot  have  existence.  For 
it  is  absurd  to  say,  there  can  be  greater  good  than  the  greatest. 
And  as  every  moral  agent  esteems  happiness  a  good  thing  ; 
increase  it  to  as  high  a  degree  as  his  capacity  will  admit,  he 
then  will  possess  as  great  a  sum  of  happiness  as  his  nature  will 
contain.  Or,  in  other  words,  he  possesses  all  the  good  his  ca- 
pacities will  admit  ;  the  greatest  good  to  which  an  individual 
can  arrive,  unless  his  capacities  are  enlarged.  Hence  the  high- 
est happiness  of  which  an  agent  is  capable,  is  his  highest  good. 
And  that,  which  is  the  highest  good  of  an  individual,  is  the 
highest  good  of  society.  Societies  are  composed  of  individu- 
als J  and  the  collective  good  of  all  the  individuals,  constitute? 


148 

the  absolute  good  of  the  society.  Accordingly,  the  sum  ot  all 
the  happiness  the  individuals  possess,  is  the  sum  of  happiness 
existing  in  that  society.  And  if  the  individuals  possess  as  much 
happiness,  as  their  natures  will  admit  ;  the  happiness  of  all 
added  together,  constitutes  the  highest  good  that  society  can 
have,  unless  the  capacities  of  the  individuals  are  enlarged. 
Hence  the  greatest  happiness  a  society  can  possess,  is  its 
highest  good.  The  greatest  possible  sum  of  happiness,  there- 
fore, is  the  highest  good  of  the  universe.  For  a  greater  good 
tlian  the  greatest,  cannot  exist. 

1  may  now  say,  that  the  greatest  possible  sum  of  happiness, 
is  not  only  the  highest  good  of  the  universe,  but  the  only  ab- 
solute good  in  it. 

Some  have  supposed,  and  professed  to  believe,  that  holiness 
is  an  absolute  good  ;  and  of  course,  the  highest  good  of  the 
universe.  If  it  be  an  absolute  good,  it  is  the  highest  good. 
And  as  this  position  is  believed  by  many,  it  is  necessary  to  say 
something  to  evince  that  it  is  an  error 

I  will  suppose  a  society  of  beings,  each  of  whom  is  perfectly 
holy  ;  vet  happiness  is  a  feeling  they  have  never  experienced, 
and  never  will.  Is  their  holiness  any  benefit  to  them  ?  If  they 
were  devested  of  holiness,  in  case  pain  were  not  to  be  the  con- 
sequence, would  their  condition  be  rendered  worse  .''  No  ; 
for  their  condition  is  precisely  the  same.  For  whether  they  are 
holy,  or  not  holy,  they  have  existence  without  feeling  either 
pleasure  or  pain.  Some  may  say,  this  is  not  a  supposable 
case  ;  because,  if  beings  are  holy,  they  will  be  happy.  If  this 
were  granted,  still  it  is  a  supposable  case  ;  because  holiness 
and  happiness  are  distinct  things.  As  they  arc  not  the  same, 
but  objects  of  separate,  distinct  consideration,  we  may  suppose 
one  to  exist  without  the  other.  Furthermore,  holiness  and  hap- 
piness are  not  inseparably  connected.  Perfectly  holy  beings 
may  suffer  pain  ;  as  was  in  fact  the  case  with  our  Savior,  who 
was  perfectly  holy.  The  above  supposition  is,  therefore,  ad- 
missible ;  and  clearly  shows,  that  holiness  in  the  universe  with- 
out hapf)iness,  would  never  be  esteemed  as  a  valuable  property 
or  benefit.  And  this  makes  it  evident,  that  holiness  is  not  au 
absolute  good. 

Again  ;  suppose  a  moral  agent  to  continue  in  existence  with- 
out experiencing  any  pleasure  or  pain,  yet  capable  of  improve- 
ments in  many  branches  of  science  ;  I  ask,  could  he  ever  have 
»py  idea  of  ^ood  and  evil  ?     Could  ^ou  communicate  to  hin* 


149 

fin  idea  of  pain,  or  pleasure  ?  No  ;  if  he  were  born  blind,  you 
could  as  easily  give  him  an  idea  of  light  and  colours.  For  we 
do  not  obtain  a  knowledge  of  pleasure  and  pain,  by  reasoning  ; 
any  more  than  we  do  of  light  and  colours.  To  have  an  idea 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  a  person  must  be  the  subject  of  them. 
And  without  an  idea  of  pleasure  and  pain,  the  words  good  and 
evil  would  be  perfectly  unintelligible  to  him.  You  might  tell 
him,  that  hoUness  is  a  good,  and  sin  an  evil  ;  but  he  would  not 
apprehend  the  meaning  of  the  terms  good  and  evil.  This  I 
think  ever}'^  one  must  grant.  This  proves,  that  holiness  is  not 
an  absolute,  but  a  relative  good.  Indeed,  without  happiness, 
why  not  as  well  to  be  without  holiness,  as  to  have  it  ;  to  be 
stones,  as  men  .''  Of  what  value  is  a  universe,  however  holy, 
if  there  be  no  happiness  ?  But  I  need  not  spend  time  in  show- 
ing, that  holiness  is  not  an  absolute  good.  This  is  so  evident,  that 
every  one  must  be  convinced  of  it,  who  is  not  under  an  undue 
bias  in  favor  of  some  beloved  system. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  evident,  that  happiness  is  an 
absolute  good,  and  the  only  absolute  good  ;  and  that  the  high- 
est possible  sum  of  happiness,  is  the  greatest  good  of  the  uni- 
verse.    I  now  add, 

2.  T^h^i  pain  \s  diQ  absolute  evil.  This  is  self  evident.  Every 
person  knows  by  experience,  that  pain  is  an  evil.  It  is  thus 
viewed,  and  dreaded,  by  every  one.  Yet  no  one  can  give  a 
reason,  why  he  views  it  to  be  an  evil,  or  why  he  dreads  it.  If 
pain,  or  misery,  is  an  evil  in  itself;  then  the  greatest  sum  of 
misery,  is  the  greatest  evil  which  can  exist.  That  being,  who 
is  perfectly  miserable,  suflers  the  greatest  possible  evil.  No^v 
every  one  will  grant,  that  pain  is  an  absolute  evil.  And,  as  it 
is  the  direct  opposite  of  happiness,  to  be  consistent,  ever}"  one 
must  grant  also,  that  happiness  is  an  absolute  good. 

3.  Every  thing,  except  happiness  and  misery,  is  good  or 
evil  in  a  relative  sense  only.  When  a  reason  can  be  given,  wh\ 
one  thing  is  good,  and  another  evil,  they  are  relatively  good 
and  evil.  We  consider  them  good  or  evil,  on  account  of  their 
relation  to  absolute  good  and  evil.  When  we  view  things  in 
this  relation,  \(i\ie\v  tendency  is  to  happiness,  wc  pronounce  them 
good  ;  but  if  their  tendency  is  to  destroy  happiness,  or  produce 
misery,  we  pronounce  them  evil.  But  to  prevent  mistakes,  iti» 
necessary  to  observe, 

1.  That  to  judge  aright  respecting  the  nature  and  tendcncj 
of  things,  we  must  take  into  consideration  xh^'w  ultimatetcndcncy . 


15# 

t'or  many  things  txfioYd  present  avid  immediate  pleasure,  whicli 
tend  ultimately  to  destroy  hajDpiness.  This  is  true  with  respect 
to  many  sinful  courses  and  practices.  They  often  aflbrd  those 
who  follow  them  much  present  satisfaction  and  pleasure  ;  yet 
they  tend  ultimately'  to  misery.  In  like  manner,  a  godly  life, 
such  as  the  apostles  and  primitive  christians  lived,  exposed 
them  to  persecution,  and  brought  upon  them  in  this  life  many 
extreme  snflerings  and  tortures.  Yet  the  ultimate  tendency  of  ho- 
liness is  to  happiness  However  much  present  pain  holiness  may 
occasion  ;  yet,  as  its  ultimate  tendency  is  to  happiness,  it  is  a 
good  thing.  And  however  much  present  pleasure  sin  may  afford  j 
yet,  as  its  ultimate  tendency  is  to  misery,  it  is  an  evil. 

We  cannot,  therefore,  judge  correctly  concerning  the  good 
or  evil  nature  of  things,  by  the  immediate  effects  they  produce. 
To  judge  aright,  we  must  take  into  view  their  ultimate  effects  ; 
and  pronounce  them  good  or  evil  according  to  their  ultimate; 
tendency. 

2.  It  is  necessary,  also,  to  explain,  in  what  sense  the  word  ten-. 
dency  is  here  used.  We  say,  the  tendency  of  all  bodies  on  the 
surface  of  our  earth  is  towards  its  centre  ;  yet  we  know  many 
things  may  be  made  to  move  in  a  direction  from  the  centre. 

We  say,  however,  their  tendency  is  not  to  ascend,  but  to  de- 
scend towards  the  centre  of  the  earth.  By  tendency,  therefore, 
in  this  instance,  we  mean,  that  according  to  established  laws 
in  the  natural  world,  bodies  meeting  with  no  obstruction  will 
move  directly  towards  the  centre,  and  will  never  rest  till  they 
reach  that  point.  This  direct  course  of  water  for  instance,  in  its 
motion  to  the  centre,  is  what  we  mean  by  its  tendency  to  the  cen- 
tre. 

We  sa}',  the  tendency  of  poison,  arsenic  for  instance,  is  to  de- 
stroy life.  Yet  it  may  be  used  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  remove 
disorders,  and  restore  health.  According  to  the  laws  which 
prevail  and  govern,  arsenic  in  its  direct  course  will  produce  one 
effect  after  another,  till  its  operation  finally  puts  an  end  to  life. 
Its  direct  course,  in  its  operation,  is  to  the  extinction  of  human 
life.  This  direct  course  is  what  we  mean  by  its  tendency. 
Things  in  this  world  are,  by  their  Maker,  connected  one  with 
another,  ^itermediately,  and  with  some  ultimate  end.  Accord- 
ing to  this  establishment,  things  produce  effects  one  after  anoth- 
er, in  a  regular  train,  till  they  reach-their  final  term  or  end. 
According  to  the  connexions  God  has  established,  their  direct 
course,  in  their  operation,  is  towards  their  ultimate  end  ;  and  in 


151 

S.uch  end  they  will  terminate,  unless,  by  some  meatis  or  othef^j 
this  established  connexion  is  broken,  or  interrupted.  This  di- 
rect course  of  things  to  some  ultimate  end  or  point,  according 
to  established  connexions,  is  their  tendency.  Now,  according" 
to  established  connexions  in  the  moral  world,  the  direct  tenden- 
cy of  holiness,  in  all  its  operations,  is  ultimately  to  happiness. 

This  is  what  I  mean  by  its  tendency.  And  the  direct  course 
of  sin  is,  in  all  its  operations,  to  the  destruction  of  happiness  ul- 
timately. And  this  is  what  I  mean  by  its  tendency.  And  there 
is  no  way,  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  by  which  a  sinner 
can  avoid  being  ultimately  miserable,  except  by  becoming  holy. 
And  a  holy  character,  continuing  holy,  cannot  be  finally  mis- 
erable ;  unless  a  different  order  of  things  should  be  established 
iti  the  moral  world. 

Also,  though  arsenic  may  be  a  means  of  restoring  health 
to  the  sick  ;  3'et,  in  order  to  this,  its  direct  course  or  operation 
must  be  destroyed,  or  interrupted.  Hence,  though  it  may,  by 
interrupting  its  course,  or  compounding  it  with  certain  other 
things,  be  a  means  of  health  ;  yet,  we  do  not  view  this  to  belts 
natural  tendency.  So,  although  sin  may  occasion  good  to  the 
universe,  yet  its  direct  course  or  operation  is  to  make  the  sin- 
ner finally  miserable.  So  all  will  say,  its  tendency  is  to  evil, 
and  not  to  good,  ultimately.  Having  explained  what  I  mean 
by  the  tendency  of  things  ultimately,  whatever  their  present 
immediate  effects  are  ;  it  may  be  said,  that  the  reason  why  we 
call  some  things  good  is,  because  they  tend  to  absolute  good 
ultimately  ;  and  the  reason  why  we  term  some  things  evil  is, 
because  they  tend  to  the  destruction  ofabsolute  good  ultimate- 
ly, or  to  absolute  evil.  Or,  we  call  some  things  good,  because 
their  ultimate  tendency  is  to  happiness  ;  and  we  call  things  evil, 
because  they  tend  ultimately  to  misery.  Here  I  would  just  ob- 
serve, that  whatever  tends  to  misery,  tends  to  destroy  happi- 
ness ;  and  whatever  tends  to  happiness,  tends  to  prevent  mis- 
Cry.  Hence  to  say,  that  a  thing  tends  to  destroy  happiness,  is 
the  same  as  saying  it  tends  to  misery  ;  and  to  say,  it  tends  to 
destroy  misery,  is  the  same  thing  with  saying  it  tends  to  happi- 
ness. The  preceding  illustrations  lead  to  the  following  impor- 
tant conclusions. 

1.  We  judge  all  relative  good,  whether  natural  or  moral,  to 
be  a  good,  for  one  and  the  same  reason. 

Why  do  we  consider  the  sun,  the  rain  of  heaven,  a  good  con- 
stitution, ancJ  health,  to  be  blessings  ?     Because  they  conduce 


152 

to  happincb*?.  For  llic  same  reason  we  view  every  thing  in  the 
natural  world  to  be  be  a  good  thifig,  or  a  blessing. 

Why  do  we  consider  holiness,  with  all  its  operations  and  ex- 
ercises, to  be  good  ?  Because  they  promote  happiness.  This 
is  their  motive  and  tendency.  If  the  question  were  asked  re- 
specting every  individual  thing,  whetjjer  natural  or  moral,  why 
we  consider  it  to  be  a  good  thing,  or  a  blessing  ;  in  answer,  we 
must  assign  one  and  the  same  reason.  We  should  say,  because 
it  tended  ultimately  to  the  promotion  and  increase  of  happiness. 
It  is  presumed  no  other  reason  but  this  can  be  given,  why  we 
judge  things  to  be  good,  whether  natural  or  moral. 

If  we  should  say,  we  consider  one  thing  good  on  account  of 
of  its  utility  ;  another  on  account  of  its  excellency  ;  another  for 
its  beauty,  or  on  any  other  account ;  still  this  is  only  saying,  in 
©ther  words,  that  we  esteem  things  good,  because  they  tend  to 
happiness  ultimately.  For  can  any  thing  with  propriety  of  speech 
be  called  useful,  excellent,  amiable,  beneficial,  or  profitable, 
which  does  not  tend  to  happiness  ^  It  must  be  granted,  that 
every  thing  has  a  tendency,  either  to  happiness  or  misery.  Ac- 
cordingly, things  which  do  not  tend  to  happiness,  tend  to  mis- 
ery. Can  we  with  any  propriety  apply  to  such  things  the  terms 
useful,  or  excellent,  or  amiable,  or  any  other  epithet  of  similar 
import  ?  If  not,  then  they  are  designated  by  such  qualifying 
epithets,  because  they  tend  to  the  happiness  of  the  universe  ;  f 
mean,  to  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness.  Indeed  it  must  be  ob- 
vious to  every  person,  who  reflects  candidly  on  the  subject,  that 
things  are  called  good  on  account  of  their  tendency.  And  if 
on  account  of  their  tendenc}',  it  must  be  for  their  tendency  to 
happiness.  For  no  one  will  call  any  thing  good,  which  tends  to 
misery,  unless  he  views  it  in  some  other,  very  diflerent  relation. 
The  same  thing,  it  is  granted,  may  be  viewed  in  diflerent  rela- 
tions ;  and  be  called  good  or  evil,  according  to  the  relation  in 
which  it  is  viewed  ;  still  it  will  be  termed  good  or  evil  according 
to  its  tendency,  in  that  relation,  in  which  it  is  viewed.  That  is 
a  good,  which  does  good ;  and  that  does  good,  which  promotes 
happiness,  or  absolute  good.  And  nothing  else  can  be  termed 
good,  without  an  abuse  of  words. 

As  every  thing  is  called  good  for  the  same  reason,  on  account 
of  its  tendency  to  happiness  ;  natural  and  moral  good  are  not 
distinguished  by  the  terms  natural  and  moral  because  they  have 
diflerent  tendencies.  If  however  all  things  are  viewed  good  for 
the  same  reason,  it  may  be  asked,  why  are  they  divided  int» 


153 

tvvo  classes,  and  marked  with  the  words  natural  and  moral  '' 
There  must  be  a  difference,  which  is  the  ground  and  reason  of 
this  distinction.  To  this  I  purpose  to  attend  in  the  next  Essay  ; 
but  now  proceed  to  add, 

2.  That  for  the  same  reason  one  thing  is  termed  evil,  ever}' 
thing  is  so  called,  whether  it  be  a  natural  or  moral  evil. 
Why  are  earthquakes,  wars,  famines,  pestilences,  and  all  bodily 
diseases,  viewed  as  evils  .''  Because  they  destroy  happiness. 
This  is  their  tendency.  If  these  evils  were  to  prevail  constant- 
ly, universally,  and  eternally,  could  created  beings  be  happy  ? 
Could  a  holy  being,  if  always  tortured  with  an  acute  disease, 
be  considered  a  happy  being  ?  Natural  evils,  if  they  were  to 
prevail  universally,  would  destroy  happiness  as  certainly  as 
moral.  So  far  as  they  do  prevail,  happiness  is  destroyed.  Why 
is  sin  considered  an  evil  ,''  For  the  same  reason  ;  because  it 
destroys  happiness.  This  is  its  invariable  tendency.  And  so 
far  as  it  prevails  in  this  world,  misery  abounds.  In  hell,  where 
sin  reigns  uncontrolled,  the  inhabitants  are  perfectly  miserable. 
It  is  then  true,  that  natural  and  moral  evils,  are  evils  for  the  same 
reason  ;  because  they  tend  to  miserj',  or  absolute  evil.  Ac- 
cordingl}^  the  reason,  why  evils  are  distinguished  by  the  epi- 
thets natural  and  moral,  is  not  on  account  of  their  different  ten- 
dencies ;  for  their  tendency  is  precisely  the  same. 

Some  may  object  and  say,  according  to  the  above  reasoning, 
the  same  thing  may  be  both  good  and  evil.  For  instance, 
moral  evil  tends  to  misery,  and  for  this  reason  is  an  evil  ;  it  is 
also  an  occasion  of  happiness,  and  for  this  reason  it  may  be 
termed  good.  Hence  the  above  reasoning  proves  too  much  j  and 
therefore  proves  nothing. 

Answer.  1.  We  say,  poison  tends  to  destroy  life  ;  and  is. 
therefore,  an  evil  thing ;  yet  it  is  sometimes  the  means  or  occa- 
sion of  preserving  life  ;  and  when  viewed  in  this  relation,  it  is 
a  good  thing.  Still,  is  it  the  tendency  of  poison  to  preserve 
life  ?  Does  it  not  naturally  destroy  life  .''  Whenever  it  is  the 
occasion  of  preserving  life,  its  tendency  is  counteracted,  by  be- 
ing connected  with  other  ingredients.  Let  a  person  feed  upon 
it  constantly,  and  it  will  soon  put  an  end  to  his  Wie.  We  saj, 
the  tendency  of  sin  is  to  the  misery  of  the  sinner  ;  yet  we  say  it 
is  the  occasion  of  good  to  the  universe.  But  is  it  not  true,  that 
its  tendency  is  to  misery;  and  is  it  not  for  this  reason  called  au 
evil  .'*     But, 

2.  The  words  occasion  and  tendency   have  difforrnt  mean- 

T 


154 

ings.  When  we  say  sin  is  the  occasion  of  good,  wlial  60  w^ 
mean  ?  We  mean  ;  that  it  is  not  the  cause  of  good  ;  it  is  not 
its  nature  to  produce  good ;  it  is  not  oxmng  to  sin,  but  to  the  wis- 
dom of  God,  that  it  is  ever  the  means  of  good.  God  makes  use 
of  it  to  promote  an  end,  which  it  tends  to  destroy.  Hence  its 
tendency  is  counteracted.  A  man  in  anger  makes  use  of  his 
hand,  or  some  other  instrument,  to  put  an  end  to  a  person's  life* 
Here  the  instrument  is  not  the  cause,  but  the  occasion  of  death. 
The  person,  who  used  it,  is  the  cause  of  the  death.  When 
therefore  we  say,  sin  or  any  other  evil  is  the  occasion  of  good; 
we  mean,  some  agent  has  made  it  a  means  of  good,  contrary  to 
Its  nature  and  tendency,  Hence,  though  evil  may  be  made  the 
occasion  of  much  good  ;  yet  its  proper  tendency  and  nature  is 
to  evil.  And  we  do  not  judge  of  the  nature  or  tendency  of  any 
thing,  by  the  good  or  evil  it  may  occasion ;  but  by  the  good  or 
evil  it  will  produce  in  its  operation,  if  not  counteracted. — Reli- 
gion has  been,  not  the  cause,  but  the  occasion  of  many  sore 
persecutions  ;  and  sin  is,  not  the  cause,  but  occasion  of  much 
good  ;  yet  the  tendency  of  religion  is  to  happiness,  and  the  ten- 
dency of  sin  to  misery.  And  we  judge  things  to  be  good  or 
evil  according  to  their  tendency,  but  not  by  the  good  or  evil 
which  they  may  occasion.  Hence  the  objection  has  no  force, 
to  invalidate  what  has  been  said  to  show,  tiiat  we  denominate 
hll  things  good  or  evil  for  precisely  the  same  reason. 

3.  It  follows,  that  all  kinds  of  good  and  evil,  natural  and  mor- 
al, have  the  same  nature  ;  which  is  either  good  or  evil.  Nat- 
ural and  moral  good  have  the  same  nature  ;  natural  and  moral 
evil  have  the  same  nature.  We  learn  the  nature  and  tendency 
of  things  by  the  effects  they  produce.  If  misery  is  the  awful 
effect  all  created  beings  would  suffer,  in  case  nothing  but  nat- 
ural evil  universally  prevailed,  then  its  nature  and  tenden- 
cy is  to  produce  miseiy.  But  if  every  created  being  was 
to  be  constantly  afflicted  with  the  excruciating  pains  of  an  acute 
disease,  then  it  is  the  nature  of  that  disease  to  produce  nothing 
but  misery.  The  same  will  hold  true  with  respect  to  every 
other  natural  evil. 

The  nature  of  sin  is  to  produce  misery.  If  every  being  in  tl>e 
universe  was  to  live  forever  under  the  entire  dominion  of  sin, 
universal  misery  would  prevail  ;  this  is  the  efiect  it  would  pro- 
duce. Hence  it  is  the  nature  and  tendency  of  both  natural  and 
moral  evil  to  produce  misery,  or  absolute  evil.  Their  natures 
then  are  precisely  the  same. 


155 

tn  like  manner,  if  nothing  but  natural  good  universally  pre 
Tailed,  universal  happiness  would  be  the  result:  and  if  every 
being  were  perfectly  holy,  universal  happiness  would  be  the  re- 
sult. So  thai  natural  and  moral  good,  if  they  universally  pre- 
vailed to  the  exclusion  of  all  evil,  would  produce  the  same  ef- 
fect. Of  course,  their  nature  is  the  same.  It  cannot  be  denied, 
therefore,  that  natural  and  moral  evil  have  the  same  nature  ; 
also,  that  natural  and  moral  good  have  the  same  nature. 
Whether  the  nature  of  moral  evil  is  not  more  destructive,  than 
that  of  natural  evil ;  and  whether  moral  good  is  not  more  con- 
ducive to  happiness  than  natural,  are  questions  which  do  not  in 
the  least  afiect  the  above  reasoning.  For  two  things  may  have, 
the  same  nature,  although  one  may  be  more  destructive,  or  sal- 
utary in  its  operation,  than  the  other. 

I  have  been  more  particular  on  this  head,  than  I  otherwise 
should  have  been,  with  a  view  to  detect  an  error  which  many 
have  embraced  ;  which  is,  that  evils  and  goods  are  distinguish- 
ed by  the  terms  natural  and  moral,  because  their  natures  and 
tendencies  are  totally  diflerent.  But,  I  apprehend  it  has  been 
fully  proved,  that  their  natures  and  tendencies  are  the  same  j  and 
that  natural  and  moral  evils,  are  evils  for  the  same  reason  ;  and 
that  natura!  an  I  moral  goods,  are  good  also,  for  the  same  r  a- 
son.  We  must,  therefore,  search  for  other  diflerences,  as  the 
ground  of  the  division  of  good  and  evil  into  natural  and  moral. 
This  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next  Essay. 


41(  if  «*«(*»** 


ESSAY  XZX. 

Of  the  Reasons,  why  good  and  evil  are  distinguish 
ed  by  the  terms  natural  andmoral. 

Where  there  is  no  difference,  there  is  no  ground  for  a  dis- 
Mnction.  The  distinction  therefore,  which  is  under  considera- 
tion, and  has  long  prevailed,  implies  a  difference. 

The  person,  who  first  made  this  distinction,  had  in  his  «w« 


150 

view,  suliicient  ground  lor  it.  And  mankind,  lor  many  ages, 
have  considered  the  distinction  well  founded.  It  has  been 
shown,  in  the  preceding  essay,  that  the  difference  in  the  nature 
of  moral  and  natural  good  and  evil  is  not  the  reason  of  the  dis- 
tinction. 

With  a  view  to  elucidate  this  subject,  I  will  divide  all  things 
which  exist,  into  natural  and  moral  agents.  Some  may  say, 
there  are  no  natural  agents.  For  all  things  which  exist,  except 
moral  agents, are  no  more  than  means  and  instruments  ;  Ecit  is  im- 
proper to  denominate  them  agents.  Though  this  will  be  grant- 
ed, yet  for  the  sake  of  elucidation,  the  distinction  may,  for  the 
present,  be  admitted.  According  to  this  distinction,  many  will 
say,  that  things  arc  called  good  and  evil  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  tiie  agents  to  which  they  belong.  Good  and  evil  qual- 
ities, belonging  to  a  natural  agent,  are  denominated  natural  ; 
and  similar  qualities,  belonging  to  a  moral  agent,  are  called 
moral.  And  this  account  of  the  matter  may  satisfy  many.  But 
inquisitive  minds  will  ask,  what  is  the  difference  between  a  nat- 
ural and  moral  agent  ?  It  is  as  necessary  to  know  the  ground 
of  this  distinction,  as  of  that  under  consideration  ?  In  answer 
to  this  inquiry,  it  is  well  to  observe,  that  the  difference  between 
a  natui-aland  moral  agent  is  very  obvious.  A  natural  agent  is 
destitute  of  all  the  properties,  which  are  necessary  to  constitute 
a  moral  agent.  Moral  agents  arc  beings,  who  have  the  proper- 
ties, or  faculties  of  understanding,  heart,  and  will.  But  all  oth- 
er agents  are  totally  devoid  of  these  properties.  All  beings  pos- 
sessed of  these  properties  are  proper  objects  of  praise  and  blame. 
But  there  is  no  propriety  in  praising  or  blaming  those  existences, 
which  are  destitute  of  these  properties.  Every  quality,  there- 
fore, whether  good  or  evil,  is  denominated  natural,  which  be- 
longs to  a  being  that  is  not  a  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame  ; 
and  qualities,  whether  good  or  evil,  are  called  moral,  if  they  be- 
long to  beings  who  are  proper  objects  of  praise  and  blame.  In 
other  words,  by  natural  good  and  natural  evil  is  meant,  that 
which  belongs  to  a  being,  which  has  not  the  properties  necessary 
to  render  it  a  lit  object  of  praise  and  blame;  and  by  moral  good 
and  moral  evil,  is  intended  that  which  belongs  to  a  being,  who 
has  the  properties  necessary  to  constitute  such  an  object.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  we  say,  the  light  of  the  sun  is  a  natural  good  j 
we  mean,  however  great  a  blessing  the  sun  is,  it  deserves  no 
praise.  But  why  not  ^  Because  it  has  not  the  properties, 
\vhich  are  requisite  to  reader  it  a  fit  object  of  praise  or  blanoc. 


.04 


For  it  has  no  intelligence,  no  voluntar)^  exertions,  no  feeling, 
or  principle  of  action.  In  like  manner,  when  we  say  all  af- 
fections or  desires  are  morally  good  or  evil,  we  mean,  they  be- 
long to  beings  who  are  proper  objects  of  praise  and  blame. 
But  why  are  they  proper  objects  of  praise  and  blame  ?  because 
they  have  all  the  properties  necessary  for  that  purpose.  But 
what  are  those  properties  ?     Understanding,  Taste  and  Will. 

This  shows  that  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  natural 
and  moral  agents.  And  the  distinction  of  good  and  evil  into 
natural  and  moral,  is  designed  to  teach  us  this  difference,  with- 
out using  circumlocution.  Now,  when  we  say  the  light  of  the 
sun  is  a  natural  good,  we  know  the  idea  intended  to  be  com- 
municated is,  that  the  sun,  by  its  light,  promotes  happiness, 
but  deserves  no  praise.  But  by  moral  good  is  meant,  that  the 
subject  of  it  is  an  object,  which  deserves  praise.  So  that  by 
this  distinction,  we  do,  in  a  short  and  easy  way,  give  each  oth- 
er to  understand  that  one  being  is,  and  another  is  not,  a  proper 
object  of  praise  and  blame.  Hence,  when  we  say  diseases, 
earthquakes  and  tempests,  arc  natural  evils,  the  meaning  is  ob^ 
vious ;  these  are  not  proper  objects  to  be  blamed.  And  when 
we  say,  that  wars,  thefts,  murders,  frauds,  and  the  like,  are 
moral  evils,  we  know  the  meaning  is,  that  the  authors  of  these 
evils  are  deserving  of  blame  and  censure.  The  same  holds 
true  with  respect  to  moral  and  natural  good. 

This  distinction  and  division  being  once  made  and  under- 
stood, our  meaning  is  obvious,  when  we  use  the  terms  natural 
and  moral.  These  terms  include  a  train  of  ideas,  which  all 
understand,  who  understand  the  ground  of  the  distinction.  AH 
those  evil  qualities  and  events,  which  do  not  imply  a  desert  of 
praise  or  blame  in  the  agents,  are  classed  together  and  called 
natural  evils  ;  and  those  evils,  which  imply  a  desert  of  blame, 
are  classed  together  and  called  moral.  So  all  things,  which 
are  good,  are  divided  into  classes,  called  natural  and  moral. 
This  classification  renders  the  communication  of  our  ideas  short 
and  easy.  And  if  this  distinction  were  not  made,  and  its  ap- 
propriate terms  were  not  adopted,  we  should  be  compelled  to 
use  many  more  words  than  we  now  do,  on  almost  every  topic. 
It  is  necessary,  however,  to  observe,  that  every  thing  belong- 
ing to  a  moral  agent,  which  may  be  termed  either  good  or  e- 
vil,  is  not  of  a  moral  nature.  The  understanding  is  not  con- 
sidered a  moral  faculty,  nor  its  operations  moral  exercises  ; 
because  mere  intellect  is  not  a  principle  of  action.     If  mankind 


158 

Were  endued  with  no  other  faculty  than  tTie  understanding-,  they 
mitrht  reason  correctly,  and  increase  in  a  knowledge  of  truth  ; 
but  they  would  never  do  any  thing,  which  is  either  good  or  e- 
vil ;  fhey  would  be  totally  inactive  beings.  Nothing  but  an 
active  principle  will  ever  prove  useful,  or  hurtful.  And  as 
mere  intellect  is  not  in  its  nature  active,  and  for  tl, is  reason  will 
never  promote  or  destroy  happiness,  it  is  not  a  moral  faculty, 
nor  its  operations  of  a  moral  nature. 

The  understanding  may  err,  and  errors  may  be  the  occasion^ 
but  not  the  cause  of  evil.  If  errors  are  considered  as  evil,  be- 
cause they  are  the  occasion  of  evil,  they  come  under  the  class 
of  natural  evils.  So  also,  if  correct  reasonings  and  acts  of 
judgment  are  termed  good,  because  they  may  be  the  occasion 
of  good  J  they  are  merely  a  natural  good.  The  understanding 
is  under  the  command  of  the  heart.  It  is  employed,  as  the 
heart  is  pleased  to  direct,  in  devising  means  and  ways  to  do 
good  or  hurt.  It  is  employed  in  concerting  wise  and  benevo- 
lent, or  wicked  and  pernicious  schemes,  according  to  the  pleas- 
ure and  direction  of  the  heart.  The  heart  of  Paul  employed 
his  intellectual  powers,  before  his  conversion,  in  devising  means 
and  ways  to  eradicate  the  christian  religion  from  the  earth  ; 
but  when  he  became  a  good  man,  his  heart  employed  his  un- 
derstanding in  concerting  plans  to  spread  it  through  the  world. 
According  to  this  example,  all  mankind  make  use  of  their  un- 
derstandings to  do  good  or  hurt,  as  their  hearts  please  to  direct. 
So  the  understanding  is  as  really  under  the  power  and  influence 
of  the  heart,  as  our  hands  or  feet.  And  the  operations  of  the 
former  are  no  more  of  a  moral  nature,  than  the  motions  of  the 
latter. 

The  same  is  true  with  respect  to  the  will.  This  faculty  U 
under  the  entire  influence  of  the  heart.  Mankind  never  choose 
or  refuse,  contrar}^  to  the  pleasure  of  the  heart  ;  but  all  their 
voluntary  exercises  are  according  to  its  highest  pleasure.  It 
has  been  shown,  that  the  pleasure  of  the  heart  is  antecedent  to 
all  voluntary  exercises  ;  and  mankind  always  act  freely,  be- 
cause they  always  act  according  to  their  pleasure.  But  if  the 
will  was  not  under  the  influence  of  the  heart,  men  could  not  act 
according  to  their  pleasure  ;  and  of  course  could  not  be  free 
agents.  Previous  to  his  being  renewed,  Paul's  heart  employed 
his  will  to  carry  into  execution  the  schemes,  which  his  under- 
standing had  formed,  to  destroy  Christianity.  But  after  his 
c1>nversion,  his  heart  employed  his  will  in  executing  plans,  to 


159 

extend  the  knowledge  of  the  Saviour  through  the  world.  In 
like  manner,  the  will  of  every  man  is  under  the  direction  and  in- 
fluence of  the  heart.  Now  as  the  will  is  under  the  influence  of 
the  heart,  its  exercises  are  not  of  a  moral  nature.  The  opera- 
tions of  the  will  produce  every  external  effect,  and  always  prove 
useful  or  hurtful.  For  this  reason  they  are  termed  good,  or 
evil.  But  they  are  not  in  a  moral  sense  good  or  evil,  for  the 
same  reason  that  the  operations  of  the  understanding  are  not. 
All  our  voluntary  exercises  therefore,  belong  to  the  class  of  nat- 
ural good  or  evil. 

The  motions  of  the  hands,  and  other  members,  sometimes 
do  good,  and  sometimes  mischief ;  and  for  this  reason  such 
actions  are  termed  good  and  evil.  But  no  one  suppeses  the 
actions  of  the  hands  and  other  members  are,  in  a  moral  sense, 
either  good  or  evil,  And  why  not  ?  Because  the  good  and 
evil  they  produce  do  not  proceed  from  them  as  the  cause  ;  but 
from  the  heart,  which  uses  them  to  do  good  or  hurt,  according 
to  its  pleasure.  Such  external  actions  are  viewed  as  good  or 
evil,  in  a  natural  sense  only.  And  for  the  same  reason,  we  must 
consider  all  operations  of  the  understanding  and  will  in  the  same 
light. 

From  these  remarks  it  follows,  that  all  the  operations  of  the 
understanding  and  will,  and  ail  our  bodily  "actions,  so  far  as 
good  and  evil  may  be  predicated  of  them,  belong  to  the  class  of 
natural  goods  and  evils.  It  also  follows,  that  nothing  but  the 
heart  and  its  operations  is  of  a  moral  nature,  belonging  to  the 
class  of  moral  good  and  evil.  And  one  reason  why  the  heart 
only  is  to  be  denominated  morally  good  or  evil  is,  this  is  the 
ox\\y  primary  principle  of  action  in  moral  agents. 

As  we  can  trace  streams  back  to  their  original  fountain  ;  so 
we  can  trace  all  the  actions  of  men  back  to  their  original  foun- 
tain ;  and  this  is  the  heart.  And  we  can  go  back  no  farther. 
We  find  nothing  in  man  antecedent  to  the  heart,  which  is  active, 
or  the  cause  of  any  actions.  The  heart  then  is  the  primary  and 
origi7ial  cause  of  all  the  moral  good  and  evil,  which  can  be  pre- 
dicated of  men  as  agents.  This  is  the  cause,  source,  or  foun- 
tain of  all  moral  good  and  evil  in  man. 

The  affections  and  passions  are  the  operations  of  the  heart. 
They  flow  as  directly  from  it  as  streams  from  a  fountain.  They 
are  the  operations  of  the  heart,  as  perceptions  are  of  the  under- 
standing, or  voUtions  of  the  will.  And  as  streams  are  of  the 
tame  nature  with  the  fouutaiu  frojn  which  they  proceed  j  so  thf 


160 

ali'ections  nnd  passion?  are  of  the  same  nature  with  the  heart. 
The  heart  is  a  moral  faculty  ;  and  its  operations  are  of  a  moral 
nature.  Tiiesc  onl}'  belong  to  the  class  of  moral  good  and 
evil.  The  understanding  and  will  are  not  moral  faculties,  be- 
cause they  are  not  primary,  active  principles.  Of  course  the 
operations  of  these  faculties  are  not  moral.  So  far  as  it  is 
proper  to  call  them  good  and  evil,  they  are  to  be  referred  to  the 
class  of  natural  good  and  evil. 

It  may  by  some  be  said,  that  as  the  operations  of  the  will 
are  connected  with  the  heart,  they  ought  to  be  viewed  as  moral 
exercises.  But  this  does  not  follow.  Things  of  different  na- 
tures are  connected.  There  is  a  connexion  between  the  under- 
standing and  the  heart  ;  jet  it  does  not  follow  that  the  opera- 
tions of  the  understanding  proceed  from  the  heart,  or  are  of  the 
same  moral  nature  with  the  operations  of  the  heart.  There  is 
as  real  a  difference  between  volitions  and  affections,  as  between 
affections  and  perceptions.  This  has  been  made  evident  in  those 
essays,  which  treat  on  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  Hence,  thougfi 
the  will  is  connected  with  the  heart,  yet  its  operations  are  not 
tlie  operations  of  the  heart,  an}^  more  than  perceptions  are  ;  and 
•f  course,  are  not  of  a  moral  nature. 

To  bring  this  essay  to  a  close,  let  the  following  things  be 
considered.  A  tree  has  fallen,  and  killed  a  man.  Does  it  de- 
serve blame  ^  No  ;  because  it  is  not  a  proper  object  of  blame. 
Why  is  it  not  ^  Because  it  has  not  the  faculties  necessary  to 
rei>der  it  a  designing  agent. 

One  man  kills  another.  Does  he  deserve  blame  ?  We  will 
answer,  yes  :  But  why  ?  Because  he  has  all  the  faculties, 
which  are  necessar}'  to  constitute  him  a  designing  agent,  or  a 
complete  moral  agent.  But  does  blame  belong  to  the  under- 
standingjWhich  devised  the  means  by  which  life  was  taken  away.'' 
No.  To  his  will,  which  executed  the  scheme  devised  ?  No. 
To  the  hand  and  dagger  by  which  the  victim  was  stabbed  ?  No. 
But  why  are  not  these  deserving  of  blame  ?  Because  they 
were  not  active  principles  ;  they  were  only  the  instruments  or 
means,  by  which  the  mirderous  purpose  was  effected.  What 
then  renders  the  murderer  deserving  of  censure  and  condemna- 
tion .''  His  heart.  But  why  ?  Because  it  is  an  active  princi- 
ple and  the  primary  cause  of  all  the  actions,  which  terminated 
in  the  death  of  his  fellow  mortal.  Here  lies  that  malice  pre- 
pense, which  is  called  murder  This  is  termed  a  moral  evil,  be- 
cause it  exists  ia  a  being  who  is  a  complete  moral  agent  ;  and 


161 

because  it  is  the  cause  of  the  death  of  his  neighbor.  To  sum 
up  the  whole  ;  moral  good  and  evil  belong  to  moral  agents ; 
and  natural  good  and  evil  to  natural  agents  But  what 
is  the  difference  between  these  two  agents  ?  One  has  all  the 
properties  necessary  to  render  it  a  proper  object  of  praise  and 
blame,  or  a  designing  agent  ;  and  the  other  is  destitute  of 
them.  But  why  is  not  every  thing  in  a  moral  agent,  which 
may  be  denominated  good  and  evil,  to  be  considered  a  moral 
good  or  evil  ?  Because  they  do  not  proceed  from  a  primary, 
active,  principle  of  action.  Accordingly,  no  good  or  evil  is^to 
be  considered  moral,  but  that  which  proceeds  from  the  heart  of 
man  ;  because  this  is  the  only  primary  principle  of  action. 
The  heart  then,  and  its  various  operations,  constitute  the  only 
class  of  moral  good  and  evil.  Every  other  good  and  evil  be- 
longs to  the  class  of  natural  good  and  evil. 

It  is  a  general  opinion,  that  exercise,  action,  activity,  ^c.  are 
essential  to  vice  and. virtue.  Hence  voluntary  exercises  have 
by  many  been  considered  as  holy  or  sinful,  because  the}^  have 
been  viewed  as  being  exclusively  active.  Since  it  is  proved, 
that  the  mind  is  endowed  with  that  faculty  called  the  taste  or 
heart;  and  that  this  is  the  only  primary,  active,  principle  in 
men  or  moral  agents;  all,  who  consider  activity  essential  to  vice 
and  virtue,  will  now  see  why  the  heart  is  the  only  moral  faculty; 
and  why  it  with  its  operations  include  all  holy  and  sinful  exer- 
cises, by  considering  the  subject  in  connexion  with  what  is  ad- 
vanced in  this  Essay.  Such  are,  hence,  desired  here  to  give 
the  subject  a  reconsideration. 


tff^lf  •fC'P'filf^  •!*  -t- 


ESSAV  XX. 

On  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  or  sin. 

I.  John,  3,  4.     Whosoever  committeth sin  transgresseth  also  the  law  ;  for  sin  is  the 
transgression  of  the  law. 

The  moral  law  is  the  rule  of  duty,  given  by  God  to  man.  It 
is  a  perfect  rule  ;  and  bindhig  on  all  intelligent,  created  beings. 
It  never  can  be  repealed  or  disannulled,  any  more  than  either 
moral  good  or  evil  can  cease  to  exist ;  or  their  natures,  in  the 

U 


162 

present  system,  be  so  altered,  that  virtue  may  become  vice,  and 
vice  virtue.  Hence  the  moral  law  is  immutable,  and  will  be 
eternal  in  all  its  requirements  and  prohibitions.  In  this  passag"e, 
sin  is  expressly  declared  to  be  a  transgression  of  the  law.  Of 
course,  every  transgression  of  this  law  is  a  sin.  And  the  moral 
law,  according  to  scripture,  extends  to  the  heart,  as  well  as  life 
and  conduct.     It  will  be  natural  then, 

I.  To  inquire  what  may  be  considered  as  a  transgression  of 
the  moral  law. 

This  law  contains  two  general  branches.  1.  Requirements. 
And — 2.  Prohibitions.  The  first  respects  what  we  ought  to 
do  ;  and  the  second  what  we  ought  toomit  doing.  Thou  shalt 
love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as 
thyself.  This  contains  die  sum  of  all  tl>at  is  required  of  men. 
Thou  shalt  not  do  any  evil.  This  contains  all  that  is  prohibited. 
These  two  constitute  the  whole  rule  of  duty  given  to  men. 
Here  it  is  proper  to  consider  how  this  rule  may  be  transgressed. 
And, 

1.  How  may  the  requirements  of  the  law  be  transgressed. 
So  long  as  men  have  in  their  hearts  and  lives  all  that  is  requir- 
ed of  them,  they  certainly  do  not  transgress  this  branch  of  the 
divine  rule.  If  they  love  God  with  the  whole  heart,  and  their 
neiglibor  as  themselves,  they  fulfil  all  that  is  required  in  their 
hearts.  They  have  the  heart  and  the  afiections  required  of  them. 
On  this  ground  they  cannot  be  blamed.  For  they  do  not  trans- 
gress. The  only  way  then  by  which  men  can  transgress  di- 
vine requirements  is  by  defects,  by  omitting  to  do  what  is  requir- 
ed. When  the  heart  is  destitute  of  love  to  God,  that  temper 
and  affection  are  wanting,  which  are  required.  Here  is  a  defi- 
cienc}',  a  want  of  the  thing  required  ;  a  defect.  The  person 
does  not  come  up  to  the  rule  of  duty,  but  falls  short  of  it.  Is 
not  a  total  want  of  love  to  God  a  great  imperfection  ?  Is  it  not 
a  transgression  of  the  law  ?  Who  can  deny  it  ?  It  is  then 
evident,  that  this  defect,  this  privation,  this  wayit  in  the  heart  of 
what  is  required,  is  a  sin,  a  transgression  of  the  law.  Hence 
any  deficiency  in  this  particular  is  a  sin.  We  are  required  to 
love  God  with  the  whole  heart.  Nothing  short  of  this  comes 
perfectly  up  to  what  is  required.  Accordingly,  if  a  person  has 
Jove  in  his  heart  to  God,  so  far  as  he  comes  short  of  the  measure 
required,  or  of  loving  with  the  whole  heart,  there  is  a  want  in 
him  of  the  afiection  required.  This  want  is  a  sin.  And  so  far 
as  any  holy  affection,  whether  it  be  love,  repentaiice,  humility, 


163 

or  any  other  grace,  is  wahtini^  in  strength  or  in  equalling  the 
power  we  have  for  such  afi'ections,  it  is  defici'^ut  ;  'here  is  a 
want  of  more  life,  and  a  greater  measure.  And  this  defect  of 
strength  in  any  holy  affection,  is  a  sin,  a  transgression  of  what 
is  required.  So  far  as  this  want  prevails,  the  christian  charac- 
ter is  deficient,  or  imperfect.  Hence  a  total  want  or  deficienc}', 
in  any  holy  affection,  is  a  sin.  And  this  is  the  primary  mperfec- 
tioti  in  every  moral  character.  Did  not  this  in  the  first  place 
exist,  there  would  be  no  irregularity,  no  sin  in  the  heart  or  life 
of  any  moral  agent.     This  will  he  proved  in  its   proper   place. 

But  as  many  deny  there  is  any  sin  in  a  mere  want,  deficien- 
cy, or  defect  in  the  moral  character  of  man,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  attend  some  further  to  this  subject. 

Suppose  the  heart  and  life  of  a  person  is  perfectly  what  it 
ought  to  be,  in  all  respects  but  one;  and  that  is  a  want  of  holy 
aflection.  Would  not  this  wr.nt  be  considered  a  great  imper- 
fection in  his  character  i*  Would  it  not  be  viewed  as  sinful  f 
Could  he  be  considered  as  keeping  the  law  perfectly  .''  Would 
not  the  divine  law  condemn  him .''  Could  he,  without  any  love 
in  his  heart  to  God,  supposing  every  thing  else  be  right,  be  ad- 
mitted into  heaven  ?  And  when  he  stands  at  the  bar  of  God 
for  trial,  destitute  of  any  love,  would  not  his  Maker  blame  and 
condemn  him  ?  The  answer  to  these  questions  is  eas^'  ;  and 
proves  that  this  want  is  a  sin. 

Again.  Do  not  all  ch-istians  feel  worthy  of  blame,  so  far  as 
they  know  there  is  a  deficiency  in  them  ^  Do  thev  not  consid- 
er the  warxt  of  more  love,  more  humility,  greater  confnimity  to 
God,  and  more  intense  desires  after  holiness,  a  s'n  in  them,  a 
moral  imperfection  .''  Do  they  ever  expect  to  be  perfect,  until 
every  grace  arrives  to  perfection  in  its  m^'asure  ?  And  1  not 
this  want  a  grief  and  burden  to  them  daily  .''  Does  i:Ot  -his 
accord  with  the  experiences  of  all  christians  ^  And  fully  prove 
that  this  want,  in  their  view,  is  a  sin  ^  This  want  is  the  very 
thing  intended  by  stupidity,  and  barrenness.  Aod  for  this  want 
of  more  love,  zeal,  fervency,  engagedness,  and  fVuitfulness,  they 
are  condemned  in  the  sacred  oracles.  Why  do  they  cry,  my 
leanness,  my  leanness  ;  why  are  they  cond-^mned  for  their  stu- 
pidity in  scripture,  if  such  a  want  be  not  a  sin  .''  Holy  affec- 
tions are  the  fruits  of  the  spirit.  And  so  far  as  these  are  want- 
ing, there  is  a  want  of  fruit ;  and  so  far  as  christians  are  want- 
ing in  fruit,  they  are  barren.  And  so  far  as  their  uirections  are 
wanting,  they  are  wanting  in  life,  zeal,  and  fruitfuluess.     And 


164 

so  far  as  they  arc  wanting  In  life,  and  zeal,  they  are  stupid.  And 
for  such  stupidity  and  barrenness,  which  we  now  see  is  only  a. 
want  of  a  greater  measure  of  holy  afiection,  they  blame  and 
condemn  themselves  ;  and  also  the  word  of  God  blames  them. 
Why  else  are  they  condemned  for  their  barrenness,  stupidity,  and 
deadness  ?  This  fully  proves,  that  this  want  or  deficiency  of 
holy  aflection  is  a  sin,  in  the  view  of  christians,  and  according 
to  the  word  of  God. 

Further.  In  what  way  can  divine  requirements  be  transgress- 
ed, but  by  a  deficiency  ?  Nothing  but  a  want  of  what  is  requir- 
ed, can  be  a  transgression  of  requirements.  Need  any  thing 
more  be  said  to  make  it  evident,  that  this  w'ant  of  right  aflec- 
tion is  a  sin  ?  In  like  manner,  all  external  neglects  of  duty  are 
sinful.  We  are  required  to  pray.  If  this  be  neglected,  the 
thing  required  is  not  done.  This  neglect,  which  is  nothing 
but  an  external  deficiency,  is  sinful  ;  is  so  considered  by  men 
generally,  and  is  thus  represented  every  where  in  the  word  of 
God.  The  same  is  true  of  all  external  neglects  of  duty.  A 
neglect  of  any  duty  is  a  deficiency  in  a  person's  life,  a  want, 
a  defect.  And  there  is  no  way  b}'  which  a  person  can  live  con- 
trary to  divine  requirements,  only  to  neglect  to  do  what  is  re- 
quired. If  a  person  neglect  to  give  to  the  poor,  when  it  is  his 
duty  to  give,  he  has  omitted  a  duty,  and  has  done  no  more;  fo 
he  has  not  stolen  from  the  poor.  Hence  a  neglect  of  duty 
implies  no  more  than  a  mere  want.  But  if  he  steals  from  the 
poor,  w'hen  it  was  his  duty  to  give,  he  has  both  omitted  his  duty 
to  them,  and  done  what  is  prohibited.  Hence  all  acts,  which 
are  forbidden,  imply  a  breach  of  the  whole  law  in  its  require- 
ments, and  prohibitions.  But  omitting  a  duty  is  a  transgres- 
sion only  of  what  is  required  ;  it  docs  not  imply  a  transgression 
of  what  is  forbidden.  It  is  now  evident,  that  a  want  or  deficien- 
cy in  the  heart,  and  a  neglect  externally  of  what  is  required,  are 
each  of  them  sinful,  a  breach  of  what  the  law  requires.  But 
as  love  is  the  sum  of  all  the  law  requires,  ii  may  aflbrd  some 
light  to  reflect  on  what  the  term  implies.  Love  certainly  implies 
a  pleasedness  with  the  object  beloved.  To  say  we  love  an  ob- 
ject, is  saying  we  are  pleased  with  it.  Pleasure  is  an  agreea- 
ble sensation.  But  what  is  the  foundation  of  this  pleasure  ;  or 
what  is  it,  which  is  pleased  .''  It  must  be  something.  For  we 
can  no  more  conceive  how  pleasure,  or  any  aflection,  can  exist 
without  a  subject,  than  we  can  conceive  of  an  action  without  an 
agent.     If  it  be  said  the  agent  is  the  subject  of  the  pleasure^  and 


165 

©f  every  alVectlon  ;  still  this  is  not  sufficiently  definite.  For 
every  moral  agent  has  faculties,  difierent  in  their  nature.  Th? 
understanding  is  one  faculty.  And  all  agree  it  is  not  a  feeling 
faculty  ;  therefore,  it  is  not  the  subject  of  pleasure.  And  the 
taste,  or  heart  is  another  faculty  ;  and  the  only  feeling  one, 
which  belongs  to  the  human  mind.  And  the  sensations  of  this 
faculty  are  always  antecedent  to  voluntary  exercises.  This  fac- 
ulty then  is  the  subject  of  that  pleasure,  which  is  ever  implied 
in  love.  As  we  are  required  to  love  God,  and  this  love  implies 
u  pleasedness  with  his  character,  and  such  pleasedness  cannot 
exist  without  a  disposition  or  heart  to  be  pleased,  God  requires 
us  to  have  this  disposition.  Indeed,  that  we  ought  to  have  a 
disposition  or  heart  to  be  pleased  with  the  divine  character,  is 
a  truth  so  evident,  it  is  presumed  no  one  will  deny  it. 

Another  thing  implied  in  love,  is  a  desire  for  the  honor  and 
happiness  of  the  person  beloved,  and  a  desire  to  enjoy  his  soci- 
ety. This  all  know  to  be  a  fact  by  experience.  Do  not  all 
wish  well  to  the  object  beloved,  and  wish  to  possess  and  enjoy 
it  .''  Now,  when  God  requires  us  to  love  him  with  all  the  heart, 
he  requires  us  to  have  a  disposition  at  all  times  to  be  pleased 
with  his  character;  and  he  requires  us  to  be  pleased  with  it,  and 
to  have  desires  for  the  glory  and  honor  of  his  name,  and  to  en- 
joy him  forever.  For  as  God  requires  love,  he  requires  every 
thing  implied  in  it.  But  a  disposition  to  be  pleased  with  him, 
and  to  desire  his  glory,  and  the  enjoyment  of  him,  is  love.  This 
shows  how  much  is  implied  in  the  command,  to  love  God  with 
all  the  heart.  And  I  here  make  no  other  distinction,  than  what 
is  made  in  the  command  itself,  bv  him  who  knows  all  thinjrs. 
He  considers  the  heart  a  distinct  thing  from  love,  and  antece- 
dent to  it.  Thou  shalt  love,  with  what.^  With  thy  heart.  The 
heart  then,  or  what  I  mean  by  disposition,  is  distinguished  from 
love,  which  is  only  an  operation  of  the  heart.  Hence,  to  re- 
quire us  to  love  with  the  heart,  is  requiring  us  to  have  a  heart 
or  disposition  to  love,  if  we  have  it  not. 

And  if  men  have  not  a  disposition  to  love  God,  the  most  es- 
sential thing  in  the  requirement  is  wanting.  And  if  this  is  want- 
ing, the  command  is  violated  ;  and  the  person  never  will  love 
his  Maker,  till  this  disposition  is  created  in  him.  And  this 
want  of  a  disposition  to  love,  or  be  pleased  with  the  character  of 
God,  is  the  primary  imperfection  in  the  moral  character  of  men. 
I  am  now  ready  to  attend, 

2.  To  the  prohibitions  of  the  moral  law. 


166 

There  are  many  aflections  of  heart,  which  we  never  ought  to 
hifhiige  or  gratify  ;  and  man}'  external  actions,  which  we  ought 
never  to  perform.  Such  as  anger,  revenge,  lying,  stealing,  and 
hating  God  or  man.  If  we  have  and  indulge  those  passions, 
which  the  law  forbids,  or  perform  those  actions,  which  are  sin- 
ful, we  transgress  the  prohibitions  of  the  law.  In  doing  this,  • 
we  go  beyond  the  rule  of  duty,  there  is  excess  in  us,  as  well  as 
defects.  It  appears,  then,  that  we  transgress  the  rule  of  duty  in 
two  ways.  1.  By  notcoming  up  to  it,  or  not  doing  and  having 
all  that  is  required  ;  and  2.  By  going  beyond  it,  or  having  and 
doing  what  is  expressly  forbidden.  And  is  it  not  as  great  a  sin, 
not  to  live  up  to  the  rule  of  duty,  as  to  go  beyond  it  .''  Are 
not  defects  as  really  sinful  as  excesses  ? 

Why  are  positive  acts  of  transgression  sinful  ?  If  it  be  an- 
swered, because  they  tend  to  destroy  the  happiness  of  the  moral 
system  ;  for  the  same  reason  such  defects  are  sinful.  For  noth- 
ing tends  more  to  destroy  the  system.  For  if  all  the  mem- 
bers were  destitute  of  that  love  the  law  requires,  the  system  is 
ruined.  Nothing  but  wars,  contentions,  disorders,  and  deso- 
lations would  prevail  in  it.  But  this  consideration  belongs  to 
another  part  of  the  subject,  where  it  will  be  attended  to  more  at 
large.  1  have  now  shown  what  a  transgression  of  the  law  is,  and 
of  course  what  sin  is.  To  elucidate  this  subject  more  fully,  a 
number  of  other  things  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  I 
proceed  therefore  to  attend, 

II.  To  Uie  principles  of  action  in  the  human  heart. 

Every  agent  possesses  a  princii)le  of  action.  There  must  be 
something  inherent,  abiding  in  him,  which  will  move  and  ex- 
cite him  to  action,  or  he  is  not  an  agent,  and  will  never  act.  He 
may  be  a  subject  to  be  acted  upon,  and  used  as  an  instrument 
in  the  accompHshment  of  many  things ;  but  he  is  nothing  more 
than  a  passive  subject  or  instrument.  As  every  being  must  have 
a  principle  of  action  in  himself,  to  be  an  agent,  it  is  a  matter  of 
importance  to  attend  to  this  in  particular. 

One  thing  is  self-evident,  that  a  principle  of  action  must  be 
something  susceptible  of  feeling.  And  as  nothing  is  a  feeling 
but  sensations  and  emotions,  which  are  pleasant  or  painful, 
something  must  exist  in  man,  which  is  susceptible  of  pleasure 
and  pain.  And  it  will  be  granted,  that  the  faculties  of  under- 
standing and  will  are  not  the  subjects  of  sensations.  The  heart 
is  the  subject  of  all  our  pleasant  and  painful  sensations.  The 
heart  is  the  only  principle  of  action  in  moral  agents,  as  has  been 


167 

already  proved.  The  next  inquiry  is,  whether  it  be  a  simple, 
or  complex  principle  of  action.  On  examination  it  will  be  ev- 
ident it  is  a  complex  principle. 

Here  let  us  attend  to  facts  and  experience.  Is  not  benevo- 
lence a  principle  of  action  .''  Is  it  not  pleased  with  divine  things, 
and  disgusted  at  sin  .''  Does  it  not  excite  to  action,  and  move  us 
to  keep  the  law  in  all  its  parts,  and  make  us  active  and  zealous 
in  the  service  of  God  .''  It  in  fact  operates  in  this  manner,  in  all 
who  possess  it.     Then  it  is  a  principle  of  action. 

Do  not  huncrer  and  thirst  excite  to  action  .''  Is  not  the  ap- 
petite pleased  with  food  and  drink?  Does  it  not  move  men  to 
use  ail  the  means,  necessary  to  a  supply  of  bodily  wants  ? 
Then  it  is  a  principle  of  action. 

Are  not  natural  atfections,  such  as  the  parental,  filial,  and 
conjugal,  piinciples  jf  action  .''  Do  they  not  operate  as  power- 
ful principles,  and  excite  to  innumerable  actions  .'*  Then  it  is  a 
fact,  which  aorreos  with  experience,  that  in  the  heart  there  are 
several  distinct  p>  inciples  of  action  ;  principles,  which  excite 
men  to  pursue  VL-rydiiferent  objects.  Benevolence  will  lead  to 
seek  the  glory  of  God  J  hunger,  to  seek  food;  thirst,  to  seek 
drink  ;  and  other  principles,  lo  seek  their  respective  objects. 

These  principles  are  so  many  distinct  appetites.  Benevo- 
lence, hunger,  thirsl;,  natural  affections,  are  so  many  distinct 
appetites,  knd  these,  collectively  considered,  constitute  the 
heart.  Hcuice  the  heart  is  a  complex  faculty,  composed  of  a 
number  of  apoetites  united ;  which  prepare  us  to  be  the  subjects 
of  all  the  sensations  we  ever  experience,  and  to  perform  all  the 
actjons  wliicii  ever  belong  to  us  as  agents.  This  point  has 
been  clearly  established  in  the  essay  on  the  appetites.     Inquire, 

III.  Why  all  vice  and  virtue  must  have  their  seat  in  the 
heart.  The  reason  is,  because  this  is  the  primary  fountain  from 
which  all  good  and  evil  proceed.  The  appetites  of  the  heart 
are  the  principles  of  action,  which  set  all  the  wheels  in  motion. 
They  govern  the  understanding,  and  the  will,  and  all  our  ex- 
ternal actions.  Take  these  away,  and  men  would  not  be  agents,, 
and  good  and  evil  could  not  be  imputed  to  them. 

When  we  see  in  men  external  conduct,  good  or  bad,  we  are 
to  trace  back,  and  find  from  whence  it  all  proceeds.  In  run- 
ning back,  we  find  the  external  actions  proceed  from  the  will  ; 
and  the  will  from  the  heart.  Here  we  come  to  the  original  foun- 
tain, from  which  all  good  and  evil  proceed.  Here  then  is  the 
seat  of  all  vice  and  virtue.     Here  are  the  principles  of  action. 


168 

which  are  the  causes  of  all  the  good  or  evil  ever  done  by  men, 
considered  as  agents.  Tiieir  moral  character,  then,  is  according 
to  the  nature  of  tiic  heart.  The  heart  is  either  virtuous  or  vi- 
cious ;  and  all  its  operations,  or  aflbctions,  are  of  the  same  na- 
ture with  itself.  For  streams  are  like  their  fountains  ;  and 
fruit,  take  the  nature  of  the  tree  which  bears  it.  For  the 
reasons  now  given,  notiiing  can  be  more  evident  than  this  ;  that 
vice  and  virtue  must  consist  in  principles  of  action,  and  must 
have  tiicir  seat  in  the  heart  of  all  moral  agents. 

Here  it  may  be  well  to  observe,  that  as  the  appetites  of  men, 
in  the  sense  explained,  are  the  principles  of  action  ;  so  some  of 
them  may  be  lost,  and  then  again  restored.  This  is  in  fact  the 
case,  with  respect  to  benevolence.  Adam  lost  his  disposition 
fo  love  God,  at  the  fdl ;  and  if  he  became  a  good  man,  it  was 
again  restored.  And  all  men  are  born  destitute  of  it  ;  and 
when  any  are  regenerated,  it  is  implanted  in  their  hearts.  And 
other  appetites,  as  well  as  this,  may  be  lost  and  restored.  And 
this  often  in  fact  appears  to  be  the  case.  Still  this  does  not 
afl'ect  the  subject  of  moral  agency.  For  when  an  appetite  is 
lost,  others,  which  are  principles  of  action,  still  remain  ;  and 
men  are  as  active  agents  as  ever.  Though  it  does  not  affect 
agency,  yet  it  will  cause  a  great  alteration  in  men's  conduct. 
That  appetites  may  be  lost*  and  restored,  is  one  thing  of  im- 
portance to  be  considered  in  relation  to  this  subject.  I  shall  now, 

IV.  Show  that  vice  and  virtue  are  not  in  themselves  good  or 
evil,  butonly  in  a  relative  sense.  This  has  been  proved  in  the 
essay  on  good  and  evil.  This  point  being  made  plain  and  es- 
tablished, we  may  now  observe,  that  the  same  thing  maybe  gpod 
at  one  time,  and  evil  at  another,  just  according  to  its  circum- 
stances and  connexions.  For  instance,  when  poison  is  taken 
in  such  quantity  as  to  destroy  life,  it  must  be  considered  as 
an  evil  thing  ;  but  wiion  taken  mixed  with  other  ingredients, 
or  alone  in  a  proper  quantity,  it  produces  health,  and  is  esteem- 
ed a  good  medicine.  Fire^  when  under  our  government,  is  a 
great  blessing.  But  when  it  rages  uncontrolled,  it  is  a  very 
great  evil.  The  sun  is  a  very  great  blessing,  when  connected 
with  a  supply  of  rain.  But  without  rain,  it  proves  the  great- 
est evil ;  for  then  its  tendency  is  to  destroy  life.  If  the  earth 
should  lose  its  projectile  force,  it  would  directly  be  swallowed 
up  in  the  sun  ;  and  every  thing  on  its  surface  would  be  destroy- 
ed. We  might  multiply  instances  to  show,  that  a  great  blessing 
in  one  state,  might  prove  a  great  curse  or  evil  in  a  different 
condition. 


169 

These  remarks  may  serve  to  show,  that  the  same  principles 
•faction  in  the  heart  of  men  indifferent  circumstances  may 
have  a  very  diflerent  tendency.  I  shall  therefore  now  con- 
sider, 

V.  How  some  principles  of  action  in  the  heart  may  and  will 
tend  to  produce  happiness  in  one  state,  and  misery  in  a  differ- 
ent state.  Adam,  we  are  informed,  was  created  in  the  image  of 
God,  both  natural  and  moral.  He  was  therefore  created  with 
a  heart  to  love  his  Maker  supremely.  And  this  was  the  gov- 
erning principle  of  his  heart.  It  was  an  active  principle.  He 
had  also  other  principles  of  action  implanted  in  his  heart.  Such 
as  huncrer,  thirst,  a  love  for  his  \\  ife  and  children,  a  desire  for 
knowledge,  a  principle  of  self  preservation,  and  others  enu- 
merated in  Essay  9th. 

Now  as  long  as  Adam  was  governed  by  love  to  his  ]Maker,  all 
the  principles  of  action  in  his  heart  would  be  subordinated  to 
the  glory  of  God,  and  kept  in  due  regulation.  If  he  ate  or 
drank,  or  gratified  any  other  appetite,  it  was  with  a  view  to  the 
glory  of  God.  He  would  not  neglect  any  duty,  the  law  requir- 
ed of  him ;  nor  perform  one  action,  which  the  law  forbade. 
There  would  be  no  defect,  or  excess,  in  his  heart  or  life.  He 
would  not  fall  short  of  the  rule  of  duty,  or  go  beyond  it ;  but 
live  according  to  it.  And  so  long  as  he  did  this,  he  was  per- 
fect. All  the  feelings  of  his  heart,  and  the  actions  of  his  life 
harmonized,  and  centered  ultimately  in  the  same  end.  Noth- 
ing but  obedience,  order,  regularity,  and  harmony  prevailed  in 
paradise.  Both  natural  and  moral  evil  was  unknown.  And 
in  this  perfect  manner  every  thing  would  have  proceeded,  had 
he  not  been  deceived  by  his  adversary  the  devil,  and  then  viola- 
ted the  divine  command.  Under  this  deception  he  believed, 
that  good,  and  not  evil,  would  result  from  his  eating  the  forbid- 
den fruit.  Being  deceived  he  ate.  And  then,  according  to 
the  divine  appointment,  he  forfeited  and  lost  his  benevolent 
principle.  The  moment  this  was  done,  he  was  in  a  staie  of 
spiritual  death.  One  of  the  greatest  changes  took  place  in  his 
moral  character.  He  was  no  longer  a  saint,  but  a  sinner.  He 
had  lost  the  moral  image  of  his  Maker.  Every  thing  the  law 
required  of  him  was  wanting.  He  had  no  benevolent  disposi- 
tion to  govern  him,  or  to  be  gratified.  He  had  no  love  for  the 
happiness  of  others ;  no  love  for  the  law  of  God,  and  nothing  to 
prompt  him  to  seek  his  glory,  or  the  good  of  his  kingdom.  He 
was  iff  the  view  of  the  law  a  simier.     Because  every  thing  the 

V 


170 

latr  required  ofhim  was  wanting  ;  and  by  tlie  law  he  was  con«' 
demned. 

Now  all  this  is  true,  considering  only  what  was  wanting  m 
Adam.  Is  not  that  character  morally  imperfect,  which  is  des- 
titute of  all  holiness  both  in  principle  and  action  ?  Is  it  not  a 
sinful  character  ;  such  as  the  law  condemns  ?  Then  a  mere 
want,  and  privation  of  holiness  is  a  moral  imperfection  ;  it  is  a 
sin,  or  a  transgression  of  the  law. 

Tiiis  sentiment  demands  the  careful  attention  of  the  reader. 
It  will  surely  be  granted,  that  as  long  as  a  moral  agent  is  per- 
fectly benevolent,  or  loves  God  with  the  whole  lieart,  and  this 
principle  governs  him,  it  will  be  impossible  for  him  to  do  any 
thing  in  a  moral  sense  wrong,  or  to  commit  sin.  It  is  evident, 
then,  the  first  sin  in  a  moral  agent  must  consist  in  the  entire,  ovpar" 
iial  want  of  benevolence.  For  so  long  as  benevolence  is  perfect, 
and  he  is  governed  by  it,  he  cannot  sin.  There  is  no  way,  then,  by 
which  he  can  become  a  sinner,  but  by  the  loss  of  benevolence 
wholly,  or  in  part.  If  entirely  lost,  he  has  no  n)oral  goodness 
remaining.  If  it  is  diminished,  and  he  should  not  love  God  half 
so  much  as  he  might  and  ought ;  then  there  is  a  partial  defect. 
Hence  the  first  sin  in  a  moral  agent  must  be  an  entire,  or  partial 
want  of  benevolence.  The  first  sin  must  be  a  deficiency,  priva- 
tion, or  imperfection.  There  is  no  other  way  conceivable  by 
which  a  perfect,  moral  agent,  can  become  imperfect  or  sinful ; 
or  by  which  sin  can  enter,  or  begin  to  exist.  Could  saints  in 
heaven,  whose  benevolence  is  now  perfect,  become  imperfect  or 
sinful,  unless  by  a  perfect  or  partial  want  of  benevolence  ?  Of 
course  the  primary  existence  of  moral  evil  must  consist  in  a  de- 
ficiency, or  want  of  benevolence,  in  whole  or  in  part. 

This  benevolence  is  all  that  Adam  lost  at  the  fall.  All  his 
other  principles  of  action  remained  the  same.  He  had  the  same 
appetites  of  hunger,  thirst,  self  preservation,  conjugal  and  filial 
affection,  and  desire  for  knowledge.  This  fact  is  undeniable. 
But  now  the  great  inquiry  is,  how  will  these  principles  of  action 
operate,  where  there  is  no  love  in  the  heart  to  God  ?  One 
thing  is  certain  ;  these  principles  of  action  will  have  the  sole 
and  entire  government  of  the  man.  For  he  has  no  other  prin- 
ciples to  govern  him.  Now  these  principles  will  never  lead  a 
person  to  seek  any  objects,  but  those  he  loves.  And  he  loves 
no  objects,  but  those  of  a  worldly  nature.  Hence  the  world,  in 
some  shape  or  other,  will  be  the  only  object  of  pursuit.  The 
"eWorld  now  is  his  idol,  ayd  only  portion.     These  principles  of 


I 


171 

•action,  where  there  is  no  love  to  God  to  rea^ulate  and  ^orcri 
them,  will  lead  men  astray  from  God.  Instead  of  serving  him, 
they  will  serve  only  the  creature  and  themselves.  These  prin- 
ciples are  all  of  the  same  nature,  and  will  produce  nothing  but 
evil.  They  fix  on  the  world  with  supreme  affection,  lead  men 
astray  from  God,  and  keep  them  travelling  the  road  to  death  ; 
and  thus  tend  ultimately  to  a  state  of  misery.  This  is  their  on- 
ly tendency.  The}'  must  then  be  viewed  as  sinful,  or  morally 
evil.  The  primary  fault,  however,  is  not  in  these  principles,  but 
in  the  want  of  benevolence.  This  is  the  primary,  original  fault 
in  the  character  of  men.  The  consequence  of  this  fault  is,  that 
all  the  other  principles  will  have  no  tendency,  but  to  misery. 
Just  as  the  tendency  of  the  sun  is  to  destroy  life,  when  there  is 
no  rain;  or  of  the  earth  to  fall  into  the  sun,  if  it  has  lost  its  pro- 
jectile force.  But  this  will  appear  more  fully,  by  attending 
particularly  to  their  operations. 

Let  us  suppose  pride  to  be  a  principle  of  action,  which  we 
bring  into  the  world  with  us.  Honor,  or  applause  is  its^  object. 
Then  some  honorary  office  or  station  is  the  object  it  will  seek. 
How  will  this  principle  operate,  in  a  person  who  has  no  love  for 
God  or  man  ?  Its  first  operation  will  be,  desires  to  obtain  the 
object,  the  honor  which  is  pleasing.  Secondly,  desires  will 
arise  for  all  the  means  necessary  to  possess  and  enjoy  the  ob- 
ject. If  other  persons  aid  him  in  his  pursuit,  he  will  be  much 
pleased  with  their  conduct,  and  appear  to  be  very  friendly  to 
them.  But  if  they  oppose  him  in  his  schemes  to  reach  his  end, 
and  thwart  and  disappoint  him,  from  hia  pride  will  arise  hatred, 
malice,  anger,  revenge,  or  a  desire  to  retahate  on  them 
for  the  injuries  he  receives.  If  others  rise  above  him  in  honor, 
he  will  envy  them  ;  and  if  he  encounters  great  and  continued 
opposition,  his  envy  and  revenge  will  become  a  rooted  hatred 
and  malice.  This  is  the  worst  passion,  which  can  exist  in  the 
human  heart;  and  when  excessive,  it  seems  to  exclude  the  com- 
mon affections  and  passions.  And  as  he  has  no  other  love  for 
God  or  man,  he  will  use  any  means  which  promise  to  secure  hie 
end,  whether  they  are  lawful  or  unlawful,  good  or  bad.  Noth- 
ing restrains  him  but  the  fear  of  punishment  or  disgrace  in  this 
world.  This  is  the  way  in  which  pride  operates  in  every  nat- 
nral  heart  ;  although  it  does  not  always  reach  this  enormous 
degree. 

Let  us  now  attend  to  the  operations  of  some  other  appetite, 
as  hunger  for  instance,  in  a  person  who  has  no  love  to  God  or 


172 

jnan.  The  object  of  this  appetite  is  food.  ^Troni  this  appetite 
will  arise  desires  for  the  object  ;  and  also  desires  lor  all  the 
means,  which  arc  necessary  to  obtain  food  in  variety  and  plenty. 
Then  will  follow  desires  for  land,  money,  and  many  other  tliinp;s 
useful  in  procuring  food.  Persons  who  favor  his  wishes  will 
be  regarded  as  friends  ;  and  opposition  will  lead  to  the  same 
results  as  in  the  former  case. 

We  will  next  attend  to  selfishness.  This  many  suppose  is  a 
principle,  by  which  all  men  are  governed,  and  the  root  of  all 
sin ;  indeed  the  only  sinful  principle  in  the  human  heart.  We  will 
grant,  for  the  present,  this  opinion  is  true,  l^et  us  see  how  this 
will  operate  in  men,  who  have  no  love  to  God  or  their  fellow 
creatures.  Self  is  the  object  or  end  of  selfishness.  To  please 
self,  is  the  end  ultimately  sought.  From  this  principle  will  a- 
risc  desires  for  every  object,  which  is  pleasing  to  it  ;  and  also 
for  all  the  means  by  which  those  objects  can  be  obtained.  And 
the  person  will  use  nil  the  means  necessary  to  this  end,  as  far  as 
he  is  able  ;  whether  they  are  lawful  and  just,  or  unlawful  and 
unrighteous,  as  far  as  is  consistent  with  safety.  He  also 
will  be  gratified  with  such  persons  as  favor  his  plans  ;  and  will 
have  his  malignant  passions  excited  against  those  who  oppose 
him. 

Let  us  now  attend  to  the  operation  of  the  same  principles  of 
action  in  the  heart  of  a  person,  who  has  a  benevolent  principle, 
invariably  governing  him  in  all  he  does.  The  end  or  object 
of  benevolence  is  the  happiness  of  others,  or  the  highest  good  of 
God's  kingdom.  If  he  is  governed  by  benevolence  invariably, 
he  will  do  every  thing  with  a  view  to  this  end.  Let  us  see  then 
how  the  other  appetites  implanted  in  him  will  operate. 

Tliey  will  certainly  be  subordinated  to  the  object  he  ultimate- 
ly seeks.  He  will  never  sufier  them  to  lead  him  astray.  He 
>vill  never  do  one  vvrong  thing  to  gratify  them.  And  in  some 
of  his  pursuits  these  will  harmonize  with  benevolence,  and 
prompt  him  to  do  the  same  thing.  Benevolence  will  prompt 
him  to  feed  the  poor  ;  and  natural  pity  will  move  him  to  do  the 
same  thing.  Here,  and  in  other  instances,  they  will  harmonize. 
This  man  will  seek  his  end  by  no  other,  than  lawful  means.  If 
others  aid  him,  he  will  be  pleased.  If  they  oppose  him  and  his 
great  object,  he  will  view  them  enemies  to  God  and  man.  But 
he  will  not  be  angry  with  them  ;  no  hatred,  or  revenge,  or  envy, 
or  malice,  will  arise  in  his  heart.  But  he  will  pity,  and  pray 
jTor  them ;  and  labor  to  bring  them  to  repentance.     Forhe  lovef 


173 

them  as  he  does  himself.  And  be  will  sacredly  regard  the  rule 
of  duty  in  all  he  does  ;  and  never  go  beyond  it,  or  fall  short  of 
it.  In  this  man,  who  is  invariably  governed  by  benevolence, 
his  other  appetites  do  no  hurt ;  and  sometimes  aid  him  in  his 
pursuits.  They  produce  no  evil,  but  are  perfectly  under  the 
government  of  benevolence.  While  he  is  governed  entirely  by 
benevolence,  no  principle  of  action  in  his  heart  can  ever  lead 
him  one  step  astray.  He  will  act  as  perfectly,  as  Adam  did  in 
a  state  of  innocence.  No  principle  of  action  can  ever  lead  him 
astray,  or  harm  him,  unless  it  becomes  stronger,  and  operates 
with  more  force  ;  which  can  never  be,  so  long  as  benevolence  is 
entire  and  governs. 

I  have  now  given  a  just  view  of  the  operations  of  all  the  prin- 
ciples of  action  in  the  human  heart.  These  principles  are  the 
laws  of  our  nature,  by  which  all  men  are  as  invariably  govern- 
ed, as  the  planetary  system  is  by  the  laws  of  attraction  and 
gravitation.  And  did  we  understand  this  subject,  and  know 
what  principles  of  action  would  govern  a  man  at  any  given  time, 
and  the  exact  circumstances  in  which  a  person  would  be  placed, 
we  could  ascertain  how  he  would  act,  as  accurately  as  we  can 
calculate  an  eclipse.  We  must  now  admit  the  following  cont- 
elusions.  1 .  A  benevolent  appetite  is  the  only  principle,  which 
will  lead  men  to  seek  the  good  of  God's  kingdom,  or  the  happi- 
ness of  others.  2.  AH  other  principles  of  action  are  implanted 
in  us,  with  a  view  to  have  them  stimulate  us  to  seek  tho?e  things 
which  are  necessary  to  the  life  and  comfort  of  the  body,  and  of 
society,  while  in  this  life.  And  as  they  will  not  be  needed  by 
saints  in  heaven,  and  there  cannot  be  of  any  benefit  to  them, 
they  will  either  be  eradicated,  or  cease  to  operate  forever.  3. 
That  if  men  in  this  life  were  always  governed  by  benevolence, 
other  principles  of  action  in  the  heart  would  ne\Qi'  do  any  hurt, 
or  produce  any  evil.  4.  That  where  benevolence  is  totally 
wanting,  all  the  other  principles  of  action  will  in  their  operations 
lead  men  astray  from  God,  to  transgress  his  law,  and  to  perpe- 
trate all  the  crimes,  to  which  circumstances  and  temptations  lead 
them.  5.  That  all  the  principles  of  action  in  a  natural  heart 
are  equally  sinful.  One  in  its  tendency  is  no  worse  than  anoth- 
er. Hunger,  thirst,  pride,  natural  affection,  and  selfishness  will 
equally  lead  natural  men  astray,  and  their  tendency  is  equally 
to  final  miser}'.  6.  That  if  tliose  principles  of  action  were 
never  opposed  by  God  or  man,  and  should  meet  with  no  obsta- 
^:les  in  their  operation,  but  were  assisted,  we  should  never  sec 


/ 


174 

the  passions  of  hatred,  anger,  envy,  rcrenf^e,  or  malice  rise  it 
the  human  heart.  For  these  passions  are  always  excited  by  op- 
poisition  raade  to  such  principles  of  action,  in  their  operation,  by 
God  or  man.  7.  That  principles  of  action  are  not  good  or  evil 
in  themselves  considered  ;  but  are  good  or  evil  according  to 
their  tendency  to  produce  happiness  or  miser}'  ultimately.  8. 
That  the  primary  fault,  or  imperfection  in  the  character  of  mor- 
al agents  is  a  want  of  a  principle  of  benevolence.  Where  this 
is  totally  wanting,  all  other  principles  of  action  tend  to  misery 
ultimately  ;  and  when  this  is  in  the  heart,  and  has  the  entire  gov- 
ernment, they  do  no  hurt,  and  their  tendency  is  not  to  misery. 
Hence — 9.  A  benevolent  appetite  is  the  only  law  of  our  nature, 
which  will  cause  all  other  principles  to  operate  regularly,  and 
prevent  confusion,  disorder,  and  evil.  It  is  therefore  in  this  case 
similar  to  other  things  governed  by  uniform  laws. — Things  are 
so  planned  and  ordered,  both  in  the  natural  and  moral  worlds, 
that  they  operate  in  connexion  with  each  other.  Of  course,  if 
one  important  thing  should  cease  to  operate,  the  operation  of 
other  things  would,  in  consequence  of  this,  produce  nothing  but 
disorder,  confusion,  evil,  and  misery.  The  system  is  perfect,  if 
all  the  parts  operate  in  harmony  together,  as  they  were  first 
created.  But  if  one  part  should  be  destroyed  and  be  wanting, 
and  the  other  part  continue  to  operate,  disorder,  evil,  and  mis- 
ery are  the  consequence.  Hence  the  most  fatal  consequences 
may  follow  from  a  mere  want  or  privation.  As  I  have  already 
observed  with  respect  to  the  operations  of  the  sun,  if  there  was 
to  be  no  rain  ;  and  of  fire,  when  it  is  not  under  a  master  ;  and 
of  the  earth,  if  it  should  lose  its  projectile  force ;  and  also  of 
the  whole  planetary  system,  if  one  planet  should  be  annihilat- 
ed ;  or  in  case  they  should  be  deprived  of  their  gravitation.  A 
privation  of  one  thing  in  such  cases  would  be  followed  with  the 
most  fatal  consequences. 

So  when  all  the  laws  of  our  nature  operate  in  connexion 
with  each  other,  as  they  did  in  Adam  before  the  fall,  their  ten- 
dency was  to  nothing  but  happiness.  All  was  order,  and  har- 
mony. But  at  the  fall,  one  of  these  laws,  that  of  a  benevolent  ap- 
petite, was  entirely  lost.  In  consequence  of  this,  all  the  other 
laws  of  our  nature  in  their  operation  tend  only  to  disorder,  evil, 
and  misery.  This  world  became  the  supreme  object,  the  idol 
of  the  heart.  And  this  will  be  their  operation,  until  a  benevo- 
lent appetite  is  restored,  or  again  implanted  in  the  heart.  Where 
this  is  done,  as  it  always  is  in  regeneration,  then  every  thing  be- 


175 

gins  to  operate  regularly ;  and  when  this  appetite  in  saints 
shall  have  the  entire  covernnient  consiaullv,  perfect  order,  obe- 
dience, and  regularity  ni  their  conduct  will  prevail  ;  and  the 
tendency  of  evtry  thiug  in  them,  and  their  conduct  will 
produce  nothiuj^  bat  happiness.  It  must  then  be  plain, 
that  the  want  of  a  benevolent  principle  is  the  great,  and 
primary  fault,  or  imperfection,  in  the  moral  character  of  moral 
agents.  It  is  the  want  of  this,  which  turned  holy  angels  in- 
to devils,  and  our  holy  progeniiors  into  sinners. 

We  now  see  what  sin  is.  It  is  a  transgression  of  the  law. 
And  the  law  is  transgressed  by  djftcts,  and  by  excesses.  As  it 
is  a  rule,  which  extends  to  the  heart,  as  well  as  the  life ;  every 
thing  wanting  in  the  heart  and  conduct  of  man,  which  the  law 
requires,  is  a  transgression  of  its  requirements.  And  every 
thing  in  the  heart  and  life,  which  the  law  forbids,  is  a  transgres- 
sion of  its  prohibitions.  And  these  two  classes  of  transgres- 
sions, of  the  requirements  and  the  prohibitions  of  the  law,  are 
innumerable. 

Let  it  be  granted  for  a  moment,  that  there  is  an  individual 
principle  of  selfishness  in  men,  which  is  the  root  of  all  sin  in  them, 
and  the  only  fountain  from  which  all  wickedness  proceeds,  as 
some  contend  ;  and  now  let  us  attend  to  its  operations.  We 
may  first  ask,  what  is  selfishness  ?  Is  it  self  love,  a  love  to  self; 
and  love  for  our  private,  individual  interest  <*  In  whatever  way 
defined,  I  suppose  it  will  be  granted,  that  such  a  degree  of  love 
to  self,  or  to  our  private  interest,  as  we  ought  to  have  for  others, 
■is  right.  To  love  our  neighbor  as  ourselves,  implies,  that  a 
degree  of  love  to  self  is  a  dut3\  And  if  we  love  ourselves  no 
more  in  proportion,  than  we  do  others,  we  are  not  guilty.  Such 
a  degree  of  love  to  self  is  not  sinful.  Hence,  it  is  not  sinful, 
until  we  love  ourselves  more  than  we  ought.  This  principle, 
then,  is  not  sinful  in  itself.  It  is  no  sin  to  love  self  as  much  as 
we  ought  to  love  others.  The  sinfulness  of  it,  then,  conists,  not 
in  a  degree  of  love  to  self,  but  in  loving  self  too  much.  Its  sin- 
fulness we  see  consists  in  an  excess  of  love  to  self.  This  is  pre- 
cisely the  case  with  hunger,  considered  as  an  appetite,  and  prin- 
ciple of  action.  There  is  no  sin  in  loving  food.  But  it  is 
a  sin  to  love  it  more  than  we  do  God.  This  must  be  granted. 
But  all  unrenewed  men  love  food,  more  than  they  love  God. 
So  the  sinfulness  of  this  appetite  consists,  not  in  Loving  food, 
iput  ia  loving  it  to9  much}  it  gonsistje  in  »n  excis$  oi\j\^  to  food. 


Here  ihe  case  is  parallel  with  that  of  selfishness  ;  and  for  the 
same  reason  we  must  view  selfishness  sinful,  we  must  consider 
the  appetite  of  hunger  sinful. 

Again,  to  indulge  or  gratify  self  to  a  certain  degree,  is  a  duty. 
But  to  indulge  self  beyond  a  certain  degree,  is  sinful ;  it  is  indulg- 
ing self  too  much.  Here  its  sinfulness  consists  in  an  excess  of  in- 
dulgence. So  it  is  no  sin,  to  indulge  hunger  to  a  certain  de- 
gree. But  to  indulge  it  beyond  this  degree,  is  sinful.  And  its 
sinfulness  consists  in  an  excess  of  indulgence.  Here  the  cases 
are  parallel.  And  for  the  same  reason  we  view  selfishness  sin- 
ful, we  must  consider  the  appetite  of  hunger  sinful. 

Again.  When  a  principle  of  selfishness  is  indulged,  in  using 
unlawful  means  lo  obtain  the  objects  which  are  agreeable  to  self, 
it  is  sinful.  Here  its  sinfulness  does  not  consist  in  using  lawful 
means  to  obtain  its  desired  objects,  or  ends  :  but  in  using  un- 
lawful, unjust  means.  So  it  is  not  sinfid,  for  hunger  to  use  law- 
ful means  to  get  food  ;  but  when  it  uses  unlawful  means,  it  is 
sinful.     Here  the  cases  are  parellel. 

Again.  Will  selfishness  criverisetoa  thousand  desires,  such 
as  a  desire  for  money, cattle,  land, elegant  houses  and  furniture? 
And  will  a  multiplicity  of  such  desires  take  ofl"  the  attention  too 
much  from  religion,  and  place  it  too  much  on  the  world  ;  and 
is  this  sinful  .''  In  like  manner,  hunger  will  give  rise  to  a  train 
of  such  secondary  desires  for  money,  land,  cattle,  and  every 
thing  necessary  to  procuring  food,  and  enjoying  it  in  an  elegant 
manner.  These  desires  will  perplex,  take  ofl'  the  attention  too 
much  from  religion,  and  place  it  too  much  on  the  world.  Here 
again  the  cases  are  parallel. 

Again.  If  a  selfish  man  is  opposed  in  his  pursuits  by  others, 
this  will  produce  in  him  anger,  hatred,  revenge,  and  such  ma- 
lignant passions  ;  a  principle,  which  will  give  rise  to  such  ma- 
lignant passions,  is  sinful.  In  like  manner,  if  others  oppose  a 
man  in  his  pursuits  to  gratify  his  hunger,  the  same  malignant 
passions  will  rise  in  his  heart.  And  if  selfishness  is  sinful,  be- 
cause it  will  give  rise,  if  opposed,  to  such  malignant  passions  ; 
then  the  appetite  of  hunger  is  sinful  ;  for  it  will  operate  in  the 
same  manner,  and  give  rise,  if  opposed,  to  the  same  passions. 
And  this  is  what  we  daily  see  in  fact.  So  that  here  the  cases 
are  parallel. 

And  there  is  no  light  in  which  this  subject  can  be  viewed,  1 
believe,  but  we  shall  find  that  every  reason,  which  can  be  as- 


177 

sl'T-nccJ  to  prove  selfishness  to  be  sinful,  but  what  will  equally 
jirovo  the  appetite  of  hunger  to  be  sinful ;  and  every  other  ap- 
petite, or  natural  allection,  witli  which  we  are  born. 

I  have  un(!er  this  particular  c:;rantcd,  for  the  sake  of  light, 
that  there  is  such  a  principle  of  selfishness  in  all  men,  as  many 
contend  for,  which  is  the  root  of  all  sin. — At  the  same  time,  I 
do  not  believe  in  such  a  principle.  I  suppose  every  appetite 
with  which  we  are  born  is  selfish.  The  man,  for  instance,  who 
is  jroverned  by  the  appetite  of  hunger,  has  no  other  or  higher 
end  in  view,  than  the  gratification  of  this  personal  appetite.  In 
doing  this,  he  has  no  regard  to  the  happiness  of  otlier  persons, 
unless  near  relatives  wliom  he  considers  as  part  of  himself. 
Whether  others  are  benefitted  or  injured,  he  will  gratify  him- 
self b\^  indulging  this  appetite.  And  can  we  conceive  of  any 
thing  more  highly  selfish  than  this  .''  In  like  manner,  every 
other  appetite  in  men  is  selfish.  So  that  selfishness  does  not 
consist  in  one  single  individual  principle  of  action.  It  may  be 
predicated  of  every  appetite,  with  which  we  are  born.  They 
are  all  in  this  sense  selfish,  that  men  under  the  influence  of  them 
will  not  seek  any  higher  good  than  the  gratification  of  their  ap- 
petites; and  in  doing  this  they  have  no  regard  to  the  happiness  of 
others;  and  will,  by  unlawful  mpans, injure  them  to  gratify  their 
appetites.      And  this  is  proved  by  daily  and  numerous  facts. 

Furthermore.  If  a  man  had  a  principle  of  self-love  in  him, 
according  to  the  opinion  of  many  ;  at  the  same  time  was  con- 
stantly governed  by  a  principle  of  benevolence,  his  selfish  prin^ 
ciple  would  never  be  gratified  in  any  of  the  above  cases  to  an  ex- 
cess, and  no  further  than  it  ought  to  be  indulged.  This  is  cer- 
tain, if  he  is  governed  in  all  he  does  by  benevolence.  In  this 
case  his  self-love  would  not  do  any  hurt,  or  produce  any  evil 
effects.  And  the  sanic  is  true  of  all  our  appetites,  so  long  as  we 
are  governed  by  benevolence.  Hence,  no  appetite  will  produce 
any  evil  effects  in  any  man,  until  benevolence  is  wanting  wholly, 
or  in  such  a  degree  as  not  to  be  all  the  time  the  governing  prin- 
ciple. So  that  the  privation  of  holiness  wholly,  or  in  part,  must 
take  place,  before  an}^  principles  in  men  will  produce  any  evil 
efiects  ;  except  in  cases  where  they  are  so  far  deceived  as  to  be- 
lieve that  is  right,  which  is  wrong. 

It  appears  to  me  that  enough  has  been  said  to  show  what  sin 
is  ;  or  in  what  total  depravity  consists.  And  according  to  the 
doctrine  advanced  in  this  essay  it  is  evident,  that  the  depravity 
of  the  heart  consists — 1.  In  the  entire  want  of  a  principle  of 

W 


17B 

benevolence,  or  holiness.  And  this  uant  is  the  primary  defi- 
ciency,  or  imperfection  in  the  moral  character  of  man.  And 
this  privation  of  holiness  must  take  place,  previous  to  the  exis- 
tence of  any  positive  acts  of  sin,  except  in  cases  of  deception. 
And— 

2.  In  the  existence  and  operation  of  those  appetites  with  which 
we  are  born.  The  tendency  of  these  is  to  sin,  to  excesses  in  all 
the  ways  described,  where  there  is  no  principle  of  holiness. 
Then  these  appetites  prefer  this  world  to  God  and  heavenly 
things  ;  lead  men  to  indulcre  them  to  an  excess  in  the  objects 
they  love  ;  and  to  the  use  of  unlawful  means  to  obtain  such  ob- 
jects. And  these  two  principles,  the  want  of  holiness,  and  the 
appetites  implanted  in  us,  will  account  for  all  the  sins  and  crimes 
ever  perpetrated  in  this  world.  And  this  scheme  is  full}  taught 
and  supported  by  the  word  of  God.  Why  will  not  men  come 
to  Christ.**  Because  they  see  no  beauty  in  him  to  attract  ihem  j 
and  because  they  love  this  world,  andpiefer  it  to  Christ  and  to 
heaven.  Why  will  they  not  come  to  the  gospel  supper,  when 
so  often  Invited  ^  Because  that  supper  contains  nothing  which 
is  agreeable  to  any  other,  than  a  holy  heart.  They  refuse  to 
come,  and  go  after  the  world,  their  farms  and  merchandize; 
because  those  objects  please  and  gratify  their  appetites.  They 
serve  the  creature,  and  not  the  Creator,  for  the  same  reasons. 
And  with  this  representation  the  wiiole  word  of  God  harmonizes. 
So  that  we  have  both  scripture  and  reason,  to  vindicate  the 
sentiments  advanced  in  these  sheets. 

This  manner  of  accounting  for  the  passions  and  actions  of 
men,  is  more  satisfactory  to  my  mind  than  the  scheme  which  im^- 
putes  to  man  a  principle  of  positive  malignity.  Disinterested 
malevolence  5  or  that  disposition  which  takes  pleasure  in  the 
misery  of  otiiers,  independently  of  our  own  interest,  is  too  dia- 
bolical to  be  admitted  as  existing  in  the  human  breast.  It  is  the 
perfect  opposite  of  the  spirit  of  holy  and  disinterested  benevo- 
lence. And  when  the  love  of  God  and  man  is  wanting,  all  the 
other  principles  of  our  nature  become  devoted  to  transgression, 
and  arrange  us  on  the  side  of  rebellion,  and  lay  us  under  wrath 
with  the  devils  themselves.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose, 
that  a  cruel  and  fiend-like  disposition  is  the  ruling  principle  of 
fallen  man.  Departing  from  God,  he  becomes  selfish  ;  and  all 
his  aflections  are  indulged  for  the  gratification  of  selfishness,  and 
contrary  to  the  divine  prohiintions  ajid  requirements.  Meeting 
with  opposition  in  his  favorite  pursuits,  both  from  his  fello^v 


179 

aen,  and  from  the  providence  and  word  of  God,  his  passions 
become  malignant,  and  he  indulges  in  deeds  of  injustice,  cruel- 
ty,  and  revenge.  This  mode  of  accounting  for  such  malignan- 
cy appears  to  me  to  agree  with  facts  that  pass  under  our  obser- 
vation, even  including  the  deliberate  cruelties  of  savages  and  of 
despots. 


*t:t>iDieiflt4Ptc* 


ESSAY  XXX. 

is 

On  the  subject  of  praise  and  hlamctcorthiness. 

We  ought,  in  the  first  place,  to  have  clear  and  distinct  ideas 
of  what  is  implied  in  praising  and  blaming  persons. 

If  a  person  sustains  a  good  character,  we  say  he  is  worthy  of 
praise.  What  does  praising  him  imply  .f*  It  implies — 1.  That 
we  Judge  his  character  to  be  what  it  is,  really  good.  This  is 
an  act  of  the  understanding.  This  is  the  faculty,  which  judges 
concerning  truth  and  falsehood,  right  and  wrong,  good  and  bad 
characters.  2.  That  we  approve  of  a  good  character,  justify 
it,  are  pleased  with  it.  This  is  an  act  of  the  heart.  It  is  the 
heart,  which  likes,  or  dislikes,  is  pleased,  or  displeased.  So 
it  comes  to  pass  often,  from  the  influence  of  a  bad  heart,  that 
good  characters  are  disliked.  3.  That  we  treat  the  person  ivells 
so  that  our  conduct  corresponds  with  his  real  character.  To 
treat  him  well,  is  to  make  him  happy  as  far  as  we  are  able. 
This  is  not  always  done ;  good  characters  are  often  treated  very 
ill.  But  this  is  a  great  inconsistency.  \(we  judge  a  character 
to  be  good,  which  really  is  ;  and  approve  it ;  and  treat  the  per- 
son accordmgly,  we  do  every  thing  implied  in  praising  him. 
In  this  sense  God  the  Judge  will  praise  good  men  at  the  judg- 
ment day.  He  will  judge  their  characters  to  be  what  they  are, 
really  good.  He  will  approve  them,  and  love  them.  And  he 
will  treat  them  well,  or  make  them  happy.  This  is  praising 
and  honoring  them  before  an  assembled  universe  j  greater  hoa- 
or  cannot  be  done  them. 


180 

Elaminc:  is  the  reverse  of  this.  If  a  character  is  really  had^ 
a  sinful  character,  it  deserves  blajne.  And  judging  it  to  be  what 
it  really  is,  disapproving  or  hating  it,  and  treating  it  according 
to  what  it  is,  is  blaming  the  person.  In  this  sense  God  ^^'11I 
])lamc  the  wicked  at  the  judgment  day.  Their  characters  are 
bad  ;  he  will  judge  them  bad  ;  he  will  disapprove  and  hato 
them  ;  he  will  make  them  miserable.  This  will  be  blaming 
them  in  the  highest  sense.  Greater  censure  cannot  be  shown  a 
person,  than  to  pronounce  him  wicked,  hate  him,  and  treat  him 
accordingly.  These  are  the  things  implied  in  praising  and 
blaming  men. 

And  now  the  question  arises,  what  properties  arc  requisite,  to 
render  a  being  a  proper  ol>ject  of  praise  and  blame,  in  this  sense  .^ 
For  we  do  not  consider  all  beings,  or  existences,  worthy  of 
praise  and  blame.  The  sun  may  be  termed  a  good  being.  It 
is  daily  doing  good  in  many  wa3"s,  and  diffusing  happiness 
through  the  world.  But  we  do  not  consider  the  sun  a  proper 
object  of  praise.  We  consider  a  pestilence,  or  plague  as  a 
great  evil.  Yet  we  do  not  consider  it  a'proper  object  of  blame,  or 
censure.  But  we  consider  good  men  as  proper  objects  of  praise  ; 
and  bad  men  as  objects  of  blame  or  censure.  Why  do  we 
make  this  distinction  ?  Because  we  view  man  as  endued  with 
every  property,  necessary  to  render  him  a  proper  object  ofpraise 
or  blame.  But  the  sun,  and  the  plague,  we  consider  as  devoid 
of  all  these  properties  ;  and  hence  they  are  not  proper  objects 
of  praise  and  blame. 

Then  we  ought  to  inquire,  what  properties  are  necessary  to 
render  a  being  a  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame  ;  and  why 
they  are  requisite  ^  This  we  have  done  in  previous  lectures. 
In  order  to  have  them  now  distinctly  in  view,  it  may  not  be  a- 
miss  to  enumerate  them.  These  properties  are  the  faculties  of 
the  undersianding,  taste  and  %viU.  It  has  been  shown  why  each 
one  of  them  is  requisite,  and  the  reasons  have  been  assigned. 

To  be  brief  in  a  recapitulation ;  the  understanding  is  necessa- 
ry, because  it  is  the  only  perceiving  faculty,  the  eye  of  the  mind, 
and  its  only  eye.  This  faculty  can  see  ends,  and  means;  it  can 
arrange,  and  connect  means,  in  the  best  manner  adapted 
to  the  end  we  wish  to  seek  ;  or  it  can  form  plans  of  operation  ; 
show  us  the  right  and  w  rong  way  ;  and  thus  prepare  us  to  act 
with  aim  and  design  in  all  v.e  do  ;  and  it  can  discern  the  wis- 
dom or  folly  of  every  being's  conduct. 

The  taste  b  a  faculty  which  feels  ;  is  the  subject  of  all  ouj- 


181 

^eiisutiJiiJ,  whether  pleasant  or  painful  ;  so  It  mu^t  be  active  m 
its  nature  ;  and  is  the  only  primary  principle  of  action  in  men. 
It  governs  the  uliole  man  ;  is  the  seat  of  all  virtue  and  vice  ; 
and  is  the  only  faciilt}',  which  renders  ns  capable  of  rewards, 
whether  good  or  evil.  Hence  without  it  man  would  not  be  an 
assent  ;  nor  virtuous  or  vicious  ;  nor  capable  of  any  reward. 
Hence  it  is  the  most  essential  property,  to  constitute  a  being- 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame. 

The  will  is  an  executive  faculty  ;  by  this  all  the  effects  are 
produced,  needful  to  execute  any  plan,  ai'.d  obtain  the  ends  we 
seek  ;  it  thus  renders  visible  the  characters  of  men,  that  all  ma}' 
know  them,  and  sec  what  they  deserve.  When  we  see  uny  be- 
ing endued  with  those  properties,  v.e  cannot  so  much  as  form 
a  conception  of  any  other  faculty,  as  necessary  to  constitute 
him  a  proper  object  of  praise  or  blame.  For  it  has  been  bhown 
that  those  faculties,  in  their  several  operations,  ^include  every 
thing  meant  by  conscience,  or  a  moral  sense  ;  by  a  capacity  for 
pleasure  and  pain  ;  and  by  immanent  and  imperate  acts. 

Accordingly  when  any  creature  exists,  &;  we  find  he  has  each 
of  these  faculties  sound  &:  entire,  we  say  he  is  a  perfect,  complete 
moral  agent ;  a  proper  object  of  praise  or  blams.  Suppose  n, 
person,  when  born,  is  possessed  of  all  these  properties,  though 
they  have  not  as  yet  begun  to  operate  ;  we  should  say  he  is 
prepqred  for  all  the  operations  or  exercises  of  the  understand- 
ing, taste,  and  will,  when  they  shall  be  developed.  As  we  sav 
of  a  clock  when  finished,  before  it  is  put  in  motion,  it  is  a  com- 
plete machine  of  its  kind  ;  it  has  every  wheel,  and  part,  neces- 
sary to  a  clock.  So  here  we  say  of  this  being,  who  has  all 
these  properties  ;  he  has  every  thing  necessary  to  constitute  hira 
a  complete,  moral  agent. 

The  next  inquiry  is,  whether  he  deserves  praise  or  bla.'ne. 
To  determine  this  we  have  to  examine  what  his  character  is  ;  is 
\\  s^ood  or  had  9  If  we  find  he  has  a  good,  benevolent  heart, 
we  pronounce  him  v/orthy  of  praise  ;  if  his  heart  is  bad,  wholly 
depraved,  v.e  declare  hiui  worthy  of  blame  or  censure.  We 
view  him  worthy  of  every  thing  implied  in  praising  or  bla.ming 
any  one,  as  soon  as  we  know  what  his  character  is.  We  have 
no  occasion  ofmaking  any  further  inquiry;  and  men  generally, 
with  respect  to  them,  never  do  make  any  further  inquiry.  As 
soon  as  wc  find  any  person  is  benevolent  in  his  heart,  v.e  pro- 
nounce him  good  ;  if  be  is  proved  guilty  of  malice  prepense,  he 
is  pronounced  a  murderer. 


182 

But  however  useful  the  sun  may  be  in  diflu<iing  happiness,  or 
however  destructive  the  plague  ;  as  each  of  them  is  destitute  of 
ull  the  properties  which  constitute  moral  agency,  we  never  think 
of  praising  the  one,  or  blaming  the  other,  or  of  rewarding  ihein 
with  any  thing  good  or  evil. 

And  wherecver  we  find  any  being  endued  with  the  properties 
or  faculties  men  possess,  we  only  wish  to  learn  their  moral  char- 
acter, whether  they  have  benevolent,  or  depraved  hearts,  in  or- 
der to  pronounce  them  worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  and  of  re- 
wards, good  or  evil.  And  here,  in  relation  to  this  subject,  our 
inquiries  ought  to  terminate  ;  and  here,  after  all  a  fruitful  im- 
agination can  say,  they  must  and  will  forever  end.  And  here 
they  would  without  any  doubt  have  terminated,  with  full  convic- 
tion and  satisfaction,  had  man  continued  holy.  But  his  de- 
praved heart  is  ever  searching  for  some  plea,  to  justify  him  ia 
his  rebellion  against  God.  Hence,  here  arise  the  various  rea- 
sonings on  this  subject,  which,  instead  of  reflecting  light,  have 
only  served  to  involve  it  in  greater  darkness.  Either  with  a 
view  to  justify  or  condemn  the  fallen  race,  some  have  invented 
a  self  determining  power  ;  some  have  made  a  distinction  be- 
tween natural  and  moral  inability  ;  and  some  have  contended 
for  a  creating  power  in  man,  in  order  for  them  to  be  considered 
as  worthy  of  either  praise  or  blame.  And  all  the  diflerent  opin- 
ions, which  have  been  adopted  and  warmly  defended  on  this 
subject,  appear  to  me  to  involve  only  one  question,  which  is 
this  ;  how  much  poiocr  is  necessary  to  render  men  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame  .''  Concerning  this,  I  have  already  given  my 
views  in  these  essays.  I  have  shown  that  men  are  agents  ; 
have  a  primary  principle  of  action  implanted  in  them  ;  and  are 
able  to  carry  all  their  plans  of  operation  into  full  execution  ; 
and  in  this  way  to  obtain  their  ends  at  which  they  aim,  and  to 
gratify  the  desires  of  their  hearts.  And  more  power  than  this 
is  not  requisite,  to  render  men  proper  objects  of  praise  and 
blame.  But  man}'  contend  that  more  power  is  necessary.  Of 
course  it  becomes  us  to  pay  some  attention  to  the  power  the}' 
contend  for  ;  and  show  that  such  a  power  does  not  relieve  any 
difficulty,  nor  reflect  any  further  real  light  on  this  subject. 

They  contend  for  ^creating power.  They  seem  to  suppose, 
that  for  men  to  be  worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  they  must  have  a 
power  to  alter  the  nature  or  temper  of  their  hearts,  as  readily 
and  easily  as  we  cnn  move  our  hands  or  feet.  So  that  they 
can  change  a  good  heart  into  a  bad  one  ;  and  a  w  icked  heart 


183 

into  a  benevolent  one.  If  this  be  a  fact,  that  such  a  creating 
powei'  is  necessary,  it  will  eflectually  exclude  all  praise  and 
blame  from  the  universe. 

Let  us  view  this  idea  in  relation  to  God.  All  grant  he  is  an 
eternal,  self-existent  being.  His  existence  had  no  beginning ; 
was  never  produced  or  created.  It  is  also  granted  he  is  a  per- 
fectly holy  being,  worthy  of  praise.  Hence  his  holiness  is  as 
necessary  as  his  being.  And  he  cannot  change  his  heart  from 
holiness  to  sin  ;  for  this  plain  reason,  that  he  has  no  disposition 
to  exert  his  omnipotence  for  such  a  purpose.  And  let  power 
be  defined  as  it  ma}',  it  is  an  attribute  which  in  all  beings  will 
be  exercised,  according  to  their  prevailing  and  governing  wish 
or  temper.  Now  then  God  did  not  create  his  own  holiness,  or 
that  benevolent  heart  which  he  possesses  ;  and  he  cannot  alter, 
or  change  it.  He  is  necessarily  holy,  and  by  the  same  necessi- 
ty will  forever  remain  the  same.  Hence,  according  to  the  sentiment 
we  are  combatting,  God  is  not  holy,  or  he  is  not  worthy  of  praise. 

And  according  to  this  opinion,  no  created  beings  can  be  con- 
sidered as  holy,  or  worthy  of  praise.     For  it  is  absurd  to  sup- 
pose any  being  ever  created  himself.     For  this  implies  that  he 
existed  before  he  did  exist.     He  is  created  b}^  some  other  agent, 
by  Jehovah.     When   God  created  man,  he  must   create  him 
with  all  the  faculties  we  now  have,  or  he  would  not  be  man  in 
his  image.     Of  course  he  must  create  in  him  a  heart,  or  the  fac- 
ulty of  taste.     As  this  is  an  active  principle  in  man,  it  must  have 
a  nature,  either  to  be  pleased  with  the  character  of  God,  or  dis- 
pleased.    It  must  therefore  be  holy  or  sinful.     An  active  prin- 
ciple cannot  be  created,  which  is  neither  sinful  nor  holy.     Be- 
cause, as  an  active  principle  or  faculty,  it  is,  and  must  be,  ca- 
pable of  feeling,  capable  of  pleasant  or  painful  sensations ;  it 
cannot  be  in  a  state  of  indifference  ;  it  must  be  either  pleased, 
or  displeased,  with  the  character  of  God,  and  divine   objects. 
In  that  case  it  is  either  sinful  or  holy.     And  at  first,  Adam,  and 
all  other  rational  beings  were  created  with  holy  hearts.     They 
came  from  the  hand  of  their  Creator,  perfectly  pure.     Adam 
and  the  fallen  angels  became   sinners  after  their  creation,  and 
in  consequence  of  some  act  of  their  own. 

Now  men  could  not  create  themselves  ;  they  are  produced 
by  God  ;  and  to  be  moral  agents  they  must  have  the  faculty  of 
taste,  as  we  have  seen  ;  and  this  faculty  must  be  sinful  or  holy. 
This  we  see  is  a  fact.  And  Adam  was  created  with  a  holy 
heart.     But,  according  to  the  sentiment  we  are   confuting,  he 


184 

^•n^  not  worthy  of  prniso  ;  bpcan:50  he  did  not  create  his  own 
heart,  and  because  liis  holiness  was  necessary.  And  if  he  and 
his  posterity  had  continued  holy  to  tliis  day,  men  would  not  be 
worthy  of  any  praise,  for  the  reasons  just  assigned.  And  the 
holy  .ingels  in  heaven  are  not  ))rai<:e  worthy  ;  for  they  are  ne- 
cessarily holy  ;  they  are  what  God  made,  and  continues  them 
to  be.  Hence,  if  the  sentiment  be  true,  that  a  power  to  create, 
alter  and  change  the  nature  of  the  heart,  inherent  in  men,  or 
any  other  being,  is  necessary  to  praise  and  blame  ;  then  all 
praise  and  blame  worthiner,s,  both  in  God  and  all  rational  be- 
ings, is  forever  fxchidcd  from  the  universe.  Thi?,  I  think,  is 
sufficient  to  convince  ail,  that  such  a  power  is  not  needful  to  ren- 
der beings  worthy  of  praise  and  blame. 

But  let  us  look  at  the  subject  in  another  light.  The  power 
they  contend  for  does  not  consist  in  the  nature  or  disposition 
of  the  heart.  For  it  is  a  power  oi  changing  the  heart  from  holy 
to  sinful,  and  from  sinful  to  holy,  which  they  contend  for.  So 
the  power,  and  the  subject  to  be  changed,  must  be  as  distinct  as 
a  cause  and  an  elfect  are.  For  they  make  their  power  a  cause, 
and  the  alteration  of  the  heart  from  good  to  bad,  or  from  bad 
to  good,  the  effect  it  is  to  produce.  Hence  their  power  tiiey 
contend  for  is  an  attribute,  which  a  person  can  use  or  exert,  as 
he  pleases,  to  alter  the  nature  of  the  heart.  As  they  can  exer- 
cise it  as  {hey  please,  it  is  in  fact  under  the  control  and  govern- 
ment of  the  heart.  Nov/  a  perfectly  holy  heart  would 
never  exert  this  power,  if  possessed  of  it,  to  change  the  heart 
into  a  sinful  nature.  For  it  would  neverheit?,  pleasure  to  change 
the  heart,  that  is,  to  change  itself,  from  holiness  to  sin.  And  if 
the  heart  is  perfectly  sinful,  as  satan's  is,  it  would  never  be  the 
pleasure  of  the  heart  to  exert  this  supposed  power  to  make  it 
holy.  For  it  loves  sin,  and  hates  holiness  ;  so  it  could  never 
be  its  pleasure  to  exert  this  power  to  produce  an  effect  it  hated, 
and  to  destroy  a  present  temper  in  which  it  delights.  Hence, 
on  the  supposition  men  had  such  a  power,  the}'  would  never 
exert  it  to  change  their  heart  from  holiness  to  sin,  or  from  sin 
to  holiness.  Accordingl}-  this  power,  if  they  had  it,  would  be  of 
no  use  to  them.  They  would  still  remain  what  they  are,  wheth- 
er hoi}'  or  sinful. — Also,  how  can  any  being,  in  the  exertion  of 
his  power  with  a  good  design,  produce  a  sinful  effect ;  or,  with 
a  bad  design,  produce  a  holy  effect  .'*  It  is  absurd  to  suppose 
It.  For  it  implies  that  a  person,  with  a  good  design,  exerts  his 
power  to  change  it  into  a  wicked  design.     The  design  of  hi«= 


185 

heart  is  good,  and  he  exerts  his  power  to  change  this  good  de- 
sign into  a  bad  one.  This  is  acting  directly  against  his  design, 
which  is  impossible.  Hence  it  would  not  be  possible,  if  men 
had  this  supposed  power,  for  them  to  exert  it  in  changing  the 
heart  from  what  its  nature  is,  whether  sinful  or  holy. 

To  look  at  :his  subject  in  one  more  light  ;  we  shall  find,  if 
men  had  such  a  power,  still  they  would  be  sinful  or  holy  for  the 
same  reasons  they  are  without  it.  That  this  may  be  clearly 
seen,  keep  in  view  the  reason  why  every  thing  is  called  good  or 
evil.  Every  thing  is  good  or  evil  according  to  its  nature,  or 
ultimate  tendency.  Hence  to  determine  whether  any  thing  is 
good  or  evil,  sinful  or  holy,  we  never  search  for  its  cause,  but 
for  its  nature.  If  the  sun  had  created  itself,  still  it  would  be 
considered  a  great  blessing,  not  because  it  produced  itself,  but 
because  it  promoted  happiness.  If  any  particular  poison  pro- 
duced itself,  it  would  be  viewed  as  an  evil  thhig,  for  the  same 
reason  it  now  is  j  not  because  it  created  itself,  but  on  account 
of  its  nature  or  tendencj-. 

Hence,  to  determine  whether  any  thing  is  good  or  evil,  we 
have  no  occasion  of  searching  after  its  cause,  or  the  power 
which  produced  it.  By  whatever  power  or  cause  any  effect  is 
produced,  whether  by  a  power  inherent  in  itself,  or  by  some  for- 
eign agent,  yet  if  its  ultimate  tendency  is  to  promote  happiness, 
it  is  good  ;  and  if  to  produce  misery,  it  is  evil.  By  the  cause, 
which  produces  an  etlcct,  we  can  never  ascertain  the  nature  of 
the  effect  ;  this  we  learn  only  by  its  ultimate  tendency.  It  is 
therefore  futile,  and  needless,  to  inquire  after  the  power,  or  cause, 
by  which  any  thing  is  produced,  to  determine  what  its  nature 
is. 

Hence  if  men  had  the  power  supposed,  and  should  in  fact  of- 
ten change  their  hearts  from  holiness  to  sin,  and  from  sin  to  ho- 
liness ;  they  would  not  be  viewed  as  worthy  of  praise  or  blame, 
because  they  produced  these  changes  ;  but  for  the  same  reason 
they  now  are — because  the  effects,  which  they  did  produce,  tend- 
ed ultimately  to  promote  or  destroy  happiness.  Accordingly, 
their  having,  or  not  having,  such  supposed  power,  would  make 
no  alteration  in  the  nature  of  their  character.  They  would  be 
viewed  and  treated  according  to  their  moral  character,  whether 
hol3'  or  sinful,  as  they  now  are.  Such  supposed  power  would 
effect  no  change  in  the  subject  of  praise  and  blame.  All  the 
good  it  could  do  them  would  be  only  this,  that  they  would  be 
able  to  do  many  things  which  now  they  cannot  do.     If  mep 


186 

were  able  to  fly,  or  create  worlds,  still  their  character  would  be 
estimated  according  to  its  nature,  and  not  according  to  the  de- 
gree of  their  power. 

God  is  holy,  because  his  heart  is  benevolent,  and  not  because 
he  is  almiphty.  And  whether  men  are  weak  or  strong,  depen- 
dent or  independent,  they  must  be  viewed  as  worthy  of  praise  or 
blame,  according  as  their  hearts  are,  whether  sinful  or  holy.  If 
they  were  omnipotent,  they  would  still  be  viewed  as  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame,  accordmg  to  the  nature  of  their  hearts. 

There  is  one  idea  to  which  mankind  are  not  apt  to  give  much 
attention.  It  is  this  ;  that  every  thing,  which  has  existence, 
must  have  a  nature,  or  a  tendency  to  good  or  evil.  And  when 
we  take  a  review  of  individual  existences,  we  cannot  find  one  sin- 
gle thing  which  has  no  nature.  Every  thing,  the  moment  it 
exists,  has  a  nature  ;  and  its  nature  must  be  good  or  evil  ;  it 
must  tend  to  promote  or  destroy  happiness,  ultimately. 

God  is  an  eternal  being;  had  no  beginning,  and  is  uncaused, 
or  self  existent.  And  his  nature  is  eternal.  It  is  love,  or  infi- 
nite benevolence.  And  angels  in  heaven,  as  soon  as  created, 
had  a  nature,  or  a  heart,  or  taste  ;  and  their  nature  was  holy. 
So  Adam  when  created  had  a  nature,  or  the  faculty  of  taste, 
and  it  was  holy.  If  he  had  not  been  created  with  this  faculty, 
he  would  not  have  been  a  moral  agent.  But  the  nature  of  this 
faculty  must  be  good  or  evil,  sinful  or  holy.  Hence,  a  moral 
agent,  as  soon  as  he  exists,  must  have  a  heart  either  sinful  or 
holy.  And  all  moral  agents  created  by  Jehovah  have  had  a 
holy  heart  or  taste.  They  come  from  his  hand  hol\-,  pure  and 
upright.  The  sentiment  then  which  some  have  embraced,  must 
be  faise.  The  sentiment  is  this,  that  moral  agents,  when  they 
first  exist,are  neither  holy  nor  sinful,  and  have  no  naturem  them, 
either  good  or  evil.  Hence  in  this  state  they  deserve  neither 
praise  nor  blame.  And  they  suppose  such  agents  make  them- 
selves holy  or  sinful.  Accordingl}',  when  angels  were  created, 
some  of  them  produced  a  holy  nature  in  themselves,  and  others 
produced  a  sinful  nature  ;  and  then  they  deserved  praise  or 
blame,  according  to  the  nature  they  gave  themselves.  This  sen- 
timent is  certainlyerroneous,  if  moral  agents  must  have  a  nature 
either  sinful  or  holy,  as  soon  as  they  have  a  being.  And  such 
a  nature  they  must  have  the  moment  they  exist,  as  every  one 
will  see,  who  has  any  just  views  of  the  properties  or  faculties 
necessary  to  constitute  a  moral  agent.  It  is  therefore  very  ev- 
Hent,  that  apou'er  in  a  moral  agent  to  create  in  himself  a  hoLv 


187 

dr  sinful  nature  or  heart,  is  not  necessary  to  render  him  an  obr 
ject  of  praise  or  blame ;  or,  if  such  a  power  is  necessary,  then 
there  is  no  being  in  the  universe,  who  is  worthy  of  either  praise 
or  blame.  For  no  being-,  in  fact,  has  this  power  for  which 
many  so  earnestly  contend.  The  holiness  of  the  Deity  is  un- 
produced  ;  the  holiness  of  angels,  and  of  Adam  before  his  fall, 
were  not  produced  by  them,  but  by  their  Maker.  Yet  all  view 
their  Maker  as  wortliy  of  infinite  praise.  They  view  angels 
also,  who  are  holy,  worthy  of  praise.  And  indeed  all  holy  be- 
ings are  worthy  of  praise.  Hence  it  is  not  considered  by  any 
one  as  essential  to  praise  w  orthiness,  that  an  agent  should  have 
power  to  make  himself  holy. 

If  any  being  has  all  the  faculties  which  constitute  a  moral  a* 
gent,  and  is  holy,  he  is  viewed  worthy  of  praise.  Wiiether  he 
created  his  own  holiness,  or  whether  it  was  produced  in  him  by 
5ome  other  agent,  never  comes  into  consideration  in  determin- 
ing whether  he  is  worthy  of  praise.  All  that  need  be  known 
is,  w  hether  he  has  the  faculties  of  understanding,  taste,  and  tvill ; 
and  then  whether  his  heart  is  holy.  If  he  has  these  faculties 
and  ii  holy,  he  is  worthy  of  praise. 

But  we  ought  to  remember,  nothing  more  is  needful  to  ren- 
der a  being  worthy  of  blame,  than  to  render  him  worthy  ot 
praise.  If  any  being  has  all  these  faculties,  and  is  sinful,  he  de- 
serves blame.  And  as  no  other  faculties  or  powers  are  ncces- 
sar}',  to  render  beings  proper  objects  of  blame,  than  are  need- 
ful to  render  them  worthy  of  praise,  how  shall  we  account  for 
the  existence  of  the  opinion,  that  something  more  is  requisite  to 
render  a  being  worthy  of  blame,  than  to  make  him  deserving  of 
praise  .''  This  sentiment,  without  any  doubt,  is  the  fruit  of  a 
disposition  in  man  to  justify  himself. 

Mankind  are  a  fallen  depraved  race  of  beings,  and  deserve 
censure.  But  we  do  not  love  to  admit  this.  Hence  their  in- 
vention has  been  exercised,  to  find  some  way  to  justify  them- 
selves ;  and  if  they  can,  to  render  themselves  so  far  indepen- 
dent of  God,  that  their  future  state  shall  be  determined  by  their 
own  pleasure,  and  not  by  the  plea>ure  of  God.  Hence  men 
have  labored  to  make  themselves  believe,  that  a  power  to  create 
in  them  either  a  sinful  or  holy  temper,  is  necessary  to  render 
them  proper  objects  of  praise  or  blame.  For  they  feel  thus  ; 
if  we  have  such  a  power,  then  we  are  not  dependent  on  Gul  for 
a  moral  character  ;  we  can  make  ourselves  holy  or  sinful,  at 
-any  time,  just  as  we  please.     But  we  have  seen,  men  do  notpos- 


188 

scss  such  a  power ;  tlicy  have  jio  power  to  create  any  thing. 
We  have  also  seen  it  is  not  necessary  to  render  men  proper  ob- 
jects of  praise  or  blame.  And  this  is  further  evident  from  this 
consideration  ;  that  after  all  their  reasonings,  snch  persons  can- 
not wholly  divest  themselves  of  a  consciousness  of  blame.  Their 
consciences,  at  times,  accuse  and  condemn  them.  This  they 
cannot  prevent  :  because  it  is  so  evident  that  they  arc,  even 
without  this  power,  proper  objects  of  blame.  They  cannot  rea- 
son themselves  out  of  it  ;  the  conviction  still  abides. 

And  if  miinkind  had  never  sinned,  but  had  continued  perfect- 
ly holy  to  this  day  ;  such  a  power  as  is  now  contended  for, 
wouUl  never  have  been  demanded.  There  would  have  been  no 
use  for  it.  We  should  have  seen,  with  the  greatest  x:learness, 
that  l)eings  endued  with  the  properties  we  have,  being  holy,  arc 
proper  objects  of  praise.  Concerning  this  there  would  have 
been  no  doubt.  And  being  holy,  and  free  from  blame,  there 
would  have  been  no  occasion  to  invent  a  way  to  justify  them- 
selves, and  free  themselves  from  censure  and  punishment.  But 
as  men  are  sinners,  they  now  wish  for  power  to  gratify  all  their 
desires  with  impunity  ;  or  to  render  themselves  independent  of 
God.  Hence  they  have  labored  to  make  themselves  believe, 
that  the}'  have  such  power  ;  or,  if  they  have  not,  that  they  are 
not  worthy  of  blame. 

That  this  sentiment  is  true,  is  evident  from  this  ;  that  we  are 
ever  ready  to  blame  and  condemn  others,  for  the  very  things  we 
allow  in  ourselv^^s.  If  our  fellow  men  injure  us  in  any  way,  we 
blame,  censure,  and  condemn  them.  And  their  plea,  that  they 
could  not  help  doing  as  they  did,  has  no  weight ;  we  still  blame 
them.  Mankind  never  make  the  plea  of  inability  to  justify  any 
but  themselves.  If  a  person's  disposition  to  rob,  steal,  and 
murder,  is  so  strong  that  he  cannot  resist  it ;  he  is  so  much  the 
more  depraved  in  our  view,  and  deserving  of  censure.  As  we 
do  not  admit  the  plea  of  inability  to  have  nx\y  force  to  justify 
others,  it  is  evident  it  would  never  have  been  made,  if  men  had 
not  become  depraved.  It  would  sound  harsh  indeed,  if  any 
person  should  plead  that  he  was  not  worthy  of  praise,  because 
his  nature  was  so  benevolent,  he  could  not  help  being  benevolent. 
And  we  have  never  heard  such  a  plea  made.  And  the  stronger 
a  person's  benevolence  is,  so  much  the  more  worthy  of  praise 
we  view  him.  And  the  more  strongly  we  find  persons  inclined 
to  evil,  we  blame  them  so  much  the  more. 

On  the  whole,  when  we  find  any  being  endued  with  the  fac' 


189 

•alties  of  the  understanding,  taste,  and  will,  wo  consider  him  a 
complete  moral  agent;  a  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame,  and  • 
of  future  rewards.     Then,  if  we  find  such  a  being  is  holy,  we 
praise  him;  if  sinful,  we  blame  him  ;  and  are  ready  to  justify 
God,  in  distributing  rewards  according  to  persons'  characters. 

And  though  we  have  sinned,  yet  a  way  for  our  recovery  is 
revealed  in  the  sacred  volume.  Now  instead  of  spending  our 
time  iu  inventing  some  plea  for  ourjustification,  which  serves  no 
other  end  than  to  blind  and  deceive  us,  and  in  this  way  keep  us 
in  a  state  of  fatal  security  ;  it  is  our  wisdom  to  spend  our  da\^s 
in  securing  an  interest  in  the  great  salvation.  We  should  cry 
unto  God  to  renew  our  hearts,  and  in  this  waj'  raise  us  from  the 
ruins  of  the  fall  to  a  state  of  purity  and  bliss.  For  though  de- 
praved and  justly  condemned,  we  are  capable  of  being  reclaim- 
ed, and  sanctified,  and  exalted  to  the  highest  seats  of  felicity 
in  heaven. 

To  give  conviction  to  gainsa3ers  and  cavillers,  so  as  to  sat- 
isfy them  on  this  subject,  is  impossible.  No  more  can  be  done, 
than  to  exhibit  the  truth  in  the  most  convincing  light.  Noth- 
ing short  of  a  power,  sufficient  to  change  their  own  hearts  at 
their  pleasure  independent  of  divine  control,  will  satisfy  them. 
For  all  power  short  of  this,  it  is  granted  they  possess.  They 
have  all  the  faculties  necessary  to  repent  and  love  God  supreme- 
ly, and  nothing  is  wanting,  but  a  heart  or  disposition  to  love 
and  obe}'.  A  power  to  produce  this  disposition,  is  what  they 
contend  for  earnestly.  This  viould  be  to  endue  them  witli  cre- 
ating j)oiver ;  a  power  to  do  as  they  please,  independent  of  God. 
And  still  they  will  not  see  nor  feel  tlie  absurdity  this  implies.  A 
power  of  this  kind  is  always  used  by  an  agent,  according  to  his 
prevailing  inclination.  If  he  has  an  inclination  to  use  his  pow- 
er to  renew  his  heart,  that  he  might  serve  and  glorify  God;  his 
virtue  iq  this  case  is  in  this  inclination,  which  is  distinct  from 
the  new  heart  he  creates,  and  antecedent  to  it.  And  it  must 
ever  be  holy  or  sinful,  according  to  the  end  he  aims  at  in  using 
his  power  to  change  his  heart.  There  is  jio  virtue  in  the  exer- 
tion of  his  power  to  change  his  heart,  unless  the  eflect  produced 
is  of  a  holy  nature.  If  the  effect  produced  is  of  a  sinful  nature  ; 
then  the  inclination,  which  moved  him  to  use  his  power  in  pro- 
ducing this  eflect,  is  sinful.  This  clearly  proves  that  his  incli- 
nation, which  excites  him  to  create  something  new  in  his  lieart, 
is  holy  or  sinful,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  eflect  produced. 
But  how  came  he  by  this  inclination  ?     According  to  his  pwn 


100 

scheme,  it  cannot  be  praise  or  blnmcwortiiy  in  him,  unless  he 
produced  it.  To  account  for  this  he  must  liave  another  inch- 
nation  distinct  from  this,  and  prior  to  it,  which  led  him  to  exert 
his  power  in  producing  it.  And  in  this  manner  he  must,  on  his 
principles,  run  back  forever,  and  never  arrive  to  a  first  cause  of 
all  the  chances  he  has  produced.  This  all  grant  is  the  greatest 
absurdity.  But  there  is  no  way  for  him  to  avoid  it,  unless  he 
grants  there  is  a  first  inclination  or  cause,  which  is  unproduced, 
self  existent.  But  to  grant  this,  is  overturning  his  whole  sys- 
tem. It  would  be  granting  the  heart  is  holy  or  sinful  accord- 
ing to  its  nature,  whatever  be  its  cause. 


•i<*4,*.l3i!**!i<* 


ESSAY  X^XZ. 

On  the  first  principles^  upon  which  the  Arminians 

and   Calvinistic  systems  of  divinitij  arc  founded  : 

and  the  primary  difference  bcficcen  them. 

Rom.  9,  19.    Thou  wilt  say  then  unto  me,  why  doth  he  yet  find  fault  ?    For  who 
hath  resisied  liis  will  ? 

Paul,  in  the  preceding  part  of  this  chapter,  had  brought 
very  clearly  and  expressly  into  view  the  holy  and  absolute  sov- 
ereignty of  God.  To  his  doctrine  the  objection  stated  in  the 
text  was  made.  If  God  does  according  to  his  pleasure,  then  his 
own  will  is  done;  and  if  done,  how  are  men  blameable  ?  The3'are 
not ;  for  no  one  hath  resisted,  or  can  resist  his  will.  The  meaning 
of  the  objection  is  this.  If  God  is  an  absolute  sovereign,  as 
Paul  preached,  mankind  are  no  more  than  machines  ;  and  of 
course  not  subject  to  blame. 

Paul  was  what  is  called  at  this  day  a  Calvinist  ;  and  the  ob- 
jector is  what  is  now  termed  an  Arminian.  The  same  objection 
was  then  made  to  the  Calvinistic  scheme,  which  is  now,  and  ever 
has  been  made  to  it  by  Arminians.  The  Calvinistic  and  Ar- 
minian schemes  have  ever  been  at  variance.  All  schemes  or 
systems  are  founded  on  some  first  principles.  And  a  diflerence 
in  opinion  concerning  first  principles,  is  the  foundation  of  diP- 


191 

fiirent  systems  of  divinity.  This  difference  is  the  primary  cause 
of  the  existence  and  prevalence  of  these  two  systems. 

My  object  is,  to  examine  the  primary  difference  betweeu 
theCalvinistic  and  Arminian  systems  ofdivinity,andthen  attend 
to  such  remarks  and  inferences  as  the  subject  affords. 

Arminians  and  Calvinists  have  ever  been  agreed  with  respect 
to  some  things.  They  beUeve  there  is  a  God,  and  divine  prov- 
idence, and  tiiat  men  are  moral  agents,  accountable  for  their 
conduct.  They  agree  that  all  men  enjoy  liberty  ;  but  with  re- 
spect to  the  natureof  that  liberty,  which  is  considered  as  essen- 
tial to  vice  and  virtue,  praise  and  blame,  they  widely  differ. 
This  difference  is  the  primary  ground  of  their  respective  schemes 
of  divinity.  This,  1  think,  may  be  made  very  evident  by  stating 
their  sentiments  concerning  liberty. 

And,  I.  I  shall  consider  the  Arminian  system. 

1.  Arminians  say  that  necessity,  both  natural  and  moral,  is 
inconsistent  with  liberty  and  destroys  it.  Their  notion  of  liber- 
ty is  such,  that  freedom  from  necessity  is  essential  to  liberty. 
So  far  as  men  act  under  the  influence  of  necessity  of  any  kind, 
so  far  they  are  not  fiee.  They  are  not  governed  by  liberty  of 
choice,  and  of  course  are  not  free.  Hence  they  say,  to  be  free, 
men  must  uever  act  under  the  influence  of  the  least  degree  of 
necessity. 

2.  They  say,  perfect  indifference  is  essential  to  liberty.  By 
this  they  mean,  that  men  must  not  have  any  inclination,  for  or 
against  any  object  of  choice,  previous  to  choice.  If  an  object 
is  pleasing  and  agreeable  to  a  person,  antecedent  to  choice,  if 
he  has  any  inclination  tow  ards  it,  this  impels  him  to  choose  it. 
This  impelling  force  is  necessity  ;  and  he  does  not  choose  free- 
ly. For  the  same  reason  he  must  not  be  disinclined,  an  object 
must  not  be  disgustful  to  him,  before  choosing  it.  For  this 
Would  impel  him  to  reject  it.  Hence,  to  act  freely,  a  person 
must  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference.  If  he  has  a  thousand 
objects  of  choice  presented  to  his  view,  they  must  never  please 
or  offend  him,  they  must  not  give  him  any  pleasure  or  pain, 
previous  to  choice.  He  must  be  destitute  of  any  feeling  what- 
soever, as  much  so  as  a  stone  is,  till  he  has  made  his  choice. 
Such  is  the  indifference  they  contend  for.  And  if  the  least  ne* 
cessity  is  inconsistent  with  liberty,  they  are  right.  For  so  far 
as  persons  choose  under  the  influence  of  any  previous  inclina- 
tion, for  or  agaipst  any  object,  so  far  they  are  governed  by  ne- 
cessity. 


102 

But  as  this  wholly  excludes  motives  and  their  influence,  to  be 
Tree,  persons  must  not  be  governed  by  motives.     If  a  person  is 
in  a  state  of  perfect  indlflereuce  when  he  choose?,  he  can  give 
no  reason,  why  he  prefers  one  object  to  another.     He  must  not 
say  one  is  aj^reeable,  and  another  disgustful ;  for  if  this  be  true, 
he  is  not  in  a  state  of  perfect  indillerence.     If  objects  of  choice 
neither  please  nor  ofiend  ;  no  reason  can  be  given  why  one  is 
chosen,  and  another  rejected  ;  and  there  is  no  room  for  objects, 
considered  as  motives,  to  have  the  least  influence.     And  indeed 
they  must  not  have  the  least  influence,  before  choice.    For  if  they 
have,  so  far  they  operate  as  necessity  operates  ;  so  far  there  is 
a  reason  and  necessity,  of  choosing  one  and  rejecting  another. 
Hence  the  doctrine  of  indifference  wholly  excludes  the  influence 
of  motives. — How  then  can  any  one  account  for  the  existence 
of  choice  .'*     To  do  this — 

3.  Arminians  say  men  have  a  self  determining  power. 
By  this  power  they  determine  their  wills,  or  produce  volitions. 
Then  ask  them  why  they  choose  one  object  and  reject  another, 
they  answer,  because  it  is  ihc'w  pleasure.  This  is  the  way  by 
which  they  account  for  the  existence  of  volitions  in  a  state  of 
perfect  indifference.  So  Arminians  do  every  thing  by  a  self 
determining  power.  Ask  them  to  define  this  power,  or  to  de- 
scribe it,  or  in  any  way  give  others  an  idea  of  it ;  and  they  are 
non-plussed.  For  there  is  no  such  power  in  existence  ;  hence 
no  one  can  give  another  any  idea  of  it.  For  that  which  has  no 
existence,  cannot  be  defined  or  described.  It  is  not  volition  ; 
one  volition  does  not  produce  another  ;  for  this  would  run  us 
back,  in  an  endless  train  of  volitions,  and  lead  us  into  obscurity. 
And  if  it  be  not  this,  it  can  be  nothing,  unless  a  previous  incli- 
nation. But  this  would  destroy  indifference  ;  of  course  it  can- 
not be  any  such  inclination. .  And  hence  it  can  be  nothing,  it  is 
a  word  without  an}'  meaning. 

We  now  have  a  clear  view  of  that  liberty,  which  is  essential 
to  the  existence  of  vice  and  virtue,  praise  and  blame.  Liberty, 
according  to  their  idea,  must  not  be  under  the  influence  of  any 
necessity,  natural  or  moral.  In  order  to  this,  a  person  must  be 
in  a  state  of  perfect  indiffermce  when  he  chooses,  uninfluenced 
by  motives  ;  and  have  a  sdf  determining  power,  that  in  this 
state  he  can  choose  and  refuse.  Hence  Arminians  commonly 
define  liberty,  to  be  a  power  to  act,  or  not  to  act.  When  persons 
are  in  that  state  of  indifference  described,  and  have  a  power  to 
choose  or  not  to  choose,  to  act  or  not  to  act,  then  they  are  free. 


193 

Then  they  consider  such  beinprs  moral  acrents,  possessing  gen- 
uine liberty,  and  accountable  lor  their  conduct. 

It  will  now  be  easy  to  see  what  that  system  of  divinity  must 
be,  which  is  Ibundcd  upon,  and  is  consistent  with  this  theory  of 
moral  agency  and  liberty.  And  all  that  will  be  necessary  to 
keep  in  view,  as  we  proceed,  is  their  notion  of  liberty,  a  free- 
dom from  necessity,  and  a  state  of  indifference. 

1.  To  be  consistent,  they  must  deny  original  depravity,  or 
original  sin.  For  if  an  infant  is  born  with  any  corrupt  or  ho- 
ly principle  in  his  heart,  he  is  not  in  a  state  of  perfect  indiffer- 
ence. If  a  man  or  an  infant  is  perfectlj^  holy?  lie  is  inclined  to 
walk  in  tlic  way  of  holiness ;  or  if  wholly  corrupt,  he  will  choose 
notliing  but  forbidden  paths.  So  far  as  he  is  influenced  by  holy 
jir  sinful  inclinations,  so  far  he  is  necessitated  to  pursue  the 
course  to  which  his  inclination  leads.  Hence  to  be  indifferent, 
.A£n\  free  from  the  influence  of  necessity,  a  person's  heart  must 
not  have  any  holy  or  sinful  propensity.  His  heart  must  be  like 
clean  paper,  on  which  there  is  no  impression,  no  mark  whatever. 
And  tliis  is  what  all  consistent  Arminians  believe.  They  say 
Adam,  when  created,  had  a  heart  which  was  neither  vicious  nor 
liolv.  He  was  in  a  state  in  which,  by  his  self  determining  pow- 
er, he-could  make  himself  holy  or  sinful.  Also  infants  are  born 
.in  the  same  state,  with  hearts  clean  as  paper,  neither  virtuous 
nor  vicious.  To  allow  that  men  are  created  holy,  is  as  incon- 
sistent witlj  their  scheme,  as  for  them  to  be  created  sinful. 
For  if  men  are  hol\-,  they  are  no  more  indifferent,  nor  free  from 
necessity,  tiian  they  are  if  made  sinful.  Hence,  to  be  a  consis- 
tent Arminian,  a  person  must  believe  that  Adam  and  all  his  pos- 
terity are  created  with  hearts,  which  are  neither  holy  nor  sinful. 
This  and  this  only  is  consistent  Arminianism.  Accordingh', 
■all  moral  agents  make  themselves  holy  or  sinful,  by  a  self  deter- 
juining  power. 

2.  To  be  consistent,  they  must  deny  total  depravity.  For 
if  men  are  totally  depraved,  they  are  not  in  a  state  of  indifference 
or  fi^eedom  from  necessity.  This  is  very  easy  for  any  one  to 
perceive.  Hence  all  consistent  Arminians  do  deny  total  deprav- 
ity. They  say,  when  men  make  themselves  sinful,  yet  there  re- 
mains in  them  a  good,  and  holy  principle.  And  if  this  were 
properly  cultivated,  it  would  become  a  ruling  principle,  and 
then  a  person  might  be  called  a  good  man.  This  however  is 
their  belief,  that  even  the  most  vicious  men  have  some  moral 


194 

goodness  remaining  in  their  hearts,  and  therefore  are  not  totalJy 
depraved.  Still  they  are  not  consistent  with  their  first  princi- 
ples. For  when  a  moral  ajrent  has  made  himself  sinful,  he  is 
no  lonfrcr  in  a  state  of  perfect  indiHtncnce;  and  the  same  is  true, 
if  he  makes  himself  holy.  Neither  are  they  in  that  case  free 
from  the  influence  of  necessit}'.  For  so  far  as  they  are  sinful 
or  hoi}',  they  are  under  a  necessity  of  acting  as  a  holy  or  sinful 
inclination  leads.  To  be  perfectly  consistent  with  the  Armin- 
ian  notion  of  liberty,  a  moral  agent  must  never  become  sinful 
or  holy.  To  be  in  a  state  of  indiflerence,  he  must  forever  live 
without  any  inclination  to  vice  or  virtue.  And  as  soon  as  he  is 
either  holy  or  sinful,  his  liberty  is  then  destroyed,  and  he  is  not 
a  moral  agent  ;  he  is  not  accountable  for  his  conduct,  or  re- 
wrudable.  However,  not  to  dwell  on  this  absurdity  here,  I  on- 
ly add  ;  that  to  be  consistent,  Arminians  must  deny  total  de- 
pravity. This  they  do  deny  without  any  hesitation,  if  tliey  un- 
derstand themselves.  And  we  see  why  they  must  deny  it,tobe  coit- 
sistent  with  their  notions  of  liberty.  So  they  hold,  that  all 
men  iiavc  some  moral  goodness  in  their  hearts  ;  and  are  inclin- 
ed to  good  as  well  as  to  evil. 

3.  To  be  consistent,  they  must  deny  regeneration  by  the  pow- 
er of  God.  For  if  God  by  his  power  creates  in  the  heart  a  ho- 
ly principle,  man  cannot  prevent  it.  He  is  the  subject  of  an 
absolute  necessity,  which  destroys  liberty.  In  regeneration  he 
is  not  free,  and  exercises  no  liberty  ;  he  is  what  God  is  pleased 
to  make  him.  Accordingly  we  find  they  do  deny  regeneration 
by  the  power  of  God. 

They  hold  to  regeneration  ;  but  it  is  in  this  sense.  All  men 
have  some  moral  goodness  remaining  in  them.  This  moral 
principle  they  ought  to  cultivate.  If  they  cultivate  it  properl}-, 
it  will  increase  ;  and  when  it  becomes  stronger,  than  the  re- 
maining corruptions  of  the  heart,  so  as  to  govern  men  in  their 
conduct,  and  make  them  act  hke  good  men,  then  they  are  re- 
generated. According  to  their  scheme  regeneration  is  a  pro- 
gressive work,  and  eflected  by  themselves,  and  not  by  the  al- 
mighty power  of  God.  In  the  sense  in  which  Calvinists  ex- 
plain the  doctrine  of  regeneration,  they  utterly  deny  it ;  and 
must  deny  it,  to  be  consistent  with  their  notions  of  liberty.  This 
is  so  plain,  that  any  attentive  person  may  see  it. 

4.  To  be  consistent,  Arminians  must  deny  the  saints'  persever-'  j 
ance.  Calvinists  say,  the  perseverance  of  saints  does  not  depend  on 
themselves.  If  left  to  themselves,  they  would  immediately  fall  into 


195 

SHI.  It  depends  on  God.  He  has  promised  to  keep  them  bj' 
his  power  unto  salvation.  He  will  therefore  work  within  them 
both  to  will  and  do,  and  promote  the  work  of  sanctification  till 
they  arrive  at  perfection.  According  to  this,  the  Arminian 
says  they  cannot  help  being::  holy  ;  they  are  constantly  under  the 
influence  of  necessity,  which  destroys  liberty.  For  this  reason, 
to  be  consistent  with  their  ideas  of  libertj ,  they  must  deny  the 
perseverance  of  saints.  They  do  deny  it  ;  and  labor  to  prove 
that  saints  may,  and  often  do,  fall  from  grace.  Hence  every 
one  may  see  wh}'  they  deny  saints'  perseverance. 

5.  To  be  consistent,  they  must  deny  divine  decrees. 

The  doctrine  of  divine  decrees  implies  the  highest  degree  of 
necessity  ;  and  is  perfectly  opposed  to  the  Arminian  notion  of 
liberty.  Hence  they  deny  it ;  and  also,  for  the  same  reason, 
they  deny  the  doctrine  of  personal  election  to  eternal  life.  There 
are  no  doctrines  which  they  abhor  more  than  these  ;  or  to  which 
they  manifest  a  greater  opposition.  Because  no  doctrines  im- 
ply a  greater  necessity,  or  more  effectually'  destroy  their  liberty ; 
and  because  no  doctrines  so  fully  manifest  the  divine  sovereign- 
ty, which  they  violently  oppose.  The  absolute  sovereignty 
of  God  is  perfectly  inconsistent  with  their  notions  of  liberty,  as 
well  as  opposite  to  the  pride  of  the  human  heart. 

6.  To  be  consistent,  Arminians  must  deny  divine  fore-knowl- 
edge. If  God  fore-knows  what  will  be,  the  events  fore-known 
are  certain.  They  will  and  must  take  place.  To  say  a  being 
knows  an  event  will  be,  and  yet  it  may  not  take  place,  is  a  con- 
tradiction ;  it  is  saying  it  will  exist,  yet  it  may  not  exist ;  it  is 
certain,  yet  uncertain.  Tiiere  is  the  same  necessit}'  that  events 
fore  known  should  take  place,  as  there  is  for  the  existence  of 
events  decreed.  Fore-knowledge  implies  the  same,  and  as  great 
necessity,  as  decrees  imply.  Hence  to  be  consistent,  Armini- 
ans must  not  only  deny  divine  decrees,  but  also  divine  fore- 
knowledge. If  they  do  not,  they  destroy  their  own  system  of 
liberty.  This  is  so  bold,  and  so  contrary'  to  scripture-,  and  the 
character  of  God,  but  (ew  of  them  dare  deny  it.  But  every 
Arminian,  who  means  to  be  consistent,  does  deny  the  foreknowl- 
edge of  God  ;  and  those,  who  do  not,  are  inconsistent  with 
themselves. — We  now  see  what  Arminians  must  deny,  to  be  con- 
sistent with  their  notions  of  liberty.  Tliey  musl  deny  original 
sin,  total  depravity,  regeneration,  saints'  perseverance,  divine 
decrees,  the  doctrine  of  election,  and  the  forekniv  ledge  of  God. 
For  the  same  reasons  they  deny  one  of  tliese  doctrines  they 


190 

must  deny  them  all.  This  any  person  may  see  with  p'eut  ease, 
tis  soon  as  ho  understands  the  Arminian  notions  of  liberty  and 
moral  agency.  On  the  other  hantl,  consistency  requires  them 
to  believe,  that  Adam  and  all  his  posterity  are  created  with 
hearts,  which  are  neitlier  sinful  nor  holy  ;  and  have  in  them  as 
tliey  grow  up  a  principle  of  moral  goodness,  which  men  can  and 
ought  to  cultivate,  till  they  become  perfectly  holy  and  fit  for 
heaven  5  and  then  their  salvation  is  efi'ccted  by  themselves. 
They  must  believe  that  men  act  independently  of  God.  All  he 
has  to  do  is  to  preserve  men  in  existence,  and  leave  them  to  the 
exercise  of  their  libert\ ,  and  the  powers  they  have  as  moral  a- 
gents,  to  fit  themselves  for  heaven  or  for  hell ;  and  he  can  nev- 
er interpose,  without  destroying  their  liberty.  And  when  men 
liave  produced  events  which  tend  to  destroy  the  universe,  he 
must  prevent  it  as  well  as  he  can,  and  overrule  their  evil  con- 
duct for  good  as  far  as  he  is  able.  But  after  all  that  God  can 
do,  men  by  their  rebellion  produce  so  much  evil,  that  in  the 
final  result  there  will  not  be  so  much  happiness  by  a  great  a- 
mount  in  the  universe,  ^s  there  would  have  been  if  mankind  had 
not  abused  their  liberty.  And  there  is  no  way  by  w  Inch  God 
can,  consistently  with  human  liberty,  prevent  this  great  dimin- 
ution of  happiness  in  the  moral  world,  or  in  the  universe.  God 
does  not  reign  as  an  absolute  sovereign,  doing  according  to  his 
pleasure  ;  but  men  reign,  and  by  their  self  determining  power 
destroy  all  order,  peace,  regularity  raid  happiness  to  an  awful 
amount,  and  it  is  not  possible  for  God  to  prevent  it.  All  ho 
can  do  is  to  patch  up  the  system  as  well  as  he  can,  after  men 
have  destroyed  it.  He  must  not  interpose,  by  a  general  or  partic- 
ular providence,  to  order  and  direct  all  events  ;  because  this 
would  destroy  liberty  and  moral  agency. 

He  is  not  a  holy,  absolute  sovereign,  doing  according  to  his 
pleasure  ;  but  is  dependent  on  the  will  of  men  ;  and  cannot  de- 
termine what  to  do,  till  nien  have  first  accomplished  theil-  will 
and  pleasure.  Such  is  and  must  be  the  Arminian  scheme,  as 
far  as  men  will  be  consistent  with  their  first  principles  concern- 
ing liberty  and  moral  agency.     I  will  now, 

n.  Define,  state,  or  describe  the  Calvinistic  ideas  of  liberty. 
To  show  what  that  liberty  is,  which  all  mankind  experience,  and 
with  which  they  are  satisfied^  does  not  reqnire  any  deep  meta- 
physical investigation.  It  consists  wholly,  according  to  the 
common  opinion,  hi  a  person's  choosing  and  acting  as  his  pleas- 
ure is. — When  a  person  has  been  long  silting,  and  feels  the  need 


197 

ot"  exeicise,  the  question  with  him  is,  what  kiiifl  of  exercise  he 
shall  use.  Among  the  various  kinds  contempiatecl,  no  one  i^ 
so  pleasing  to  him  on  every  account,  as  walking  the  room. 
Here  then  it  is  Kis  pleasure  to  walk  the  room.  This,  every 
thing  cousidcrecl,  he  prefers  to  any  other  exercise.  He  chooses 
to  rise  and  walk,  lie  finds  he  is  at  liberty  to  choose  according 
to  his  pleasure.  His  will  is  not  bound;  there  is  nothing  to  pre- 
vent his  making  a  choice,  which  corresponds  with  his  pleasure. 

Therefore  he  enjoys  perfect  liberty  of  choice.  lu  case  he 
foundany  thing  opposing,  and  preventing  hia  choosing  as  he  wish- 
ed, he  would  say  liberty  of  will  is  destroyed.  But  if  no  hindrance 
is  in  the  way  of  choosing  according  to  his  pleasure,  he  enjoys 
all  the  liberty  of  will  he  desires.  When  the  choice  or  exertion 
is  made  to  rise  and  walk,  he  finds  nothing  to  prev^enthis  walk- 
ing, he  then  enjoys  liberty  of  action.  If  any  thing,  at  that  time, 
restrained  him  from  walking  ;  or  any  thing  constrained  him  to 
walk  in  directions  contrary  to  his  choice,  he  would  say  that 
his  liberty  of  action  was  abridged  and  destroyed.  But  if  he 
found  no  impediment  in  the  way,  and  walked  according  to  the 
exertions  he  had  made,  and  of  course  according  to  his  pleasure, 
he  would  confess  he  enjoyed  all  the  liberty  of  action  he  desired* 
In  the  case  now  stated  a  person  enjoys  perfect  liberty  of  choice 
and  of  action,  as  great  as  he  desires  ;  and  so  great,  he  cannot 
conceive  of  more  perfect  liberty,  than  what  he  experiences. 
And  what  is  liberty  here  ?  It  is  the  total  absence  of  every  thing, 
which  might  prevent  his  choosing  and  acting  according  to  his 
pleasure. 

According  to  this  description  of  liberty,  there  is  a  connexion 
between  a  \)GX%o\\  ?, pleasure  and  choice  ;  and  between  his  choos- 
ing to  act,  and  his  actions.  Pleasure  is  first,  choice  next,  and 
actions  are  the  result.  If  an  object  is  disgustfid,  and  we 
wish  to  avoid  it — with  this  disgust  choice  is  connected,  and  with 
choice  actions  are  connected,  the  actions  necessary  to  slum  the 
disagreeable  object.  And  here  also  a  person  acts  according  to 
his  pleasure.  And  one  thing  here  to  be  carefully  noticed  is, 
that  the  greater,  or  n)ore  certain  the  connexion  is  between  our 
pleasure  and  volition,  and  our  volitions  and  actions,  the  more 
certain,  and  the  greater  is  human  liberty.  In  the  case  above 
stated,  it  is  a  person's  pleasure  to  walk.  I  will  now  suppose 
there  is  no  connexion  between  his  pleasure,  choice,  and  walking. 
Suppose  choice  will  not  follow  his  pleasure  ;  and  if  volitions  ex- 
ist, and  actions  or  walking  do  not  follow  these  ;  or  suppose  vo 


198 

Kiions  and  actions  to  follow,  which  arc  directly  opposed  to  his 
pleasure,  would  a  person  feel  himself  in  the  possession  of  liber- 
ty ;  would  he  wish  to  exist  in  such  a  condition  ?  Again  ;  sup- 
pose a  person  knew  he  might  have  his  wishes  gratified,  concern- 
ing the  liberty  he  should  desire  to  enjoy.  Would  not  anywise 
man  say,  let  me  have  liberty  to  choose  and  act  as  I  please,  or 
according  to  my  pleasure — let  volitions  be  connected  with  m^' 
pleasure,  and  let  actions  be  connected  with  my  volitions,  so  that 
I  can  have  my  pleasure  done?  This,  he  would  say,  is  the  lib- 
erty I  wish.  And  let  this  connexion  be  so  firm,  so  certain,  that 
nothing  can  ever  dissolve  or  destroy  it ;  then  1  am  sure  of  act- 
ing according  to  my  pleasure  at  all  times.  Such  liberty  I  de- 
sire, and  I  desire  no  other  kind,  or  greater  liberty.  For  I  can- 
not form  a  conception  of  any  liberty  greater  than  this. 

It  is  now  evident  that  such  a  connexion  as  the  above  is  es- 
sential to  liberty.  For  without  this  there  is  no  certainty  that 
any  volitions  or  actions  will  ever  follow  our  pleasure  ;  or  if  any 
follow,  there  is  uo  certainty  they  will  be  of  that  kind,  which 
will  gratify  our  pleasure.  Hence  without  it,  there  cannot  be 
any  such  libert}'  enjoyed,  as  a  wise  man  would  wish  ;  and  with 
this  certain  connexion  established,  a  person  enjoys  liberty  in 
the  highest  perfection.  Accordingly,  such  a  certain  connexion 
is  not  inconsistent  with  liberty,  but  essential  to  its  existence. 
This  connexion  between  our  pleasure  and  volition,  and  between 
volition  and  thosj  actions  which  accomplish  our  pleasure,  is 
what  is  meant  by  necessity.  Whether  this  be  a  natural  or  moral 
necessity,  will  make  no  difference,  as  it  respects  liberty.  Every 
one,  therefore,  is  at  liberty  to  call  it  natural,  or  moral,  as  he 
pleases. 

This  shows  that  this  necessity,  all  the  necessity  I  contend  for 
here,  does  not  destroy  liberty;  but  is  essential  to  its  existence. 
So  that  liberty  ana  this  necessity  agree,  they  are  consistent 
witii  each  other.  This  is  the  Calvinistic  idea  of  libcriy. 
Though  they  may  explain  it  in  different  ways,  yet  all  their  ex- 
planations will  be  found  to  becomained  in  the  description  here 
^iven  ;  so  far  as  they  differ  from  the  Arminian  notion  of  liber- 
ty. For  all  consistent  Calvinists  agree,  however  they  may  ex- 
plain themselves,  that  liberty  and  this  necessity  are  consistent 
with  each  otiier.  And  it  will  in  the  end  appear,  that  those,  who 
essentially  differ  from  this  description  of  libert}',  are  not  consist- 
tent  with  themselves,  if  they  profess  to  be  Calvinists  ;  and  that 
in  fact,  they  arc  neither  consistent  Calvinists,  nor  consistcDt 


199 

Arminlans,  but  partly  both,  and  inconsistent  with  themselves. 

The  only  material  fault  any  Calvinist  can  find  with  this  de- 
scription of  liberty  is,  that  it  makes  a  distinction  between  our 
pleasure  and  volitions.  It  does  not  e:rant,  that  the  pleasure  or 
disjiust  which  objects  afford  us,  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  a 
vohtion  ;  but  maintains,  that  they  are  antecedent  to  all  volition. 
This  dispute  has  been  attended  to  in  other  essays,  to  which  I 
refer  the  reader  at  this  time.  Here  1  shall  only  observe  two 
things;  first,  that  those,  who  consider  this  pleasure  as  a  volition, 
must  admit  the  Arminian  doctrine  of  perfect  indifference,  as  has 
been  proved  in  previous  essays,  or  be  inconsistent ;  and  second- 
ly, that  on  the  Arminian  plan  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
liberty,  osily  in  theory.  For  let  a  person  be  in  a  state  of  per- 
fect indifference,  a  state  in  which  he  has  no  inclinations,  no 
feelings,  no  desires,  any  more  than  a  stone  or  block.  Ask 
hiai  what  kind  of  liberty  do  you  wish  to  enjoy  .''  His  answer 
must  be,  that  he  docs  not  know  ;  for  he  has  no  idea  what  you 
mean  by  the  term  liberty.  He  does  not  prefer  one  thing  to 
another,  for  he  has  no  preference.  He  is  indiflerent.  And  one 
thing  is  as  agreeable  to  him  as  another  ;  because  nothing 
pleases  or  disgusts  him.  He  must  answer,  it  is  all  one  to  him 
what  kind  of  liberty  he  has,  or  whether  he  has  any  at  all.  In 
this  state  it  is  impossible  for  a  person  to  choose  or  to  act.  For 
there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  exciting  him  to  action.  And 
without  excitement  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  choice,  or  ac- 
tion of  any  kind.  And  if  he  could  choose  in  that  state  of  indif- 
ference, and  by  this  choice  destroy  his  indifl'erence,  and  now 
have  a  preference  of  one  thing  to  another  in  future,  he  would 
by  this  devesthimself  of  all  liberty  forever.  For  he  would  no 
more  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference  ;  and  as  indifference  is 
considered  essential  to  liberty,  he  can  no  more  enjoy  any  lib- 
erty, after  he  has,  by  making  one  choice,  overcome  this  indiffer- 
ence. Being  overcome  by  the  choice  he  made,  he  is  no  longer 
indifferent;  he  prefers  in  future  one  object  to  another,  and  there- 
fore has  no  liberty. 

I  have  now  described  the  idea  of  liberty,  which  is  entertain- 
ed by  Calvinists.  On  this  ground  it  appears,  that  liberty  and 
necessity  agree  ;  that  the  latter  is  essential  to  the  existence  of 
the  former ;  and  that  the  greater  the  necessity  is,  or  the  more 
certain  the  connexion  is  established  between  desires  and  voli- 
tions, and  between  volitions  and  actions,  so  much  the  more  per- 
fect is  our  liberty.     God  has  established  this  connexion,  and 


200 

thus  has  endued  moral  agents  with  liberty.  This  connexion  he 
will  continue  to  preserve,  and  thus  grant  his  creatures  all  the 
liberty  they  can  desire. 

If  it  be  their  pleasure  to  rebel  against  him,  they  are  at  liber- 
ty to  do  it  ;  and  they  do  abuse  their  liberty  for  that  purpose. 
If  it  be  their  pleasure  to  serve  him,  they  are  at  liberty  to  do  this  ; 
and  all,  who  have  this  pleasure,  do  serve  him. 

We  may  now  easily  see,  that  if  any  of  the  doctrines  contain- 
ed in  the  bible  imply  a  necessity,  however  great,  they  are  not 
on  tins  account  inconsistent  with  the  Calvinistic  idea  of  liberts'. 
Any  doctrine  revealed,  however  great  the  necessity  it  implies, 
Calvinists  can  consistently  admit  and  believe  with  their  ideas  of 
liberty.  All  therefore  they  have  to  do  is,  to  go  to  the  word  of 
God,  and  there  learn  what  are  the  doctrines  which  God  has  re- 
vealed and  taught.  Has  he  there  revealed  that  Adam  was  cre- 
ated hol}^ ;  and  was  not  indifl'erent,  w  hether  he  served  the  Lord 
OF  not  ?  He  was  strongly  inclined  to  obey  his  Maker  ;  and, 
so  far  as  inclined,  he  was  under  a  moral  necessity  of  doing  his 
will  ;  it  was  his  pleasure  to  serve  the  Lord  only,  and  according 
to  his  pleasure  he  acted,  till  he  sinned.  All  this  the  Calvinist 
can  consistently  believe  ;  but  the  Arniinian  cannot  admit  it.  It 
is  re^'ealed  that  infants  are  born  witli  corrupt  hearts,  inclined  to 
evil  only  ;  and  that  all  men  are  totally  depraved,  inclined  to 
forsake  God  and  live  in  rebellion.  So  it  is  their  pleasure  to 
serve  satan,  and  disobey  their  Maker.  And  according  to  their 
pleasure  they  live,  till  they  are  renewed.  These  doctrines 
Calvinists  can  consistently  believe  ;  for  they  harmonize  with 
their  ideas  of  liberty  ;  but  Arminians,  to  be  consistent,  must 
reject  these  doctrines.  It  is  revealed  that  men,  who  are  saved, 
are  bom  tigain  ;  have  a  relish  of  heart  given  them,  which  in- 
clines them  to  forsake  sin  and  serve  the  Lord,  and  according  to 
their  pleasure  they  live.  Calvinists  can  consistently  believe 
this  doctrine  ;  but  consistent  Arminians  must  reject  it. 

Calvinists  can  consistently  believe  all  that  is  revealed  con- 
cerning the  christian  warfare.  According  to  which  they  have 
the  old  and  new  man  in  their  hearts,  and  sometimes  do  the 
pleasure  of  one,  and  i5ometimes  of  the  other,  just  as  one  or  the 
other  has  the  ascendanc}'.  This  agrees  with  the  Calvinistic 
idea  of  Hberty  ;  but  not  with  the  Arminian  notions  on  that  sub- 
ject. 

It  is  revealed  that  God  has  decreed  all  things,  and  has  chos- 
en some  from  the  fallen  race  to  be  the  heirs  of  life,  and  has  de- 


201 

termined  to  renew  k  sanctify  them  and  bring  them  home  to  heav- 
en. All  these  decrees  perfectly  harmonize  with  liberty.  For 
the  first  in  the  train  is,  that  men  shall  always  act  according  to 
their  pleasure.  Hence  to  have  men  act  freely,  and  divine  de- 
crees be  accomplished  consistently  therewith,  all  God  has  to  do 
is  to  produce  such  alteralioas  in  the  feelings  of  men,  that  it  shall 
always  be  their  pleasure  to  act  as  he  has  decreed. 

Hence  Calvinistscan,  consistently  with  their  ideas  of  liberty, 
believe  in  the  doctrines  of  divine  decrees  and  personal  election, 
as  they  find  them  revealed.  But  Arminians  are  obliged,  to  be 
consistent,  to  expunge  from  their  creed  all  doctrines  which  im- 
ply any  necessity.  Hence  Calvinists  can  admit  into  their  creed 
every  doctrine  revealed  in  the  bible,  however  great  the  neces- 
sity which  it  ma}^  imply.  And  Arminians,  to  be  consistent, 
are  obliged  to  reject  all  such  doctrines. 

This  shows  us  the  fundamental  and  primary  difference  be- 
tween Calvinists  and  iVrminiaiis.  They  first  differ  in  their  sen- 
timents concerning  human  liberty  ;  that  liberty,  which  is  sup- 
posed to  be  essential  to  vice  and  virtue.  Thisla\  s  the  founda- 
tion of  their  different  systems  of  divinity,  as  has  been  shown. 
And  if  the  several  parties  are  consistent  with  their  own  ideas  of 
liberty,  they  must  form  opposite  systems,  which  are  subversive 
of  each  other.  x\ll  this  must  now  be  as  evident  to  an  attentive 
mind,  as  noon  day  light.  And  both  systems  maybe  understood 
readil}^  as  soon  as  a  person  has  clear  ideas  of  the  Arminian  and 
Calvinistic  ideas  of  liberty. 

And  when  we  take  a  view  of  the  two  systems,  can  any  one  be 
at  a  loss,  to  determine  which  is  most  agreeable  to  the  word  of 
God,  and  to  common  sense  ?  The  Arminian  has  to  explain 
scripture  to  support  iiis  system.  To  do  this,  he  has  to  put  for- 
ced, unnatural,  and  false  constructions  on  the  word  of  God.  If 
he  construes  scripture  according  to  its  plain,  and  most  obvious 
import,  it  confutes  his  system.  He  is  obliged  therefore  to  be 
constantly  forcing,  and  wresting  the  meaning  of  scripture,  and 
to  go  contrary  to  common  sense  and  the  experience  of  mankind. 

But  the  Calvinist  has  formed  such  ideas  of  liberty,  as  harmo- 
nize with  the  word  of  God.  Hence  he  goes  to  the  bible  and 
reads  the  word,  and  becomes  acquainted  with  the  doctrines  there 
taught,  and  finds  they  agree  with  his  sentiments  concerning 
liberty  and  moral  agency  ;  and  has  no  preconceived  opinions 
to  bias  his  judgment.  He  only  has  to  construe  the  word  ac- 
oording  to  its  plain  import,  and  the  dictates  of  sober,  unbiassed 


202 

reason  ;  and  every  page  adds  to  liis  knowledge,  till  he  forms  a 
system  from  the  word  of  Jduivnli,  \\lij(li  is  ofcourse  siippurted 
by  it.  He  raji  therefore  v  iih  case,  with  the  bible  in  his  hand, 
support  his  system.  These  things  are  evident  from  the  writings 
of  Arminians  and  Calvinists.  It  is  now  clear,  that  the  prima- 
ry did'erenre  between  these  two  denominations,  consists  in  dif- 
ferent opinions  concerning  liberty  and  moral  agency.  Here 
they  dillcr  so  widely,  that,  if  each  is  consistent  with  himself,  they 
must  form  systems  of  divinity,  which  are  ever  at  variance  with 
each  other  ;  systems  so  essentially  dillerent,  that  they  never  can 
harmonize.  Hence  every  person  must  be  an  Amiinian  in  length 
and  breadth  ;  or  a  Calvinist,  with  respect  to  all  the  essential 
doctrines  of  the  gospel  ;  or  be  inconsistent  with  himself.  What 
1  have  further  to  say  will  be  included  in  remarks  and  inferences. 

1 .  Remark.  There  are  but  two  systems  of  divinity  in  Chris- 
tendom, which  are  consistent  with  the  fundamental  principles  on 
which  they  are  founded.  These  two  systems,  which  include 
all  others,  are  the  Arminian  and  Calvinistic  systems. 

There  are,  it  is  true,  a  great  variety  of  sects  and  different  de- 
nominations in  Christendom.  Let  any  one  take  pains  to  exam- 
ine them  candidly,  and  he  will  find  thoy  are  either  purely  Ar- 
minian ;  or  Calvinistic  ;  or  composed  partly  of  the  one,  and 
partly  of  the  otlver,  and  of  course  are  full  of  contradictions,  in- 
consistencies, and  absurdities.  To  be  full}"  convinced  of  this, 
let  any  one  be  at  the  trouble  of  examining  the  systems,  which 
are  now  embraced  by  different  sectaries.  For  instance,  a  per- 
son believes  in  the  Arminian  notion  of  liberty,  yet  believes  in  the 
doctrines  of  original  and  total  depravity'.  It  he  does  believe  the 
latter,  he  is  perfectly  inconsistent  with  his  first  principle  con- 
cerning liberty.  For  the  fact  is,  if  the  Arminian  notion  of  lib- 
erty is  true,  his  whole  system  founded  on  this  is  true.  And  if 
the  Calvinistic  idea  of  liberty  is  just,  his  system  founded  upon 
it,  if  consistent,  is  true.  And  these  two  sects  can  never  agree, 
unless  they  can  agree  in  their  ideas  concerning  liberty.  Were 
they  agreed  here,  and  consistent  with  themselves,  they  woul# 
have  but  one  system  of  divinity.  For  the  primary  dispute  be- 
tween Arminians  and  Calvinists  respects  liberty  and  moral  a- 
gency.  Did  they  agree  in  this,  and  were  they  consistent,  they 
Avould  agree  in  every  thingessential.  But  with  respect  to  liberty, 
their  views  are  essentially  diflerent  ;  and  this  is  the  foundation 
of  their  diflerent  S3'strms.  And  the  reason  why  Calvinists  in 
their  system  agree  with  the  word  of  God  is,  because  their  ideas 


203 

©f  liberty  are  such  as  the  bible  teaches.  Hence  if  these  parties 
ever  do  agree,  and  dismiss  tlieir  disputes,  they  must  beheve  a- 
like  concerning  human  liberty. 

And  as  every  essential  doctrine  must  harmonize  with  that 
idea  of  liberty  which  is  consistent  with  necessity,  or  destroy  it ; 
all  men  must,  if  consistent,  embrace  the  doctrines  of  Calvinists, 
or  Arminians.  And  all  the  essential  doctrines  of  every  denom- 
ination must  therefore  agree  with  the  Calvinistic,  or  the  Ar- 
minian  svstem,  or  a  person  must  be  very  inconsistent  with  him- 
self. Hence  there  are  but  two  systems,  which  agree  with  first 
principles,  the  Arminian  and  Calvinistic;  and  these  two  include 
all  other  systems,  by  whatever  name  they  arc  called  ;  or  else 
some  embrace  a  system,  whose  parts  are  forever  ai  variance 
with  each  other. 

2.  We  learn  the  importance  of  understanding  the  subjects  of 
moral  agency  and  libert}',  in  order  to  be  correct  and  consistent 
divines.  Moral  agency  and  liberty,  are  the  foundation  of  ev- 
ery  system  of  divinity.  The  ideas  men  form  of  divine  and  hu- 
man agency,  and  liberty,  lay  the  broad  foundation  on  which  sys- 
tems of  divinity  arc  formed.  And  as  no  man  can  form  a  con- 
sistent system,  unless  he  clearly  understands  the  foundation  on 
which  it  rests  ;  it  is  evident  the  first  principles  must  be  under- 
stood. 

And  it  IS  owing  to  the  want  of  a  knowledge  of  moral  agency 
and  liberty,  that  tiiere  are  so  many  divines  in  our  land,  whose 
minds  are  inconsistent  and  confused.  Here  then  is  the  place, 
where  the  study  of  divinity  ought  to  begin.  Every  candidate 
ought  to  begin  with  the  study  of  moral  agency'  and  liberty,  in 
God  and  in  his  creatures.  And  if  he  understands  these  subjects, 
and  is  capable  of  founding  a  system  upon  them,  the  parts  of 
which  agree  with  each  other,  he  will  have  a  consistent  scheme, 
and  one  which  will  agree  with  the  word  of  God.  But  if  he  is 
unacquainted  with  these  fundamental  subjects,  he  may  have 
what  he  calls  a  system  ;  but  it  will  be  composed  of  heterogene- 
ous materials,  partly  Arminian  and  partly  Calvinistic,  without 
any  consistency.  And  this  is  the  lamentable  state,  in  which 
many  divines  are  at  this  day  involved. 

And  now  the  cry  against  metaphysics  is  so  great,  that  the 
first  principles  of  divinity  are  overlooked,  neglected  and  never 
brought  into  a  candidate's  view.  Hence  the  reason  why  we 
have  so  many  candidates  at  this  day,  who  ai*e  so  inconsistent, 
so  unable  to  defend  their  systems,  and  unable  to  make  any  pro- 


!i04 

gress  in  divinit}-.  Tlicv  have  no  foundaiioii  laid,  and  of  course 
have  nothing  on  which  to  build  ;  and  know  not  when  they  are 
consistent,  or  inconsistent  with  the  word  of  God.  Hence  it  h 
the  duty  of  all,  who  teach  students  divinity,  to  begin  with  the 
subject  of  moral  agency  and  liberty.  This  would  lead  to  the 
discussion  of  a  number  of  distinct  questions.  The  first 
in  order  would  be  this;  what  properties  must  a  being  pos- 
sess to  be  a  proper  subject  of  vice  and  virtue,  praise  and  blame, 
and  future  rewards.^  And  then  inquire  whether  men  have  these 
properties  ;  and  reasons  ought  to  be  given  why  each  particular 
p'operty  is  necessary  to  constitute  such  a  moral  agent.  By 
such  a  method,  a  candidate  would  obtain  a  clear  and  consistent 
knowledge  of  the  subject  of  moral  agency  and  liberty  ;  and  see 
not  only  the  several  parts  of  this  subject,  but  their  agreement 
w  ith  each  other,  and  the  reasons  why  each  property  of  the  mind 
is  necessary.  Then  he  has  a  foundation  laid  to  form  consistent 
views  of  all  the  doctrines,  and  parts,  which  constitute  a  com- 
pJete  s}  stem  of  divinity.  And  in  this  way  only,  will  any  person 
ever  see  clearly  the  consistency  of  all  the  parts,  which  compose 
a  system  of  divinity.  This  shows  the  importance  of  the  previ- 
ous essajs  on  the  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind. 

3.  On  supposition  the  heart  is  not  a  faculty,  and  is  nothing 
but  those  exercises,  which  many  call  immanent  and  imperate 
in  succession,  it  is  vei'y  evident  on  this  ground,  that  men  must 
be  in  a  state  of  indiflerence  previous  to  choice,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  motives  is  excluded.  To  be  convinced  of  this,  we  have 
only  to  go  back  to  the  first  exercise  of  the  heart.  Previous  to 
this  there  is  no  heart.  For  the  idea  of  a  faculty,  antecedent  to 
dn  exercise,  is  denied.  Hence  there  is  nothing  on  which  mo- 
tives can  operate,  or  have  influence.  There  is  no  such  tiring  as 
pleasure  or  pain,  experienced  by  a  man.  All  objects  are  alike 
to  him.  And  on  supposition  he  has  a  clear  perception  of  ob- 
jects, of  truth  and  falsehood,  and  sees  their  adaptednesss  to  their 
respective  ends  ;  yet,  antecedent  to  the  first  exercise,  they  do 
not  aflect  him  agreeably  or  disagreeably  ;  they  excite  no  sen- 
sation, no  feeling  of  any  kind.  He  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  in- 
diflerence towards  every  object.  In  this  state  the  first  exercise 
has  existence.  Whether  this  exercise  be  an  agreeable  or  pain- 
ful sensation,  or  an  immanent  or  imperate  act,  still  it  is  a  voli- 
tion according  to  the  defenders  of  this  scheme.  This  first  exer- 
cise is  an  eflect,  and  nuist  have  a  cause.  And  it  is  produced 
in  a  moral  agent  at  the  time,  when  he  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  ip- 


205 

difference.  And  if  choice  can  exist  in  such  a  state  of  mind,  it 
is  agreed  by  all  opposed  to  Arminians,  that  motives  cannot  have 
any  influence. 

Hence  the  defenders  of  the  exercise  scheme  and  Arminians 
must  agree  in  two  particulars.  First,  that  voluntary  exercises 
may  exist,  when  the  mind  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  indiflerence  ; 
and  secondly,  that  motives  have  no  influence  in  choosing  ;  or 
that  the  influence  of  motives  is  wholly  excluded.  And  of  course 
the  only  diflcrence  in  this  particular,  between  Arminians  and 
those  on  the  exercise  scheme,  respects  the  cause  of  voluntary 
exercise.  The  former  sa}-,  it  is  produced  by  a  self  determining 
power  in  man  ;  the  latter  say,  it  is  produced  by  the  immediate 
agency  of  God  ;  and  which  of  them  is  most  consistent,  1  leave 
for  others  to  determine.  But  to  make  this  subject  more  evi- 
dent, it  may  be  observed, 

That  by  indiflerence  is  meant  a  state  of  mind,  in  ^^  hich  a  per- 
son has  no  Inclination  for  or  against  an  object  of  choice  ;  or  is 
totally  destitute  of  an>'  feeling  for  or  against  an  object.  He  is 
then  in  a  state,  in  which  objects  of  choice  make  no  impression, 
excite  neither  agreeable  or  disgustful  sensations.  He  has  no 
sensations,  no  feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

By  the  influence  of  motives  is  meant,  that  the  object  of  choice 
moves  or  excites  a  person  to  choose  or  reject  it.  If  motives 
do  not  this,  it  is  hard  to  conceive  how  they  have  any  influence. 
To  say  a  motive  is  nothing,  but  the  object  or  end  chosen,  or  on 
which  choice  terminates ;  and  to  say  this  object  Is  neither  a- 
greeable  nor  disagreeable,  antecedent  to  choice,  is  to  deny  the 
influence  of  a  motive  entirely.  To  objects  of  choice  the  term 
motive  is  applied.  And  why  ?  Because  some  objects  are  sup-' 
posed  to  move,  incline,  or  excite  the  will  to  choose  one  object 
rather  than  another.  And  so  far  as  an  object  pleases  or  dis- 
gusts a  person,  so  far  It  moves  him  to  choose  one  object  in  pre- 
ference to  another.  But  if  it  does  not  excite  In  him  any  feeling 
of  pleasure  or  of  pain,  it  does  not  move  him.  For  this  is  the 
onh'  way,  by  which  an  object  can  move  or  Incline  the  will  to 
choose  or  reject.  Hence  to  say,  antecedent  to  choice  objects 
excite  neither  pleasing  nor  painful  sensations,  is  denying  the  in- 
fluence of  motives,  and  defending  the  doctrine  of  indiflference. 
And  if,  antecedent  to  choice,  there  is  nothing  in  the  mind  or 
heart  which  objects  of  choice  can  afl'ect,  please  or  disgust ;  then 
certainly,  at  the  time  choice  does  exist,  the  person  is  in  a  state, 
of  perfect  indiflerence  j  and  the  object  chosen  did  not  move  or 


2m 

create  in  hlin  tliat  choice  ;  it  had  no  influence.  It  is  then  very 
clear,  that  the  exercise  scheme  up:rees  with  the  Arminian  notions 
of  hberty,  in  t\\  o  important  particnhirs.  It  supports  tlieir  doc- 
trine ofperfect  indiUercnce,  and  wholly  denies  the  inlhience  of 
motives.  And  to  evade  tliis  reasoning  by  saying,  that  motives 
have  influence  after  the  first  choice  exists,  is  very  futile.  For 
how  can  they  have  influence  then  ?  Certainlv  they  had  no  in- 
fluence in  tlic  production  of  the  first  choice.  For  the  influence 
of  a  motive  is  too  late,  after  the  choice  has  existence.  And  it 
can  have  no  influence  in  any  future  choice,  any  more  than  in  the 
first.  For  the  first  choice,  as  soon  as  it  exists,  is  past.  It  is  fu- 
gitive ;  it  is  gone,  as  much  as  an  exercise  a  person  had  ten 
years  since  ;  and  can  no  more  be  a  something  on  which  mo- 
tives can  have  influence,  than  exercises  a  person  had  ten  3  ears 
before.  Hence  every  future  succeeding  choice  must  exist,  w  hen 
the  mind  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference  ;  and  of  course, 
motives  cannot  have  any  influence. 

And  to  say  there  is  in  every  moral  agent  a  capacity  for  pleas- 
ure and  pain,  a  itecedent  to  choice,  and  must  be,  or  the  exist- 
ence of  choice  can  never  be  accounted  for,  is  giving  np  the  ex- 
ercise scheme  wholly  ;  and  granting  all  those  contend  for,  who 
are  opposers  of  the  scheme.  Fortius  is  granting  that  a  capa- 
city exists,  v.liich  is  n feeling  capacity,  and  the  foundation  of  all 
our  pleasures  and  pains  ;  that  the  mind  is  never  in  a  state  of  in- 
difl'erence  antecedent  to  choice  :  and  that  motives  have  influ- 
ence, by  exciting  in  this  capacity  pleasing  or  painful  sensations. 
And  this  capacity  must  in  its  nature  be  moral  ;  either  vicious, 
or  virtuous.  For  when  the  divine  character  and  divine  truths 
are  exhibited  to  view,  they  must  please  or  oflend  this  capacity. 
If  they  please  it,  does  not  this  prove  it  is  virtuous  or  holy  in  its 
nature  ?  And  if  they  oflend  it,  does  not  this  prove  it  is  vicious 
or  sinful  in  its  nature  ?  Certainly  no  one  in  his  senses  can  de- 
ny this.  Tins  capacity  then  for  pleasure  and  pain  is  the  very 
thing,  which  we  call  a  faculty,  or  by  the  name  of  taste.  Its  na- 
ture and  operations  are  the  same.  Hence  they  yield  all  we 
contend  for.  How  a  person  on  the  exercise  scheme  can  grant 
this  and  be  consistent,  is  hard  to  conceive.  On  the  whole,  the 
exercise  scheme,  to  be  consistent,  must  agree  with  the  Armini- 
an scheme  in  two  fundamental  points;  by  admitting  the  doctrine 
of  indifference,  and  by  excluding  the  influence  of  motives.  And 
how  such  can  be  consistent  Calvinlsts,  is  beyond  my  power 
of  conception.  This  shows  more  fully,  how  important  it  is  for  all 


207 

canclidates  to  study  the  subject  of  moral  agency.  For  It  is  the 
foundation  on  which  every  consistent  scheme  of  divinity  must 
rest. 

4.  The  Arminian  notion  of  liberty  destroys  vice  and  virtue, 
accountability  and  future  rewards.  Because,  if  moral  agents 
are  cither  sinful  or  holy,  they  are  not  in  a  state  of  perfect  in- 
difference. And  if  not  in  a  state  of  perfect  indiflerence,  they 
are  not  free,  but  governed  by  necessit}',  which  Arminians  say 
destroys  libert}'.  And  if  they  are  not  free,  they  say  they  are 
not  moral  agents,  any  more  than  clocks  or  other  machines. 
And  if  not  moral  agents,  they  are  no  more  virtuous  or  vicious, 
or  accountable,  or  proper  subjects  of  future  rewards,  than  mere 
macliines  are.  Hence,  according  to  the  Arminian  notions  of 
liberty,  there  cannot  be  any  such  thing  as  vice  or  virtue,  praise 
or  blame,  accountability  or  rewards,  in  the  universe.  Thus 
the  Arminian  notion  of  liberty,  with  one  bold  stroke,  excludes  all 
vice  and  virtue,  and  rewards  and  punishments,  from  the  moral 
system. 

5.  If  any  persons  contend  for  the  Arminian  notion  of  liberty, 
yet  admit  the  doctrines  of  total  depravity,  and  regeneration  by 
divine  power,  they  are  perfectly  inconsistent  with  themselves. 

A  person  totally  depraved  is  inclined  to  sin  only.  This  in- 
clination is  a  strong,  mni-al  necessity,  causing  him  to  depart 
from  the  living  God.  And  as  this  necessity  is  inconsistent  with 
liberty,  how  is  he  free  ?  And  if  a  person  is  renewed  by  divine 
power,  how  can  he  help  being  holy,  and  inclined  to  virtue  ?  But 
as  he  is  thus  inclined,  he  cannot  be  free.  So  that  all,  who  ad- 
mit these  doctrines,  must  either  relinquish  their  notions  of  lib- 
erty, or  be  forever  inconsistent  with  themselves. 

Indeed  there  are  but  two  schemes  of  divinity,  the  parts  of 
which  can  agree  with  each  other.  These  are  the  Arminian  and 
Calvinistic.  Hence  all  divines,  and  all  other  men,  to  be  consis- 
tent, must  be  entire  Arminians  or  Calvinists.  And  if  they  ad- 
mit some  Arminian,  and  some  Calvinistic  doctrines  into  their 
systems,  they  are  always  inconsistent.  For  these  two  schemes 
are  forever  at  variance  ;  there  neither  is  or  can  be  any  agree- 
ment between  them,  because  their  first  principles  are  contradic- 
tory to  each  otlK/.  We  now  see  the  reason  why  there  are  but 
few  divines,  in  any  land,  who  are  consistent.  There  are  but 
few,  who  do  not  admit  into  their  systems  some  Arminian,  Sc  some 
Calvinistic  sentiments.  So  far  as  they  do  this,  they  are  incon- 
sistent with  themselves.     It  requires  much  study  and  close  in- 


208 

vestii^atlon,  to  understand  clearly  the  foundation,  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  Arminianisni,  nnd  Calvinism.  And  but  few,  on  either 
side,  clearly  understand  the  first  principles  on  w  hich  these  two 
schemes  arc  founded.  Hence  the  reason  why  they  are  so  apt 
to  be  inconsistent.  This  shows  the  vast  importance  of  having 
the  first  principles,  or  the  subjects  of  moral  agency  and  liberty, 
taught  to  theological  students.  With  this  study  they  ought  to 
begin,  and  lay  the  foundation  right  ;  and  then  they  may  erect 
consistent  schemes  thereon.  And  if  what  is  here  written  shall 
awake  attention  to  this  subject,  one  great  end  aimed  at  in  this 
Essa} ,  will  be  obtained  :  that  all  may  see  the  reason,  why  so 
many  contend  they  are  not  to  blame,  saying,  who  hath  resisted 
his  will  ? 


.ft4of^4aj<4:4:<c:Jc?fr 


ESSAY  XXIIX. 

On  the  decrees  and  prescience  of  God,  and  their  con- 
sistency with  each  other. 

Acts  2,  23.    Him,  being  delivered  by  the  determinate  counsel,  and  foreknowledge  of 
God,  ye  have  taken,  and  by  wicked  hands  have  crucified  and  slain. 

These  words  assert  the  crucifixion  and  death  of  Christ. 
They  contain  three  propositions,  wl.ich  respect  this  event.  1. 
That  the  death  of  Christ  was  determined  or  decreed  by  God. 
2.  That  it  was  foreknown  by  him.  And — 3.  That  his  enemies 
acted  freely  in  putting  him  to  death.  Each  of  these  proposi- 
tions is  true  ;  and,  of  course,  they  do  not  destroy,  but  are  con- 
sistent with  each  other.  They  teach,  that  divine  deci-ees,  fore- 
knowledge, and  human  liberty  consistently  harmonize.  This 
many  deny,  and  say  they  destro}'  each  other,  and  hence  they 
cannot  all  be  true.  And  many  grant  they  are  truths,  which  a- 
gree  j  but  to  show  their  consistency  is  beyond  the  powers  of  the 
human  mind.  Others  believe  that  their  agreement  and  consis- 
tency may  be  seen  and  demonstrated.  Such  diversity  of  opin- 
ions prevails  concerning  this  subject.  There  can  be  no  harm 
in  attending  to  it,  and  the  light  and  evidence  which  maj'  be  re- 


209 

fleeted  upon  it.     This  is  my  object  at  this  time. 

I.  Let  us  see  what  reason  teaches  concerning  the  decrees 
and  foreknowledge  of  God. 

It  is  certain  that  all  created  things  had  a  beginning.  Hence 
there  was  a  time,  when  nothing  existed,  but  that  being  who  is 
eternal,  and  acknowledged  to  be  the  uncreated,  and  infinite  Je- 
hovah. As  he  was  the  only  being  in  existence,  before  any 
thing  was  created.  He  was  the  only  being,  who  could  create. 
He  must  b?  the  first,  efficient  cause  of  all  things.  But  can  any 
being  act,  or  create,  without  determination  ?  If  God  was  nei- 
ther determined  to  create,  or  to  forbear,  he  was  indifi'erent,  wheth- 
er any  thing  should  exist,  or  not,  except  himself.  If  God  had 
determined  never  to  create  any  thing,  then  certainly  nothing 
Would  ever  have  existed.  For  he  could  not  exert  his  power  to 
do  what  he  was  determined  never  to  do.  He  would  never  ex- 
ert his  power  contrary  to  his  will.  Hence  he  must  be  determin- 
ed to  create,  previously  to  giving  existence  to  any  thing.  This 
is  only  saying,  that  determination  must  precede  action;  and 
must  precede  the  exertion  of  power. 

Whatever  definition  may  be  giv^en  of  power,  this  much  is  cer- 
tain, it  is  an  attribute  of  a  moral  agent,  which  is  exercised  to 
accomplish  his  determinations.  Hence  it  will  not  be  exerted, 
till  there  is  a  determination  to  exert  it.  And  it  will  always  be 
exercised  according  to  the  determination  of  the  agent.  A  man 
may  form  in  his  mind  a  compleie  plan  of  a  house.  He  may 
have  a  clear  view  of  all  its  parts,  with  all  their  arrangements 
and  connexions.  Such  an  entire  plan  of  a  building  may  exist 
in  his  mind.  He  may  then  determine  to  erect,  or  not  to  erect, 
such  a  building.  If  he  determines  not  to  erect  such  a  building, 
and  never  alters  his  mind,  such  a  building  will  never  be  ei*ected 
by  him.  But  if  he  determines,  and  does  not  alter,  to  erect  such 
a  building,  then  his  power  will  be  exerted  for  such  a  purpose. 
And  his  power  will  be  exerted  to  prepare  all  the  materials,  to 
bring  them  to  the  spot,  to  arrange  and  connect  them  together 
just  as  he  had  determined,  till  the  building  is  finished  according 
to  the  plan  he  had  formed.  And  if  he  has  power  to  do  any 
thing  he  determines,  and  is  certain  his  mhid  will  never  change, 
and  knows  there  is  no  being  able  to  prevent  his  carrying  all 
his  determinations  into  execution ;  then,  when  he  has  formed  the 
plan  of  a  building,  and  has  determined  to  erect  it  according  to 
his  plan,  he  knows  perfectly  before  hand,  what  kind  of  building* 
will  finally  be  erected. — For  as  the  whole  depends  on  his  deter- 

a2 


no 

Inination,  and  lie  has  determined  what  to  do  from  step  to  stc^, 
till  the  building  is  finished  ;  and  knows  what  his  own  determi- 
nations are,  which  no  being;  can  frustrate  ;  he  from  that  moment 
knows  what  will  be  done,  and  can  tell,  before  he  does  one  thing, 
what  he  can,  and  what  he  shall  do.  All  this  is  true  respecting 
any  plan,  and  every  thing  done  by  moral  agents,  supposuig 
them  to  be  able  to  accomplish  their  deteiminations,  and  that 
they  will  never  change  their  mind.  These  observations  lead  us 
to  several  important  and  interesting  conclusions. 

1.  That  a  wise  agent,  such  as  God  is,  will  form  a  plan  of 
operation,  before  he  acts,  or  does  any  thing.  Indeed  we  can- 
not conceive  it  to  be  possible  for  a  being  to  act,  without  a  plan 
previously  formed.  Because,  without  a  plan,  he  could  not 
know  what  to  do.  Could  any  being  form  such  a  creature  as  a 
man,  or  create  a  world,  or  a  vegetable,  or  a  fly,  or  any  thing 
else,  without  any  plan  of  it  pre^  iously  forrried  in  his  mind  ?  Ev- 
ery one  sees  it  is  impossible,  and  what  a  wise  agent  would  nev- 
er attempt.  This  shows  undeniably,  that  a  plan  of  every  thing 
existed  in  the  divine  mind,  previously  to  his  creating  any  thing 
whatever.  Also,  that  when  God  does  create  or  accomplish  any 
purpose,  he  acts  according  to  the  plan  he  had  previously  form- 
ed. In  this  sense,  God  might  have  a  knowledge  of  a  thousand 
different  plans,  and  know  which  among  the  whole  is  the  best  to 
attain  the  end  he  designs  ultimately  to  reach.  This  knowledge 
of  plans  is  a  knowledge  of  what  might  he,  or  of  what  h  possible. 
For  he  knows  he  is  able  to  carry  any  plan,  among  ever  so  great 
a  number,  into  execution.  But  this  is  only  knowing  what 
might  be  done,  or  is  possible  ;  it  is  not  a  knowledge  of  what 
ioill  be,  only  of  what  might  be.  This  forming  of  plans,  and  hav- 
ing a  perfect  knowledge  of  them,  which  is  necessary  previous 
to  action,  is  only  a  knowledge  of  what  is  possible,  but  not  a 
knowledge  of  what  icill  have  existence. 

2.  By  what  has  been  said  we  see,  that  a  determination  to  act 
tnust  precede  action.  If  God  has  formed  a  plan  of  creating  the 
world,  and  of  governing  it  when  created  ;  still  nothing  will  bo 
done,  till  he  has  determined  to  carry  bis  plan  into  execution.  A 
man  may  form  the  plan  of  a  house  ;  but  he  will  not  build,  until 
he  comes  to  a  determination  to  execute  the  plan  he  had  formed. 
And  when  any  being  has  formed  a  plan,  and  has  determined  to 
execute  it  in  all  its  parts,  then  he  knows  what  he  shall  do.  And 
if  an  agent  has  determined  to  carry  such  a  part  of  a  plan  into 
execution,  at  such  a  time,  and  knows  no  one  can  hinder  his  act- 


211 

ing  as  he  has  determined  ;  he  could  tell  beforehand  particular-" 
\y  every  thing  he  should  do,  and  every  thing  which  would  be 
done.  He  could  sit  down  and  write  a  history  beforehand  of 
what  would  be  done  from  da}'  to  day,  even  to  the  smallest  mi- 
nutiae, till  his  whole  plan  should  be  perfected.  God  formed  a 
plan  of  the  creation,  a  plan  of  government,  and  had  a  perfect 
view  existing  in  his  mind  of  every  part  of  his  plan,  from  the 
greatest  part  to  the  least,  even  the  falling  of  a  hair  to  the  ground. 
And  forming  a  plan,  we  sec,  was  necessary  previous  to  action. 
Then  he  determined  to  execute  it,  in  all  its  parts,  according  as 
it  existed  in  his  mind.  And  such  determination  we  see  is  neces- 
sary, previons  to  action.  Then  the  divine  being  could  foretel 
every  thing  which  would  be  done,  from  the  beginning  of  time 
to  the  final  conclusion  of  all  things.  Because  he  knew  what  his 
plan  was,  and  what  his  determinations  were  j  and  that  all  things 
depended  upon  him,  and  that  no  being  could  frustrate  his  de- 
signs. 

God  is  an  eternal  being,  and  all  his  determinations  are  eternal. 
So  that  one  thing  is  not  before  another,  in  the  order  of  time. 
But  in  the  order  of  nature  one  thing  is  before  another.  Though 
a  sun  and  light  may,  and  must  exist  at  the  same  instant,  yet  we 
must  conceive  of  a  sun  as  being  previous  to  light ;  and  a  cause 
as  being  previous  to  an  eftect,  though  an  effect  may  exist  instan- 
taneously with  the  cause.  In  forming  clear  and  just  concep- 
tions of  the  divine  being,  we  must  view  one  thing  as  being 
previous  to  another  in  the  order  of  nature. 

Hence  we  must  conceive  concerning  God,  that  he  forms  a 
plan  of  every  thing  he  means  to  do,  in  his  own  mind,  previous 
to  his  effecting  any  thing.  This  plan  formed  is  a  knowledge  of 
whdit  may  be.  Then  he  determines  to  carr}' the  plan  in  all  its  parts, 
into  execution.  This  determination  is  also  previous  to  action. 
Then,  as  all  things  depend  on  his  determination,  he  knows 
what  he  shall  do  ;  and  can  predict  every  event  that  will  take 
place,  if  he  pleases,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  time. 
This  is  a  knowledge  of  what  ivill  be. 

Now  a  knowledge  of  what  may  be  is  previous  to  his  deter- 
minations. Butthisisnot  foreknowledge.  For  foreknowledge 
is  a  knowledge  of  what  tvill  be,  whereas  this  is  only  a  knowl- 
edge of  what  might  be.  But  when  he  has  determined  what  he 
ivill  do,  then  he  knows  before  hand  what  will  have  existence. 
This  h  foreknowledge.  This  is  subsequent  to  his  determinations^ 
and  founded  upon  them. 


212 

It  is  like  this.  A  man  forms  the  plan  of  a  building  in  Ijis  own 
mind,  which  he  knows  might  be  erected.  But  he  does  not  know 
th;it  it  ever  will  be  built,  because  he  has  not  as  yet  determined 
to  erect  such  a  house.  The  plan  then  he  has  formed,  is  only  a 
knowledge  of  what  might  be  done.  When  he  has  determined  to 
build  a  house,  exactly  according  to  the  plan  he  has  formed,  and 
as  the  erection  of  it  depends  solely  on  him,  he  then  knows  what 
will  be  done.  And  all  this  he  knows  before  he  does  any  thing. 
Now  a  foreknowledge  of  a  house  exists  in  his  own  mind.  This 
foreknowledge  is  founded  on  his  determinations. 

We  now  now  see  what  reason  teaches  concerning  the  divine 
being. 

1.  That  divine  determinations  or  decrees  must  precede  action. 
God  neither  did  nor  can  do  any  thing,  but  what  he  has  decreed 
to  do  ;  because  no  being  can  act  without  determination.  Tliis 
establishes  the  doctrine  of  divine  decrees,  which  is  taught  in  the 
bible.  It  proves  that  he  did  decree  to  make  such  a  world,  in 
all  its  parts,  as  we  see  exists  ;  and  to  govern  the  universe  ac- 
cording to  his  plan  ;  and  that  no  events  can  or  will  take  place, 
but  as  he  has  decreed.  As  every  thing  depends  on  him,  and  as 
he  cannot  act  without  determination,  nor  otherwise  than  he  has 
decreed,  so  the  existence  of  this  world,  and  every  event  which 
takes  place,  must  be  according  to,  and  an  effect  of  his  dctermin- 
tion. 

2.  We  see  that  two  kinds  of  knowledge  exist  in  the  divine 
mind  ;  one  is  a  knowledge  of  plans,  or  what  might  be,  and  is  an- 
tecedent to  his  determinations  ;  the  other  is  a  knowledge  of 
what  will  be,  and  is  foreknowledge. 

•3.  liho-t  fo7'cknoivledge  is  different  from  a  decree,  and  found- 
ed upon  it,  and  subsequent  to  it.  Hence  if  God  had  never  de- 
creed any  thing,  he  could  never  have  foreknown  any  thing. 
This  is  a  most  obvious  truth.  For  if  any  thing  depends  wholly 
on  my  determination,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  know  what  I 
shall  do,  till  I  have  determined  what  to  do.  When  I  have  de- 
termined what  to  do,  as  all  depends  on  me,  then  1  know  what 
I  shall  do,  or  what  will  be  done.  Hence  if  any  deny  divine  de- 
crees, they  must,  to  be  consistent,  deny  also  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge. Thus  much  reason  teaches  concerning  the  divine 
character,  and  proves  the  decrees  and  foreknowledge  of  God, 
as  clearly  taught  in  the  text.  Now  let  us  see  what  the  bible 
teaches  concerning  the  decrees,  and  prescience  of  God. 

3  -  Both  are  expressly  asserted  in  the  text.     Also  the  bible 


213 

says,  he  workclh  all  things  according  to  tlic  counsel  of  his 
own  will  ;  that  he  doeth  according  to  his  pleasure  in  heaven  a- 
bove,  and  on  the  earth  beneath  ;  that  he  is  of  one  mind,  and 
none  can  turn  him  ;  that  the  counsel  of  the  Lord  shall  stand ;  and 
that  all  the  counsels  formed  against  him  shall  be  frustrated,  turn- 
ed into  foolishness,  and  be  carried  headlong  ;  that  all  things 
are  his,  and  he  hath  a  right  to  do  according  to  his  pleasure  ; 
and  many  other  passages,  too  numerous  to  be  mentioned.  The 
evident  language  of  scripture  is,  that  God  has  decreed  all  things ; 
so  tiiat  a  sparrow  is  not  sold,  and  a  hair  does  not  fall  to  the 
ground,  without  his  notice.  And  every  one  will  admit  this  to 
be  the  language  of  scripture,  when  they  reflect,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  God,  or  any  agent,  to  act  without  a  previous  determi- 
nation ;  or  that  the  determination  of  an  agent  is  the  cause  of 
every  thing  done  b}'  him. 

2.  The  predictions  in  the  bible  prove  the  decrees  and  pre- 
science of  God.  The  present  state  of  the  Jews  was  predicted 
by  Moses ;  that  they  should  be  scattered,  and  be  a  by-word,  and 
a  proverb,  among  all  nations.  The  ruin  of  Babylon  and  Tyre 
was  predicted  by  .Josiah  and  Jeremiah  ;  the  coming,  the  birth, 
the  life,  suflcrings,  death,  resurrection,  and  ascension  of  Christ, 
were  all  predicted  by  the  prophets,  long  before  he  made  his 
appearance  on  earth.  No  one  can  deny,  that  the  bible  con- 
tains many  important  predictions  ;  and  that  the  book  of  revela- 
tion contains  predictions  of  all  the  leading  and  important  events 
and  revolutions,  which  are  to  take  place  from  the  days  of  John 
to  the  end  of  the  world. 

And  it  is  granted  by  every  one,  that  no  being  can  look  into 
futurity  and  predict  events,  but  Jehovah.  The  predictions 
then,  contained  in  the  bible,  are  a  standing  proof  of  the  divine 
foreknowledge.  But  how  does  this  prove  his  decrees  ^  Only 
keep  in  view  what  hath  already  been  said,  and  ever}'  one  will 
readily  see,  his  foreknowledge  proves  his  decrees.  His  fore- 
knowledge is  founded  on  his  decrees.  If  future  events  depend- 
ed solely  on  any  of  us,  we  could  not  tell  what  we  should  do,  un- 
til we  had  determined  what  we  would  do.  We  must  determine 
then  what  we  will  do,  before  we  can  tell  what  will  be  done.  If 
then  we  infallibly  foretold  an}'  event,  this  proves  we  had  deter- 
mined, or  decreed,  that  such  an  event  should  exist. 

The  existence  and  downfal  of  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  and 
of  such  a  city  as  Babylon,  depended  wholly  on  God.  How 
iben  could  he  know  such  a  nation  would  rise  and  fall,  and  such 


«14 

a  city,  if  he  had  never  determined  such  events  ?  His  foretelling 
their  rise  and  fall,  proves  he  had  decreed  it.  Thus  we  see  the 
bible  proves,  wjiat  reason  dictates,  concerning  the  decrees  and 
prescience  of  the  great  Jehovah. 

Now  only  go  on  this  plan,  that  God  never  has  decreed  any 
thing,  deny  this  doctrine  wholly,  and  then  look  at  events  which 
have  taken  place,  and  see  how  the  divine  character  must  ap- 
pear. Angels  did  rebel,  and  there  was  war  and  confusion  in 
heaven.  Men  have  rebelled.  Sin,  disorder,  and  confusion 
have  prevailed  in  this  world.  Satan  has  reigned  as  the  god  of 
this  world,  and  done  unspeakable  mischief.  The  Son  of  God 
has  come  into  this  world  to  destroy  the  works  of  the  devil  ;  he 
has  suffered  reproach,  shame  and  a  cruel  death  on  the  cross. 
His  followers  have  been  persecuted,  tortured,  and  cruelly  slain. 
These,  and  many  other  such  events,  have  taken  place  in  God's 
dominions.  Was  he  determined  they  should  take  place  ?  No. 
Was  he  determined  they  should  not  have  existence  ?  No  :  say 
those  who  deny  divine  decrees.  What  then  .'*  He  was  perfect- 
ly indifferent  concerning  them.  What  character  was  that, 
which  was  perfectly  indifferent  concerning  such  events  in  his 
kingdom  ?  Can  any  king  sustain  a  more  odious  character  ? 
Opponents  may  say,  he  was  determined  against  their  taking 
place  ?  Why  then  did  he  not  prevent  them  .''  Because  he 
could  not,  consistently  with  the  liberty  he  had  given  to  his  crea- 
tures. But  is  that  being  w  ise,  who  makes  creatures,  and  endues 
them  with  such  liberty  that  he  cannot  govern  them  ;  creatures 
who  will  perpetrate  the  most  horrid  crimes,  and  destroy  all  the 
order,  peace,  and  happiness  of  the  world  he  had  created,  yethe 
cannot  prevent  it  ?  Would  it  not  argue  the  greatest  folly  in  a 
man,  to  make  such  a  clock  as  would  destroy  the  peace,  govern- 
ment, and  happiness  of  his  family,  aud  he  knew  it  would,  and 
yet  knew  he  could  not  prevent  it  ?  Would  he  make  such  a  clock .'' 
And  would  God  make  such  creatures,  who  would  do  so  much 
unspeakable  mischief,  and  he  knew  it,  yet  knew  he  could  not 
prevent  it .''  Thus,  they  who  deny  the  decrees,  either  make  God  an 
indifferent  being  concerning  the  most  interesting  events  that  ev- 
er existed,  or  make  him  so  weak,  or  so  unwise,  that  enemies 
may  destroy  his  kingdom,  and  it  is  not  in  his  power  to  prevent 
it.     But, 

II.  Let  us  attend  to  human  liberty,  the  other  proposition 
contained  in  the  text. 

Every  person  knows  by  experience  what  liberty  is.     It  is  the 


215 

privifegc  of  acting  as  we  please,  without  restraint,  or  constraints 
This  supposes  that  we  have  inclinations  or  desires,  which  we 
wish  to  gratify.  If  we  had  no  feelings,  objects  would  neither 
please  nor  disgust  us  ;  they  would  not  affect  us,  any  more  than 
they  do  stones.  For  without  feeling,  we  should  be  insensible 
as  stones.  But  nrankind  have  feelings  ;  they  have  appetites, 
inclinations,  and  desires.  Many  objects  are  agreeable,  and  oth- 
ers are  disgustful  to  us.  We  wish  to  obtain  and  enjoy  those 
things,  which  are  agreeable  to  us.  It  is  our  will  or  pleasure 
to  possess  and  enjoy  them.  And  if  tiiere  is  nothing  to  prevent 
or  hinder  our  obtaining  and  enjoying  the  objects,  which  are  a- 
greeable,  we  enjoy  liberty  ;  we  feel  that  we  act  freely.  If  a 
person  has  a  strong  inclination  to  take  a  journey,  to  visit  a 
dear  friend,  it  is  his  will  or  pleasure  to  take  it.  If  nothing  pre- 
vents his  making  such  preparation  as  he  wishes,  and  nothing' 
hinders  his  journeying  as  he  wishes  ;  or  if  nothing  hinders  the 
obtainment  of  his  end,  which  is  making  the  intended  visit ;  he 
acts  according  to  his  pleasure,  and  enjoys  all  the  liberty  he 
wishes.  But  if  he  is  by  some  power  restrained  from  taking  the 
journey  he  wishes,  or  is  constrained  to  go  another  way  contrary 
to  his  desires,  in  this  case  his  liberty  is  infringed  and  destroyed  ; 
for  he  does  not  act  according  to  his  pleasure.  In  all  that  man- 
kind ever  do,  they  always  have  some  object  or  end,  which  they 
wish  to  attain.  And  to  act  as  the}^  please,  and  to  act  freely,  is 
to  pursue  and  obtain  their  object  or  end,  without  any  thing  to 
hinder  or  prevent.  In  such  cases  they  act  freely  ;  and  they 
cannot  conceive  of  any  greater  liberty  than  they  enjoy.  For 
no  one  can  conceive  of  any  greater  liberty,  than  to  act  free  from 
all  restraint  and  constraint.  Then  men  always  act  as  they 
please,  and  follow  their  inclinations  whithersoever  they  lead 
them. 

Now  do  mankind  wish  to  live  in  a  condition,  in  which  it  is 
very  uncertain  whether  they  shall  enjoy  liberty  f  And  to  have 
it  very  uncertain,  whether,  if  tli£y  act,  they  shall  obtain  the  end 
they  seek  ^  No  person  would  wish  to  live  in  such  a  state. 
Then  there  are  two  things,  which  men  desire.  One  is,  to  have 
it  made  certain,  that  they  shall  alwa}  s  act  freely,  or  enjoy  lib- 
erty ;  and  the  other  is,  to  have  it  made  certain,  that  when  they 
act,  they  shall  always  reach  the  end  they  seek.  And  if  it  is 
made  absolutely  certain,  that  they  shall  always  enjoy  libertyj 
and  always  succeed  in  reaching  the  ends  they  seek,  the  more 
pleased  they  are.     They  wish  to  have  it  certain  that  they  shall 


21G 

yet  freely,  in  the  management  of  all  their  temporal  and  spiritu- 
al concerns  ;  and  tlicy  wish  to  have  it  certain,  that  if  they  sow, 
they  shall  reap.  Mankind  then  arc  friendly  to  the  idea  of  ne- 
cessitij,  when  it  agrees  with  their  wishes  ;  and  never  oppose  it, 
only  when  coutrary  to  their  wishes.  Now  all  see  what  liberty 
is  ;  it  is  to  act  as  we  please,  or  as  our  inclinations  lead  us  to 
act,  free  from  all  restraint  and  constraint  from  any  external  a- 
gent.  Can  3'ou  conceive  of  any  greater  liberty  ?  Are  you 
not  conscious  that  you  enjoy  this  liberty  ?  Do  you  not  daily 
act  as  you  please  ?  Do  you  not  rise  in  the  morning,  and  thro* 
the  day  follow  your  inclinations  and  desires  ?  Is  there  any  ex- 
ternal agent,  who  restrains  you  from  acting  as  you  wish  ;  or 
who  constrains  you  to  act  contrary  to  your  wishes  ?  If  not,  you 
are  perfectly  free. 

III.  Inquire  whether  divine  decrees  are  inconsistent  with  hu- 
man liberty.  Some  say  they  are,  and  destroy  it.  Some  say 
they  agree,  but  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  mortals  to  show  their 
consistency  with  each  other.  All  I  shall  attempt  is,  to  show 
what  the  decrees  of  God  are  with  respect  to  human  liberty. 
This  perhaps  will  show  clearly  their  consistency. 

Previous  to  the  creation  of  man,  God  formed  the  plan  of  such 
a  being  in  his  own  mind,  as  he  intended  to  create.  Then  he 
created  him,  according  to  the  plan  he  had  formed.  Hence  he 
formed  a  plan  of  a  human  body,  of  all  its  parts,  and  connexions. 
He  also  formed  a  plan  of  the  soul,  or  immortal  part,  he  meant 
to  create.  He  formed  a  plan  in  his  mind  to  agree  with  his  own 
image.  The  model  formed  was  this  ;  that  the  soul  should  be 
endued  with  certain  faculties  ;  such  as  an  understanding,  to  per- 
ceive objects,  to  reason,  to  judge,  to  remember,  and  to  reflect. 
Also  man  was  to  have  that  faculty  given  him,  which  in  scripture 
is  called  the  heart ;  the  philosophical  name  for  it  is  taste.  This 
was  a  faculty  capable  of  pleasure  and  pain,  of  loving,  hating, 
desiring,  and  of  all  the  afl'ections  and  passions  we  ever  experi- 
ence. He  was  to  have  given  him  a  will,  to  enable  him  to 
choose  and  refuse,  and  to  carry  the  wishes  of  the  heart  into  ex-' 
ecution.  According  to  the  plan  formed,  man  was  to  be  a  free 
agent  ;  and  always  act  as  he  pleased,  or  to  follow  and  gratify 
the  inclinations  and  desires  of  his  heart,  without  any  thing  to 
hinder  or  prevent.  Such  soul  would  resemble  God,  and  be  in 
his  likeness  and  image.  This  soul,  when  made,  was  to  be  unit- 
ed to  the  body  ;  and  this  union  was  to  continue  until  death. 
This  is  the  plan  formed.     And  we  have  shown  that  a  plan  of 


217 

operation  must  be  formed,  previous  to  determination  ;  because 
determination  respects  the  plan.  For  the  determination  is,  to 
accomplish  the  plan  formed,  in  all  its  parts.  And  this  determin- 
ation must  precede  action,  or  the  exertion  of  power  to  execute 
the  plan.  Now  when  God  had  formed  a  plan  of  a  man  in  his 
mind,  as  we  do  of  a  building,  such  a  beins  as  man  would  never 
exist,  if  God  did  not  determine  to  give  him  existence  ;  as  we 
should  never  erect. a  house,  till  we  determine  to  do  it.  God 
did  determine  to  maiie  such  a  being  as  man,  and  to  create  him 
exactly  according  to  the  plan  he  had  formed  in  his  mind.  Man 
is  created  according  to  the  plan  formed,  and  according  to  the 
determination,  or  decree  of  God.  And  we  find  it  is  a  fact,  that 
all  man  have  bodies,  and  souls,  which  are  alike.  They  all  have 
an  understanding,  a  heart  to  feel,  and  a  will  to  choose.  They 
do  in  fact  enjoy  liberty.  Here  observe,  every  part  of  a  man  is 
the  eli'ect  of  the  decrees  of  God.  God  said,  that  is,  decreed,  let 
there  be  light,  and  light  was  ;  the  existence  of  the  light  was  the 
effect  his  decree  produced.  God  said,  or  decreed,  let  a  man 
exist,  with  the  faculties  of  understanding,  heart,  and  will,  and 
widi  the  privilege  of  always  acting  freely,  or  as  he  pleases. 
Such  a  man  exists-  And  every  part  of  his  existence,  all  his 
qualities,  properties,  and  powers,  and  his  liberty  are  the  effects 
of  the  decrees  of  God.  And  if  God  had  not  decreed  to  make 
such  a  being  as  man,  such  a  being  would  have  never  existed. 

Now  all  you  have  to  do  is,  to  inquire  whether  the  decrees  of 
God  destroy  the  liberty  of  man.  So  far  from  it,  they  are  the 
cause  of  his  existing,  and  acting  as  a  free,  moral  agent.  Did 
God's  decreeing  the  existence  of  light,  destroy,  impede,  or  bin- 
der its  existence  ?  Did  his  decreeing  to  make  a  man,  Avho 
should  always  act  as  he  pleased,  or  freely,  destroy  the  idea  of 
liberty  ?  Why  does  man  exist  .''  Because  God  decreed  it.  « 
Why  does  he  reason,  feel,  will  and  act.^  Because  God  decreed 
he  should.  Why  does  he  follow  his  inclinations,  and  act  as  he 
pleases,  and  free  from  restraint  and  consti'aint  f  Because  God 
decreed  he  should  always  thus  act.  Then  the  decrees  of^ 
God,  so  far  from  infringing,  or  destroying  the  liberty  of 
moral  agents,  are  the  cause  of  all  the  liberty  enjoyed. 
The  perfect  liberty  of  man  is  the  effect  of  his  decree.  ' 
And  it  is  as  certain  that  man  will  alwa3's  act  freely,  as  it 
is  that  the  decrees  of  God  will  never  alter.  Take  away  this 
decree,  and  man,  together  with  his  liberty,  would  immediately 


218 

cease  to  exist.  The  decrees  of  God  are  llie  foundation  and 
cause  of  the  existence  of  moral  apjenta,  and  of  perfect  freedom, 
and  of  the  continuance  of  tiieir  existence  and  liberty.  Now 
every  one  may  judpe,  wiiothor  decrees  are  inconsistent  with 
human  liberty.  And  it  seems  all  must  see,  that  so  far  liom  in- 
fringing liberty,  the  decrees  of  God  are  the  foundation,  on  which 
the  liberty  of  moral  agents  wholly  rests  for  its  support. 

Remarks.  1.  Did  not  Joseph's  brethren  act  freely  in  selling 
him  ?  Did  they  not  act  as  they  pleased  ;  did  they  not  follow 
their  own  inclinations  ?  At  one  time  it  was  their  aim  to  kill 
him  ?  After  that  it  was  more  their  j)leasure  to  sell  him  ;  and 
this  they  did.  Why  did  they  act  thus  freely  .''  Because  God 
decreed  they  should  act  freely  in  all  tlit>y  did.  While  acting 
thus  freely,  they  did  what  God  had  decreed,  and  were  fulfilling 
his  decrees.  But  did  they  mean  this  "^  No,  they  meant  to 
gratify  their  revenge,  St  did  it ;  k,  God  meant  by  what  they  did, 
to  promote  the  glorious  ends,  which  were  accomplished  by  Jo- 
seph's living  in  Egypt.  Did  not  the  Jews  act  freely  in  crucify- 
ing Christ  ?  Why  did  they  .''  Because  God  decreed  they 
should  follow  their  inclinations.  And  they  gratified  their  hatred 
and  revenge,  in  putting  him  to  death  ;  &,  in  doing  it  they  fulfd- 
led  the  decrees  of  God.  It  was  not  their  object  to  fulfil  his  de- 
crees, or  to  do  his  will  ;  but  to  please  their  own  hearts.  But 
God's  object  was  to  promote  his  own  glory  in  the  salvation  of 
men.  Here  we  see  men  may  act  freely,  and  in  so  doing  perform 
what  God  has  decreed  ;  and  in  the  same  events  men  and  God 
have  totally  diflerent  ends  ;  and  men  may  be  wicked,  and  God 
righteous. 

In  this  manner  all  men  act.  They  always  act  freely  ;  yet 
are  always  doing  what  God  has  decreed.  What  men  aim  at  is, 
to  do  their  will,  to  gratify  and  please  their  own  lusts.  While 
they  thus  live,  ihey  do  the  will  of  God,  contrary  to  their  inten- 
tion. Hence  men  act  just  as  though  nothing  was  decreed.  Be- 
cause they  act  just  as  they  would,  if  nothing  ever  had  been  de- 
creed. Hence  it  is  easy  to  see  how  men  may  do  their  own  will, 
and  be  very  wicked,  and  yet  without  meaning  it,  do  the  will 
of  God.  A  person's  inclination  may  lead  him  to  do  something 
you  wish  to  have  done.  He  docs  it  to  please  himself,  not  you  j 
yet  he  has  done  the  very  thing  you  wislied.  In  this  case  you 
easily  see  he  is  as  deserving  of  blame,  as  he  would  have  been, 
if  the  thing  he  did  had  been  something  contrary  to  your  wishes  ; 
because  his  end  is  the  same  in  both  cases.     Men  never  act  with 


219 

a  view  to  fulfil  the  decrees  of  God  ;  they  are  never  influenced 
by  his  decrees,  neither  can  be  ;  because  they  never  know  be- 
fore hand  what  they  are.  Yet  while  they  are  doing  their  own 
will  freely,  without  meaning;  it,  they  are  fulfilling  the  decrees. 
And  their  wickedness,  and  blameworthiness  are  the  same  they 
would  be,  if  no  decree  had  ever  existed. 

2.  Sinners  travel  the  road  freely,  which  leads  to  hell,  and 
saints  ualk  the  path  freely,  which  leads  to  heaven.  The  very 
life  the  wicked  live,  is  the  road  to  death.  Why  do  they  live 
this  life  ?  Because  it  is  their  pleasure,  agreeable  to  their  incli- 
nations. And  they  complain,  when  they  are  so  restrained  that 
they  cannot  gratify  their  feelings.  As  you  prefer  this  road, 
how  can  you  justly  complain,  if  you  land  in  hell  ?  Has  a  man 
any  reason  to  complain,  when  he  reaps  the  same  seed  he  freely 
sowed  .'*  Eternal  death  is  the  wages,  the  fruit  of  sin.  While 
you  sow  the  seeds  of  corruption  freely,  have  you  any  ground 
to  complain,  that  you  reap  corruption  and  death  ?  Saints  also 
act  freely.  It  is  their  pleasure  to  serve  God ;  their  inclinations 
lead  them  to  it.  And  they  never  sei-ve  God  any  further,  than 
their  hearts  prompt  them  to  do  it.  All  who  come  to  Christ, 
come  freely.  For  they  never  do  come,  till  their  inclination 
leads  them  to  him.  Hence  all  men  act  freely,  and  all  act  as 
their  inclination  leads  them  ;  and  all  do  their  pleasure,  as  far 
as  their  power  extends. 

3.  Men  never  find  fault  with  the  divine  decrees,  only  when 
they  cross  their  feelings.  God  has  decreed  that  men  shall  al- 
ways act  as  they  please.  This  decree  they  approve.  He  has 
decreed  that  the  truly  virtuous  and  benevolent  shall  be  forever 
blessed.  This  they  like.  He  has  decreed  that  the  husband- 
man shall  reap  what  he  sows,  that  all  seeds  shall  produce  their 
own  kind  ;  that  seed  time  and  harvest,  summer  and  winter  shall 
succeed  each  other.  Such  decrees  they  approve,  and  a  thous- 
and others,  which  accord  with  their  own  feelings.  God  has  al- 
so decreed,  that  the  wicked  shall  lie  down  in  hell.  This  they 
dislike  ;  for  they  wish  to  live  a  wicked  life,  and  yet  be  saved. 
They  wish  to  serve  satan  while  they  live,  and  at  death  be  admit- 
ted into  heaven.  And  because  God  has  decreed  they  shall, 
after  death,  live  and  sufler  with  the  master  they  served  through 
life,  they  are  provoked.  They  do  not  find  fault  with  this  de- 
cree, because  it  is  unreasonable  ;  but  merely  because  it  is  con- 
trary to  their  wishes. 

But  it  is  the  nature  of  fallen  man,  to  find  fault  with  every 


220 

thing  which  is  opposed  to  his  wishes  and  feelings.  Men  are  of- 
ten angry  with  themselves,  because  they  cannot  gratify  all  their 
desires.  One  loves  mono}',  and  loves  a  life  of  intemperance  ; 
loves  honor,  and  hates  poverty  and  disgrace.  His  feelings 
are  so  opposite  to  each  other,  tiiat  he  cannot  gratify  them  all. 
His  love  ibr  spirits  is  his  strongest  inclination  ;  and  he  freely 
hidnlges  it,  till  poverty  like  an  armed  man  comes  upon  him, and 
he  is  covered  with  shame  and  disgrace,  and  his  family  is  ruin- 
ed. Then  he  murmurs,  frets,  and  finds  fault  with  himself  for 
his  foil}',  and  with  every  one  around  him.  Go  where  he  will, 
it  appears  to  him  every  one  dislikes  him ;  this  he  cannot  endure. 
Ifhe  enters  the  sanctuary,  and  hears  the  word  preached,  it  seems 
to  him  that  all  he  hears  is  aimed  at  him  ;  bec&use  he  is  in  such 
a  state,  that  almost  every  truth  is  against  him.  Now  he  leaves 
the  house  of  God,  provoked,  and  angry  with  his  Maker.  How 
many  besides  drunkards  often  by  their  own  misconduct  plunge 
themselves  into  such  a  state,  that  they  cannot  please  themselves, 
or  gain  a  reputation  with  the  virtuous  and  pious.  In  this  state 
they  are  peevish,  turbulent,  and  do  nothing  but  make  themselves 
and  others  around  them  unhappy. 

What  would  men  have,  if  they  could  ?  They  would  have 
power  to  gratify  all  the  inclinations  of  their  hearts  ;  and  they 
would  do  all  this  with  impunity,  without  ever  being  called  to  an 
account,  or  punished  for  any  of  their  deeds.  In  order  to  this  they 
must  be  omnipotent,  and  exalted  above  God  himself,  so  as  to  be 
independent  of  him  and  all  other  beings.  In  this  they  never 
will  be  indulged.  Hence  they  never  will,  or  can  be  gratified, 
while  they  remain  enemies  to  God. 

4.  What  is  meant,  when  persons  say,  they  cannot  help  act- 
ing as  they  do,  because  every  thing  is  decreed,  and  >lhat  they 
cannot  counteract  the  decrees  of  God  ?  The  thing  meant  isj 
they  cannot  help  acting  as  they  please  ;  for  this  is  Avhat  is  de- 
creed. And  it  is  true  that  persons  cannot  act  contrary  to  their 
pleasure.  Are  they  any  the  less  wort[)y  of  blame  for  this  ?  This 
is  ih :  very  reason  why  they  are  blameable  when  they  do  wrong, 
berause  they /mt'e  acted  as  they  pleased.  It  was  their  y?Zeas- 
vrc  to  do  wrong,  and  they  do  it.  And  who  can  shew  a  worse 
spirit  than  a  person  does  when  he  says,  in  murdering  a  man,  I 
did  ray  pleasure.  So  all  sinners  act,  and  in  all  their  wickedness 
they  only  do  their  pleasure.'*  It  is  their  pleasure  to  act  wicked- 
ly ;  and  they  cannot  help  it  wlyle  they  remain  wicked,  for  they 
must  act  according  to  their  pleasure.     That  is  the  vilest  heart, 


whose  plea!!ure  it  is  to  be  always  living  in  rebellion  against  God, 
rejectinj;  his  Son,  and  refusing  oftcred  mercy. 

5.  To  be  happy,  men  must  submit  to  the  will  of  God. 

When  their  hearts  are  united  to  the  happiness  and  glory  of 
God's  kingdom,  then  it  will  be  their  desire  ikat  all  things  should 
promote  these  ends,  and  terminate  in  the  highest  felicity  of  God's 
friends.  When  they  learn  (Vom  the  word  of  God,  that  no  events 
shall  take  place  ultimately  to  injure  his  ciusc  ;  and  that  every 
event  necessary  to  advance  it  shall  take  place  ;  and  are  assur- 
ed that  all  this  is  made  certain  by  the  unalterable  decrees  of 
God,  then  they  feel  safe  and  hnppy.  The  accomplishment  of 
his  decrees  is  doing  his  will,  which  is  the  highest  glory  of  his 
kingdom.  As  his  decrees  assure  them  of  the  accomplishment  of 
all  their  desires,  they  are  the  foundation  of  their  peace,  safety 
and  joy.  Whatever  may  take  place,  they  rejoice  that  Cod 
reigns. '^  They  submit  to  his  will.  .Take  away  his  decrees,  their 
foundation  of  joy  and  safety  is  removed.  Hence  no  subject  is 
more  pleasing  to  the  christian,  than  the  divine  decrees.  And 
no  subject  is  more  disgustful  to  the  wicked.  Can  any  charac- 
ters then  be  more  opposite,  than  those  who  love,  and  those  who 
hate  the  decrees  .?  And  if  those  who  love  them  are  saints,  how 
can  those  be  saints  who  hate  them  ?  This  is  a  test,  by  which 
to  try  and  know  the  hearts  of  men. 


*XBf*:fr*H<*** 


Containing  arguments  from  scripture,  that  the  sen- 
timents advanced  in  the  prcccdijig  essays  are  true. 

Here  it  is  necessary  for  the  reader  to  rccal  to  mind  the  senti- 
ments which  have  been  advanced,  and  which  I  propose  to  sub- 
stantiate by  scripture.  Otherwise  he  will  not  see  the  relation 
of  arguments  to  the  points  to  be  established,  nor  feel  their  force. 

The  leading  sentiments  advanced  in  the  cssa3s  written  are  these; 
that  the  taste,  or  heart,  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  separate  and 
distinct  from  the  understanding  and  will  :  that  it  is  a  moral 


22-2 

faculty,  containinjET  all  \ho  primary  principles  of  action  in  moral 
at^-cnts  ;  and  is  the  scat,  or  fotintaiii  of  all  vice  and  virtue.  So 
that  when  we  trace  back  all  the  actions  ever  performed  by  men, 
n  ith  a  view  to  ascertain  their  original  and  primary  source  from 
which  they  all  proceed,  we  f^hall  fid,  that  according  to  scrip- 
ture, the  heart  is  this  fountain.  If  this  be  a  truth  taught  in  the 
bible,  then  the  sentiments  advanced  in  these  essays  are  true, 
bible  sentiments  ;  otherwise  they  are  not.  For  the  whole  sys- 
tem these  essays  contain  is  founded  on  this  principle,  that  the 
heart  or  taste  is  a  distinct  faculty. 

All  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  of  which -vve  are  con- 
scious, or  of  which  we  see  indications  in  others,  are  included  in 
three  general  classes.  First,  perceptions.  And  the  more  any 
person  examines  the  subject,  the  more  he  will  be  convinced,  I 
am  confident,  that  all  the  operations  of  what  are  called  reason, 
memory,  judgment,  conscience,  imagination,  or  simple  appre- 
hension, are  nothing  more  or  less  than  perceptions  of  objects, 
differing  from  each  other  in  the  manner  which  has  been  describ- 
ed ;  which  difference  is  the  reason  of  dividing  them  into  several 
specific  classes. 

Secondly,  affections  form  another  general  class  of  operations. 
AnalTection  or  passion  is  a  compound  of  either  painful  or  agree- 
able sensations,  with  desires  to  avoid  the  painful,  or  obtain  the 
agreeable  object.  These  have  the  same  generic,  or  general  na- 
ture. The  more  they  are  examined,  the  more  evident  this  will 
appear.  These  afiections  have  a  specific  difl'erence,  and  ought 
accordingly  to  be  divided  into  specific  classes  as  has  been  at- 
tempted. 

Thirdl}^  volitions  constitute  another  general  class  of  opera- 
tions. A  volition  is  an  exertion  made  by  an  agent,  with  a  view 
to  produce  external  effects,  for  the  purpose  of  gratifying  the  al- 
fections  or  desires,  or  doing  our  pleasure.  These  have  the 
same  general  nature,  without  anj'  specific  difierence  ;  and  are 
Jiiot  divisible  into  specific  classes. 

The  first  class  are  the  operations  of  the  understanding  ;  the 
second  class,  operations  of  the  heart  or  taste  ;  the  third  class, 
operations  of  the  will.  These  three  classes  contain  all  the  op- 
erations of  the  mind  of  man.  We  experience  no  other,  we  see 
no  other  ;  of  course  we  never  hear  any  person  say  or  write 
any  thing  concerning  any  other  operations.  And  I  believe  ev- 
ery person,  who  has  candidly  read  the  essays  on  the  operations 
of  the  mindj  must  be  convinced,  that  there  is  as  real  a  generic 


223 

diflerence  between  the  aflcctions  and  volitions,  as  there  is  be- 
tween either  of  them  and  the  operations  of  the  understanding. 
Hence,  for  tlie  same  reason  tiiat  all  correct  writers  have  consid- 
ered tiie  mind  as  having  tivo  distinct  faculties  termed  the  under- 
standing and  the  will,  they  must  admit  a  third  called  the  heart 
or  the  taste.  Perceptions  and  volitions  are  so  different,  it  is 
agreed,  that  they  cannot  be  operations  of  the  same  faculty.  And 
the  sensations  and  desires,  or  the  affections  and  passions,  are  a 
class  of  operations  so  different  from  perceptions,  they  cannot  be- 
long to  the  understanding  ;  and  they  are  so  different  from  voli- 
tions, that  they  cannot  belong  to  the  will ;  of  course,  they  must 
be  the  operations  of  another  faculty,  which  is  properly  called 
the  heart. 

Now  if  the  bible  teaches  that  all  moral  good  and  evil  proceed 
from  the  heart ;  that  the  affections  are  operations  antecedent  to 
volitions,  and  contain  all  vice  and  virtue  ;  then  it  proves  that 
the  heart  ought  to  be  considered  a  distinct  faculty,  of  w  hich 
the  affections  are  its  operations.  If  the  bible  establishes  this 
sentiment,  it  proves  the  system  explained  in  these  essays  to  be 
according  to  the  mind  of  God.  This  is  the  point  to  be  proved, 
to  which  I  shall  now  attend. 

I  will  begin  with  our  Saviour's  answer  to  the  question  of  the 
scribe.  He  answered,  thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with 
all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.  Here  Christ  makes 
a  plain  distinction  between  the  heart,  and  love  ;  the  former  is  a 
faculty,  and  the  latter  an  operation  of  it.  Here  he  brings  into 
view  the  person,  the  agent,  thou  ;  and  the  faculty,  which  is  to 
be  exercised  to  its  utmost  strength,  the  heart ;  and  the  exercise, 
or  operation  of  it,  called  love.  Thus  viewed,  the  language  is 
correct,  and  makes  good  sense.  If  a  person  was  commanded  to 
reason  with  all  his  understanding,  the  ideas  we  should  receive 
would  be  these  ;  the  person  as  an  agent  is  to  reason,  not  with 
the  heart,  but  understanding  ;  this  is  to  be  exercised  to  its  ut- 
most strength,  and  reasoning  is  its  operation.  Such  modes  of 
expression  make  good  sense,  and  agree  with  our  common  un- 
derstanding. But  to  construe  the  passage  to  agree  with  the 
opinions  of  some,  would  be  nonsense,  and  vain  tautology. 
They  say  the  heart  and  love  are  the  same  thing  ;  love  is  the 
heart ;  we  know  of  nothing  antecedent  to  love.  To  construe 
the  passage  to  agree  with  this  sentiment,  we  must  read  it  thus, 
thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  love.  If  love  is 
the  heart,  this  is  its  sense,  and  proper  reading.     But  who  can 


224 

agree  to  this  sense/jf  free  from  prejudice?  Here  then  our  Lord 
phxinly  distinguishes  between  the  heart  as  a  facuhy,and  its  oper- 
ations. On  this  frround  and  no  other,  the  words  are  intclhgi- 
ble.  Again  ;  Math.  7.  15 — 21,  Christ  teaches  that  as  we 
know  trees  by  their  fruit,  so  we  are  to  know  men  by  tlieir  fruit. 
This  passage  exiiibits  the  satne  sentiment  with  tlie  former. 

What  do  wo  learn  from  the  fruit  a  tree  brings  forth  .''  We 
learn  its  nature,  whether  it  be  good  or  corrupt.  It  is  an  opin- 
ion universally  prevalent,  that  every  being  has  a  nature  peculiar 
to  itself  ;  and  its  fruit  will  be  good  or  bad,  according  to  its  na- 
ture. Hence  by  its  fruit  we  learn  its  nature.  It  is  on  this 
ground  our  Lord  uses  the  similitude  in  this  nassaa^e.  If  men 
have  not  a  nature,  different  from  their  fruit,  by  their  fruit  we 
learn  nothing.  To  say  men  have  no  nature  distinct  from  and 
antecedent  to  their  fruit,  is  destroying  the  force  of  our  Savior's 
reasoning  in  this  passage  entirely. 

Here  then  we  must  inquire,  what  that  fruit  is  by  which  men 
are  to  be  known.  He  is  speaking  of  false  teachers,  and  says 
they  come  to  aien  in  sheep"'s  clothing,  but  inwardly  are  raven- 
insr  wolves.  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them.  But  their 
external  actions,  words,  and  conduct  are  good.  These  consti- 
tute the  sheepskin,  with  which  they  externally  clothe  and  adorn 
themselves.  They  outvvardl}^  manifest  great  love,  humility,  and 
zeal  in  the  cause  of  Christ.  To  judge  them  by  this  fruit,  we 
should  say  they  are  w-liat  they  appear  to  be,  real  sheep,  friends 
of  Christ.  But  wdien  we  look  farther,  wc  find  that  their  inward 
feelings  are  against  the  truth.  They  show  a  hatred  of  truth, 
a  proud,  self-conceited  spirit,  a  self-righteous  temper.  They 
manifest  a  want  of  humility,  of  love  to  Christ,  and  to  the  self- 
denying  doctrines  of  the  cross.  These  internal  affections  seen 
in  them  are  the  fruit,  by  %vhich  we  learn  their  nature,  and  de- 
tect their  hypocrisy ;  and  by  it  are  convinced  they  have  the 
nature  of  a  wolf,  though  they  have  on  externally  sheep's  cloth- 
ing. It  is  by  the  affections  of  the  heart  we  learn  what  men  are. 
If  we  wish  to  know  whether  a  person  is  renewed  or  not,  we  la- 
bor to  learn  what  his  inward  feelings  or  affections  are.  If  we 
discover  love  to  God,  repentance  for  sin,  a  humble,  and  teach- 
able spirit,  faith  in  Christ,  love  to  the  truth,  resignation  to  the 
will  of  God  ;  if  we  see  evidence  of  these  inward  affections,  we 
infer  from  them  that  he  has  a  new  heart.  Indeed,  such  internal 
affections  are  the  fruits  by  which  we  know  men.  These  are  the 
firuits  of  the  Spirit,  as  they  are  enumerated  by  the  Apostle  in 


225 

Gal.  5.  22,  23,  and  in  many  other  passages.  If  we  Ho  not  dis- 
cover such  affections  iu  a  person,  we  have  no  evjelence  that  he 
is  bovn  again  ;  though  outwardly  his  life  may  be  regular  and 
inoffensive,  and  though  he  may  manifest  much  J03',  fervency, 
and  zeal  in  the  cause  of  Christ.  It  is  by  such  fruit  false  teach- 
ers arc  detected.  It  is  by  our  internal  feelings  or  affections, 
we  judge  ourselves  as  well  as  others.  And  these  are  the  fruits 
of  the  Spirit,  and  the  fruits  by  which  our  Lord  would  have  us 
judge  of  men  in  the  passage  under  consideration. 

But  what  are  we  to  learn  by  this  fruit  ?  We  learn  the  moral 
nature  or  character  of  men.  Every  being  has  a  nature.  Of 
this  we  have  no  intuitive  view,  we  cannot  see  it  as  God  does. 
We  learn  it  by  their  fruit.  From  the  fruit  which  we  see,  we 
infer  what  the  nature  of  any  being  is.  Where  we  see  rational 
operations  and  exercises,  we  infer  from  them  that  the  person 
has  a  rational  faculty,  called  the  understanding.  From  volun- 
tary operations  or  exertions,  we  infer  the  man  has  a  will,  a 
willing  faculty.  And  from  those  operations  which  we  call  af- 
fections, desires,  or  passions,  we  infer  that  men  have  a  heart,  the 
faculty  called  by  this  name.  And  from  these  fruits,  when 
we  see  them,  we  infer  what  the  nature,  the  temper  of  the  heart 
is,  whether  it  be  good  or  bad.  In  this  way  we  learn  there  is  a 
great  difference  between  the  hearts  of  different  persons,  and  be- 
tween the  heart  of  man  at  one  time,  and  the  heart  he  has  at  an- 
other time. 

But  on  supposition  man  has  not  such  a  faculty  as  we  call  the 
heart,  which  is  antecedent  to  its  operations,  and  distinct  from 
them,  then  from  the  affections  or  fruits  we  see  in  man  nothing 
can  be  inferred,  and  ihe  whole  force  of  our  Snvior's  reasoning 
is  destroyed.  But  in  the  ground  I  have  taken,  his  reasoning 
is  full  to  the  point,  and  conclusive. 

All  men  believe  trees  have  a  nature,  something  in  their  con- 
stitution whi^^h  prepares  them  to  bear  different  kinds  of  fruit. 
What  the  nature  of  the  tree  is,  when  they  approach  it,  they 
know  not.  Nature  is  something  beyond  the  direct  view  of  men  ; 
and  something  which  we  cannot  ascertain,  only  by  its  frnit. 
And  if  we  admit  this  principle  as  Just,  that  every  tree  will  bear 
fruit  according  to  its  nature,  then  from  its  fruit  we  safely  infer 
its  nature.  It  was  on  this  principle  Christ  at  all  times  reasoned, 
when  the  nature  of  any  thing  was  to  be  learned.  Hence  if  men 
have  no  such  thing  as  a  nature,  no  faculties  distinct  from,  and 
antecedent  to  their  operations,  from  iheir  fruits  notijing  is  to  be 

4 


inferred,  and  the  reasonint^  of  our  Ijord  has  no  force.  But  \( 
there  are  faculties  belonging  to  the  mind,  which  are  antecedent 
to  their  operations,  and  which  are  known  to  men  only  by  their 
operations  or  fruits  ;  then  our  Lord's  reasoning  is  conclusive. 
Hence,  when  we  see  what  kind  of  aftections  men  have,  whether 
they  are  holy  or  sinful,  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit  or  of  the  flesh, 
then  we  know  what  the  heart  of  man  is.  From  their  fruit  we 
infer  two  things — 1 .  That  they  have  the  faculty  called  the  heart, 
which  is  antecedent  to  all  afl'octions,  the  foundation  or  fountain 
from  which  the}  rise.  2.  We  infer  the  moral  nature  of  this  fac- 
ulty. In  some  we  find  it  is  altogether  corrupt.  In  others  we 
learn  it  is  holy  in  part,  though  not  perfect  as  yet.  Such  are  the 
sentiments  taupht  b}'  Christ  in  this  passage.  And  when  the 
temper  ofthe  heart  is  known,  then  we  know  what  a  person's  mor- 
ni  character  is,  whether  good  or  bad.  For  not  his  fruit,  but 
his  nature,  constitutes  his  moral  character.  And  if  we  could 
have  an  intuitive  view  of  the  heart  as  God  has,  we  should  know 
what  every  person's  nature  or  moral  character  is,  and  what 
fruit  he  would  bring  forth,  without  having  first  seen  the  fruit. 
We  should  know  certainly,  by  an  intuitive  view,  what  their  na- 
ture is  ;  but  to  judge  by  their  fruit,  we  may  form  an  erroneous 
opinion.  This  passage,  then,  proves  the  sentiments  it  is  brought 
to  establish,  conclusively.  There  is  no  fair  way  to  evade  the 
force  of  the  argument. 

Another  passage  of  the  same  import  is  in  Math.  15.  19.  For 
but  of  the  heart  proceed  evil  thoughts,  murders,  adulteries, 
fornication,  thefts,  falsewitness,  blasphemies.  The  sins  here 
mentioned  nre  internal,  such  as  sinful  desires,  aflections,  and 
passions.  If  it  be  admitted,  that  those  external  actions  called 
by  those  names  are  included,  vet  the  internal  desires  of  the 
heart  are  also  intended  by  our  Savior.  And  he  undoubtedly 
had  his  eye  expecially  fixed  on  such  evil  desires  within.  For 
Christ  has  taught  that  tho  desires  ofthe  heart  are  sinful.  If  a 
man  look  on  a  womai!,  to  lust  after  her,  he  hath  committed  a- 
dulter}'  with  her  already  in  his  heart.  Lust  is  a  desire.  This 
desire  to  commit  the  unlawful  act,  is  adultery  ;  and  this  is  a 
sin  ofthe  heart.  The  heart  here  is  the  fountain,  from  which 
such  evil  desires  proceed.  Also  John  saith,  he  that  hateth  hi? 
brother  is  a  murderer.  Hence  hatred  is  expressly  called  mur- 
der. And  the  moral  law  extends  to  the  heart,  and  condemns  all 
sinful  desires  or  affections.  Indeed,  when  desij'es  exist  to  mur- 
der, to  steal,  to  conunii  adultery,  or  perpetrate  any  crime,  the 


227 

person  is  then  in  the  sight  of  God  guilty  of  these  crimes.  This 
the  word  and  law  of  God  clearly  teach. 

Such  evil  desires,  our  Lord  says, proceed  from  the  heart.  He 
makes  here  a  clear  distinction  between  the  heart  and  its  opera- 
tions, or  desires.  Such  desires  defile  the  man.  He  represents 
the  heart  here  as  a  fountain,  and  desires  as  the  streams  proceed- 
ing from  it.  And  by  these  streams,  or  desires,  every  person 
may  know  what  his  heart  is,  whether  hoi}'  or  sinful.  This  pas- 
sage, with  the  former  which  has  been  explained,  expressly  leads 
us  to  view  the  heart  as  existing  antecedent  to  its  desires  or  op- 
erations, and  as  co)istituting  the  moral  character  of  man. 

Another  text  spoken  by  Christ,  of  the  same  import,  is  in  Luke 
C.  45.  A  good  man  out  of  the  good  treasure  of  the  heart, 
bringeth  forth  that  wlwch  is  good  ;  and  an  evil  man  out  of  the 
evil  treasure  of  the  heart,  bringeth  forth  that  which  is  evil.  This 
passage  is  in  connexion  witii  what  Christ  said  concerning  trees, 
that  they  are  known  by  their  fruit,  and  that  men  are  known  by 
their  fruit.  Hence  the  good  treasure  of  the  heart,  or  the  heart 
itself,  which  is  the  same  thing,  is  the  nature  which  is  known  by 
the  good  or  evil  things  which  proceed  from  it. 

Every  person  has  what  is  here  called  a  good,  or  an  evil  treas- 
ure ;  and  from  this  ail  good  or  evil,  both  internal  and  externa], 
proceed.  If  we  see  in  false  teachers  or  any  other  persons,  such 
evil  desires  or  affections  prevailing,  as  hatred  of  God,  envy,  re- 
venge, pride,  anger,  selfconceit,  and  the  like,  we  should  pro- 
nounce them  wicked  men,  and  say  their  hearts  are  full  of  evil. 
Mankind  do  not  consider  such  affections  as  constituting  the 
primary,  and  real  character  of  man  ;  but  as  evidences  of  his  real 
character.  That  every  man  has  jkheart,  either  sinful  or  holy, 
which  is  antecedent  to  its  operations  ;  and  that  every  person's 
moral  character  is  what  this  heart  is,  is  evident  from  the  manner 
in  which  persons  uniformly  express  themselves,  in  conversation 
and  writing  in  relation  to  this  subject.  Their  manner  is  to  say 
that  the  heart  hates,  loves,  and  so  on.  They  never  say,  that 
hatred  hates,  and  love  loves  ;  which  they  ought  to  do,  in  case 
love  and  hatred,  or  the  affections,  constitute  all  that  is  ever 
meant  by  the  heart.  To  say  the  heart  loves,  when  in  fact  love 
is  the  heart,  is  ever  calculated  to  convey  erroneous  ideas.  Hence 
if  there  is  no  heart  antecedent  to  affections,  a  radical  change 
ou£;ht  to  take  place  in  the  use  of  language.  It  is  needless  to 
multiply  passages,  which  are  of  the  same  import  with  these  al- 
ready explained.      Every  one  may  now  easily  see  that  every 


passajsre  in  the  bible,  where  a  tlistinetion  is  made  between  the 
heart  uud  its  operatjous,  the  heart  aiul  the  aficctions  and  Iriiits 
which  proceed  froni  it,  are  direct  proofs  of  the  sentiment  they 
are  adduced  to  establish.  Such  passages  are  very  nuiuerous, 
and  need  not  here  be  quoted. 

One  method  is  taken  to  evade  the  force  ofsuch  passages.  Wri- 
ters make  a  distinction  between  imi/ianeni  and  iinperate  acts  of 
the  will.  They  then  say,  by  the  heart  with  which  we  love,  from 
which  good  and  evil  proceed,  and  the  good  treasure  of  which 
Christ  speaks,  are  meavd  immanent  acts;  &i  the  impernic  acts  are 
the  fruits  which  proceed  from  them.  In  their  view  immanent  acts 
constitue  theheart,  &:  imperate  acts  are  the  things  which  proceed 
from  it.  Hence  they  say,  there  is  nothing,  no  faculty,  no  heart, 
antecedent  to  Immanent  aficctions;  and  these  and  imperate  acts 
are  both  of  them  exercise.^of  ihewill;  or  in  fact,  their  immanent 
acts  constitute  the  will,  and  imperate  acts  are  the  operations  of  it. 

In  answer  to  this  objection,  several  things  ma3'  be  observed. 

1.  Their  immanent  acts  are  what  are  called  the  aflections  and 
passions.  These  are  called  immanent,  because  they  do  not  ini- 
medii^tel}' produce  any  external  actions.  Love  may  exist,  }et 
not  appear  outwardly  in  any  actions.  Still  it  remains  there, 
and  never  will  become  visible,  till  imperate  acts  are  exerted. 
According  to  this  distinction  and  this  scheme,  immanent  acts 
give  rise  to  imperate  acts  ;  and  imperate  acts  produce  externa] 
and  visible  fruit.  Imperate  acts  proceed  from  the  immanentj 
as  streams  from  the  fountain  ;  and  from  the  imperate  acts  pro- 
ceed external  actions  and  fruits.  This  is  their  scheme,  if  I  can 
understand  it.  Hence  when  it  is  is  said  that  out  of  the  heart 
proceed  evil  thoughts,  and  f^m  the  good  treasure  men  bring 
forth  good  things,  they  say  immanent  aflections  are  the  heart, 
and  imperate  acts  and  external  fruits  proceed  from  them.  On 
this  sentiment  it  is  proper  to  remarli. 

1 .  That  all  virtue  and  vice  must  consist  in  these  immanent  af- 
fections. If  love  to  God  may  exist  in  any  degree  antecedent  to 
any  imperate  acts,  it  may  exist  in  a  perfect  measure.  A  person 
may  be  said  to  love  God  with  the  ivhole  heart,  and  in  this  re- 
spect be  as  perfect  as  any  saint  in  heaven.  This  love  may  exist 
and  remain  in  his  heart  an  hour,  without  any  other  acts  pro- 
ceeding from  it  ;  and  if  an  hoar,  it  may  remain  there  a  month, 
or  a  year,  witiiout.  producing  any  imperate  or  external  actions. 
This  is  certaail}'  possible.  In  this  case  the  person  may  be,  and 
is,  all  this  time,  a  perfect  character,  perfectly  holy  and  bencv^- 


22» 

lent  in  the  sight  of  God.  Hence  his  virtue  primarily  and  es- 
sentially consists  in  this  immanont  aflcction.  And  a-  thisfniay, 
so  other  immanent  holy  afll'ctions  ma}'  exist  in  perfection  for 
days,  months,  and  years,  without  givinj;  rise  to  any  iniperatc 
acts,  or  producing  any  external  fruit.  This  also  is  possible, 
In  like  manner,  immanent  sinful  nflections  may  exist  in  their 
full  strength  for  days  and  months,  without  producing  any  im- 
perate  acts  or  external  fruits.  This  is  also  certainly  possible. 
According  to  this  scheme  a  person  may  be  a  perfectly  holy,  or 
a  perfectly  sinful  character,  for  days  and  months,  without  hav- 
ing one  imperate  act,  or  perforni'iig  one  external  action.  This 
shows  to  a  demonstration,  that  on  this  scheme  immanent  affec- 
tions constitute  the  moral  cliDracter  of  every  person.  Those 
affections  comprise  all  virtue,  or  vice,  which  ever  exist  in  men. 
This  1  think  is  now  evident ;  and  I  wish  it  to  be  carefully  no- 
ticed and  kept  in  view. 

2.  From  the  preceding  demonstration  it  follows,  that  imper- 
ate acts  are  no  more  of  a  moral  nature  than  external  actions, 
are  not  considered  as  criminal,  and  constituting  any  part  of  mur- 
der. These  imperate  acts,  or  voluntary  exertions,  which  im- 
mediately produced  these  effects,  are  not  murder,  nor  do  they 
constitute  any  part  of  it.  They  are  only  the  fruit  of  a  murder- 
ous heart.  The  person's  hand,  which  holds  th®  dagger,  and 
thrusts  it,  is  not  an  active  principle,  nor  the  primary  cause  in 
the  agent  of  this  murder.  This  hand  acted,  as  it  was  moved  by 
tlie  agent.  Th!«;  is  the  reason  why  the  hand  is  not  blamed. 
And  those  imperate  acts  winch  produced  ihose  effects,  are  not 
a  primary  principle  of  action  in  this  case.  They  are  such  as 
the  heart,  or  immanent  act,  produced  ;  they  obeyed  the  com- 
mand of  the  heart,  just  as  the  hand  obeyed  these  imperate  acts. 
And  for  the  same  reason  the  hand  is  not  worthy  of  biame,  these 
imperate  acts  are  not  worthy  of  it.  Again,  murder  had  a  com- 
plete and  full  existence,  previous  to  those  imperate  and  exter- 
nal acts.  Hatred,  or  what  is  called  malice  prepense^  constitutes 
the  agent  a  mnrdorer  ;  and  this  hatred  is  an  immanent  affec- 
tion, and  the  primary  principle  of  action  in  the  agent,  v.liich 
gave  rise  to  those  imperate  and  external  actions.  Hence,  there 
is  the  same  difference  between  immanent  and  imperate  acts,  as 
there  is  between  acts  which  are  virtuous  or  vicious,  and  those 
which  are  not ;  or  between  virtuous  or  vicious  actions,  and  ex- 
ternal actions. 

3.  It  follows,  that  imperate  acts  are  not  affections.     They 


230 

are  mere  voluntary  «\\crtions,  to  produce  some  bodily  motion 
and  some  external  action  or  effect.  1'lie  immanent  acts  are  tlie 
affections.  Love  and  hatred,  and  every  oilier  affection,  has 
complete  existence  before  imperate  acts  arise,  or  any  exertions 
are  made  to  produce  external  effects.  A  voluntary  exertion, 
therefore,  is  not  an  affection,  nor  an  affection  continued,  any 
more  than  the  motion  of  the  hand  is  an  affection  cominued. 
And  it  seems  to  me  that  every  person  isconscious  of  a  difference 
between  love  when  he  feels  it,  and  voluntary  exertions.  If  a 
person  experiences  a  warm  lov»  for  an  absent  person,  and  then 
by  a  voluntary  exertion  puts  his  body  in  motion  to  c;o  and  visit 
the  beloved  object,  is  he  not  conscious  of  a  difference  in  those 
operations  ?  Does  he  not  perceive  as  real  a  difference,  as  he 
experiences  between  an  afi'cction  and  the  exertion  of  strenjilh 
to  raise  or  move  a  heav}'  body  ?  Imperate  acts,  or  voluntary 
exertions,  are  mental  strength,  exercised  to  obtain  the  object  of 
an  affecticHi,  or  to  avoid  it.  This  voluntary  exertion  is  not  a 
sensation  of  pleasure  or  pain,  nor  a  desire  ;  but  both  of  these 
together  constitute  an  affection.  Volition  is  a  mere  simple  ex- 
ertion of  the  mind,  or  rather  of  the  will,  to  gratify  an  affection 
in  obtaining  possession  of  its  object.  It  does  not,  therefore,  par- 
take of  the  nature  of  an  affection. 

Imperate  acts  are  internal  operations  cf  the  mind,  as  reall}'  as 
immanent  acts  are.  They  are  internal  and  invii^ible,  until  seen 
in  the  external  fruits  they  produce.  Hence  they  are  not  called 
imperate  acts,  to  distinguish  them  from  those  which  are  inter- 
nal. Why  then  are  they  thus  termed  ?  It  Is,  as  1  suppose,  be- 
cause they  command  the  existence  of  external  actions ;  they  reg- 
ulate and  govern  the  external  conduct  of  all  men.  But  they 
are  inferior  commanders.  And  whence  do  they  receive  their 
orders  ?  From  the  immanent  affections,  as  the  abettors  of  this 
distinction  allege.  Hence  they  are  the  only  servants  to  their 
master,  who  in  fact  governs  the  whole  man. 

These  observations  are  sufficient  to  show,  that  there  is  a  wide 
moral  difference  between  immanent  and  imperate  acts.  Im- 
manent acts  comprise  all  vice  and  virtue,  and  are  the  primary 
principle  of  action  in  moral  agents.  But  imperate  acts  are 
neither  virtuous  nor  vicious  ;  are  not  of  a  moral  nature  in  any 
other  sense,  than  external  actions  are  ;  nor  are  they  primary 
■principles  of  action.  They  are  in  fact  only  servants  to  the  im- 
manent affections  ;  they  arc  not  affections,  and  nothing  more 
•ikan  simple 'exertions,  whose  end  ib  to  gratify  the  affections. 


231 

No  operations  of  the  human  mind  differ  in  thoir  nature  more 
widely.  Can  any  candid  person  then  say,  that  they  are  opera- 
tions of  the  same  facuhy  ;  ami  difler  from  each  other  in  no  oth- 
er sense,  than  the  first  and  all  successive  acts  of  the  same  series 
differ  from  each  other  ?  We  might  with  as  much  reason  say, 
that  our  perceptions  or  rational  operations,  and  affections,  are 
of  the  same  nature,  and  differ  in  no  other  sense  than  the  first 
and  successive  acts  of  the  same  series  differ.  They  so  widely 
differ  in  their  nature,  that  thoy  must  be  the  operations  of  differ- 
ent faculties.  And  as  the  advocates  of  this  scheme  say,  that 
imperate  acts  are  operations  of  ihe  will ;  the  immanent  acts,  or 
affections,  nmst  be  the  operations  of  some  third  faculty.  They 
cannot  be  the  operations  of  the  understanding,  and  for  the  same 
teason  they  are  not  the  operations  of  the  will  ;  of  course  they 
belong  to  some  other  faculty,  and  we  say  the  heart  is  this  fac- 
ulty. And  if  there  must  be  a  third  faculty,  to  which  the  affec- 
tions belong,  our  opponents  would  not  object  against  attribut- 
ing them  to  the  heart. 

Thoujrii  they  sometimes  admit  the  existence  of  faculties,  yet 
at  other  times  they  deny  it.  If  we  meet  them  on  this  ground,  they 
must  acknowledge  the  existence  of" three  distinct  classes  of  oper- 
ations, belonging  to  the  mind.  One  class  includes  all  our  per- 
ceptions or  rational  operations.  A  second  class  includes  all  the 
aflections  and  passions.  And  a  third  class  comprises  all  our 
volitions,  or  exertions  to  produce  external  actions.  And  we 
may  reduce  these  classes  to  one,  with  as  much  reason,  as  to 
reduce  them  to  t^o.  Therefore,  when  this  distinction  of  our 
opponents  is  fairly  examined,  it  makes  nothing  in  their  favor, 
nor  in  the  least  evades  the  force  of  the  texts  adduced  to  support 
our  system. 

For  now,  to  be  consistent,  they  must  grants  that  by  heart  in 
these  texts  is  meant  that  faculty  called  in  these  essays  the  heart; 
or  if  they  deny  the  existence  of  Hiculties,  they  must  grant,  that 
the  second  class  of  operations,  called  the  affections,  constitutes 
the  heart.  Then  this  heart,  which  we  call  a  faculty,  and  which 
on  their  scheme  must  be  considered  a  distinct  class  of  opera- 
tions, is  the  heart  intended  in  scripture  ;  which  includes  all 
moral  operations,  all  vice  and  virtue,  and  from  which  as  a  foun- 
tain all  good  and  evil  fruit  proceeds.  And  this  is  the  point  for 
which  we  contend  ;  and  the  sentiment  they  mean  to  undermine 
by  their  distinction  between  immanent  and  imperate  acts.  But 
their  distinction  fails  them  on  examination,  and  is  devested  of 


232 

all  its  force.  Hence  the  scriptures  adduced  retain  all  the  evi- 
dence contended  lor,  to  prove  the  sentiment  for  which  they  were 
adduced. 


crJt=t  ***♦**>■ 


ESSATT  ZtKV, 

Objections  ag&inst  this  system,  stated,  and  answered ^ 

Objection  1.  It  is  said  this  scheme  represents  vice  and  vir- 
tue, as  consisting  in  principles  which  are  inactive  and  dormant ; 
which  is  contrary  to  all  our  Ideas  of  vice  and  virtue  ;  and  ac- 
cording to  which  we  may  as  well  suppose,  that  sin  and  holiness 
may  be  as  rationally  predicated  of  inactive  matter.  No  prin- 
ciple, say  they  objectors,  can  be  holy  or  sinful,  unless  it  is  ac- 
tive. Activity  is  essential  to  their  existence.  And  as  there  is 
no  action,  or  activity  but  in  volitions,  or  such  exercises  ;  vice 
and  virtue  cannot  have  existence  in  any  thing  else.  This  is  one 
objection  in  its  full  force,  so  far  as  my  knowledge  extends. 

Answer.  It  is  eviclent  the  per>on,  who  makes  this  ob- 
jection, for  some  reason  or  other,  has  not  understood  the  sen- 
timents to  which  he  objects.  1  have  labored  to  prove  there  are, 
and  must  be,  difi'crent  and  distinct  princi[)les  of  action  in  the  hu- 
man heart.  There  is  no  other  way  to  account  for  the  eflects  it 
produces,  and  to  accord  with  facts,  and  the  experience  of  all 
mankind.  But  I  have  no  where  said,  that  these  principles  are  in- 
active, and  dormant.  If  I  have,  itis  a  great  oversight.  Again, 
the  scheme  advanced  in  these  essays,  is  fully  proved  by  the 
scripture  account  of  the  christian  warfare.  According  to  the 
word  of  God,  saints  have  in  their  hearts  what  are  termed  thejlcsk 
and  spirit  ;  the  law  ofthe  members,  and  tlie  law  of  the  mind  ; 
the  old  and  neto  man  ;  so  that  when  they  would  do  good  evil  is 
present  with  them. 

These  opposite  principles  abide  and  remain  in  them.  They 
do  not  succeed  each  other,  as  volitions  do,  but  are  permanent. 
They  are  in  the  same  man,  at  the  same  time.  According  to  the 
word,  they  are  very  active,  operative  principles  ;  and  the  afTec- 


233 

tions  proceeding  from  them  arc  as  different  from  each  other, 
as  sin  and  holiness.  Also  they  oppose  each  other  at  the  same 
time.  The  flesh  lustetk  ac^ainst  (he  spirit  ;  and  the  spirit  lusU 
eih  against  the  flesh.  The  law  in  the  members  wars  against 
the  law  of  the  mind  ;  and  the  law  of  the  mind  wars  against  the 
law  in  tlie  members.  From  one  of  these  fountains  proceed 
sweet,  and  from  the  otlier  bitter  waters  ;  and  the  old  and  the 
new  man  are  constantly  at  variance.  In  the  opposition  of  these 
two  active  principles  to  each  other,  consists  the  christian  warfare  j 
that  inward  war,  which  all  real  saints  experience.  This  is  the 
scripture  account  of  this  warfare  ;  and  it  is  perfectly  similar  to 
the  description  of  the  heart  given  in  these  essaj  s.  It  has  been 
shown  that  the  heart  of  man  is  composed  of  several  distinct  ap- 
petites, from  which  proceed  different  and  opposing  affections, 
both  in  saints  and  sinners  ;  so  that  sinners  experience  a  warfare 
at  times,  as  well  as  saints,  though  of  a  different  moral  complex- 
ion. For  the  warfire  of  the  sinner  is  between  one  sinful  and 
another  sinful  affection,  which  arise  from  distinct  appetites,  or 
inclinations.  But  the  war  of  the  christian  is  in  the  opposition 
of  hoi}',  and  sinfid  affections.  And  this,  it  is  believed,  is  the 
only  scriptural  and  rational  description,  which  can  be  given  of 
the  chrirtian  warfare.  And  as  this  is  agreeable  to  these  essays,  the 
word  of  God,  by  giving  the  same  view  of  the  subject,  fblly  es- 
tablishes the  leading  sentiments  advanced  in  them. 

If  we  take  the  ground  of  some,  that  all  vice  and  virtue  con- 
sist in  voluntary  exercises  ;  and  that  two  of  these  do  not  exist 
in  the  mind  at  the  same  time,  but  are  constantly  succeeding 
each  other  ;  a  warfare  seems  to  be  impossible.  For  a  war  ne- 
cessarily supposes  two  parties,  opposed,  and  contending,  at  the 
same  time.  Though  holy  and  sinful  volitions  are  different  and 
opposite  in  their  nature  ;  3'et  they  cannot  in  that  case  contend 
or  fight  with  each  other,  because  they  are  never  on  the  ground, 
or  in  the  mind,  at  the  same  time.  How  can  two  armies  fight, 
if  not  opposed  to  each  other  in  the  field  at  tlie  same  time  ?  If 
they  come  into  the  field  in  succession,  so  that  one  has  left  the 
ground  before  the  other  occupies  it,  there  cannot  be  any  actual 
fighting  between  them.  Also,  on  the  scheme  that  men  have  but 
one  volition  at  a  time,  and  that  all  vice  and  virtue  consist  in  vo- 
litions, saints  must  be  perfectly  holy,  or  perfectly  sinful,  through 
every  moment  of  their  existence  in  this  world.  For  the  same 
simple  volition  cannot  be  partly  holy,  and  partly  sinful  ;  and 
this  is  granted  by  them.     Hence,  when  they  have  holy  volitions 


234 

tliey  are  perfortly  lioly,  and  wlicn  tlipy  linve  sinful  volition?* 
tlii^y  :»ce  peii'octly  sinful.  Hence  they  fall  from  grace,  and  are 
renewed  apaiii,  perhaps  a  thousand  times  every  day.  Such  ideas 
are  too  absurd  to  be  adnjitted.  Yet  they  necessarily  follow 
from  the  sentiment  now  opposed,  if  it  be  admitted,  to  avoid 
such  absurdities,  that  the  heart  is  a  faculty,  which  exists  antece- 
dent to  any  of  its  operations,  and  is  the  seat  of  all  vice  and  vir- 
tue ;  yet  if  it  is  a  simple  faculty,  how  is  it  possible  to  account 
for  the  christian  warfare  ?  It  is  very  inconsistent  to  suppose 
that  a  simple  faculty,  or  the  same  simple  principle  of  action, 
should  contain  in  itself  two  difierent  and  opposite  moral  natures. 
Yet  it  must,  in  order  to  account  for  its  sentling  forth  both  sweet 
water  and  bitter,  at  the  same  time,  or  to  account  for  the  existence  of 
sinful  and  holy  affections  at  the  same  time.  Of  course,  on  this 
ground  a  warfare  cannot  exist.  This  simple  faculty  must  be 
perfectly  holy,  or  sinful.  And  if  saints  have  both  sinful  and  ho- 
ly exercises,  this  faculty  must  be  changed  in  its  nature  from  ho- 
liness to  sinfulness,  and  then  back  again,  as  often  as  they  have 
sinful  and  holy  affections.  This  is  as  absurd,  as  to  suppose  sin- 
ful and  holy  volitions  succeed  each  other,  and  of  course  that 
persons  may  be  perfectly  holy  and  perfectly  sinful  many  times 
in  d  day.  And  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  way  to  avoid 
these  absurdities,  and  to  account  for  the  christian  warfare  of 
which  the  scriptures  inform  us,  except  on  the  ground  taken 
in  these  essays. 

Hence  the  sentiments  advanced  concerning  the  heart  or  taste, 
as  a  compound  faculty,  containing  different,  active  principles, 
which  may  and  often  do  oppose  each  other,  are  rational  and 
scriptural.  It  agrees  with  the  experience  of  Paul,  and  all  chris- 
tians in  every  age,  who  have  ever  found  one  law  in  them  war- 
ring against  another,  the  flesh  and  spirit  contending,  so  that 
when  they  would  do  good  evil  was  present  to  oppose  them. 

For  it  has  been  my  design  to  show,  that  they  are  in  their  na- 
ture the  most  active  principles  in  existence  ;  and  the  primary 
cause  in  moral  agents  of  all  the  effects  ever  produced  in  the  uni- 
verse.— Hence  I  see  no  way  but  one,  by  which  any  persons 
could  have  received  such  ideas,  as  are  contained  in  the  objec- 
tion. These  principles  have  been  considered  as  existing  in  the 
order  of  nature,  or  of  time,  antecedent  to  their  operations.  So 
from  this,  the  objector  might  sa}',  if  they  exist  prior  to  any  op- 
erations one  second,  ♦hey  might  a  year,  and  during  that  time  re- 
main inactive  and  dormant.     But  does  this  prove  they  are  in,' 


235 

active  in  their  nature  ?  It  is  tlioii£rht  not.  The  objector,  it  is 
supposed,  will  irrant  there  are  such  things  as  c«t/i.:s  in  existence, 
and  causes  which  are  active  in  their  nature,  and  which  exist  in 
some  sense  antecedent  to  the  effects  which  the}  produce.  Will 
it  follow  from  this,  that  all  causes  are  in  their  nature  inactive, 
and  dormant,  and  ofcourse  that  there  are  no  active  causes  cxist- 
ine^  in  tiie  universe  ?  He  may  as  well  draw  this  inference,  as 
the  former.  Suppose  the  objector  should  say,  that  active  cau>es 
are  always  operatinp^.  Grant  it.  Does  this  prove  thej  did 
not  exist  in  some  sense,  previous  to  the  eflect  they  produce  .'  If 
it  be  said,  they  exist  previous  to  their  eflects  in  the  order  of  na- 
ture, but  not  of  time  :  and  may  not  active  principles,  which 
are  in  reality  causes,  exist  in  the  order  of  nature  previous  to 
their  operations  ?  This  he  must  grant,  or  boldly  say,  the  op- 
erations of  the  human  mind  have  no  cause,  but  are  accidental. 
For  if  these  causes  do  not  exist  in  the  human  mind,  they  must 
exist  some  where.  If  it  be  said  that  God  is  the  immediate  cause 
of  all  mental  exercises  ;  still  this  cause  existed  previous  to  the 
operations  of  the  mind,  or  the  operations  it  produces. 

Hence  the  existence  of  eflects,  and  all  operations  of  the  hu- 
man mind,  prove  the  existence  of  active  causes  and  principles; 
and  that  these  exist  previous  to  the  effects  and  operations,  which 
they  produce.  If  this  be  not  true,  then  eflects  and  operations 
have  no  cause.  But  this  is  the  principal  thinp,  which  I  labored 
to  prove  ;  that  active  principles  do  exist  in  the  mind,  antecerlent 
to  the  operations  which  proceed  from  them  ;  antecedent  in  the 
order  of  nature,  or  of  time,  or  both.  And  now  is  the  objector 
prepared  to  say,  that  active  causes  or  principles  are  always  op- 
erating from  tlie  instant  they  exist,  and  never  cease  to  operate 
for  one  second  ?  He  may  assert  this  ;  but  can  he  prove  it  ? 
Perhaps  he  would  find  he  has  a  task  to  perform,  greater  than  he 
supposed,  or  will  be  able  to  accomplish.  It  is  the  nature  of  wa- 
ter to  run  to  the  centre.  But  is  it  always  running  .''  It  is  the 
nature  of  lightning  to  deprive  man  of  life.  But  is  it  nlwiiys 
lightning  .'*  Is  this  fluid  always  in  operation  ?  It  has  been 
proved,  and  the  objector  must  grant,  or  deny  the  existence 
of  any  causes,  that  active  principles  do  exist  previous  to  their 
operations.  They  do  produce  love,  hatred,  anger,  ajid  a  pi  eat 
variety  of  affections  and  passions.  Is  the  same  person  always 
hating,  alwa3s  loving,  always  angry  ?  If  not,  wliere  is  the 
principle,  which  produced  anger,  but  is  not  now  producing  it  ? 
Is  it  always  operating,  or  producing  its  proper  eflect  .'*     W  so, 


236 

why  is  not  the  samr  person  always  angry  ?  And  the  saint,  who 
has  an  active  principle  in  him,  oj)eratJng  in  love  to  God  ;  is  he 
always  lovinp;  God,  and  to  the  same  degree  ?  The  objector  is 
a  person  who  is  apt  to  say,  that  man  cannot  have  but  one  exer- 
cise at  a  time  ;  also  that  he  has  some  sinful  exercises;  of  course, 
he  is  not  always  loving  God.  Hence,  the  principle  which  pro- 
duces love  is  not  aliuat/s  in  operation,  producing  the  same  afl'ec- 
tion.  If  the  objector  says,  u  hen  it  is  not  operating  in  love,  it  is 
operating  in  hatred,  and  in  this  sense  isalivays  operating  :  but 
can  the  same  principle  produce  both  love  and  hatred  ?  This 
the  scriptures  expressly  deny.  Hence  the  principle,  which  op- 
erates in  love  to  God,  is  not  operating  in  the  same  person,  while 
hatred  or  some  other  aflection  is  there.  Perhaps  it  is  not  easy, 
or  possible,  to  prove  that  active  causes  are  always  in  operation. 
To  say  a  cause  is  active  in  its  nature,  does  not  prove  this,  nor 
necessarily  imply  it.  If  not,  then  causes  ov  principles  may  be 
active  in  their  nature,  yet  not  always  be  in  operation.  And  to 
say  they  are  so,  a  person  would  involve  himself  in  difficulties, 
from  which  he  could  never  extricate  himself.  By  an  active 
cause,  active  in  its  nature,  no  more  I  believe  is  generally  meant 
than  this,  that  it  produces  an  effect  by  its  own  energy  ;  or,  that 
it  is  the  primary  and  only  cause,  in  a  person,  of  a  given  eirect. 
Love,  and  all  the  aflbctions  of  men,  proceed  from  some  prima- 
ry principle  implanted  in  them.  We  do  not  mean  by  it,  that 
the  cause  or  principle  of  action  is,  or  isnot,  always  in  operation. 
But  when  an  effect  exists,  we  search  for  the  cause ;  when  we 
have  traced  it  to  a  primary  principle  in  man,  so  that  we  find 
in  him  nothing  antecedent  as  a  cause,  we  consider  this  the  pro- 
per, primary,  and  real  oause  in  him  of  the  effect.  And  we  call 
it  active,  because  we  cannot  conceive  it  possible  for  any  thing  to 
be  the  real,  only  cause  of  an  effect,  unless  it  is  in  its  nature  ener- 
getic, active,  capable  of  operating.  This  we  call  an  active 
cause.  S i;me  of  them  may  be  always  operating,  as  we  may 
suppose  the  benevolence  of  God  has  been  ;  and  some  of  them 
may  not  be  always  in  operation.  /For  this  idea  is  not  necessa- 
rily implied  in  causes  or  principles,  which  we  say  are  operative 
or  active  in  their  nature.  However,  by  primary  active  causes 
in  men,  I  do  not  mean  causes  which  operate  independently  of 
Gad,  an}'  more  than  other  secondary  causes  do. 

The  appetites  or  principles  of  action,  which  constitute  the 
heart,  are  not  dormant,  and  inactive.  Some  of  them,  at  certain 
times,  may  not  be  in  operation.     Whether  this  is  the  fact,  it  may 


237 

be  impossible  to  ascertain.     But  granting  they  do  not  all  oper- 
ate at  the  same  time,  this  no  more  proves  that  they  are  inactive 
principles,  like  inert  matter,  than  that  causes  are  not  energetic 
in  their  nature,  when  they  are  not  producing  their  respective 
effects.     These  principles  of  the  heart  are  the  only  principles 
in  the  universe,  ot"  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  which  are  ac- 
tive in  their  nature.     And  they  are  the  primary  cause  of  all  ef- 
fects which  exist ;  at  least  this  is  my  belief.     Being  active  in 
their  nature,  and  the  primary  cause  in  men  of  ^11  the  c;ood  and 
evil  of  which  we  as  agents  are  the  authors,  they  must  be  virtu- 
ous or  vicious.     To  view  them  in  this  liiz-jit,  it  is  not  nccessarv 
every  principle  should  be  considered  as  constantly  operating. 
To  determine  whether  any  thing  is  good  or  evil,  we  wish  to 
know  two  things  ;  what  the  nature  of  a  thing  is,  and  what  the 
tendency  of  its  nature  is.     Mankind  believe  all  things  have  a 
nature.     Yet  many  carp  at  the  word,  and  ask,  what  is  nature  ? 
By  it  is  generally  meant  the  internal  form  or  construction  of  a 
thing.     By  the  nature  of  a  clock,  a  vegetable,  a  tree,  is  meant 
its  internal  structure,  or  organization.      As  these  structures  are^ 
diderent  from  each  other,  tlierefore,  things  are  viewed  as  having 
difft?rent  natures.     And  we  learn  what  the  difierent  natures  of 
things  are,  by  the  various  fruits  and  effects  they  produce.     If 
any  ask  what  is  meant  b}'  the  nature  of  an  active  principle  in 
the  heart ;  the  answer  is,  a  particular  somethinp-,  of  such  a  con- 
struction, by  whatever  name  it  may  be  called,  which  is  suscepti- 
ble oC pleasure  and  pain ;  and  when  either  of  these  is  felt,  the 
principle  ope*»"atcs  and  produces  effects.     If  the  fruits  or  effects 
it  produces  tenrl,  or  in  their  <firec^  course  and  connexion,  if  not 
prevented,  will  uUImatelj-  dcslro}'  happiness,  or  promote  it,  it  is 
good  or  evil.     This  is  the  wa\',  by  which  we  learn  what  the  na- 
ture of  a  thing  is.     When  the  divine  character  is  seen  by  two 
persons,  if  one  is  pleased  with  it,  and  the  other  displeased,  we 
are  sure  they  have  different  hearts.     If  one  is  good,  the  other  is 
evil.     But  which  of  them  has  the  good  heart,  and  which  the 
evil  .''     This  we  learn  from  the  ultimate  tendency  of  their  op- 
erations.    If  the  operations  of  the  heart,  which  is  pleased  with 
the  divine  character,  promote  happiness  ultimately,  it  is  good, 
or  virtuous ;  and  if  the  operations  of  the  other  destroy  hap- 
piness, it  is  evil,  or  sinful.     It  is  in  this  way  that  we  learn,  that 
hatred  is  an  evil,  and  love  to  God,  a  good,  affection  ;  or  that 
the  former  is  sinful,  the  latter  holy.     If  love  should  produce  the 
effects  of  hatred,  and  hatred  those  of  love,  ultimately  ;  then 


33S 

hatred  would  have  been  viewed  as  holy,  and  love  a  sinful  affcc- 
tion. 

Wlien  an  object  of  choice  is  presented  to  view,  one  person 
chooses  it,  and  another  rejects  it.  We  then  know  their  voli- 
tions arc  not  the  same  in  their  nature  ;  and  if  we  say  the  voli- 
tion of  one  i.>  holy,  and  the  other  sinful  ;  yet  we  cannot  deter- 
mine which  of  ihcm  is  holy,  and  which  sinful,  till  we  learn  what 
is  the  ultimate  tendency  of  each  volition.  Hence  it  is  evident, 
that  those  volitions  are  not  sinful  or  holy,^  merely  because  they 
are  exercises,  or  what  is  called  action  and  nciivity.  If  they 
were,  each  of  them  would  be  sinful  or  holy  ;  for  each  of  them 
is  an  exej-cise.  The  only  reason,  why  exercises,  action,  activi- 
ty, energy,  is  considered  essential  to  vice  and  virtue,  is  this ; 
nothing  else  can  ever  produce  eflccts,  and  ultimately  promote, 
or  destroy  happiness. 

If,  then,  what  we  call  principles  or  appetites  are  operative, 
active,  and  will  produce  effects,  which  will  ultimately  destroy 
or  promote  happiness,  they  have  the  quality  which  is  necessary 
to  denominate  them  sinful  or  holy.  It  is  said  vice  and  virtue 
must  consist  in  exercise,  and  cannot  consist  in  any  thing  else. 
And  why  .''  Plainl}',  because  nothing  else  will  produce  effects, 
and  ultimately  promote  or  destroy  happiness.  Volitions  are 
exercises  of  this  hind  ;  hence  they  only  are  sinful  or  hol\\  But 
it  has  betn  proved,  that  there  is,  and  must  be,  something  ante- 
cedent to  volitions,  which  in  fact  produce  or  give  rise  to  them  ; 
or  there  never  would  nor  could  exist  such  an  exercise  as  a  voli- 
tion. And  this  something,  which  we  call  the  heart,  composed 
of  principles  of  action,  is  antecedent  to  voluntary  exercises. 
And  these  principles,  appetites,  or  inclinations,  are  operative,  ac- 
tive, and  do  produce  volitions,  and  by  this  medium  external  ef- 
fects and  fruits,  which  ultimately  promote  or  destroy  happiness; 
and  of  course  are  virtuous  or  vicious.  And  whether  they  are 
sinful  or  holy,  we  must  determine  in  the  same  way  by  which 
we  ascertain  the  moral  nature  of  volitions  ;  and  that  is,  by  their 
ultimate  tendency.  Seeing  such  principles  do  exist  in  the  heart, 
whether  each  of  them  is  operating  constantly  or  not,  they  are 
with  the  same  propriety  termed  sinful  or  holy,  thatthe  advocates 
for  the  exercise  scheme  say  that  all  voliiions  are  sinful  or  holy. 
And  as  those  j:)rinciples,  whether  called  principles  or  immanent 
exercises,  are  antecedent  to  volitions,  or  what  they  denomin- 
ate imperate  exercises,  vice  and  virtue  must  be  primarily  seated 
^n  these  princi])les  j  these  arc  the  fountain,  from  which  all  goo^ 


2?9 

and  evil  in  men  flow  or  proceed.     And  what  has  now  been  said 
is  a  suffioiout  answer  to  ihe  objecdon. 

Here  I  will  put  a  case,  and  then  proceed.     Acertain  tree  pro- 
duces excellent  fruit.     From  this  we  infer  it  has  an  excellent 
nature.     And  by  nature  here  we  mean  its  particular  structure, 
which  is  the  cause  or  foundation  of  its  producing  such  good 
fruit ;  whether  this  nature  be  active  or  not.     We  lind  this  fruit 
puts  an  end  to  misery,  wherever  it  is  eaten,  and  produces  no- 
thiiig  but  pure  constant  Inppiness.     Hence  its  nature  is  to  de- 
stroy misery,   and  promote  happiness  forever.     We  therefore 
call  it  a  good  tree  ;  and  its  goodness  consists  primarily  in  its 
nature.     But  we  say,  it  is  good  in  a  natural,  but  not  in  a  moral 
sense.     Suppose  this  tree  should  be  endued  with  a  faculty  of 
understanding,  and  could  perceive,  reason,  judge,  remember, 
accuse  and  condemn.      Also  had  a  heart  given  it,  which  would 
be  pleased  or  disgusted  with  every  object  seen;  and  should  now 
become  very  active  and  operative  in  affections  ;  then  in  voli- 
tions, by  being  endued  with  a  will  ;  and  in  this  way  produces 
daily  innumerable  fruits,  which  will    forever  destroy  pain  and 
promote  happinss?.     I  now  ask,  would  not  its  nature  be  good, 
for  the  same  reason  it  was  before  called  good  ?     Would  not  its 
nature  be  good  in  a  moral  sense  .''     And  would  it  not  be  a  mor- 
al agent,  and  a  proper  object  of  praise,  and  of  a  blessed  reward  .f* 
You  answer,  jes ;  but  say,  it  is  no  longer  a  tree ;  it  is  formed 
into  a  moral  agent.     Very  well ;  but  do  you  not  now  see  all 
that  is  necessary  to  constitute  any  being  a  moral  agent  ;  and 
do  you  not  see  that  the  moral  character  of  such  an  agent  is  just 
what  the  nature  of  the  tree  or  the  heart  is  .''     That  his  heart,  or 
nature,  constitutes  his  moral   character  ;  and   not  those  voli- 
tions, which  you  call  imperate  .''     And  why  does  the  heart  con- 
stitute his  moral  character  ?     Because  here  are  the  primary 
principles  of  action  ;  the  fountain,  from   which  all  good  and 
evil  proceed.       In  this  his   agency  consists.     Without  such  a 
heart,  he  could  not  with  propriety  be  termed  an  agent,  and  es- 
pecially a  moral  agent,  any  more  than  a  tree. 

Objection  second.  Some  say  this  scheme  is  Arminianism  : 
that  it  represents  men  as  acting  without  motives,  governed  by  a 
self  determining  principle,  and  as  being  morally  good  or  evil 
according  to  their  work ;  and  that  it  is  directly  opposed  to 
Calvinism. 

Answer.  How  this  objection  can  arise  from  the  principles 
advanced  in  these  essays,  is  beyond  my  power  to  conceive.     It 


240 

is  not  possible  for  ony  sentiments  to  oppose  others  more 
directly,  tliun  these  do  the  Arminiun  scheme,  if  I  know  uhat 
that  scheme  is.  And  whether  I  do  understand  either  the  Cal- 
vinlstic  or  Arminian  scheme  of  divinity,  every  one  may  judge 
for  himself  after  he  has  read  the  essays,  and  particularly  the  es- 
say in  which  the  two  schemes  are  stated,  and  the  diflerence  be- 
tween them  illustrated.  The  essays  themselves  contain  as  full 
an  answer  to  this  objection  as  can  be  given  ;  and  I  will  not  tire 
the  patience  of  a  reader  by  adding  any  thing  n)ore,  than  mere- 
ly this ;  that  the  person  who  makes  this  objection,  I  am  confi- 
dent, does  not  understand  my  sentiments  ;  and  he  is  advised  to 
study  them  till  he  does  understand  them  ;  then  he  will  no  more 
make  this  objection. 

Objection  third.  Some  say  this  scheme  tends  directly  to 
fatalism  ;  representing  that  the  univf  r<eis  go\erned  by  an  invin- 
cible necessity,  and  liberty  is  forever  excluded. 

Answer.  It  is  taken  for  granted,  that  the  Arminian  scheme, 
and  that  of  the  fatalists,  are  directly  opposed  to  each  other. 
How  then  can  it  be  accounted  for,  that  when  persons  read  those 
essays,  some  should  say,  it  is  Arminiani»m  ;  and  others,  it  is 
fatalism  ?  Can  this  be  accounted  for,  if  all  who  read  them  un- 
derstand the  sentiments  advanced  ?  It  is  thought  not.  Would 
it  not  be  well  for  every  person  to  understand  what  he  reads,  be- 
fore he  makes  objections  against  it  ? 

In  these  essays  it  is  said,  that  men  are  agents  ;  that  their  a- 
gency  consists  in  the  active  principles  of  the  heart ;  that  by 
these  principles  all  men  are  invariably  governed;  that  mankind 
ar^  endued  with  liberty  of  will  and  of  action;  and  with  all  the 
libebU'  they  can  conceive  of  or  desire  ;  and  it  is  shown  why 
such  liberty  is  necessary  and  for  what  purpose  ;  also  that  men 
are  not  only  agents,  but  moral  agents.  It  is  shown  what  pro- 
perties are  necessary  to  constitute  complete  moral  agents,  and 
wh}'  they  are  requisite  ;  and  that  men  are  proper  subjects  of 
praise  or  blame,  and  of  future  rewards,  according  to  their  mor- 
al characters.  Is  this  fatalism  ^  If  so,  I  have  never  known 
what  fatalism  is.  I  have  always  supposed  that  fatalism  ex- 
cludes all  the  ideas  above  stated  ;  inculcating  that  men  are  not 
moral  agents,  are  not  free,  are  not  deserving  ofpraise  or  blame, 
or  future  rewards  of  an}'  kind  ;  indeed,  that  there  is  no  real 
difference  between  men  and  k'ees. 

On  the  whole,  if  any  person  clearly  knows  what  fatalism  is, 
and  understands  the  sentiments  I  have  defended,  he  will  confess 


241 

that  the  latter  are  opposed  to  fatalistri  as  directly  as  light  to 
darkness. 

Objection  fourth.  Some  say,  the  scheme  advanced  in  these 
essays  is  perfect  selfishnesss.  That  all  men  seek  objects  and 
ends  Tor  the  same  reason,  because  they  please  them  ;  and  they 
seek  them  to  pratify  their  desires,  so  that  all  their  pursuits  ter* 
minate  in  personal  or  self  gratification;  that  men  se?k  the  glory 
of  Cod,  because  it  pleases  them  ;  just  as  men  seek  their  own 
honor,  because  it  pleases  them  ;  and  this  is  pure  and  perfect 
selfishness. 

Answer.  According;  to  this  objection,  to  avoid  selfishness, 
and  be  benevolent,  a  jierson  must  choose  and  act  without  mo- 
tives. He  must  not  prefer  one  object  to  anodier,  because  it  is 
agreeable  to  him.  If  he  chooses  any  object,  because  it  is  a- 
greeable,  he  is  selfish;  Now  when  objects  are  presented  to  the 
view  of  the  mind,  they  must  please  or  disGi^ust  us  bpfore  they  are 
chosen,  or  in  this  wa}'  aflect  us  subsequent  to  choice  ;  or,  on 
the  other  hand,  must  neither  please  nor  displease  us,  before  or 
after  they  are  chosen.  One  or  the  other  of  these  hypotheses 
must  be  true. 

1 .  If  objects  do  not  please  or  disgust  us  before  they  are  chos- 
en, then,  if  *hey  are  ever  agreeable  or  the  contrary,  it  is  subse- 
quent to  choice.  This  necessarily  implies  three  things — 1. 
That  no  reason  can  be  given  why  an  object  is  chosen  ;  or,  in 
preferring  one  object  to  another,  motives  have  no  influence. 
When  objects  of  choice  are  before  us,  and  they  are  not,  and 
must  not  be,  either  pleasing  or  painful,  we  shall  feel  in  a  stale 
of  perfect  indilTerence  towards  them  ;  and  it  is  in  this  state  we 
are  to  make  our  choice,  according  to  this  scheme.  When  one 
object  is  preferred  to  another,  no  reason  can  be  given  why  we 
preferred  it.  We  cannot  say,  because  it  was  more  pleasing  to 
us.  If  we  say  we  preferred  it  because  it  was  our  duty,  or  be- 
cause it  was  more  valuable  than  the  object  rejected,  still  we  are 
not  influenced  by  any  motive.  For  we  are  in  a  state  of  perfect 
indifference ;  neither  the  object,  nor  duty,  nor  the  worth  of  the  ob- 
ject can  have  any  influence.  For  no  object  can  influence  an 
agent,  if  it  do  not  aflect,  please,  or  pain  him.  For  if  we  are  in- 
fluenced by  either  of  these  considerations,  we  are  tnc/inciZ  towards 
the  object  previous  to  choice  ;  and  this  the  objector  calls  self- 
ishness. And  surely  if  no  considerations  move  or  incline  us  to 
prefer  one  object  to  another,  we  are  in  a  state  of  perfect  indif- 
ference ;  and  in  this  state  motives  have  no  influence.  If  we 
are    governed    and     influenced    by    motives,    objects     must 

6 


^4^ 

afl'ect  us  previous  to  choice  ;  if  they  do  affect  us,  we  ar6 
either  pleased  or  distrusted  by  them.  Because,  if  they  neither 
please  nor  offend  us,  they  do  not  affect  us.  Hence,  according 
to  this  scheme,  previous  to  choice  we  must  be  in  a  state  of  per- 
fect indifference,  wholly  unaffected  by  any  consideration  what- 
ever.     And  then,  if  we  are  pleased, 

2.  Our  pleasures  must  be  subsequent  to  our  choice.  One  of 
two  things  must  be  true,  if  objects  ever  please  or  displease  us  ; 
they  must  have  this  effect  previous,  or  subsequent  to  choice  ; 
unless  we  say  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  volitions,  which  is  ab- 
surd. If  they  do  not  excite  agreeable  or  painful  sensations 
previous  to  choice,  they  must  subsequent  to  it.  If  this  be  true^ 
then  our  happiness  and  misery  dejjend  on  our  pleasure  ;  we  can 
produce  either  pleasure  or  pain  at  any  time.  For  all  we  have 
to  do  is,  merely  to  choose  or  reject  an  object.  All  men  love 
pleasure,  and  hate  pain.  Why  is  it,  then,  that  any  suffer  them- 
selves to  remain  in  a  state  of  pain  one  moment,  when  by  a  sin- 
gle choice  they  can  render  themselves  happy?  Do  any  believe 
that  our  happiness  or  misery  are  produced  by  us  ;  that  they 
depend  on  our  pleasure  .''  [f  this  were  true,  would  persons 
continue  to  suffer  the  pains  of  disease  ;  or  would  sinners  remain 
in  a  state  of  torment  in  hell  ^  This,  however,  is  the  very  es- 
sence of  the'  Arminian  scheme.  Bishop  King,  on  the  origin 
of  evil,  says,  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  subsequent  to  choice, 
imd  we  create  our  own  happiness  and  misery.  And  he  is  a 
consistent  Arminian.  For  objects  must  please  before  or  aftef 
they  are  chosen,  if  ever  ;  the  former  he  denies,  as  every  con- 
sistent Arminian  must  ;  and  the  latter  he  defends.  And  all  ort 
this  ground  have  embraced  the  essence  of  Arminianism.  And 
objects  must  forever  please  us,  before  or  after  they  are  chosen, 
or 

3.  They  will  never  afford  us  any  pleasure.  This  is  so  evident,  it 
is  impossible  for  any  one  to  deny  it.  Which,  then,  of  the  three 
hypotheses  is  true  ?  If  we  say,  that  objects  previous  to  choice 
never  affect  us,  never  excite  any  pleasing  or  painful  sensations, 

,  no  not  in  the  least  degree  ;  and  this  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be, 
the  reason  why  we  choose  one  and  reject  another  object  ;  thert 
we  must  say,  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  subsequent  to  choice, 
and  created  by  it  ;  cr  that  we  never  experience  either  of  them. 
The  latter  is  contrary  to  daily  facts  and  experience.  If  we 
embraco  the  other  hypothesis,  we  are  always  in  a  state  of  per- 
fect indifference,  wlien  we  make  a  choice,  and  are  never  influ- 


243 

uenced  by  motives  ;  and  to  be  consistent,  ong'ht  to  be  Armini- 
ans  in  length  and  breadth.  Also,  seeins:  all  men  hate  pain  and 
love  pleasure,  why  is  it  that  there  is  any  pain,  in  this  world  or 
a  future,  since  it  depends  wholly  on  our  pleasure  ?  Is  it  not 
now  evident  to  every  one,  that  objects' must  and  do  aflect  us,  do 
please  or  displease  us,  previous  to  choice  ;  and  that  this  is 
the  reason  why  we  prefer  one  to  another,  because  it  is  more 
agreeable  to  us  ?  And  if  this  be  true,  then  motives  govern  and 
influence  us.  So  far  as  an  object  aflects,  pleases  or  disgusts  us, 
so  far  it  moves,  inclines  and  induces  us  to  choose  one  and  reject 
another. — But  it  is  said,  this  is  selfishness.  According  to  this, 
saints  and  sinners  are  influenced  by  the  same  motives,  govern- 
ed by  the  same  reasons. 

But  I  ask,  is  it  wrong,  is  it  sinful  in  me,  tobcjo/eoserfwitlnhe  di- 
%nne  character ;  with  the  characifr  ci  Christ ;  with  the  glory  &:  hap- 
pitiess  of  his  holy  eternal  kingdom  ;  with  the  law  and  service  of 
God  ;  h  with  praising  and  exalting  hi-  name .'  If  not ;  is  it  sinful 
in  me,  for  this  reason,  to  choose  God  for  my  portion  ;  Christ 
for  my  savior  ;  his  law  for  my  rule  of  duty  ;  his  service  to  be 
my  yoke  ;  and  his  holy  kingdom  to  be  my  eternal  residence  ? 
Is  this  selfishness  ?  If  it  is,  it  is  surely  a  glorious  thing  to  be 
selfish. — This  objection  evidently  arises  from  erroneous  ideas 
concerning  selfishness  and  benevolence.  Every  being,  who  is 
destitute  of  a  heart  to  be  pleased  with  the  happiness  of  other  be- 
ings, is  selfish  in  all  he  does.  Hunger,  and  every  other  appe- 
tite in  him,  is  selfish.  He  seeks  ever}-  object  to  gratify  his  ap- 
petite ;  and  if  he  destroys  the  happiness  of  the  universe  by  feed- 
ing this  personal  desire,  he  cares  not  ;  because  he  has  no  love, 
ao  feeling  for  the  happiness  of  any  but  himself.. 

Rut  if  a  person  rejoices  in  the  happiness  of  other  beings,  or 
the  happiness  of  God's  holy  kingdom,  this  will  be  the  object  of 
his  ultimate  pursuit,  and  he  will  sacrifice  and  subordinate  every 
thing  to  it.  And  this  is  benevolence.  To  determine  whether 
persons  are  selfish  or  benevolent,  we  have  to  learn  what  is  the 
ultimate  object  in  which  their  hearts  delight,  and  which  they 
seek.  Is  the  happiness  of  God's  holy  kingdom,  or  bis  glory  in 
which  their  hearts  delight,  is  this  their  ultimate  end  .''  Theu 
this  is  the  end  which  they  will  seek,  and  to  it  they  will  subor- 
dinate every  thing,  and  for  it  they  will  labor,  and  patiently  suf- 
fer every  thing  necessary  to  it,  even  death  itself.  Can  any  thing 
be  more  benevolent  than  this .''  Is  it  a  sin  for  them  to  rejoice 
in  the  happiness  of  others,  or  the  glory  of  God  ?     No,  it  proves 


244 

a  benevolent  heart.  Is  it  sinful  for  them  to  dioose  and  prefer 
this  as  their  ultimate  emi,  because  it  is  more  delightsome  to  tlicm, 
than  any  other  ?  Who,  if  he  understands,  ean  see  any  selfish- 
ness or  sinfulness  in  this  ?  How  is  it  possible  for  any  moral 
aji^ent  to  possess  a  heart  more  benevolent,  or  more  friendly  to 
God,  and  the  universe  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  if  a  moral  atrent  has  no  appetite  or  re- 
lish for  the  h;ippiness  of  others,  or  the  .ylory  of  God  ;  if  sueh 
objects  afibrd  him  no  delight,  and  he  has  no  love  lor  them,  he 
certainl}  will  never  seek  them.  If  at  the  same  tin)e  he  has  a 
relish  for  worldly  objects,  for  riches,  or  for  worldly  honors,  or 
lor  any  sensual  pleasures  and  amusements  ;  if  such  objects 
please  and  delight  him,  he  will  prefer  them,  and  seek  them  to 
gratify  the  relish  and  desires  he  has  for  them.  And  to  such 
pursuits  he  will  subordinate  every  thing,  and  sacrifice  the  hap- 
piness of  millions  to  please  his  heart.  He  will  commit  any 
crime,  if  he  dare,  to  gratify  his  desires.  This  I  call  selfishness, 
and  wickedness.  For  it  is  sinful  in  him  to  delight  in  such  ob- 
jects supremely,  and  sinful  to  prefer  them  to  the  glory  of  God, 
and  good  of  his  kingdom  ;  sinful  to  seek  them  as  his  portion, 
and  subordinate  every  thing  to  them. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  what  harm  is  there  in  loving  bread, 
or  riches  ?  I  answer,  as  I  have  laborsd  to  prove,  that  the  pri- 
mary fault,  or  imperfection,  or  sin,  in  the  character  of  men, 
does  not  consist  in  a  love  to  these  objects  ;  but  in  a  want  of  all 
love  to  God,  and  his  kingdom  ;  or  in  the  total  want  of  all 
benevolent  feelings,  or  relish  for  God  and  his  glory.  In  this 
want  his  imperfection  primarily  consists.  If  he  loves  God  su- 
premely, if  he  has  far  greater  delight  in  his  glor}'  and  the  hap- 
piness of  his  kingdom,  than  in  any  worldly  objects,  he  will  sub- 
ordinate all  his  desires  to  this  supreme  delight  of  his  heart ;  if 
he  then  love  food  he  will  seek  it  no  further,  nor  bv  any  other 
means,  than  are  consistent  with  the  giory  of  God,  his  supreme 
delight.  Deprive  him  of  this  love,  of  this  relish  for  God  and 
his  kingdom  ;  and  at  the  same  time  let  his  love  of  food  remain 
the  same,  neither  increased,  nor  diminished  ;  his  greatest,  su- 
preme delight  is  in  food.  Now  his  heart  loves  and  prefers  this 
object,  above  God  and  his  kingdom.  This  is  certain  ;  for  he 
has  no  love  for  God,  and  has  a  love  for  food.  Hence  this  ob- 
ject is  preferred  by  his  heart  to  every  thing  divine  and  heavenly; 
and  his  conduct  will  comport  with  it.  And  then  let  his  heart 
be  renewed,  and  u  relish  for  the  glory  of  God  be  restored,  and 


Si5 

•jet  he  deliqiits  in  food  as  he  ever  had  done.  He  has  now  an 
object  in  which  he  experiences  far  greater  pleasure  tha/i  in  food, 
and  therefore  will  never  gratify  his  love  for  lood  in  any  way 
incousistent  with  the  glory  of  God.  AH  this  is  plait;  and  evi- 
dent ;  and  clearly  shows,  that  the  moral  characters  of  men  arc 
afl'ected,  or  chanc^ed  from  holy  to  sinful,  and  from  sinful  to  ho- 
ly, as  often  as  they  loose  all  relish  for  God,  or  h;!ve  it  again 
restored,  though  all  their  other  appetites  or  inclinations,  im- 
planted in  them  by  their  Maker,  remain  the  same  through  all 
the  changes. 

The  fact  is  this,  there  is  in  man  something,  by  whatever 
name  it  may  be  called,  which  is  antecedent  to,  and  distinct  from, 
all  our  volitions  ;  or  there  is  not.  If  there  is  not,  then  moral 
agents  must  necessarily  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference,  at 
the  same  time  they  make  a  choice.  It  can  be  nothing  but  a  vo- 
lition, which  puts  an  end  to  their  indifference,  respecting  any 
particular  object  of  choice.  And  if  in  a  state  of  inflifference, 
then  motives  do  not,  neither  can,  have  any  influence,  as  has 
been  clearly  shown  by  man}'.  This  plan,  then,  wholly  excludes 
motives  ;  and  of  course  wholly  destro}  s  moral  agency  and  lib- 
erty. It  is  taking  Arminian  ground  in  length  and  breadth.  If 
they  do  not,  they  arc  inconsistent  with  themselves. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  heart  is  a  dis- 
tinct faculty  from  the  will,  and  the  subject  of  all  the  pleasures 
and  pains  we  experience  ;  then,  to  be  consistent,  a  person  must 
adopt  the  system  advanced  in  these  essays.  Hence  the  great 
question  to  be  decided  is  this ;  whether  the  heart  or  taste  is  a 
distinct  faculty  from  the  will  ?  Those  who  deny  this  must  be 
Arminians,  or  be  inconsistent  with  themselves ;  and  those  who 
believe  this,  must  embrace  the  sentiments  advanced,  or  the  Cal- 
vinistic  scheme  and  system  ;  or  else  be  inconsistent  with  them- 
selves. It  is  the  primary  ground  concerning  which,  in  reality, 
Arminians  and  Calvinists  differ  ;  and  where  they  take  their  de- 
parture from  each  other,  and  embrace  different  systems  of  theol- 
ogy. 

And  all  who  mean  to  be  Calvinists,  and  deny  the  heart  to  be 
a  faculty,  are  inconsistent  with  themselve".  They  have  but  two 
ways  to  maintain  apparent  consistency.  One  is,  by  aduiitting 
what  they  call  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain.  This  has  been 
s!iown  to  bo  the  same  thing  with  the  heart  or  ta>te.  Hence 
they  have  to  admit,  under  another  name,  the  very  thing  they 
deny.     For,  their  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain  is  the  very 


24G 

thing  we  mean  by  the  heart  or  taste.     If  there  ho  this  capacity, 
not  only  pleasure  and  pain,  hut  all  the  aflections  or  desires,     j 
must  be  its  operations,  distinct  from,  and  antecedent  to,  voli-      ' 
tions.  ^ 

Their  other  way  to  support  an  apparent  consistency  is,  by 
makinc:  their  distinction  between  immanent  and  impcrate  acts. 
Acf^ording  to  this  distinction,  all  the  operations  of  tbe  mind  are 
formed  into  three  distinct  classes — perceptions,  affections,  and 
volitions.  Then,  if  they  den3'  the  existence  of  faculties,  yet 
they  arc  obliged  to  admit  three  distinct  classes  of  operations  or 
exercises.  And  these  are  so  dificrent  from  each  other,  that  the 
class,  which  they  call  immanent  acts,  which  includes  all  our 
aflections  or  desire?,  includes  also  all  vice  and  virtue,  and  all  the 
principles  and  springs  of  action.  Hence,  on  their  own  ground, 
they  make  all  vice  and  virtue,  and  the  moral  character  of  man, 
to  consist  in  operations  or  exercises,  which  are  antecedent  to 
that  class,  which  they  call  imperateacts.  In  this  way  the  only 
grand  difi'erence  between  them  and  us  is  this  ;  we  admit  facul- 
ties, to  which  these  classes  of  operations  belong  ;  and  they  de- 
ny their  existence.  For  if  they  admit  faculties,  they  must  em- 
brace our  system  ;  or  refer  classesof  operations,  very  diflerent 
from  eayih  other  even  in  their  moral  nature,  as  well  as  in  other 
respects,  to  the  same  faculty.  This  is  very  unphilosophioal, 
and  creates  confusion  in  the  study  of  the  human  mind.  In  fact 
they  have  no  way  to  maintain  a  plausible  consistency,  only  in 
some  form  or  other  to  admit  the  very  fundamental  sentiments, 
for  which  we  contend  ;  yet,  while  they  in  fact  admit  them,  they 
in  words  deny  them.  Whereas,  if  they  only  granted  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  faculty  as  the  heart,  distinct  from  the  willj  they 
might  then  with  ease  and  consistency  be  on  Calvinistic  ground. 

Ohjection  5th.  Some  may  say.  the  system  advanced  in  these 
essays  represents  the  appetite  of  hunger,  and  all  the  appetites 
with  which  we  are  born,  as  being  in  their  nature  sinful,  in  all 
who  are  unrenewed,  and  even  in  christians.  But  this  cannot 
be  true.  For  almost  ever  person,  in  every  age,  has  considered 
such  natural  appetites  as  innocent  and  harmless.  Hence  the 
system  advanced  must  be  radically  erroneous. 

Atvswer.  The  particular  ends  and  purposes,  for  which  these 
appetites  were  created  and  implanted  in  us,  has  been  already 
shown.  Hence  there  is  no  need  of  repeating  here  any  thing  to 
answer  the  objection.  Something  also  has  been  said-^  which  is 
connected  with  this  subject,  in  the  essay  on  the  nature  of  sin. 


U7 

Accordingly,  but  few  observations  more  are  needful,  to  answer 
the  present  objection. 

It  will  be  necessary  for  the  reader  to  keep  steadily  in  view 
the  idea  often  expressed,  what  constitutes  the  primary  imperfec- 
tion in  moral  characters.  That  is,  the  total  privation  of  the 
moral  image  of  God,  or  of  all  supreme  love  to  God,  and  that 
love  to  our  neiglibor  which  tlic  law  requires.  A  character, 
perfectly  destitute  of  that  love  to  God  and  man  which  the  law 
requires,  is  an  imperfect,  sinful,  character.  In  this  ^mprimarily 
consists.  'For,  until  there  is  a  want  of  this  love,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  it  is  impossible  for  sin  in  any  sense  to  exist  in  the  heart  of 
man  ;- unless  we  consider  as  sinful  those  seeds  or  principles, 
which  may  become  corrupt,  when  the  moral  image  of  God  is 
lost. 

It  will  be  well  also  to  reflect,  that  every  thing  is  good  or  evil 
in  its  nature,  according  to  its  tendency-  Hence,  although  u 
particular  principle,  in  one  condition,  does  not  by  its  tendency 
produce  any  evil  ;  yet  in  a  different  condition,  and  under  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  its  tendency  is  to  evil  daily.  When  this  is 
the  case,  if  we  judge  correctly  concerning  the  nature  of  things 
by  their  tendency,  we  must  consider  that  principle  to  be  sinful, 
which  tends  daily  to  a  transgression  of  the  law.  If  no  rain 
were  to  fall  and  water  the  earth,  and  Uie  sun  should  continue 
shining  with  all  its  burning  rays,  would  you  predicate  good  of 
it  ?  Would  you  say,  a  sun  in  this  condition  was  a  great  bless- 
ing, or  a  great  evil  t  If  no  water  replenished  the  earth,  heat 
would  tend  to  the  production  of  evil.  Here,  the  primary  fault 
consists  in  the  want  of  rain. 

Before  Adam  sinned,  his  appetite  of  hunger  was  under  the 
influence  of  benevolence,  or  love  to  God.     It  would,  then,  nev- 
er be  indulged  to  excess  in  eating  or  drinking,  nor  in  using  any 
unlawful  means  to  obtain  food.     Hence  its  operation  would  be 
harmless,  and  harmonize  with  the  influence  of  benevolence. 

But  when  he  was  wholly  deprived  of  the  moral  image  of  God, 
then  food  was  one  of  the  supreme  objects  of  his  heart's  desire. 
Food  now  occupied  the  same  place  in  his  heart,  which  God  had 
filled, when  his  supreme  affection  was  set  on  him.  Now  hunger  has 
the  entire  government.  He  seeks  food  for  no  other  end  or  pur- 
pose, than  to  remove  the  pain  of  hunger,  preserve  his  life,  and 
enjoy  the  pleasure  which  eating  affords.  He  has  nothing  to 
resti'ain  him  from  eating  and  drinking  to  excess,  or  from  using 
anlnwfid  menns  to  obtain  food.     For,  however  much  he  may 


248. 

vlislionor  God,  or  injure  men,  in  gratifyiuG;  this  appetite  ;  ^et 
this  does  not  restiuin  him,  or  give  him  any  uneasiness,  in  case 
he  can  do  it  with  impunity.  For  he  has  no  love  for  God  or 
man  ;  and  hence  no  desire  to  honor  his  Maker,  and  do  good  to 
men.  So  (V.r  as  other  appetites  do  not  interfere,  and  fear  of 
future  punishment  in  this  world  do  not  restrain  him,  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  his  eating  to  excess,  and  using  any  means 
however  unlawful  or  injurious  to  others  in  obtaining  food, which 
is  now  the  supreme  object  of  his  heart,  and  his  god.  And 
while  men  continue  in  this  condition,  with  hearts  uYirenewcd, 
the  tendency  of  this  appetite  is  to  evil  only,  to  excess  in  eating, 
and  the  use  of  unlawful  means  to  obtain  food.  And  how  often 
has  it,  in  fact,  prompted  one  to  steal  ;  another  to  rob  men  on 
the  highway  ;  another  to  commit  murder  to  get  money  ;  and 
another  to  lie,  defraud,  and  oppress,  when  the  end  has  been  no 
other  than  to  obtain  food  to  eat,  and  feast  this  appetite.  So 
long  as  he  lives  within  the  bounds  of  temperance,  and  uses  only 
lawful  means  to  acquire  food,  this  appetite  in  its  operations  is  in- 
nocent and  lawful.  But  the  appetite  itself  will  never  keep  men, 
long  at  a  time,  within  such  limits.  Its  tendency  is  to  exceed 
them,  and  indulge  itself  in  riotous  living.  As  it  does  in  fact 
operate  in  this  manner,  \\here  there  is  no  love  for  God  or  men, 
who  can  say  it  is  not  sinful,  but  always  innocent  in  its  nature  f 
And  the  observations  now  made,  with  regard  to  this  appetite,  will 
apply  to  all  the  other  appetites  with  which  we  are  born.  They 
all  seek  their  respective  objects  as  their  supreme  good,  and  seek 
them  often  to  great  excess,  and  by  unlawful  means  ;  so  they 
are  daily  transgressing  the  divine  law,  and  disturbing  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  society. 

These  sentiments  must  be  received  as  true ;  or  we  must  admit, 
that  when  Adam  lost  the  moral  image  of  God,  He  created  in  him 
a  positive,  sinful  principle,  such  as  some  term  selfishness.  Let 
it  be  admitted  this  was  the  fact,  for  the  present.  What  will  be 
the  tendency'  and  operations  of  this  selfishness  ?  Will  it  love 
and  regard  self  supremely,  and  place  its  aftcctions  supremely 
on  this  world  .''  This  is  the  very  fact  with  respect  to  our  oth- 
er appetites.  Will  it  seek  this  world  as  its  only  portion  .'*  This 
is  true  of  our  appetites.  Will  it  seek  the  world  to  excess,  and 
by  unlawful  means  ?  Thus  our  appetites  in  fact  operate. 
Will  it  move  a  man  to  cotnmit  crimes,  crimes  of  the  deepest 
stain  ?  This  our  appetites  move  us  in  fact  to  do.  View  this 
selfishness  iu  what  light  we  may,  its  tendency,  nature,  and  op- 


249 

erations  are  the  very  same  with  tlic  tendency,  nature,  and  op- 
eration of  our  appetites,  as  has  been  I'epresented.  Its  nature 
then  is  the  same  ;  and  there  is  no  difference  between  the  two, 
only  in  words.  Call  tlien  our  appetites  principles  of  selfishness, 
as  they  really  ai'e  ;  and  then  these  appetites  constitute  the  only 
selfishness  we  are  in  fact  acquainted  with,  or  any  where  see  in 
operation.  Hence  the  only  difference  between  the  systems 
advanced,  and  a  principle  of  selfishness  for  which  some  contend, 
is  merely  concerning  the  nature  of  selfishness.  And  concern- 
ing this,  from  what  has  been  said,  we  see  there  is  in  reality  no 
difference.  And  is  it  not  more  consistent  with  the  moral  char- 
acter of  God,  to  believe  he  created  in  Adam  all  the  principles  of 
action  he  would  need,  and  all  he  ever  designed  to  create  in  him, 
when  he  first  gave  him  being ;  than  to  suppose,  that  when  the 
Image  of  God  was  lost.  He  then  created  in  him  a  sinful,  active 
principle  ?  Our  system  supposes  no  alteration  took  place  in 
Adam,  but  the  loss  of  the  divine  image  ;  in  consequence  of 
which,  all  his  other  appetites  were  placed  supremely  on  this 
world,  and  led  him  and  his  posterity  away  from  God  the  living 
fountain  of  waters.  If  this  be  admitted,  then  the  objection  be- 
fore us  is  fully  answered.  I  have  now  replied  to  all  the  objec- 
tions, worthy  of  particular  notice,  which  have  come  to  my 
knowledge. 


*i=Mc*:|c**l:i 


ESSAV  XXVZ. 

An  Examination  of  the  ideas  of  Rhetoricians,  con- 
cerning a  Taste  for  beauty,  novelty,  8^  grandeur. 

Rhetoricians  commonly  define  Taste,  to  be  a  power  of  de- 
riving pleasure  or  pain  from  objects  of  nature  and  art ;  and  con- 
sider beauty  and  sublimity  to  be  sources  of  the  greatest  pleas- 
ures afforded  to  it. 

I  believe  they  have  never  considered  this  power,  as  they  call 
it,  a  distinct  faculty  of  the  mind  ;  nor  attended  to  its  operations 
m  this  light.     When  w^  read  what  authors  have  said  on  this 

7 


:f50 

subject,  their  taste,  and  what  we  call  taste  or  the  heart,  are  ev- 
idently the  same  property  of  the  mind.  Pleasure  and  pain, 
emotions,  affections,  passions,  desires,  arc  the  operations  of  what 
they  call  taste.  In  this  they  agree  with  us.  To  me  it  appears 
very  clear,  that  their  taste,  and  what  is  called  by  the  same  name 
in  these  essays,  are  the  same  power,  property  or  faculty.  They 
have  reflected  great  light  on  this  branch  ofintellectual  philoso- 
phy. But  they  have  treated  the  subject,  as  it  appears  to  me, 
in  a  too  restricted  and  limited  sense.  The  deficiencies  of  wri- 
ters on  the  subject  of  taste,  as  far  as  my  reading  has  extended, 
it  is  proposed  here  to  point  out. 

1.  They  have  not  attended  to  it  as  a  distinct  faculty  of  the 
mind,  vvitli  sufficient  precision.  Hence  a  reader,  after  he  has 
perused  all  they  have  to  say,  is  ready  to  ask  such  important 
questions  as  the  following  ;  do  they  consider  taste  to  be  one  of 
the  faculties  of  the  mind,  as  th«y  do  the  understanding,  or  not  ? 
Do  they  consider  it  a  power  belonging  to  some  faculty  ?  If 
they  do,  to  what  faculty  do  they  view  this  power  as  belonging.^ 
The  reader  might  say,  I  find  no  answer  to  these  'questions  so 
definite  as  to  afford  conviction,  and  still  have  doubts  concern- 
ing the  answers  they  would  now  give  to  them.  This  deficien- 
cy clouds  the  subject  with  greater  or  less  obscurity.  They  ex- 
hibit a  train  of  thoughts  connected  with  each  other,  but  to  what 
general  system  do  they  belong?  How  can  I  connect  them  with 
other  branches  or  parts  of  intellectual  philosophy,  so  as  to  re- 
tain them,  and  see  the  place  they  occupy  in  a  system  .'' 

The  several  parts  or  branches  of  any  particular  science,  form 
one  general  system.  And  when  all  the  parts  are  so  arranged, 
that  the  place  each  part  occupies,  with  their  relation  to,  and 
connexions  with  each  other  from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  are 
easily  and  clearly  seen,  then  the  whole  appears  more  plain  and 
convincing,  is  far  more  easil}^  remembered  and  reviewed,  when 
occasion  requires  it,  and  lays  a  foundation  for  a  further  im- 
provement of  the  system.  Taste  is  one  branch  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  mind.  In  order  for  us  to  see  its  connexion  with 
tire  other  branches  of  this  subject,  so  as  to  have  our  ideas  sys- 
tematically arranged,  it  seems  to  be  necessary  to  determine 
clearly,  whether  taste  is,  or  is  not,  a  faculty  of  the  mind.  This 
point  not  being  fully  settled,  presents  a  deficiency,  which  must 
render  all  that  is  said  by  writers,  in  certain  respects,  very  ob- 
scure. And  this  will  appear  more  evident,  as  we  pass  along^ 
in  our  observations. 


251 

2.  Another  great  deficiency,  in  writings  ou  the  subject  of 
taste,  is  this  ;  they  leave  it  uncertain,  whether  they  consider  all 
our  pleasures  and  pains,  and  all  our  affections  and  passions,  to 
belong  to  it  or  not.  This  is  left,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  ex- 
tends, in  a  state  of  great  doubt. 

It  is  true  all  the  pleasures  and  pains  afforded  us,  and  all  the  af- 
fections excited  in  us,  by  objects  of  beauty  and  sublimity,  and 
many  others,  do  belong  to  this  power  or  faculty.  But  with  re- 
spect to  many  of  our  pleasures,  and  pains,  and  affections,  wheth- 
er they  are  the  operations  of  this  taste,  or  not,  is  uncertain. 

Our  pleasures  and  pains,  affections  and  passions,  are  more 
or  less  acute,  lively,  strong,  and  powerful.  In  this  respect 
they  differ,  from  the  very  least  and  faintest,  to  the  greatest  or 
most  lively,  and  sensible.  Some  objects  affect  us  so  little,  we 
are  unable  to  say  whether  they  give  us  any  pleasure  or  pain ; 
we  feel  almost  indifferent  in  view  of  them.  Others  affect  us 
more  sensibly.  And  some  objects  make  very  deep  impressions, 
please  or  disgust  us  in  the  highest  degree  ;  and  excite  in  us  the 
warmest  affections.  Though  they  differ  in  all  these  respects  ; 
yet  they  have  one  general,  or  generic  nature.  Pleasure  is 
pleasure,  and  pain  is  pain,  every  affection  is  an  affection,  wheth- 
er little  or  great,  faint  or  lively  ;  almost  insensible,  or  very  dis- 
cernible. Having  the  same  generic  nature,  they  ought  to  be 
viewed  as  forming  one  general  class  of  operations  or  exercises ; 
and  as  belonging  to  the  same  faculty.  If  they  have  not  the 
same  .generic  nature,  it  ought  to  be  proved  ;  if  they  ought  to 
be  formed  into  several  generic  classes,  this  ought  to  be  done  ; 
and  if  there  are  several  powers  or  faculties  belonging  to  the 
mind,  to  which  such  generic  classes  of  operations  belong,  they 
ought  to  be  distinguished,  and  their  different  natures  illustrated, 
so  that  their  differences  from  each  other  may  be  perceived. 
This  is  certainly  necessary  to  a  perspicuous,  sysfematic  view  of 
the  mind,  and  of  its  faculties  and  operations.  And  so  far  as 
this  is  wanting,  intellectual  philosophy  remains  in  a  state  of  ob- 
scurity and  darkness. 

Whether  only  one,  or  several  powers  of  receiving  pleasure 
and  pain  from  objects,  belong  to  the  mind  or  not,  we  are  not  in- 
formed ;  and  whether  all  our  emotions,  affections,  or  passions, 
are  operations  of  one  faculty  or  of  several,  we  are  not  told.  At 
least  the  reader  is  at  a  loss  to  know,  in  what  light  writers  in- 
tend to  consider  those  things  In  these  respects.  This  deficiency 
leaves  the  subject  of  the  mind  in  a  state  of  great  obscurity. 


To  iiieit  appears  plain  thalilie  niiud  has  but  one  feeling  f'ac- 
culty.  To  this  fjtculty  all  our  pleasures,  and  pains,  and  afl'ec- 
tious,  belongs  ;  or  are  its  operations  froni^  the  most  faint  to  the 
strongest.  Thonjz:h  tliese  operations  form  but  one  general  class, 
because  they  all  have  the  same  f^eneric  nature,  yet  such  dift'er- 
ences  are  discernible  among  them,  that  they  ought  to  be  divid- 
ed into  several  specific  classes.  This  renders  the  subject  of 
mind  more  clear  and  systematic.  This  is  wanting,  in  all  the 
writers  1  have  read,  on  the  subject  of  taste.  Hence,  though 
the\  have  said  many  excellent  things,  and  reflected  much  light 
in  relation  to  many  subjects,  and  especially  the  subject  of  crit- 
icism, 3  et  great  obscurity  prevails. — ^To  dispel  this  darkness, 
is  one  thing  greatly'  needed. 

3.  Another  deficiency,  in  writers  on  taste,  is  this  ;  whether 
they  mean  to  consider  tlieir  taste  a  moral  power  or  faculty,  the 
primary  seat  of  all  vice  and  virtue.  This,  as  far  as  my  reading- 
extends,  is  left  in  a  state  of  uncertainty.  And  so  far  as  they 
say  any  thing,  which  might  determine  what  their  opinion  was  ; 
3et  by  comparing  what  they  have  written  in  different  pages, 
there  seem  to  be  inconsistencies. 

Taste  is,  or  is  not,  a  moral  faculty.  If  morel,  it  is,  in  its  na- 
ture, either  vicious  or  virtuous ;  or  it  partakes  partly  of  the  na- 
ture of  each,  so  that  sometimes  its  operations  are  virtuous,  and 
at  othertimes  vicious.  If  nil  vice  and  virtue  have  not  their  pri- 
niarjr  seat  in  this  taste,  tiicn  there  must  be  other  moral  faculties 
belongiag  to  the  mind.  But  whether  they  consider  theii  taste 
as  the  only  moral  faculty,  the  onlj'  primary  seat  of  all  vice  and 
virtue  ;  or  as  the  fountain  of  some  vices  and  virtues,  while  oth- 
er moral  acts  belong  to  some  other  faculty,  are  points  which  I 
do  not  find  clearly  decided. 

But  is  it  not  very  necessary,  in  order  to  present  the  subject 
of  intellectual  philosophy  in  a  perspicuous  systematic  light,  to 
determine  and  show  distinctly,  that  taste  is,  or  is  not  a  moral 
faculty  .'*  To  show  to  what  faculty  ati  vice  and  virtue  are  to  be 
referred  as  their  fountain  ^  And  if  the  mind  has  more  than  one 
moral  faculty,  should  it  not  be  made  evident  ? 

If  the  mind  has  only  one  moral  faculty,  and  is  the  primary 
scat  or  fountain  of  all  vice  and  virtue,  and  this  is  proved,  we 
shall  certainly  have  a  far  more  clear  understanding  of  its  oper- 
ations. Or  if  it  have  several  sucii  moral  powers  ;  and  some 
virtues  and  vices  belong  lo  one,  and  soin<>  to  another  ;  if  this 
were  proved,  and  ilhjstrated  clearly,  we  should  on  this  ground 


255 

have  more  distinct  views  of  its  operations.  My  view  of  this 
subject,  I  have  endeavoured  to  give  in  previous  essays. 

4.  Another  deficiency  in  their  writings  on  this  subject  is  this  ; 
tlie}'  do  not  determine  distinctly,  whether  taste  is  a  simple,  or 
compound  power,  or  facult}-.  Some  things  VvTitten  would  lead 
us  to  conclude,  they  considered  it  simple  in  its  nature  ;  and  oih- 
er  things  would  lead  us  to  a  difl'erent  conclusion.  This  is  a 
point,  which  ought  to  beclearl}'  and  fully  decided.  For  if  two 
persons  should  agree,  that  taste  is  the  only  feeling  and  moral 
faculty  of  the  mind  ;  yet  one  should  view  it  as  simple  in  its  iiu- 
ture,  and  the  other  m  compounded,  they  must  di/l'or  in  their  opin- 
ions in  some  things  connected  with  the  subject,  and  take  diirer- 
ent  methods  to  account  for  some  facts.  It  is  a  fact  that  some 
objects,  which  are  highly  pleasing  and  entertaining  to  some,  are 
very  disgusting  to  others.  This  is  a  fact  with  respect  to  the 
idolatries  and  superstitions  of  the  heathen  ;  and  also,  with  re- 
spect to  the  doctrines  of  the  gospel.  Many  of  these  doctrines, 
which  the  apostles  of  Christ  loved,  the  Jews  hated.  How  can 
such  facts  be  accounted  for,  if  taste  is  a  sin)ple  faculty  ?  It  is 
certain  that  two  persons,  who  embraced  different  opinions  con- 
cerning taste,  whether  it  is  a  simple  or  compound  faculty,  would 
take  dilTerent  ways  to  account  for  such  facts.  And  both  of 
them  cannot  be  in  the  right. 

This  is  sufficient  to  show  that  it  is  a  muKer  of  importance,  to 
have  this  point  decided,  whether  tasie  is  a  simple  or  compound 
facidty.  Such  deficiencies  as  have  been  mentioned,  without 
adding  more,  are  sufficient  to  show,  that  the  philosophy  of  the 
mind  must  be  in  a  state  of  less  or  greater  obscurity,  until  those 
deficiencies  are  removed.  They  can  be  removed  only  by  the 
reflection  of  greater  light,  and  by  giving  a  more  systematic  view 
of  the  mind. 

The  subject  of  taste  has  genrrally  been  investigated  no  farth- 
er, than  it  respects  objects  of  nature  and  art.  Its  operations, 
with  respect  to  the  wide  field  of  objects  which  theology  opens  to 
view,  have  not  been  mucij  attended  to  by  writers.  Yet  this  is 
the  field  in  which  we  shall  see  the  operations  of  taste,  and  their 
nature,  and  be  able  to  rei'ect  more  light,  and  to  better  advan- 
tage, than  we  now  do  by  confining  our  investigations  to  subjects 
of  nature  and  art. 

The  faculty  of  taste  is  the  mo»t  important  property  of  the 
mind.  It  \i  the  seat  of  all  our  pleasures  and  pains  ;  contains 
«U  the  principles  of  action,  which  govern  men  ;  it  is  the  foun- 


# 


I 


«54 

tain  of  vice  and  virtue  ;  and  according  to  its  nature  such  is  the 
moral  character  of  men  and  of  all  intelligent  beings  ;  and  ac- 
cording to  its  nature  when  we  bid  farewell  to  life,  such  will  be 
our  endless  state  bejond  the  grave.  Hence  our  usefulness,  our 
happiness,  here  and  forever,  the  honor,  and  respectability  of  our 
characters,  our  friendship  with  God,  our  enjoyment  of  him,  the 
society  of  all  holy  beings,  and  all  good,  depend  on  the  temper 
of  heart  which  we  cultivate.  If  its  sinful  lusts  and  desires  are 
gratified,  cultivated,  and  nourii;hed  till  death,  we  must  then  as- 
sociate with  the  shameful,  degraded,  characters  of  the  wickfd, 
and  sink  deeper  forever  into  disgrace  and  misery.  But  if  ho- 
liness of  heart  is  cultivated  on  earth,  and  we  die  conformed  to 
God,  we  sliall  rise,  and  associate  with  holy,  difznified,  exalted, 
and  glorious  characters,  and  with  them  triumph  over  all  evil, 
and  sing  the  song  of  victory  over  every  foe  with  enraptured  de- 
light forever.  That  which  will  distinguish  men  finall}',  is  not 
riches,  or  honors,  or  dignified  titles,  or  the  greatest  acquired 
knowledge  ;  but  the  nature  and  character  of  the  taste  or  heart. 
Hence  the  rich  man  in  the  gospel,  if  he  had  with  his  riches  been 
an  emperor,  and  swayed  the  sceptre  of  the  world,  and  had  ac- 
quired a  knowledge  of  all  the  arts  and  sciences  in  the  greatest 
perfection,  and  hadclied  as  he  did  with  an  evil  heart,  he  would 
have  sunk  in  end'ess  infamy,  disgrace  and  misery  ;  while  the 
beggar,  notwithstanding  his  poverty,  the  neglects  with  which 
he  was  treated,  and  the  disgrace  in  which  he  was  held,  and  the 
misery  he  suflered  here,  would  be  exalted,  to  the  highest  honors, 
glorias,  and  felicities  in  heaven.  Hence  every  thing  good,  great, 
honorable,  glorious,  and  blessed  ;  and  every  thing  evil,  despic- 
able, degraded,  shameful,  and  miserable,  depend  on  the  nature, 
and  cultivation  of  the  taste,  which  is  implanted  in  every  man. 

Had  writers  on  taste  considered  the  subject  in  this  interesting^ 
light,  would  they  have  confined  their  observation  chiefly  to  the 
eifects  produced  on  it  by  the  works  of  nature  and  art  ?  The 
moral  world  contains  objects  of  beauty,  grandeur,  and  sublimi- 
ty, infinitely  exceeding  any  thing  of  this  kind  in  the  natural 
world,  or  the  arts  hi  which  men  have  excelled.  Had  they  ex- 
tended their  criticism  to  the  moral  world,  as  they  have  to  the 
natural,  and  to  the  arts,  they  would  have  rendered  far  greater 
service  to  the  best  interests  of  men.  Their  defects  do  not  per- 
tain to  what  the}' have  done;  but  to  their  neglects.  They  have 
done  well,  as  far  as  they  have  proceeded  in  the  path  of  truth, 
observation,  and  experience ;  and  they  would  have  done  far  bet- 


A.\ 


255 

ter,  and  more  for  tlie  happiness  of  men,  if  they  had  proceeded 
to  examine  critically  all  liic  beauties  and  sublimities  in  the  mor- 
al world,  and  shown  the  eti'ects  they  would  produce  on  a  cor- 
rect and  delicate  taste  ;  or  on  one  destitute  of  these  qualities. 

When  this  truth  is  established,  that  all  men  have  tliat  facul- 
ty called  taste,  which  is  the  subject  of  all  our  pleasures  and 
pains  ;  then  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  all  objects,  natural  and  moral, 
and  works  of  art,  would. produce  in  the  taste  pleasant,  or  painful 
sensations,  whether  we  call  them  emotions,  affections,  or  pas- 
sions. They  would  also  find,  that  no  objects  in  the  natural 
■world  afford  so  much  pleasure  and  pain,  as  the  most  beautiful 
and  sublime.  This  thev  have  found  is  a  fact.  Then  had  thev 
proceeded  to  the  moral  world,  they  would  have  seen  objects  of 
greater  beauty  and  sublimity,  and  objects  of  greater  deformity. 
What  objects  in  the  universe  are  so  beautiful  and  sublime,  as  the 
character  of  God,  that  love  displayed  in  the  work  of  redemption, 
the  holiness  the  gospel  enjoins;  the  love,  the  zeal,  the  fortitude, 
the  useful  services,  the  exalted  praises,  and  fervent  prayers,  of 
the  apostles  and  all  saints  t  What  objects  in  the  natural  world 
are  so  beautiful  and  sublime,  as  the  character  Christ  displayed 
on  the  earth,  the  doctrines  he  taught,  the  wonders  he  wrought, 
and  the  fortitude  and  love  he  manifested  on  the  cross  .''  What 
deformities  can  be  found  in  the  natural  world  so  great,  as  the 
deformity  of  a  sinful,  rebellious  character,  such  as  the  proud 
Pharisees  displayed  in  the  days  of  our  Lord  i*  Let  the  beauti- 
ful and  sublime,  the  hateful,  desrraded,  and  depraved  characters 
in  the  moral  world  be  examined  ;  also  the  sensations,  emotions, 
and  affections  they  produce ;  and  all  would  be  convinced  that 
the  tastes  of  men,  as  to  their  moral  nature,  are  very  different. 
The  result  of  an  examination  of  these  objects,  and  the  affections 
they  produce,  would  have  been  a  full  conviction,  that  taste  is  a 
moral  faculty,  the  primary  principle  of  action,  the  seat  of  vice 
and  virtue,  and  the  foundation  of  endless  felicity  or  misery. 

This  must  have  impressed  on  the  mind  the  importance  and  ne- 
cessity of  cultivating  a  holy  taste. 

It  has  been  one  great  object  of  these  essays,  to  convince  men 
that  they  have  the  faculty  called  taste  by  many  writers,  to  des- 
cribe its  nature  and  operations,  and  to  shew  what  part  it  occu- 
pies in  a  correct  system  of  the  mind,  and  its  connexion  with  the 
other  parts  the  understanding  and  will ;  and  to  show  that  these 
properties  of  the  mind  constitute  men  complete  moral  agents, 
who  are  worthy  of  praise  or  blauje,  and  endless  rewards.     And 


25G 

as  they  are  virtuous  or  vicious,  and  must  be  forever  happy  or 
miserable  according  to  the  nature  of  their  taste,  which  is  capa- 
ble of  changes  ;  that  their  chief,  great  and  daily  attention  ought 
to  be  given  to  the  cultivation  ol"  a  holy  taste  :  a  taste,  which 
will  not  only  be  pleased  with  the  beauties  and  sublimities,  dis- 
cernible in  the  works  of  nature  and  art  ;  but  also  with  the  far 
more  beautiful  and  sublime  objects,  which  exist  in  the  moral 
world. 

And  in  writing  these  essa3'S,  it  has  been  the  determination  of 
the  author  to  admit  no  speculations  as  true,  but  those  which  a- 
gree  with  fads,  observation,  and  the  experience  of  men.     The 
desiG:n  has  been,  to  advance  no  sentiment,  which  is  not  founded 
on  facts  and  experience. 


>f!**i  *>(:****• 


ESSAY  XXVZI. 

On  total  Depramty. 

Admitting  the  views  which  have  been  given  of  the  humatt 
mind  to  be  true,  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity,  as  explained  by 
the  orthodox,  is  a  just  inference.  And  one  reason,  why  the  ad- 
vocates and  the  opponents  of  this  doctrine  have  not  agreed,  is, 
because  they  have  not  begun  with  first  principles,  nor  reasoned 
from  them,  in  relation  to  the  mind.  If  any  person  is  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  first  principles  relating  to  moral  agency,  he 
cannot,  if  consistent,  deny  this  doctrine.  But  to  prove  this 
doctrine,  we  must  in  the  first  place  explain  it,  that  all  may  know 
how  much  it  contains,  as  we  understand  it. 

By  total  depravity  is  meant,  a  heart  destitute  of  moral  virtue 
or  holiness.  No  trace  of  the  moral  image  of  God,  or  true  be- 
nevolence, remains  in  the  heart.  Real  holiness  is  wholly  want- 
ing. In  consequence  of  this,  all  the  operations,  or  aflections 
of  the  heart,  are  sinful.  Yet  it  is  granted,  that  the  totally  de- 
praved have  all  the  faculties,  with  which  Adam  was  created, 
still  remaining.  They  have  all  the  faculties,  and  the  liberty, 
which   are  necessary  to  constitute  a  complete    moral   agent. 


They  have  the  same  faculties  of  the  imdorsfandinp:,  heart,  and 
will,  which  Adam  had  before  the  fall.  By  his  sini)ine:,  no  direct 
alteration  took  place  in  him,  or  his  posterity,  except  in  the  fac- 
ulty of  the  heart,  or  taste.  When  he  ate  of  the  forbidden  fruit, 
he  was  deprived  of  that  moral  imag^e,  or  benevolent  appetite, 
with  which  he  was  created.  He  was  then  spiritually  dead,  des- 
titute of  all  moral  goodness,  or  totally  depraved.  Then  all 
the  other  appetites  with  whicJi  he  was  created  became  sinful. 
Hence,  when  we  say  man  is  totally  depraved,  the  meaning  is, 
he  has  no  moral  goodness,  remaining  ;  and  every  operation 
and  desire  of  his  heart  is  sinful,  in  a  moral  sense  evil.  Yet  all 
the  faculties  he  ever  had,  or  which  constitute  a  moral  agent,  re- 
main entire  ;  and  are  not,  except  in  a  moral  sense,  in  the  least 
impaired.  This  explains  my  view  of  this  subject.  But  a  few 
things  are  necessary  to  establish  the  truth  of  this  doctrine. 

1.  The  faculty  termed  the  taste  or  heart  is  essential  to  moral 
agency.  To  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  desired  to  peruse 
carefully  and  candidly  the  description  given  of  this  faculty  in 
the  8th  and  9th  essays,  on  taste  and  the  appetites, — According 
to  the  description  there  given,  the  heart  is  the  only  faculty 
which  feels,  or  is  the  subject  of  pleasant  or  painful  sensations. 
It  is  the  onl}'  primary,  active,  principle,  in  moral  agents  ;  and 
is,  also,  the  only  moral  faculty.  And  it  is  so  essential  to  moral 
agency,  that  without  it,  men  would  not  be  agents  ;  could  not 
be  virtuous  OY  vicious,  or  subjects  of  final  rewards.  Also  this 
faculty  is  always  in  its  nature  sinful,  or  holy. — For  the  divine 
character,  and  all  moral  objects,  must  afford  itpleasure^r  pain. 
Or  in  view  of  divine  objects,  every  person's  heart  wilFexpini- 
ence  delight,  or  disgust,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree.  Being 
pleased  with  divine  objects,  proves  the  heart  to  be  holy  ;  and  if 
displeased,  this  equally  shows,  that  it  is  in  its  nature  sinful,  de- 
praved. These  are  truths,  which  have  been  proved  in  the  es- 
says to  which  we  have  referred. 

This  shows  with  a  moral  certainty,  that  a  moral  agent  cannot 
exist,  and  at  the  same  time  be  neither  sinful  nor  holy.  If  a 
moral  agent,  he  has  the  faculty  called  the  heart ;  and  this  is,  in 
its  nature,  always  sinful,  or  holy.  It  cannot  exist  in  any  oth- 
er condition.  Hence  the  sentiment  which  some  advance,  that 
the  hearts  of  men  when  born  are  like  clean  paper,  without  any 
marks  of  vice  or  virtue,  is  certainly  false.  And  if  any  feel  in- 
clined to  view  this  as  a  whim,  or  an  absurdity  ;  thev  are  desired 
to  undertake  to  show,  how  it  is  possible  for  any  person  to  ev 

8 


:*5^ 

ist,  and  be  neither  sinful,  nor  holy,  yet  be  a  moral  agent.  Ifh^S 
is  a  moral  ag^ent,  he  has  the  faculty  of  taste.  And  if  any  per- 
son should  labor  to  show,  this  faculty  may  exist,  and  be  clean 
as  paper,  in  its  nature  neither  sinful  nor  holy,  he  will  soon  find 
his  labor  is  in  vain. 

He  n)ay  deny  the  existence  of  this  faculty.  If  he  does,  he 
must  admit  the  existence  of  a  faculty  similar  to  it,  or  grant  men 
are  not  moral  agents.  If  he  should  say,  we  have  not  the  facul- 
ty of  taste  ;  but  wc  have  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain,  and 
this  constitutes  us  moral  agents  ;  this  is  only  another  name  for 
what  is  termed  taste  ;  and  the  nature  of  this  capacity  must  be 
such,  that  the  character  of  God  will  please,  or  ofiend  it ;  and  in 
either  case,  this  proves  it  to  be  sinful  or  holy.  Call  it  by  what- 
ever name  they  may,  they  must  admit  it  is  susceptible  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain  ;  or  grant  we  have  no  active  power  or  principle 
in  us  5  and  of  course  are  not  moral  agents. 

If  it  be  granted,  that  men  are  moral  agents,  it  must  be  admit- 
ted, that  we  have  that  faculty,  which  I  call  the  taste  or  heart } 
and  if  any  give  it  a  difl'erciit  name,  yet  this  does  not  alter  its  na- 
ture. It  will,  therefore,  remain  an  eternal  truth,  that  as  men 
are  moral  agents,  they  have  a  faculty,  the  nature  of  which  is 
similar  to  the  description  given  of  it,  in  the  essays  on  taste  and 
its  appetites.  Hence  the  sentiment,  which  some  advance,  that 
we  are  born  with  hearts  as  clean  as  white  pajjer,  neither  sinful 
nor  holy,  is  a  dangerous  falsehood ;  a  sentiment,  which  can  nev- 
er be  supported,  and  men,  at  the  same  time,  be  moral  agents. 

2.  Adam,  when  created  by  his  Maker,  was  perfectly  holy. 
T!ie  mofal  imnge  of  God  was  instairiped  on  his  heart,  perfect 
and  entire.  He  came  from  the  hand  of  his  God  perfectly  holy. 
He  was  made  in  a  moral  sense  upright,  created  with  knowledge 
and  holiness.  God  created  in  his  heart  the  same  benevolent 
appetite,  which  in  Himself  is  termed  /ove  or  holiness.  In  this 
respect  he  perfectly  resembled  ins  Maker  ;  having  the  same  be- 
nevolence in  kind,  though  not  in  drgrec. 

God,  also,  created  him  with  all  the  other  appetites,  which 
are  enumerated  in  the  9ih  essay,  on  the  appetites.  These  pre- 
pared him  to  live  in  this  wi>rld,  to  preserve  his  life,  propagate 
his  race,  support  them  in  infancy,  relieve  them  in  distress  ;  and 
for  every  other  purpose  needful  to  his  comfort  in  this  life,  in 
case  he  should  lose  his  benevolent  appetite,  as  God  knew  he 
would.  Thus  Adam,  as  first  created,  was  endued  with  all  the 
fac.  Itics  necessary  to  make  him  a  complete,  moral  agent  j  and 


259 

being:  perfectly  holy,  he  was  prepared  to  serve  and  enjoy  his 
Maker,  here  and  forever;  and  he  endowed  him  with  every  other 
appetite  requisite  to  answer  the  ends  for^  which  they  were  given, 
if  he  should  be  deprived  of  his  moral  iinaG;e,  which  at  last  prov- 
ed to  be  the  fact.  This  shows  what  our  first  parents  were,  when 
they  came  from  the  hands  of  their  Creator.  Accordingly,  when 
they  were  deprived  of  the  moral  image  of  God,  the}'  still  had 
all  the  other  appetites  remaining,  which  were  necessary  to  an- 
swer the  ends  (or  which  they  were  implanted  in  them.  Such 
were  our  first  parents,  when  createfi.  They  were  moral  agents ; 
being  perfectly  holy,  they  were  prepared  for  the  enjoyment  of 
God  ;  and  their  other  appetites  qualified  them  to  live  in  this 
world,  even  when  sin  should  enter  it. 

3.  When  they  ate  the  forbidden  fruit,  they  were  deprived  of 
the  moral  image  of  God  ;  of  that  benevolent  appetite,  with 
which  they  were  at  first  created.  They  were  now  in  a  moral 
sense  dead,  and  had  no  holy  principle  remaining  in  them  ;  and 
were  in  a  moral  sense  also,  imperfect,  and  sinful.  In  one  word, 
they  were  in  a  state  of  total  depravity.  For  by  total  depravity 
is  meant,  an  entire  want  of  a  holy  principle  of  action.  No 
trace  of  holiness  remained  in  them,  after  they  ate,  unless  their 
other  appetites  were,  some  of  them,  holy  ;  which  it  will  be 
shown  was  not  the  fact. — There  are  only  two  ways  at  pre&ent 
conceivable,  by  which  this  truth  can  be  evaded. 

1.  It  may  be  said  by  some,  that  Adam,  after  he  had  eaten, 
was  not  ivholly,  and  only  mi  n  partial  sense,  deprived  of  the  holy 
image  of  his  Creator.  It  ma}'  be  said,  he  had  some  supreme 
love  for  his  Maker  still  remaining  ;  and  of  course  was  not  to- 
tally depraved. 

All  this  may  be  asserted.  But  assertio^is,  without  proof, 
have  no  weight.  What  evidence  can  be  adduced,  to  prove 
that  Adam  was  but  partially  deprived  of  God's  moral  image  .'' 
The  word  of  God  is  directly  against  this  opinion.  If  Adam  by 
the  fall  was  only  in  part,  and  not  wholly,  destitute  of  love  to 
God  ;  then  all  his  posterity  have  some  love  to  him,  when  born. 
If  this  be  true,  wh}'  does  the  bible  represent  all  men  as  going 
astray  from  the  womb,  and  as  by  nature  children  of  wrath,  con- 
demned already  ;  conceived  in  sin,  and  born  in  iniquit}'  ?  Will 
God  condemn,  and  send  to  hell,  those  who  love  him  supreme- 
ly ?  Tliere  is  not  one  passage  in  the  whole  bible,  which  rep- 
resents unrenewed  men  as  having  some  supreme  love  to  God, 
jremaining  in  the  heart.     But  they  arc  repeatedly  said  to  be  hi*: 


oueuiies,  as  hatiiifi  both  the  Father  and  the  Sou  ;  and  in  a  state 
of*  »el)elli(>n,  robbing  their  Creatoi".  Till  proof  from  tiie  bible 
is  produced  in  support  of  the  assertion,  that  all  men  liave  some 
supreme  love  remaining  in  their  hearts,  since  the  fall,  or  until 
renewed  by  grace ;  the  assertion  ought  to  be  rejected  as  a  dan- 
gerous error. 

Again.  The  assertion  we  reject  as  unfounded  is  contradicted 
hy  facts,  and  the  experience  ol"  men  in  all  ap,es.  If  men,  since 
the  lapse  of  Adam,  iiave  sonie  supreme  love  for  God  remaining, 
ther(»  is  no  special  difierence  between  them,  and  those  called 
christians,  or  saints.  For  christians  do  not  love  God  with  the 
whole  heart ;  in  this  respect  they  are  deficient,  and  imperfect  j 
and  complain  daily  of  the  want  of  more  love.  Unrenewed  men, 
then,  are  really  saints,  holy  in  part,  and  havini:  the  same  char- 
acter in  reality,  with  those  who  are  called  by  the  pen  of  inspira- 
tion the  friends  of  God.  I(  this  be  true,  why  does  the  word  of 
God  divide  mankind  into  two  classes,  sauils  and  sinners  ;  the 
unrenewed,  and  renewed  t  Also,  if  this  be  true,  mankind  do 
not  need  the  change  <-alled  regeneration.  Iliey  are  renewed, 
as  really  as  saints  are.  For  when  they  are  born  again,  tliey 
have  a  heart  given  to  love  God  ;  but  this  love  is  imperfect.  In- 
deed, if  the  assertion  is  true,  there  is  no  difierence  among  men, 
in  a  moral  sense,  but  this  ;  some  may  love  God  more  than  oth- 
ers ;  but  all  love  him,  and  all  will  be  saved.  For  God  will  send 
none  to  hell,  who  have  some  supreme  love  to  him. 

But  does  the  assertion  we  oppose  agree  with  facts  ?  Do  all 
men,  in  fact,  appear  to  have  some  supreme  regard  for  their  iMa- 
ker  ?  Did  the  body  of  the  .Jews,  in  the  days  of  Christ  and  his 
Apostles,  manifest  any  true  love  for  God,  and  the  religion  then 
taught  ?  Do  the  heathen  appear  to  know  and  love  the  true  God  f" 
Or  do  all  men,  in  our  day,  manifest  a  supreme  love  to  Him  f" 
If,  for  an  example,  we  select  those  men  at  this  day,  who  are  the 
most  moral,  honest,  and  upright,  yet  unrenewed  ;  what  spirit 
do  they  manifest,  when  sorely  afflicted .''  If  they  were  to  be 
stripped  naked,  as  Job  was,  would  they  say  as  he  did,  with  a 
sincere  heart,  the  Lord  hath  given,  and  taken  away,  and  blessed 
be  his  name  ?  Would  they  not  rather  display  ihe  temper  of 
Job's  wife  ?  Is  there  not  reason  to  believe  this  from  the  fretful, 
murmuring,  and  complaining  spirit,  which  they  frequently  mani- 
fest, when  providences  are  crossing  and  afflictive  ?  We  know 
men  will  manifest  much  of  what  is  (ailed  good  natme,  when  all 
events  agree  and  harmonize  with  their  desires.     But  what  spir- 


Ml 

it  would  they  show,  if  aflllctcd,  and  treated  as  Job  was,  and  per- 
secuted like  Paul  ?  Would  they  sincerely  adopt  Paul's  words, 
these  lifjht  afiVictioiis  shall  work  out  for  us  a  farniore  exceeding 
and  eternal  weight  of  glory  ? 

Again.  Can  all  men  say  sincerely,  that  they  dail\'  experience 
that  spirit,  described  in  the  beatitudes  of  C!irisT,  Math.  5th 
chapter?  Can  all  anionc,-  us  say,  they  experience  daily,  that 
poverty  of  spirit,  that  mourning  for  sin,  that  purity  t)f  heart, 
that  hungering  and  thirsting  after  righteousness,  tliat  meek  and 
lowly  spirit,  that  lo\e  of  peace,  and  thai  blessedness  in  their 
souls,  which  is  given  to  those  who  have  such  a  heart  ?  Do 
thev  know  by  experience,  what  the  spirit  and  blessedness  are, 
described  by  Christ  ?  If  they  have  some  supreme  love  in  their 
hearts  for  God,  they  certainly  know  by  experience  the  nature  of 
that  spirit,  and  the  blessedness  held  up  to  view  in  that  chapter, 
and  in  other  passages  of  the  new  testament.  Cut  those  who 
converse  much  with  unrenewed  men  on  experimental  subjects  of 
religion,  will  alwa3s  find,  that,  instead  of  their  being  acquaint- 
ed experimentally  with  such  subjects,  they  are  perfect  strangers 
to  them.  Inform  them  thattliose,  who  love  God  in  some  meas- 
ure, groan  daily  under  the  weight  of  remainii^.g  sin;  that  they 
never  lie  so  low  before  God  as  they  ouabt,  and  wish  ;  tlat  noth- 
ing they  see,  in  this  or  an}-  other  world,  is  so  lovely  as  holiness: 
that  thev  lonrj  more  earnestlv  to  be  freed  from  sin,  and  made 
perfectly  holy,  than  for  their  daily  food  ;  il.at  they  pant  after 
God  as  their  only  portion,  and  that  it  is  their  chief  concern  to 
grow  In  grace,  and  ripen  for  heaven.  Such  feelings  are  so  dis- 
tant from  any  thing  the}-  experience,  that  they  would  say,  if  all 
who  love  God  feel  thus  daily,  we  have  no  love  for  Him.  And 
such  language  would  appear  so  strange  to  them,  they  would  be 
ready  to  say,  that  persons  of  this  description  were  superstitious, 
fxnatical,  hypocritical,  blind,  and  deceived.  Yet  this  is  ihe  lan- 
guage of  all  who  love  God,  according  t<>  the  bibh-  :  ii!K!  il.ose 
vviio  love  God  understand  such  language,  tlicir  (twn  expener.ce 
accords  with  it.  Indeed  the  bible,  facts,  and  experience,  united- 
ly testifv,  that  unrenewed  men  have  no  love  in  their  hearts  for 
God.  And  to  sa}',  they  have  son^e  love  rcmriining,^  or  are  not 
totally  depraved,  contradicts  the  scriptures,  and  is  opf>osed  to 
facts,  experience,  and  observation.  And  this  is  so  e\  ident,  but 
very  few  pretend  to  say,  that  Adam's  posterity  h;t,ve  an}-  cftliat 
supreme  love  to  God;  which  he  hud  before  his  fall.      Instead  of 


!262 

saying  all  men  have  some  supremo  love  to  God,  to  evade  the 
truth,  they  generally  take  other  ground,  and  say, 

2.  That  all  men  have  remaining  in  them  some  natural  pit}', 
and  gratitude,  and  other  natural  affections,  which  they  call  vir- 
tuous or  holy  ;  hence  men  are  not  totally  depraved.  And  it 
is  true,  if  any  of  the  appetites  implanted  in  Adam,  when  creat- 
ed, and  which  remained  in  him  after  he  ate,  are  virtuous  and 
holy,  men  are  not  totally  depraved.  For  if  men  have  any  thing 
remaining  in  their  hearts  of  a  holy  nature,  the  doctrine  of  total 
depravity  must  be  rejected. 

Here  the  reader  is  desired  to  attend  cnrefulh'  to  a  few  obser- 
vations.    One  is,  that  when  God  created  Adam,  he  not  on.ly  im- 
planted in  his  heart  a  benevolent  appetite,  or  a  dispo.sition  to 
love  him  supremely  ;  but  he  createtl  in  lilm  every  other  appe- 
tite, which  he  had  and  manifested  after  his  fall.     Another  re- 
mark is  this,  that  at   the  time  Adam  ate  the  forbidden  fruit, 
and  was  deprived  of  his  benevolent  appetite,  there  was  nothing 
ercated  in  him,  which  he  had  not  before  his  full.      Some  have 
seemed  to  think,  that  when  Adam  ate,  and  lost  the  moral  im- 
age of  God,  that  then  God  produced  in  him  an  evil,  sinful  dis- 
position, which  they  call  a  principle  of  selfishness  ;  that  he  nev- 
er had  this,  till  after  he  ate.     If  this  be  true,  then  tliere  was  a 
new  something,  very  sinful,  created  in  him,  at  the  time  he  fell. 
This  sentiment  is  without  any  foundation.     Tiiere  is  not  so 
much  as  a  hint  given  in  the  bible,  which  I  could  ever  find,  that 
something  new,  and  sinful,  was  then  created  in  him.     And  such 
a  supposition  answers  no  purpose  ;  it  will  not  help  to  account 
for  the  sins,  which  have  prevailed  in  the  world,  which  may  not 
be  as  easily  accounted  for  w  ithout  it ;  nor  does  it  shun  any 
difficulty  ;  but  it  produces  one  hard  to  be  solved,  or  reconciled 
with  the  moral  character  of  God.     Let  it,  then,  be  carefully 
noticed,  that  at  the  fall  there  was  nothing  new  created  in  Adam, 
unless  a  new  heart  ;  and  none  suppose  this  took  place  at  the 
time  he  ate,  and  lost  the  moral  image  of  God.     The  truth  is 
this,  according  to  scripture  representation,  that  when  God  gave 
"  Adam  existence,  he  created  him  with  all  tiic  faculties  he  ever 
had  ;  created  in  his  heart  all  the  appetites  he  e\cr  had  ;  creat- 
ed him  perfect  in  his  own  likeness,  both  natural  and  moral. 
And  his  moral  likeness  consisted  of  that  benevolent  appetite, 
which  the  word  calls  a  spirit  of  righteousness  and  true  holiness. 
This  is  all  he  lost,  when  he  ate.     All   the  other  appetites  or 
propensities,  with  which  he  was  at  first  created,  remained  in 


263 

llitn  entire,  after  his  fall.  And  now,  to  avoid  repetition  as 
much  as  possible,  the  reader  is  requested  to  peruse  carefully 
what  is  written  concerning  the  appetites  and  their  operation,  in 
the  essays  on  the  appetites,  and  on  moral  good  and  evil,  and 
particularly  on  sin. — Then  but  few  remarks  here  will  be  ne- 
cessary, to  establisih  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity. 

Now  let  the  reader  take  a  carefid  survey  of  Adam,  after  he 
had  eaten  the  forbidden  fruit.  He  has  lost  the  moral  image 
of  his  Maker.  He  has  no  benevolent  appetite  left,  no  love  for 
God.  Mis  glory  is  departed.  He  has  none  of  that  love  for 
God,  and  men,  which  the  moral  law  requires.  But  all  his  oth- 
er appetites  remain  unimpaired.  Here  consider,  what  are  the 
objects,  which  these  appetites  respectively  love  and  seek  .''  For 
what  purposes  and  ends  were  they  implanted  in  him  ^  When 
3'ou  have  read  those  essays  to  which  you  have  been  referred, 
you  will  see  they  were  implanted  in  him  to  be  active  principles, 
stimulating  to  all  those  crLcrtions  necessary  to  preserve  life, 
propagate  his  own  species,  to  support  and  nurse  men  in  infan- 
cy, to  relieve  the  distressed,  in  a  word  to  promote  the  good  of 
society,  and  the  happiness  of  our  race  as  long  as  we  continue 
inhabitants  of  this  world. — There  you  will  find,  that  his  ap- 
petites are  not  placed  on  an}^  other,  or  higher,  or  better  objects, 
than  those  of  a  worldly  nature.  They  will  never  move  him  to 
seek  any  other  or  higher  good,  than  v.orldly  good,  till  fear  of 
eternal  death  is  excited.     Hence  they  are  sinful. 

For,  let  me  say,  his  appetite  or  love  of  property  is  idolatrous. 
He  has  no  love  for  God,  but  he  loves  propert^'jor  riches.  This 
love  for  riches  is  supreme  ;  it  prompts  him  to  seek  this  object 
with  an  ultimate  regard  to  his  personal  gratification,  without 
any  regard  for  the  happiness  of  the  human  family.  For  re- 
member, he  has  no  love  for  the  happiness  of  others.  In  pursuit 
of  riches,  if  he  injures  others,  defrauds  them,  and  transgresses 
the  law,  he  will  not  care,  if  he  personally  suffers  no  evil  by  it. 
Is  not  that  love,  which  is  placed  supremely  on  this  world,  when 
there  is  no  love  for  God,  sinful  .''  Is  it  not  loving  and  serving 
the  creature,  and  not  the  Creator  ?  Does  not  this  world  stand 
higher  in  a  person's  heart,  than  God,  when  it  loves  the  world, 
and  at  the  same  time  has  no  love  for  the  Creator.''  Is  not  this 
idolizing  the  world,  having  another  god  and  portion,  distinct 
from  the  true  God  .''  Will  not  this  love  for  this  world,  where 
there  is  none  for  God,  lead  him  to  seek  it  as  his  portion  ;  to 
forsake  the  fountain  of  living  waters,  and  go  after  a  brokea 


261 

cistern  ?  Will  it  not  lead  li'im  to  reject  Christ,  and  turn  Ins 
hark  npon  the  qo^pel  supper,  when  lie  finds  to  embrace  the 
Savior,  and  come  to  the  supper,  he  must  give  up,  and  deny  all 
the  supreme  rec:ard  he  has  had  for  this  world  ?  And  is  not 
this,  in  fart,  the  way  in  which  mankind  do  treat  gospel  provi- 
sions ?  Now  what  I  liavc  observed  concerning  tliis  appetite 
for  propert}',  is  true  with  respect  to  all  other  appetites.  They 
move  men  as  active  principles  to  seek  their  respective  objects, 
to  gratify  them  without  any  regard  for  God,  and  the  happiness 
of  men.  But  as  those,  who  deny  total  depravity,  have  much 
to  say  concerning  the  virtues  of  natural  pity,  gratitude,  and 
some  other  natural  affections,  it  may  be  well  to  give  some 
more  particular  attention  to  these  appetites. 

Natural  pity  claims  our  first  attention.  This  affection  is 
a  compound  of  a  painful  sensation,  and  a  desire  to  remove  its 
cause.  It  is  excited  by  objects  of  pain  and  distress.  God 
has  so  formed  us,  that  the  distress,  and  calamities  of  our  fellow- 
men  shall  excite  in  us  a  painful  sensation.  The  appetite,  which 
we  call  pity,  is  given  to  all  men  ;  and  its  nature  is  such,  that 
the  calamities,  which  befall  men,  shall  give  us  pain.  The  rea- 
son of  this  is  apparent,  when  we  consider  the  aim  and  design  of 
pity.  It  moves  us  to  relieve  others  in  their  distresses.  And 
the  end  obtained  by  offering  help  to  objects  of  distress,  is  the 
removal  of  the  pain  in  us  excited  by  the  evils  others  suffer. 
This  presents  to  our  view  the  catcse  of  the  pain  we  feel.  It  is 
the  evil,  calamity,  or  affliction,  which  we  see  others  are  suffer- 
ing. It,  also,  presents  to  our  view  the  object  of  pity,  this  is 
the  entire  relief  of  the  sufferer.  And  the  reason  why  we  afford 
them  relief  is,  that  the  pain  we  feel,  when  they  suffer,  may  be 
removed.  As  soon  as  we  are  relieved  of  the  pain  excited  by 
distress,  pity  ceases  to  operate.  Our  desire  to  help,  and  do 
them  good, subsides.  This  is  pit},  and  such  are  its  operations. 
And  it  is  easy  to  see  why  God  has  implanted  this  appetite  in 
us.  Mai)\'  in  a  distressed,  helpless  state,  would  die,  if  no  one 
assisted  them.  And  as  men  in  a  fallen  state  have  no  benevo- 
lence to  influence  them  to  afford  relief  to  sufferers,  and  God 
knew  this,  he  implanted  this  appetite  to  answer  the  end  of  be- 
nevolence in  this  particular  way.  Still  it  is  very  unlike  benev- 
olence in  its  nature.  For  benevolence  delights  in  the  happi- 
ness of  others,  and  desires  to  remove  pain  in  others,  because  it 
is  inconsistent  with  their  happiness  ;  and  at  the  same  time  to 
promote  their  positive  happiness,  and  especially  that  which  is 


265 

durable  and  eternal,  or  which  consists  in  the  enjoyment  of  God. 
Hence  its  operations  are  wholly  diflerent  from  those  of  natural 
pity,  except  in  one  particular,  which  is  the  mitigation  and  re- 
moval of  pain  in  a  sufl'erer. 

Natural  pity  moves  us  to  afford  relief  to  a  sufferer,  and  re- 
move his  pain  and  distress.  As  soon  as  this  is  done  we  feel  re- 
lieved, our  pain  is  removed,  which  his  calamity  excited.  Here, 
then,  we  stop,  and  are  now  satisfied.  And  then  probably  we 
shall  invite  him  to  some  place  of  merriment  and  vanity,  to 
driidiinjj  and  feasting,  that  he  may  forget  his  sufferings.  This 
is  certainly  enticing  him  to  spend  his  time  and  money  in  un- 
lawful ways.  And  if  we  have  business  to  transact  with  him, 
some  bargain  to  make,  we  shall,  if  possible,  take  the  advcmtage, 
and  defraud  him.  It  is  certain  there  is  nothing  in  natural  pity, 
which  will  prevent  our  enticing  him  into  sin  in  man}'  ways,  or 
which  will  keep  us  from  injuring  him  in  his  character,  proper- 
ty, or  person.  This  is  proved  by  facts.  For  if  we  see  others, 
towards  whom  we  have  always  been  inimical,  in  a  distressed, 
helpless,  dying  state,  natural  pity  will  excite  us  to  relieve  them. 
•And  as  soon  as  they  are  relieved,  and  our  pain  excited  by 
their  sufferings  is  removed  ;  we  pursue  our  former  course  of 
hostility  towards  them.  Hence  it  is  not  their  happiness,  which 
pity  aims  at  ;  it  aims  at  nothing  further,  or  better,  than  a  re- 
moval of  the  pain  we  feel,  when  we  see  others  in  a  calamitous, 
helpless  state.  When  pain  is  removed  vve  shall  treat  them  as 
we  do  ourselves,  after  we  have  recovered  from  a  state  of  dan- 
gerous sickness.  Then  how  often  it  is,  that  men  proceed  in  the 
same  sinful  courses,  they  had  followed  previous  to  their  sick- 
ness. So  we  shall  treat  men,  whom  we  have  assisted  in  distress, 
as  we  always  had  done,  previous  to  their  calamity.  If  we  had 
always  been  enemies  to  them,  we  shall  continue  to  injure  them, 
as  soon  as  the  pain  is  gone,  which  their  distress  excited  in  us. 
A  thousand  facts  might  be  adduced  to  prove  this  truth. 

But  benevolence,  which  ever  aims  at  the  happiness  of  others, 
will  not  only  remove  calamities  others  suffer  ;  but  when  they 
are  removed,  will  seek  to  promote  and  increase  the  person's 
happiness  in  every  consistent,  possible  way.  Benevolence  is 
not  satisfied  with  a  mere  removal  of  distress  In  another  ;  and 
will  never  be  satisfied  with  any  thing  short  of  their  entire  hap- 
piness. This  shows,  that  the  object  and  aim  of  benevolence 
and  natural  pity,  are  as  different  as  light  and  darkness,  except 
in  one  particular.     One  aims  at  the  happiness  of  others  iu  af- 

9 


ii6C  ^ 

fording  them  relieJ',  when  in  distress  ;  the  other  aims  at  nothing 
higher,  than  its  own  relief  from  the  pain  which  the  suflerings 
of  others  excite.  As  they  cannot  mitigate  their  own  pain  only 
by  affording  assistance  to  sufferers,  they  assist  them.  And  as 
soon  as  their  pain  is  removed,  they  will  treat  the  person  they 
had  helped  as  they  always  had  before  done. 

Again.  It  is  a  known  fact,  that  natural  pity  may  be  almost 
wholly  eradicated  from  the  human  breast,  by  a  very  frequent  re- 
petition of  calamity  and  suffering.  Hence  soldiers,  by  daily 
beholding  death  and  carnage,  and  hearing  the  cries  and  groans 
of  the  wounded  and  dying,  become  so  hardened,  that  such 
scenes  of  suffering  excite  scarcely  any  emotion  or  pity.  They 
see  the  wounded  and  dying,  hear  them  cry  for  help,  yet  pass 
on  without  affording  them  any  relief.  So  when  epidemical 
diseases  prevail  in  a  place,  and  many  die  every  day,  in  a  short 
time  the  living  are  so  hardened  they  pursue  their  own  ways, 
free  in  a  gre;it  measure  from  every  painful  emotion.  This  is 
a  fact,  though  it  is  not  my  design  to  enlarge  upon  it,  or  show 
why  it  is  thus  ordered. 

But  the  more  frequently  instances  of  calamity  occur,  and  the 
greater  they  are,  benevolence,  instead  of  being  hardened  at  the 
sight,  becomes  more  engaged  to  remove  distress,  assuage  grief, 
and  listen  to  the  cries  of  sufferers.  Every  thing  will  be  done, 
which  can  be  done,  to  remove  every  evil,  and  promote  hap- 
piness. Is  it  not  now  evident,  that  there  is  a  wide  difference 
between  benevolpnce,  and  natural  pity  .''  As  they  differ  so  ma- 
terially in  their  mture,  all,  who  will  grant  that  benevolence  is 
a  moral  virtue,  or  holy  appetite,  will  say  that  natural  pity  is  not. 
They  will  grant  it  is  a  selfish  appetite.  And  that  the  person, 
who  is  possessed  of  it,  aims  at  his  own  freedom  from  pain,  the 
peace  and  quietness  of  his  own  breast,  in  relieving  distress  ; 
Just  as  he  aims  at  removing  the  painful  cravings  of  hunger, 
and  his  own  personal  happines  in  seeking  and  eating  food.  In 
this  he  does  not  aim  at  the  happiness  of  others  ;  and  whether 
they  are  happy  or  not  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  him,  if  he 
can  remove  his  own  pains,  and  promote  his  ow  n  good  by  eating. 
So  a  person  influenced  by  natural  pity,  feels  no  concern  for  an- 
other's future  good  and  happiness,  if  he  can  by  assisting  him  in 
his  present  distress  remove  all  the  pain  he  feels,  and  quiet  his  ^ 
own  breast.  As  soon  as  this  is  done,  he  has  no  feeling  for  the  j 
future  happiness  of  his  fellow  mortal  ;  and  instead  of  promot-  ' 
ing  it,  in  many  ways  he  injures  him,  as  facts  prove  many  have 


267 

done.  Hence  natural  pity,  where  there  is  no  benevolence,  U 
selfish  in  all  its  operations  ;  yet  it  answers  the  end  in  many 
cases  for  which  it  was  created  in  the  heart.  And  as  soon  as 
any  one  has  a  clear  view  of  the  human  mind,  and  is  acquaint- 
ed with  the  laws  of  our  nature  by  which  we  are  invariably  §^ov- 
erned,  and  sees  for  what  end  they  were  created  in  us ;  he  will 
then  see  readily,  that  natural  pity  is  wholly  unlike  benevolence, 
and  is  selfish  in  its  operations. 

We  may  next  attend  to  natural  gratitude.  What  is  it.'*  A 
pleasant  sensation  is  experienced  ;  and  a  desire  which  corres- 
ponds with  it,  according-  to  the  nature  of  the  object  whicli  ex- 
cites the  pleasant  emotion  within. — A  pleasant,  agreeable  sen- 
sation,with  an  attendeut  desire,  constitutes  the  affection  of  grat- 
itude. The  difference  between  natural  gratitude  and  benevo- 
lence may  be  easily  seen.  The  object  of  benevolent  gratitude 
is  the  divine  goodness.  This  is  the  object,  which  excites  in  the 
heart  of  the  benevolent  man  pleasant  and  delightful  emotions. 
His  desire  is  to  enjoy  the  divine  goodness  more  sensibly,  to  have 
his  pleasant  emotions  continued  and  increased  ;  and  to  have 
the  goodness  of  God  displayed,  and  diffused  to  the  highest  pos- 
sible degree.     This  is  desiring  the  glory  of  God. 

In  natural  gratitude,  delightful  emotions  are  excited  by  the 
temporal  blessings  enjoyed.  Worldly  prosperity  is  the  object 
and  source  of  the  pleasure  felt  in  this  case  by  the  selfish  man. 
And  his  desires,  which  arise  from  his  pleasant  emotions,  have 
for  their  object  the  continuance,  and  increase  of  worldly  pros- 
perity ;  that  the  pleasure  this  affords  him  may  be  continued 
and  increased.  Here  we  clearly  see,  that  the  objects  which 
excite  agreeable  sensations,  and  the  desires  attending  them,  are 
very  different  in  their  nature.  Worldly  prosperity  is  the  ob- 
ject which  pleases  in  natural  gratitude,  and  divine  goodness 
the  pleasing  object  in  benevolent  gratitude  ;  and  the  desires  of 
the  former  are  for  the  continuance  and  increase  of  temporal 
blessings ;  and  in  the  latter  the  desire  is  for  the  display  and  great- 
est diffusion  of  divine  goodness.  Hence  these  affections  are 
very  different  in  their  nature.  One  is  benevolent,  and  the  oth- 
er is  selfish.  What  is  explained  and  asserted  as  truth  shall  now 
be  proved. 

1.  The  vilest  men  have  natural  gratitude.  They  common- 
ly have  the  most  of  it  ;  and  all  have  it  in  proportion  to  the 
love  they  have  for  this  world.  The  more  they  love  the  world, 
the  greater  will  be  their  delight  when  their  goods  increase.    Yet 


268 

the  more  they  love  this  world,  so  mucli  more  they  transgress  the 
law  of  God  in  amas-'Uig  wcalih.  They  are  in  the  same  pro- 
portion forgetful  of  God,  and  their  dut}-,  and  engaged  after  tiie 
world  as  their  portion.  All  this  is  verified  by  facts  daily.  WIio 
idolize  this  world  ?  Who  are  most  apt  to  forget  God,  restrain 
prayer,  defraud,  and  oppress  ?  Surely  those,  who  love  this 
this  world  most,  and  arc  most  pleased  with  earthly  good.  Now 
can  that  gratitude,  which  is  most  dehghted  with  worldly  bles- 
sings, and  has  the  strongest  desires  after  them  ;  and  whicli  in- 
variably forgets  God,  and  seeks  things  below  as  a  portion  j 
have  any  tiling  morally  good  in  it  ?  Is  not  such  gratitude  ev- 
idently selfish  and  sinful ,'' 

2.  Compare  tlie  man  mentioned  in  the  gospel,  who  pulled 
down  his  granaries  to  build  greater  to  contain  his  goods,  with  the 
apostle  Paul,  who  relinquished  all  earthly  good,  and  laid  down 
his  life,  for  the  sake  of  diliusing  the  goodness  and  love  of  God 
through  this  world  in  the  salvation  of  souls.     And  remember 
the  rich  man  had  a  great  share  of  natural,  and  Paul  of  benev- 
olent giatitude.     Then  ask,  was  the  gratitude  of  these  two  men 
similar  in  its  nature  ?     Did  it  not  operate  in  Paul  as  different- 
ly from  the  operations  in  the  rich  man,  as  light  is  from  dark- 
ness ?     If  in  Paul  it  was  holv,  such  as  the  rich  man  had  was 
unholy  and  selfish.     But  it  may  be  said,  that  we  have  not  giv- 
en a  right  definition  of  natural   gratitude.     It  may  be   said, 
that  the  object,  which  excites  a  delightful   sensation,  ever  im- 
plied in  gratitude,  is  not  worldly  good,  but  divine  goodness. 
If  this  be  true,  then  there  is  no  difTerence  in  nature  between  nat- 
ural and  benevolent  gratitude,  they  are  entirel}'  similar.     Why 
then  do  those,  who  deny  total  depravity,  go  on  the  ground,  that 
natural   gratitude  is  distinct  from  benevolent;  so  that,  if  men 
naturally  have  no  benevolence,  3'et  they  have  natural  gratitude, 
which  is  holy,  so  they  are  not  wholly  depraved  ?     In  my  illus- 
tration! have  endeavored  to  show  what  gratitude  iinplifes,  give 
it  what  name  we  may.     And  if  natural  and  benevolent  gratitude 
are  not  the  same,  but  are  distinct  afl'ections  ;  the  definitions 
given  of  them  are  just.     And  if  just,  then  natural  gratitude  is 
an  unholy,  sinful  affection,  as  proved. 

But  those  who  deny  depravity,  to  maintain  their  ground,  will 
say  natural  gratitude  does  delight  in  God.  The  evidence  they 
bring  for  this  is,  that  when  a  person  takes  a  view  of  the  nu- 
merous blessings  he  enjoys,  and  reflects  they  are  given  him  by  his 
Maker,  he  cries,  oh  how  good  God  is,  how  kind  to  me  ;  blessed 


269 

be  his  name  for  sucli  displnys  of  his  love.  They  say,  is  not 
this  the  feeling  and  language  of  gratitude  ;  and  arc  not  such 
feelings  holy?  Answer.  Any  person,  who  takes  it  for  grant- 
ed, that  all  such  feelings  when  expressed  are  surd}'  holy,  has 
no  just  views  of  human  nature,  and  may  in  many  ways  be  im- 
posed on  and  deceived.  Let  us  put  a  case.  A  certain  neigh- 
bor has  ever  been  a  bitter  enemy  to  you.  To  let  him  know 
that  you  indulge  no  ill  will  towards  him,  and  as  you  know  he 
is  a  great  lover  of  money,  you  make  him  a  present  of  thousands 
of  dollars.  In  that  case  how  will  he  feci,  and  express  himself.'* 
Will  he  not  be  highly  pleased  with  the  gift  .''  VVdl  he  not 
thank  you  for  it,  in  language  which  will  express  much  friend- 
ship for  you  .''  Would  this  be  inconsistent  with  his  feelings  of 
hatred  towards  you  ?  For  he  expresses  no  more,  than  a  high 
pleasedness  with  the  gift.  All  this  he  might  do,  yet  to  morrow 
curse  you,  if  you  should  in  any  way  oppose  him.  Not  only 
so,  but  watch  an  opportunity  to  steal  money  from  you,  which 
he  knows  you  have  by  you.  1  have  shown  in  the  essay  where 
the  affections  are  formed  into  distinct  classes,  that  if  3'ou  gratify 
a  person's  primary,  and  secondary  feelings,  he  will  appear  to 
love  you,  and  view  yon  as  a  friend  ;  yet  if  you  oppose  him  in 
his  pursuits,  he  will  hate  you.  So  it  is  with  men  in  their  con- 
duct towards  God.  If  he  bestows  plentifully  on  them  those 
blessings,  which  they  love,  they  will  manifest  many  feelings, 
which  appear  like  love  and  gratitude  ;  yet  if  in  his  providence 
he  should  sorely  afflict  them,  as  he  did  Job  ;  they  would  mui-- 
mur,  complain,  and  act  like  bullocks  unaccustomed  to  the  yoke, 
as  the  Jews  did  in  the  wilderness.  They  would  give  full  evi- 
dence, that  at  the  time  they  expressed  so  much  gratitude,  it  was 
not  God  with  whom  they  were  pleased,  but  solely  on  account 
of  the  blessings  given  them.  Then  their  seeming  gratitude  all 
disappears.  Hence  when  the  definitions  given  of  natural  and 
benevolent  gratitude  are  attended  to,  and  the  argument  brought 
to  prove  the  difference  there  is  in  tlnir  nature,  every  person 
will  grant,  that  natural  gratitude  is  a  sinful,  selfish  affection,. 
For  if  this  gratitude  has  the  nature  of  benevolence  in  it,  it  does 
delight  in  the  goodness  of  God,  in  his  character  as  just,  as  well 
as  merciful,  and  will  delight  in  the  happiness  of  others.  If  this 
be  a  fact,  why  do  not  all  men,  «ho  have  it  as  our  opponents 
say,  seek  the  glory  of  God,  obey  and  serve  him,  and  do  all  in  , 
their  power  to  promote  the  happiness  of  man,  and  have  their 
whole  conduct  harmonise  with  the  nature  of  an  affection,  which 


270 

is  placed  supremely  on  God  ?  Instead  of  living  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  gratitude  contended  Ibr  ;  they  live  in  opposi- 
tion to  it,  and  just  as  all  men  would,  if  they  hig^hl^  valued  the 
blessings  given  tiiem,  yet  had  no  love  for  God,  oi  their  fellow 
men.  Those,  then,  who  assert  that  natural  gratitude  is  a  holy 
afl'ection,  ought  to  prove  it  does  delight  in  the  whole  character 
of  God,  and  in  the  happiness  of  others,  whether  friends  or 
foes  ;  and  that  tiiC  conduct  of  all  mon  does  correspond,  in  some 
measure,  with  this  love  to  God  and  man.  Till  they  have  prov- 
ed all  this,  their  assertions  have  no  weight,  and  this  gratitude  is 
only  a  love  for  self,  and  the  blessings  necessary  to  its  gratifica- 
tion. 

It  is  also  contended,  that  natural  affections  are  holy,  such  as 
the  mutual  love  of  husbands  and  wives,  parents  and  children, 
brothers  and  sisters. 

If  any  persons  had  a  clear  view  of  the  nature  of  holiness,  or 
benevolence,  how  could  they  assert,  that  natural  aft'ections  are 
holy  in  their  nature,  and  so  men  are  not  totally  depraved  ? 
The  nature  of  holiness  has  been  described  in  the  essay  on  that 
subject ;  I  shall,  therefore,  repeat  no  more  than  what  is  really 
necessary  in  this  place.  It  has  been  shown  that  benevolence, 
which  comprises  all  holiness,  delights  ultimately  in  the  happi- 
ness of  others,  or  in  the  greatest  felicity  of  God's  kingdom  : 
and  that  this  is  the  ultimate  object  of  all  its  desires  :  and  that 
the  lives  of  all  who  have  benevolence,  will  agree  more  or  less 
with  that  good,  which  is  ultimately  loved  and  desired  for  its  own 
sake.  It  will,  therefore,  as  readily  incline  such  to  seek  the  hap- 
piness of  enemies,  as  of  friends;  and  the  happiness  of  all  men. 
as  well  as  that  of  relations.  This  is  the  nature  of  holiness  ; 
and  no  affection  is  holy,  unless  it  has  this  nature,  and  will  op- 
.erate  in  this  manner. 

Bat  have  natural  affections  this  nature  ;  do  they  operate  in 
this  manner  ?  Do  such  appear  to  regard,  and  seek  the  hap- 
piness of  all  men  ;  of  enemi-^sas  well  as  friends,  and  of  all  those, 
who  are  not  by  blood  or  descent  related  to  them  ?  No.  Natur- 
al affection  does  not  embrace  all  men  ;  and  extends  no  further, 
than  to  the  circle  of  a  few  relatives.  Beyond  this  circle  natu- 
ral affection  manifests  nothing  of  the  nature  of  real  benevolence. 
It  is  a  known  fict,  that  husbands  and  wives  may  love  each  oth- 
er vith  ardent  affection,  yet  live  at  enmity  with  all  around  them, 
for  years,  yea  their  whole  lives  ;  and  instead  of  desiring  and 
yieeking  their  happiness,  may,  and  often  do,  act  a  part  hostile 


271 

to  them,  anil  calculated  to  lead  them  on  in  the  ways  of  sin,  and 
to  final  perdition.  Is  this  benevolence  ?  God  has  created  in 
all  men  natural  affections  ;  or  an  ajipetite,  which  is  an  active 
principle,  and  which  operates  in  love  to  all  near  relatives.  His 
design  in  this  is  very  evident.  It  is  a  principle,  which  inclines 
men  to  propagate  their  own  species,  to  nurse  persons  in  infan- 
cy ;  to  seek  each  other's  comfort  and  happiness,  and  promote 
harmony  and  peace  among  relatives.  If  all  men  were  perfect- 
ly benevolent,  that  principle  would  incline  them  to  promote 
these  objects  ;  and  then  there  would  be  no  need  of  natural  af- 
fections. But  God  knew  that  man  would,  after  the  fall,  be 
born  without  any  benevolence  ;  and  that  some  other  active 
principle  would  be  necessary  to  propagate,  and  promote  the 
peace  and  happiness  of  the  human  species,  so  far  as  to  render 
their  existence  here  somewhat  comfortable.  The  principles, 
called  natural  affections,  were  created  to  answer  these  purposes, 
and  no  others.  Hence  they  never  move  men  to  seek  the  good 
of  any,  but  their  relatives  and  particular  connexions.  How 
can  any  consistent!}'  view  natural  affections  as  holy  in  their  na- 
ture, which  are  so  limited  ;  which  never  incline  them  to  pro- 
mote the  happiness  of  more  than  one  in  ten  thousand  of  the  hu- 
man family  f 

This  is  not  all.  Natural  affection  does  nQt  oppose  the  reign 
of  sin,  which  is  the  final  ruin  of  our  race.  It  do;s  not  oppose 
the  prevalence  of  sin  in  relatives,  any  further,  than  it  militates 
against  their  worldly  prosperity.  Hence  the  reason  parents 
in  fact  do,  in  a  thousand  instances,  set  an  evil  example  before 
their  children  ;  Justify  them  in  those  vain  amusements,  which 
lead  to  their  final  ruin  ;  and  exhort  tliem  to  follow  the  customs 
and  fashions  of  this  world,  as  far  as  is  consistent  with  their  tem- 
poral support  ;  and  say,  or  do,  little  or  nothing  to  turn  them 
from  sin  to  holiness,  or  from  the  service  of  satan  to  the  service 
of  God.  Indeed,  notwithstanding  the  infiuence  of  natural  af- 
fection, it  is  a  fact,  that  thousands  of  parents  travel  the  broad 
road  to  final  ruin,  and  by  their  example  lead  their  children  af- 
ter them  in  the  same  way,  without  any  remorse  or  compunction. 
And  if  all  the  Jiarents  in  this  world  were  to  live  and  die  desti- 
tute of  that  benevolence,  whicli  loves  God  supremely,  and  ulti- 
mately seeks  the  highest  happiness  of  his  kingdom,  it  is  certain 
they  would  perish  forever,  and  their  children  with  them,  if  they 
followed  their  example.  How  ran  there  be  any  thing  of  the 
nature,  of  holiness,  or  benevolence,  in  those  affections  which 


will  incline  men  to  travel  the  road,  even  to  death,  which  will 
land  them  in  hell  ?  Tills  would  be  a  new  and  strange  kind  of 
holiness. 

It  is  a  fact,  that  natural  afT'ction  is  not  hostile  to  the  reign 
of  sin  in  our  own  hearts  and  lives,  or  in  those  of  our  relatives, 
and  in  the  rc^t  of  the  world,  in  any  instances  in  which  it  does 
not  oppose  worldly  prosperity.  Hence  natural  affection  in- 
clines no  person  to  listen  to  gospel  invitations,  to  renounce  the 
world  as  a  portion,  and  come  and  put  their  trust  in  Christ  for 
eternal  life.  It  docs  not  incline  any  person  to  do  this  himself, 
or  to  persuade  his  relatives  and  others  to  do  it.  Hence,  al- 
though all  men  have  natural  affections,  yet  the  world  is  fdled 
M'ith  sin  and  misery.  Would  this  be  the  fact,  if  all  men  had 
real  holiness,  or  benevolence  ;  aiid  were  influenced  as  much  by 
it,  as  they  now  are  by  their  natural  affections.''  No,  if  this 
were  the  fact,  we  should  see  the  fruits  of  love,  friendship,  and 
righteousness  every  where  prevail.  Mankind  would  lead  lives 
as  diflerent  from  those  they  now  live,  as  light  is  from  darkness. 
Indeed  we  cannot  view  this  subject  in  any  true  light,  in  which 
it  will  not  appear  very  evident,  that  natural  affection  has  noth- 
ing of  the  real  nature  of  holiness  in  it.  And  all  that  can  be 
said  is  this,  that  in  one  or  two  particulars  it  has  the  resemblance 
of  it;  but  not  its  iiature.  If  all  would,  with  candid  and  unbi- 
assed minds  with  the  light  they  have,  form  a  just  opinion  con- 
cerning natural  pity,  gratitude,  conjugal,  parental,  filial,  and 
fraternal  afiections ;  they  would  say,  these  active  principles  are 
necessary  to  the  temporal  hnppiness  and  prosperity  of  man,  in 
a  world  destitute  of  the  principle  of  holiness,  and  in  some  good 
degree  answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  implanted ;  yet  they 
have  not,  in  their  nature  and  operation,  any  thing  of  the  real 
nature  of  holiness  or  benevolence.  Hence  these  natural  appe- 
tites or  principles  are  no  arguments,  disproving  the  doctrine 
of  total  depravity.  Men  may  have  these  principles,  yet  l)e  to- 
tally depraved.  In  fact  these  principles  are  so  far  from  being 
holy  in  their  nature,  they  are  sinful,  and  do  in  thousands  of  in- 
stances influence  men  to  commit  sin.  How  often  has  the  love 
parents  ha\  e  for  their  children  led  them  to  defraud,  and  oppress 
their  fellow  men,  for  the  sake  of  acquiring  property  to  bequeath 
to  their  children  when  they  die.  The  nature  of  their  love  is  such, 
it  will  lead  them  to  do  any  thing  however  sinful  to  promote 
the  credit,  the  honor,  and  the  wealth  and  worldly  prosperity  of 


273 

their  children,  as  far  as  is  consistent  with  their  own  honor  and 
safety  ;  and  in  tact  have  done  it. 

It  was  tlie  love  Jehu  had  for  his  children,  which,  as  one  prin* 
ciple,  led  hiui  to  commit  all  the  sinc>  he  did  commit  to  gain  the 
crown  of  Israel,  and  secure  it  to  his  posterit}'.  Love  to  child*- 
ren  was  one  principle,  whicli  led  Jewish  parents  to  persuade 
their  children  to  live  in  idolatry.  The  love  the  Pharisees  had 
for  their  children  was  one  principle,  that  led  them  to  entice  and 
persuade  them  to  reject  Christ  as  the  true  Messiah.  The  love 
heathen  parents  have  for  their  children,  leads  them  to  initiate 
them  into  all  the  superstitions  of  heathenish  idolatry.  And  love 
to  children  is  one  principle,  which  induces  parents  to  lead  their 
children  into  all  the  errors  and  sins  in  which  they  have  indul- 
ged themselves.  Would  real  benevolence  lead  men  to  embrace 
errors,  and  live  in  a  course  of  wickedness  and  rebellion  a2;ainst 
God,  and  persuade  their  children  to  do  the  same  .''  No,  benev- 
olence enlightens  the  mind,  hates  every  error  and  sin  ;  and 
leads  all  governed  by  it  to  shun  errors,  fight  against  sin  ;  and 
persuade,  if  possible,  their  children  to  do  the  same.  It  appears, 
then,  that  natural  affections  are  so  far  from  being  holy,  that 
their  operation  is  sinful  in  all,  in  whom  benevolence  is  wanting. 
Hence,  as  Adam  v/hen  he  ate  lost  the  holy  morel  image  of  his 
Maker,  and  had  no  principles  of  action  remaining  in  him,  but 
those  appetites  which  were  necessary  to  his  well  being  in  this 
life,  and  of  which  mention  has  been  made;  and  as  it  novv'  ap- 
pears, that  these  have  nothing  of  the  nature  of  real  holiness  ia 
them,  but  are  sinful  in  their  operation  in  all  destitute  of  holiness; 
the  doctrine  of  total  depravity  is  proved,  and  established  oa  a 
permanent  foundation. 

Those  who  deny  the  doctrine  under  consideration,  proceed 
on  this  ground,  that  men  are  endued  with  several  distinct,  holy 
principles  of  action.  According  to  their  reasoning,  natural 
pity  is  one  ;  gratitude,  another  ;  natural  afiection,  another  ; 
and  the  harmless  good  nature,  which  children  manifest,  another. 
And  according  to  this  we  pessess  several  distinct,  individual 
principles  of  action,  each  of  which  is  holy.  This  mode  of  rea- 
soning clearly  proves,  that  such  persons  have  not  a  distinct, 
and  just  view  of  the  true  theory  of  the  mind.  For  if  they  had 
they  would  be  convinced,  that  no  beings  with  whom  we  are  ac- 
quainted have  more  than  072c  individual,  holy  principle  of  ac- 
tion. Holiness  is  comprised  in  one,  simple,  uncompounded 
priaciple  ©f  action.     An  appetite,  ©r  disposition  to  be  plea":*!! 

10 


274 

with  l\appitiess  as  an  nb«;oliite  good,  is  lioliiiess.  Happiness  is 
tljc  only  nhsohite  poinl  in  the  universe,  which  is  tielighted  in, 
and  soiicht  for  its  own  sake.  And  a  disposition  oC  heart  to  be 
pleased  with  it,  and  seek  it,  and  desire  it,  for  its  own  sake,  is 
lioliness.  This  is  tlie  nhimateend  of  real  benevolence.  This 
will  incline  all  beings,  who  have  it,  to  seek  the  highest  possible 
measuic  ofhappiness  in  God's  holy  kingdom. 

This  is  the  only  principle  of  holiness  in  God.  He  is  love. 
He  rejoices  in  the  happiness  of  other  beings.  He  esteems  hap- 
piness as  a  good  in  itselt',  nn  absolute  erood.  His  love  toit  in- 
clined him  to  create  beings  capable  of  happiness ;  and  to  give 
his  Son  to  redc(  m  sinners.  In  a  word,  it  is  thti  love,  which 
moved  Him  to  display  all  his  attributes,  and  dilVuse  and  com- 
municate all  his  fulness  perfectly  and  entirely,  for  the  sake  of 
producing:  ultimately  the  greatest  possible  measure  of  happiness, 
in  that  holy  kingdom  wliich  is  to  exist  forever  in  heaven.  And 
let  it  be  remembered,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe,  that  the 
happiness  of  this  kingdom  will  be  eternally  increasing  ;  and  in 
this  view  we  may  consider  his  attributes  in  the  highest  degree 
displayed,  and  iiis  fulness  perfectly  difiused,  or  communicated. 
This  love,  or  sin)ple  uncomponnded  disposition  in  God,  viewed 
as  an  eternally  active  principle,  is  suflicient  to  account  for  all 
the  actions  of  Deity,  appearing  in  his  works,  or  his  word.  All 
he  ever  duJ,  or  said,  may  be  traced  back  to  this  active,  self-raov- 
hig  principle.  Hence  every  thing  is  from  him  as  the  self-mov- 
ing cause.  And  we  do  not  read  in  the  word  of  God  of  any 
other  principle,  which  influences  and  governs  Him  in  all  he 
does.  God  is  love  ;  he  50  loved  tlie  world  ;  he  first  loved  us  ; 
herein  is  love  ;  so  everv  where  love  is  the  first,  moving  cause  ; 
all  thin'jjs  are  ascribed  to  it  as  the  eternal  fountain  of  good. 
And  there  was  no  necessity  for  the  existence  of  any  other  holy 
principle  in  God.  This  one  is  suflicient  to  account  for  every 
thine:  be  ever  said,  or  did.  This  moved  him  to  employ  his  wis- 
dom in  forming  a  plan  of  operation,  and  his  power,  or  will,  in 
carrying  it  into  full  execution  ^  which  plan  includes  all  his 
works,  and  words. 

Holiness  in  angels  is  a  disposition  of  the  same  nature.  And 
they  need  only  this  one,  simple,  active  principle,  to  incline 
them  to  seek  the  greatest  happiness,  and  serve  God  with  all 
their  might.  And  holiness  in  men,  in  saints,  is  the  same  love, 
or  disposition  wl)ich  delights  ultitnately  in  happiness,  and  in- 
clines them  to  desire  and  seek  it  as  tltc  greatest  good.     Hence 


275 

all  holy  beings  have  the  same  holy  appetite,  or  disposition  ; 
they  all  seek  the  same  objecl  as  their  ultimate  end  ;  and  of 
course  they  will  agree,  and  harmonise,  in  all  the}'  say  and  f/o, 
Avhich  proceeds  from  this  principle.  According  then  to  Christ's 
prayer,  they  arc  and  will  he  forever  one  ;  one  with  each  other, 
one  wicli  God,  and  witii  Christ  ;  they  will  be  perfect  in  one. 

Now  one  simple,  uncompounded,  holy  principle  of  action  is 
sufiicient.  No  being  needs  another  to  render  him  perfect. 
For  there  is  but  one  absolute  good  in  the  universe  ;  but  one  ul- 
timate end,  which  ought  to  be  sought  ;  which  is  the  greatest 
happiness  of  God's  holy  kingdom.  Accordingly,  no  being  we 
ever  heard  of  has  any  more,  than  one  holy  principle  in  him. 
This  is  all  the  law  of  God  requires.  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord 
with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.  This  love,  if 
perfect,  is  all  the  holiness  the  law  requires.  And  the  word  of 
God  uniformly  speaks  the  same  language.  Hence  all  liolmess 
consists  in  one  simple,  uncompounded,  activt-  principle,  which 
I  have  for  the  sake  of  perspicuity  called  a  holy  appetite,  io  dis- 
tinguish it  from  all  other  appetites  with  which  men  are  evident- 
ly endued. 

All  the  appetites  of  men,  holiness  excepted,  are  created  in 
them  to  answer  particular  distinct  ends,  or  purposes,  vvi)lle  they 
live  in  this  world,  and  are  destitute  of  holiness.  Thus  the  ap- 
petite of  hunger  was  created  in  us,  to  prompt  us  to  seek  food  for 
the  nouiishment  of  the  body,  and  to  relish  it  while  eating  it.  As 
far  as  food  is  obtained,  this  appetite  is  gratified,  and  its  end  is 
answered.  It  never  moves  man  to  seek  any  thing  else  as  an 
end.     It  inclines  him  to  use  all  the  means  necessary  to  his  end. 

The  sexual  apjietite  is  created  in  men  for  fhe  propagation 
of  our  species.  As  far  as  this  end  is  obtained  by  it,  its  end  is 
answered.  Hanger  does  not  incline  us  to  seek  this  end  ;  nor 
does  the  sexual  appetite  incline  men  to  obtain  food.  They  are 
ajipetites,  which  incline  men  to  seek  different,  and  distinct  ends. 

Natural  affection,  or  an  appetite  in  parents  to  be  more  pleas- 
ed with  their  own  children  than  with  others,  is  given  to  move 
them  to  nurse  and  provide  for  their  children  in  infancy,  and 
through  life.  And  the  love  children  have  for  their  parents  in- 
clines tliem  to  oi)8y  them,  and  support  them  when  old  ;  and 
their  love  for  each  other  is  necessary  to  unite  their  exertions  in 
promoting  the  peace,  prosperity,  and  haj)piness  of  the  family. 
As  far  as  these  ends  are  obtained,  natural  affect-on  is  gratified. 
Such  affection  never  moves  thcni  to  seek  the  good  of  any  but 


276 

tlielr  relatives,  unless  the  good  of  others  is  necessary  to  their 
own.  And  natnral  pity  is  an  appetite  created  in  us,  to  incline 
us  to  help  and  rclicv(,'  eacli  other  in  calamity  and  distress.  And 
this  is  requisite  to  the  preservation  and  comfort  of  the  jjuman 
race.  But  uhen  persons  in  an  afflicted,  helpless  state  are  re- 
lieved, then  this  appetite  is  gratified,  and  its  end  obtained  ;  and 
it  seeks  nothinc;:  fuithev,  and  will  cease  to  operate,  until  anoth- 
er oljject  of  distress  meets  the  eye,  and  excites  pain  in  the  be- 
holder. 

And  all  the  appetites  created  in  man,  however  many,  arc 
designed  to  move  us  to  seek  these  particular  distinct  ends,  ne- 
cessar}'  to  our  being  and  happiness  in  this  world.  But  not  one 
of  them  delights  in  happiness  as  an  absolute  good,  or  seeks  it 
as  an  ultimate  end.  And  if  the  human  family  were  all  as  per- 
fectly holy  as  Adam  was  at  fir;rt,  or  as  saints  are  in  heaven, 
these  appetites  would  not  have  been  needful,  nor  have  been 
created  in  us.  For  benevolence  would  have  inclined  all  men 
to  seek  all  the  ends,  which  these  appetites  incline  us  to  seek. 
But  as  God  knew  that  holiness  would  be  lost,  he  created  those 
appetites  in  Adam  and  all  his  posterit}',  to  supply  the  want  of 
benevolence  in  some  measure,  while  v.e  li\ e  on  this  earth. 
Hence  they  will  not  be  needed  in  heaven,  where  all  are  perfect- 
ly holy  ;  and  there  they  will  never  operate,  if  they  exist. — It  is 
very  evident,  then.,  that  not  one  of  these  appetites  partakes  of 
the  nature  of  holiness  or  benevolence.  Hence  our  having  them 
is  no  evidence  of  holiness  in  us,  or  any  objection  to  the  doctrine 
of  total  depravity.  While  Adam  was  perfectly  hoi}-,  and  gov- 
erned entirely  by  his  benevolent  appetite,  those  other  appetites 
nvould  be  regulated  by  it  ;  and  never  be  indulged  to  excess  in 
any  thing,  or  in  the  pursuit  of  their  respective  objects  in  any 
Unlawful  loay,  or  in  any  manner  inconsistent  with  the  end  and 
desires  of  benevolence.  They  would  be  so  regulated  and  gov- 
erned, as  never  to  lead  him  to  do  any  thing  contrary  to  his  be- 
nevolent designs  and  desires.  Hence  they  would  do  no  harm. 
Such  order,  and  harmony  prevailed  in  Paradise  previous  to  the 
fall. 

But  when  Adam  ate  the  forbidden  fruit,  he  forfeited  the  con- 
tinuance of  his  benevolent  appetite,  and  was  deprived  of  it. 
Then  he  had  no  holiness  existing  in  his  heart,  and  was  a  sinner, 
spiritually  dead,  and  totally  depraved.  For  as  holiness  is  the 
only  holy  principle  existing  in  any  being,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
moment  this  was  lest,  he  was  perfectly  destitute  of  every  trace 


217 


and  operation  of  a  hoi}'  principle.  And  this  is  the  principal 
thing  intended  by  total  depravity. 

Bat  his  other  appetites  all  remained  in  ftdl  vigor,  not  lessen- 
ed, or  impaired  in  the  least  degree.  And  all  his  posterity  are 
born  destitute  of  holiness,  wid)  the  same  appetites  which  Adam 
Iiad.  For  he  begat  a  son  in  liis  ow  n  liUeness,  the  likeness  he 
had  after  he  sinned. — Now  these  appetites  remaining  in  him, 
sound  and  unimpaired,  were  the  only  active  principles  in  his 
heart.  By  them  he  would  be  governed  in  all  his  conduct. 
They  were  the  laws  of  his  nature,  by  which  he  v»ou!d  be  as  in- 
variably governed,  as  he  previously  had  been  b}^  his  benevolent 
appetite.  These  appetites  would  lead  him  to  seek  the  respec- 
tive ends,  which  were  pleasing  to  him.  And  as  these  appetites 
TV'ere  not  pleased,  or  had  any  feeling  or  desire  for  any  other 
objects  or  ends,  than  those  of  a  worldly  nature,  the  world  was 
now  his  supreme  object,  his  god,  and  only  portion.  They  in- 
clined him  to  seek  every  object  w  hich  pleased  the  appetites  cre- 
ated in  him,  and  still  remaining. 

Is  it  not  easy  then  to  see,  that  Adam  and  his  posterity  would 
Jove  the  world,  its  riches,  honors,  and  pleasures ;  and  seek  them 
as  their  only,  and  highest  portion  and  good  ;  as  we  see  in  fact 
they  have  done  ever  since  the  fall.'*  Will  not  every  one  go  af- 
ter the  objects  which  please  his  appetites,  without  any  regard  to 
God's  glory,  or  the  happiness  of  their  fellow  men,  any  further 
than  might  be  requisite  to  their  own  personal  gratification  ;  just 
as  we  see  they  have  in  fact  lived  from  age  to  age  ? — Indeed 
Adam,  or  any  of  his  posterity,  if  they  had  understood  clearl3' 
the  principles  and  laws  of  our  nature  by  wiiich  we  are  invaria- 
bly governed,  might  have  foretold,  then,  how  all  men  would 
in  general  conduct  through  the  whole  of  their  lives,  in  cast  no 
renovation  or  alteration  should  take  place  in  the  laws  of  their 
nature.  Adam  might  have  said,  my  posterity  will  never  seek 
each  other's  happiness,  or  the  glory  of  God  ;  they  will  never 
aim  at  any  other,  or  higher,  or  greater  good,  than  what  the 
objects  of  this  world  will  afibrd  them.  The  world  now  is,  and 
will  be  their  god,  their  portion  ;  and  as  such  they  will  seek  it. 
They  will  disregard  the  authority  of  God,  his  law,  and  gov- 
ernment;  and  live  in  rebellion,  robbing  him  of  his  due,  and  of 
every  thing  they  owe  to  him.  And  if  God  send  a  deliverer  to 
save  them,  according  to  what  is  implied  in  the  jn'omise  thai  die 
seed  of  the  woman  shall  bruise  the  serpent's  head,  they  will  re- 
ject him.     For  they  cannot  embrace  and  serve  this  Savior,  im- 


A 


278 

less  ihey  renounce  the  world  as  a  portion,  and  dcnj'  self,  and 
keep  his  benevolent  precepts.  Tiiey  will,  therefore,  unitedly 
say,  we  will  not  have  this  man  to  reipii  over  us.  And  thus  they 
will  live  and  conduct,  each  one  (hronp^h  his  life,  and  perish. 
The^'  will  never  any  more  return  to  their  allegiance  to  the  king 
of  heaven,  uidess  God  should  again  restore  to  them  that  be/iev- 
olent  appetite,  which  we  have  lost  by  eating  the  forbidden 
frnit.  All  this  any  one,  who  understood  the  laws  which  govern 
moral  agents,  might  have  predicted.  And  all  that  is  said  in  the 
bible,  of  men  in  their  natural  stale,  harmonises  with  the  gener- 
al representation. 

And  now  those  wlio  deny  total  depra\ity  are  desired  to  ob- 
serve carefully,  that  after  Adam  had  lost  the  moral  image 
of  God,  all  his  other  appetites  were  placed  supremely  on  this 
world  ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  all  his  posteiity.  And  if  can- 
did, will  the}^  not  own  that  a  supreme  regard  for  this  world  is 
idolatr}'  ?  And  of  course  that  all  the  operations,  all  the  desires 
of  their  appetites,  arc  sinful  f  They  are  represented  in  this 
light  in  the  word  of  God  ;  tliat  mankind  serve  and  worship  the 
creature  and  not  the  Creator.  It  is  true,  that  men  love  food, 
and  all  the  means  necessary  to  it.  But  this  leads  them  to  seek 
the  world  as  their  only  portion.  Parents  love  their  children, 
mid  this  leads  them  to  seek  their  worldly  prosperit}'  only,  and 
as  their  highest  good.  And  all  tlieir  seeming  gratitude  is  no 
more,  than  their  delight  in  worldly  prosperity ;  and  the  pity 
they  manifest  towards  objects  of  distress,  aims  at  nothing  nu)re 
than  freedom  from  the  pain  they  themselves  feel,  when  they  be- 
hold distress  ;  so  that  as  soon  as  they  are  relieved,  they  mani- 
fest no  more  concern  for  their  happiness.  And  as  men  ha\  e  no 
love  for  God,  or  for  the  everlasting  happiness  of  each  other, 
they  never  aim  at  these  ends  in  any  of  their  conduct ;  and  aim 
at  notliing  higher,  than  to  gratify  their  personal  desires.  All 
their  aims  terminate  in  self  gratiiication ;  and  will,  until  a  be- 
nevolent appetite  is  again  restored. 

Hence  no  holy  principle  is  to  be  found  in  any  unrenewed  per- 
son. And  all  his  appetites  prompt  him  to  seek  the  world  as  his 
portion  without  any  regard  for  God  or  the  happiness  of  his 
race;  and  of  course  are  wholly  sinful  in  all  their  operations 
and  desires.  If  such  chara<-iers  are  not  totally  depraved,  such 
depravity  cannot  exist.  And  there  is  no  way  to  evade  this 
reasoning,  unless  we  deny  tlje  first  principles  upon  which  it  is 
founded.     It  must  be  denied,  that  maiikind  have  that /ce/ms- 


279 

faculty,  and  tliose  appetites,  which  have  been  described  in  these 
essays.  If  this  be  denied,  then  men  are  not  agents,  and  of 
course  not  moral  agents  ;  our  accountabihty  is  all  a  dream, 
and  all  vice  and  virtue,  praise  and  blame,  are  banished  from 
the  world.  But  if  it  be  admitted,  that  men  have  this  feeling 
faculty,  and  such  appetites,  which  constant  experience  and  facts 
prove  to  be  true;  then  the  consequence  inevitably  follows, that 
men,  in  the  sense  explained,  are  totall}'  depraved. 

In  discussing  this  subject,  I  have  not  quoted  those  texts 
which  prove  this  doctrine.  The  reasons  are,  this  has  been  of- 
ten done  by  others  ;  and  my  design  was,  to  establish  the  doc- 
trine as  a  true  inference  from  a  just  thcor^y  of  the  human  mind. 
1  feel,  that  this  end  is  now  answered.  The  subject  is,  therefore, 
left  to  the  judgment  of  all  candid  readers. 


***>(****** 


ESSA7  XXV3XI. 

On  benevolence  or  holmess. 

"  Without  holiness  no  man  shall  see  the  Lord." 

Various  and  different  opinions  have  been  entertained  concern- 
ing the  nature  of  benevolence  ;  and  each  one  cannot  be  true  in 
all  its  branches.  On  this  subject,  as  well  as  others,  truth  and 
error  are  frequently  blended  together.  Seeing  opinions  are  so 
various,  a  candid  examination  of  the  subject  is  necessary.  And 
the  subject  is  very  interesting  and  important  ;  for  holiness  is  a 
requisite  qualification  for  eternal  life.  Persons  may  embrace 
false  views  of  the  nature  of  holiness  and  thoy  may  have 
that  disposition  in  which  they  suppose  it  consists,  and  on 
this  ground  believe  they  are  the  heirs  of  heaven  and  with  a  false 
hope  feel  safe  and  secure.  But  at  death  the}'  meet  with  an 
awful  disappointment.  For  all  me:i  will  be  rewarded  hereafter 
according  to  their  real  character,  and  not  according  to  their 
opinions.  Hence,  as  holiness  is  a  requisite  qualification  for 
endless  bliss,  it  is  all  important  to  have  clear,  distinct  and  just 
views  of  its  nature. 


289 

In  fJiscussinc;  Uiis  nihicct,  I  slinll  aim  at  truth,  and  cndeavoi' 
to  expose  some  errors  concerning  lioliiiess,  wlilcli  have  been  ad- 
vancetl  by  great  names. — I  design  to  consider  the  subject  ex- 
tensively, and  in  its  several  relations.     And, 

I.  Attein|)t  to  describe  the  nature  of  benevolence. — To  un- 
derstand the  nature  of  benevolence,  two  things  are  necessary — 
a  distinct  view  of  its  seat  in  man,  and  of  its  ultimate  end. — The 
mind  is  endued  with  several  faculties.  To  which  of  them  does 
benevolence  belong  ?  And  ultimate  ends  may  be  numerous  ; 
which,  then,  is  the  final  end  of  holiness  .'*  To  ascertain  this  is 
of  the  last  importance.  Because  we  cannot  learn  the  nature  of 
any  active  principle,  until  we  know  in  what  end  it  ultimately 
terminates. 

By  an  ultimate  end  is  meant  that  object,  which  is  sought  for 
its  02cn  sake  ;  which  is  in  itself  a  real,  absolute  good. — When 
we  seek  any  object  for  the  sake  of  another,  it  is  not  an  ultimate, 
but  subordinate  object.  An  ultimate  object  is  never  sought 
for  the  sake  of  another  beyond  it ;  but  for  its  own  sake.  Our 
views  and  afiections  centre  in  it;  with  it  we  rest  satisfied  ;  and 
they  never  extend  beyond  it,  after  some  other  or  better  object. 
When  a  person  has  attained  his  ultimate  object,  he  has  reached 
the  end  in  which  all  his  desires  terminate ;  here  he  rests,  with 
this  he  is  satisfied  ;  and  this  is  the  great  source  of  his  happiness. 

And  every  moral  agent,  in  this  sense,  must  have  an  ultimate 
object  or  end.  If  he  had  not,  he  would  seek  one  object  for  the 
sake  of  another,  and  the  last  for  the  sake  of  another  further  on  j 
and  in  this  manner  would  he  proceed  forever,  and  never  arrive 
at  any  final  end.  This  is  not,  and  cannot  be  the  case.  There 
must  be  some  object,  which  is  final,  and  for  the  sake  of  which 
all  other  objects  are  sought.  That  every  moral  agent  must 
have  an  ultimate  end  in  view,  which  he  seeks  for  its  own  sake, 
in  which  his  happiness  is  placed,  is  a  truth  so  obvious  it  is  need- 
less to  spend  any  more  time  in  proving  it. 

The  next  inquiry  then  is,  what  is  the  ultimate  object  or  end 
of  benevolence  ?  If  this  can  be  certainly  understood,  the  na- 
ture of  benevolence  will  appear  clear  and  distinct, — All  will 
agree  that  whatever  is  the  final  end  of  benevolence,  it  must  be 
an  object  which  can  be  sought  consistently  with  the  glory  of 
God,  and  the  highest  good  of  his  kingdom.  For  all  profess 
to  believe  that  benevolence  is  friendly  to  God,  and  his  holy 
kingdom ;  that  it  is  not  in  its  nature  or  operations  hostile  to  thr. 
Higltest  good  in  the  least  degree. 


281 

Thru  what  object  can  be  souplu  on  its  own  account,  which 
is  consistent  with,  and  in  all  respects  friendly  to  the  divine  ^lorj', 
and  hitfhest  eood  of  his  kingdon)  .^ — It  is  believed,  there  is  but 
one  object  in  the  universe,  which  can  be  sought  as  an  ultimate 
end,  which  is  friendly  to  the  hliiheht  good  ;  and  this  is  happi- 
ness.    But  that  this  may  be  clearly  understood  it  is  necessary 
to  observe,  that  the  happiness  intended  is  an  object  or  end,  which 
is  soucrht  for  its  own  sake;  also,  it  is  not  our  own  personal  hap- 
pmess  ;  but  happiness  existing  in   others,  distinct  fi  oai  our- 
selves.    The  hungry  love  food,  not  because  it  is  their  property, 
but  because  it  is  suited  in  its  nature  to  satisfy  hunger,  whenev- 
er, and   wherever  it  can  be  found. — So  the  benevolent  dc'ight 
in  happiness,  wherever  they  see  it,  because  it  is  in  its  nature  a- 
grceable  to  their  feelings.     Happiness  in  the  abstract  is  the  ul- 
timate object  of  benevolence.     Hence  they  delight  in  it  wherev- 
er they  see  it,  whether  in  young  or  old,  rich  or  poor,  honora- 
ble or  abased.      And  happiness  cannot  exist  but  in  a  feeling, 
sensible  being;  and  no  where  is  it  ever  seen,  except  in  ration- 
al beings,  or  beings  capable  ofpieasure  and  pain.     Hence  it  is 
the  happiness  of  such  intelligent  beings,  which  is  the  ultimate 
objpct  of  benevolence.     Hence,  when  it  is  asserted,  that  happi- 
ness is  the  ultimate  object  or  end  of  benevolence,  it  is  not  o%ir 
oivn  which   is  sought  ;  but  the  happiness  of  others,  of  God's 
holy  kingdom. 

Our  personal  happiness  can  never  be  our  ultimate  object. 
This  implies  an  absurdity.  For  in  this  case  we  must  be  hap- 
py in  order  to,  or  before  we  can  be  happy.  We  derive  our 
happiness  from  our  ultimate  end;  this  is  the  object  which  pleases 
and  gratifies  our  desires.  Hence  the  object  or  source  of  hap- 
piness, and  happiness,  are  two  distinct  objects.  And  it  is  ob- 
vious, that  the  object  or  source  of  hapjjiness  must  exist  in  the 
order  of  nature,  and  of  time,  previously  to  our  deriving  pleas- 
ure from  it.  It  must  exist,  and  be  seen,  before  it  can  afford 
j)leasure,  or  gratify  our  feelings.  Hence  if  our  happiness  is 
our  ultimate  object,  our  happiness  must  exist  as  an  object  be- 
fore we  can  derive  any  satisfaction  from  it.  Does  not  every 
one  see,  that  according  to  this  theory  we  must  be  happy  before 
we  can  be  happy.  If  I  am  now  happy,  and  this  is  the  ultimate 
object  of  my  pursuit ;  from  whence  do  I  derive  this  happniess? 
From  what  object  or  source  .''  Surely  from  nothing.  For  to 
say  I  derive  it  from  previous  happiness  as  an  object,  is  rujnrng 
back  in  a  circle  forever. — It  is  plain  to  all,  who  reflect,  that  our 

11 


282f 

own  happiness  is  not  the  nltitnate  object   of*  any  moral  ag^nf. 

Some  may  ask,  thin,  why  is  it  so  often  said,  that  all  mec 
seek  their  own  ha[)piiiess  ?  The  meaning  of  this  expression  is 
ti)is  ;  tiiatail  men  seek  objects,  and  especially  an  ultimate  ob- 
ject, for  the  iake  of  tlie  pleasure  they  derive  from  it,  or  take  in 
it.  For  example  ;  honey  is  sweet.  It  is  an  object  of  pursuit. 
It  may  be  sought  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  for  the  sake  of  some 
further  object  beyond  it.  If  sought  for  its  own  sake,  it  is  an 
ultimate  objector  end.  Why  is  it  sought  .''  What  influences, 
and  prompts  a  person  to  seek  it .''  h  is  the  pleasure  he  expects  to 
derive  from  it.  He  expects  it  will  satisfy  his  appetite,  and  gra- 
tify the  desires  he  has  for  it.  And  by  doing  this,  it  is  to  Ifim 
a  source  of  happiness  ;  a  source,  good  in  its  nature,  and  on  its 
own  account.  Hence  the  proper  use  of  language  in  this  case 
is,  to  say,  honey  is  his  ultimate  object  or  end  ;  no  end  beyond 
it  exists,  for  the  sake  of  v/hich  he  seeks  it.  And  the  satisfac- 
tion he  expects  to  derive  from  it  is  the  reason  why  he  seeks  it. 
It  is  this,  which  gives  it  the  influence  of  a  motive.  In  this  sense, 
we  seek  our  own  happiness.  If  we  say  honey  is  sought,  not 
because  it  is  agreeable,  then  it  is  an  object  of  indiflbrence  j 
and  on  this  ground  we  act  without  the  influence  of  motives. 
For  no  object  has  the  influence  of  a  motive,  unless  it  is  in  itself 
pleasing.  A  person  who  has  a  taste  for  honey,  yet  has  never 
tasted  it,  does  not  know  it  is  sweet.  Hence  he  may  see  it,  and 
pass  by  it,  and  never  seek  it;  and  never  will,  until  in  some  way 
he  believes  it  will  afford  him  pleasure.  Then  the  pleasure 
expected  gives  the  object  the  force  and  influence  of  a  motive. 
The  truth  then  is  this — the  object,  which  is  in  itself  agreeable 
is  an  ultimate  end  ;  and  the  reason  why  we  seek  it  as  ultimate, 
and  not  for  the  sake  of  some  further  object,  is,  because  it  is  a- 
greeable,  and  suits  the  relish  of  the  heart.  It  is  in  this  sense 
tliat  all  men,  good  and  bad,  seek  ultimate  objects.  All  seek 
them  for  the  same  rea-;on,  because  they  are  agreeable.  This 
is  tfje  sense  in  which  the  happiness  of  others,  or  of  God's  king- 
dom, is  the  ultimate  object  or  end  of  benevolence. 

We. now  ought  to  inquire,  whether  tl)e  greatest  sum  of  hap- 
piness is  not  the  highest  good,  which  all  ought  to  seek.  It  is 
generally  granted,  that  the  greatest  good  is  the  ultimate  object 
of  benevolence.  Concerning  what  constitutes  the  highest  good, 
various  ojiinions  have  been  embraced.  Here,  I  mean  to  show, 
in  what  the  greatest  good  consists  j  and  then  confute  erroneous 
opinions. 


28S 

What  is  tlic  hicrhcst  good  ?  If  we  cnn  clearly  show  what 
constitutes  the  highest  good  of  an  individuni,  rational,  being, 
we  shall  clearly  see  what  the  highest  good  of  the  universe  is. 
For  the  greatest  good  of  the  universe,  is  the  sum  of  all  the  good 
enjoyed  by  the  friends  of  God.  Suppose  one  thousand  to  be 
the  whole  number  of  rational  beings  existing.  Add  the  high- 
est goods  of  these  individuals  together,  and  the  sum  total  is  the 
highest  good  of  this  society.  This  is  very  evident.  Hence, 
as  soon  as  we  learn  what  is  the  highest  good  of  an  individual, 
we  see  at  once  what  is  tiie  greatest  good  of  the  universe. 

And  it  is  so  evident,  that  the  greatest  measure  of  happiness 
any  person  is  capable  of  enjoying,  is  his  highest  good,  nothing 
scarcely  can  make  it  plainer.  It  is  nearly,  if  not  really,  a  self 
evident  proposition.  A  rational  being  never  does,  and  never 
can,  set  a  value  on  any  object  whatever,  which  does  not,  and 
cannot  aflbrd  him  the  least  degree  of  pleasure,  or  pleasing  grat- 
ification. Hnppiness  is  in  itself,  on  its  own  account,  a  good. 
It  is  the  only  absolute  good  existing.  If,  then,  we  are  sur- 
rounded with  objects,  and  behold  them,  yet  they  neither  please 
nor  disgust  us  in  the  least  degree,  we  view  them  with  as  perfect 
indifference,  and  without  any  emotion,  ps  stones  which  are  in- 
capable of  feeling.  In  this  state  we  should  not  view  objects  as 
good,  or  as  evil  ;  or  possessing  any  real  worth.  But,  if  ihey 
excite  in  us  painful  sensations,  we  view  them  as  evil,  as  hostile 
to  us.  If  they  give  us  pleasure,  we  pronounce  them  good  ;  we 
set  a  value  on  them  according  to  the  degioe  of  pleasure  they 
do,  or  can  afford.  If  a  person  possessed  all  the  riches  of  this 
world,  and  its  highest  honors  ;  yet  if  they  did  not,  and  could 
not,  excite  in  him  any  sensation  of  pleasure,  tiiey  in  fact  do  hnii 
no  good  ;  he  would  be  as  well  without  them,  as  he  \<  wiih  tin  m; 
and  he  would  treat  them  as  perfectly  U'^eless  things.  If  he 
\vere  perfectly  holy,  3'et  this  did  not,  and  he  knew  never  would, 
afford  him  any  pleasure,  it  does  him  no  good,  and  is  of  no  val- 
ue to  him.  Indeed,  to  exist,  yet  feel  no  pleasure  in  any  thing, 
any  more  than  stones  do,  is  no  better  than  non-existence.  It 
is  of  no  service  to  have  existence,  unless  Inijipiness  attends  it. 
And  to  exist  and  be  perfectly  miserable,  is  worse  than  non-ex- 
istence. For  as  happiness  is  an  absolute  good,  so  misery  or 
pain  is  an  absolute  evil.  And  when  any  person  reflects  rnnci  id- 
ly on  this  subject  he  must  grant,  that  happitiess  is  an  absolute 
good,  and  the  greatest  happiness  of  which  a  rationni  being  is 
capable  is  his  highest  good. — This  cannot  be  denied  with  any 
consistency. 


i>84 

From  this  it  follows,  (hat  the  ^eatest  sum  ol*  happhiess  is 
the  highest  uood  of  the  Universe. — Here  it  is  well  to  observe, 
that  rational  beinijs  cannot  be  finall}  happy,  unless  they  are 
holy.  For  it  is  holiness  which  pre]iarcs  them  to  enjoy  (lod, 
the  only  fountain  of  {:::ood.  And  as  all  holy,  created  bciners, 
are  finally  to  live  together  in  he^iven  ;  it  is  in  this  society  only 
that  happiness  will  be  enjoyed.  '  These  holy  characters  are  the 
subjects  of  God,  and  constitute  his  heavenly,  divine  kinirdom. 
And  it  is  the  desic^n  of  God,  that  in  this  kingdom,  with  Christ 
as  the  head  or  kinjr,  tbe  greatest  possible  sum  of  happiness 
shall  exist.  And  tiiis  greatest  sum  of  felicity,  existing  in  this 
kingdom,  is  the  highest  good  of  the  universe.  And  the  sum 
lotal  of  the  happiness  of  each  individual  is  the  highest  good  of 
this  kingdom,  and  the  ultimate  end  of  benevolence. 

1  say,  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  is  what  benevolence 
seeks.  Some  have  made  it  a  question,  whether  benevolence 
aims  ultimately  at  the  greatest  sum,  or  at  making  the  greatest 
number  happy.  If  the  greatest  number  is  the  object  sought, 
then  benevolence  would  be  constantly  creating  beings  capable 
of  pleasure,  and  making  them  happ)-.  But  we  see  in  fact  this 
is  not  the  ultimate  end  of  divine  benevolence.  For  God  might 
create  millions  more  than  he  really  does,  and  might  make  all 
of  them  happy  ;  yet  he  assures  us  some  will  be  finally  misera- 
ble ;  and  misery  in  a  great  degree  does  in  fact  prevail  in  this 
world,  which  is  wholly  inconsistent  w  ith  this  supposition,  that  lie 
ain*is  at  making  tiie  greatest  possible  number  happy.  If  this 
weie  his  end,  there  would  be  no  need  of  an}-  misery  in  tbis, 
any  more  than  in  the  world  to  come.  Wo  may  then  safe]}' 
conclude,  that  it  is  not  the  greatest  number,  but  the  greatest 
sum  of  hap'piness,  at  which  benevolence  aims.  And  this  is  con- 
sistent with  the  nature  of  benevolence,  according  to  the  dictates 
of  reason.  When  the  happiness  of  an  individual  is  the  object, 
it  is  his  greatest  happiness,  which  is  sought.  For  if  happiness 
itself  is  agreeable,  and  for  this  reason  it  is  sought,  then  the 
greatest  sum  will  aflord  the  most  pleasure,  and  will  be  aitned 
at.  Hence  Avhatever  would  destroy,  or  lessen  happiness  on  the 
whole,  would  be  avoided  ;  and  whatever,ever3'  thingconsidered, 
will  promote  this  greatest  happiness,  will  be  pursued.  Accord- 
ingly, if  suffering  a  degree  of  paiii  for  a  time  will  increase  a 
person's  happiness,  beyond  w  hat  it  could  have  been  if  no  pain 
had  been  endured,  he  would  choose  to  sufler  this  degree  of  evil. 
On  this  ground  it  is,  that  men  daily  sufler  more  or  less  pain  : 


.iC 


they  do  it  for  the  sake  of  f?i*e;itor  liapplness.  Hence  in  a  per- 
fect system  of  means,  uheii  the  i;reatest  sum  of  happ.iies>  is 
the  end,  so  much  evil  will  be  permitted  as  is  real!}  necessary 
to  the  greatest  sum  of  good  fmailv,  and  no  more.  It  is  in  this 
view  only,  that  evil  can  be  perniilied  in  the  universe,  ( onsist- 
ently  with  the  nature  of  benevolence  ;  and  it  is  on  this  grouiid 
that  the  final  punishment  of  the  wicked  is  justifiable.  Anti  as 
iJiis  is  the  plan  God  is  in  fact  executing,  we  may  rest  assur- 
ed that  infinite  perfection  knows  it  is  necessar}-  to  the  greatest 
sum  of  happiness,  that  evil  should  prevail ;  and  the  degree  and 
duration  of  its  prevalence  are  determined  by  Jehovah.  It  is 
now  evident,  that  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  is  that  highest 
good,  which  benevolence  seeks  as  its  ultimaie  end.  And  ihat 
it  is  not  our  personal  happiness,  but  the  happiness  of  God's 
holy  kingdom,  which  is  tlie  object  of  benevolence.  This  be- 
ing the  end, a  holy  being  will  invariably  avoid  and  oppose  every 
thing,  which  is  inconsistent  witli  the  greatest  sum  ot  happiness; 
and  diligently  pursue  objects,  and  use  all  the  means  necessary 
to  this  greatest  sum.  As  far  as  benevolence  governs,  the 
means  necessary  to  the  greatest  iiappiness  will  be  invariably 
and  constantly  ust'd. 

Having  ascertained  the  idtimate  end  of  benevolence,  it  will 
be  easy  to  see  what  benevolence  is,  and  where  seated  hi  the 
mind.  Benevolence  must  consist  in  a  disposition  to  seek  the 
happiness  of  God's  holy  kingdom.  It  is  then  a  disposition  or 
an  appetite,  to  be  pleased  with  happiness  wherever  it  is  seen  ; 
and  a  disposition  to  seek  the  increase  of  it.  And  it  must  be 
an  active  disposition.  By  this  is  meant,  it  must  be  a  disposi- 
tion which  will  excite,  prompt,  or  move  a  person  to  seek  the 
happiness  of  God's  kingdom.  And  if  it  is  a  disposition, 
which  is  pleased,  or  which  takes  delight  in  the  hapj/.ness  cl  his 
kingdom  on  its  own  account,  it  will  excite  and  move  a  person 
to  seek  this  end  with  all  his  powers.  For  the  ultimate  plea- 
sure an  object  affords  is  the  motive,  which  influences  and  gov- 
erns ;  it  is  the  spring  of  action,  whicii  puts  every  wheel  in  mo- 
tion. It  is  then  in  its  nature  an  active  di>position.  Its  seat 
must  be  in  the  heart.  For  this  faculty  is  the  seat  of  all  dispo- 
sitions or  appetites,  good  or  bad,  and  of  all  the  afl'ections.  1 
call  it  a  disposition.  If  it  be  callcfl  a  taste,  or  ^relish,  or  an 
inclinntion,  or  a  preparedness,  or  n'ore  properly  an  appetite 
for  seekim,-- happiness  ultimately,  still  it  is  the  same  thing  in  its 
nature.  It  is  a  simple  somoihins:  in  the  heart,  by  whatever 
particular  name  called,  which  prepares  a  person  to  be  delight-' 


285 

«d  with  tlio  happiness  of  others,  or  of  God's  kingdom  on  its. 
own  account  as  an  ultimate  end.  And  as  it  prepares  him  to  he 
pleased  with  this  ohjcct,  it  will  prompt  or  move  him  to  use  all 
his  powers  in  seckiuj":  and  promoting:  this  end.  Because  there 
is  no  other  way  hy  which  he  can  Gfratify  his  own  fcolincs  and 
desires.  And  every  ay:eiu  will  scel;  the  gratification  of  hi?  de- 
sires. This  is  too  evident  to  be  denied.  And  it  is  self-evident, 
that  where  there  is  no  feclinsc  there  is  no  principle  of  action. 
And  where  neither  pleasure  nor  pain  is  experienced,  there  i;:  no 
feeling.  Painful  or  pleasant  sensations  are  fcclini^s,  and  our 
only  primary,  original  fee///jo-^.  Hence  they  are  the  primary, 
and  orijjinal  principles  of  action.  And  where  there  are  sensa- 
tions, they  must  have  a  subject  or  sorneihiiig  which  feels.  This 
same  thinp:,  by  whatever  name  called,  is  what  I  mean  by  a  be- 
nevolent disposition.  And  tliis  disposition  must  be  antecedent 
to  action,  to  every  desire,  and  afl'ection  ;  it  must  be  the  foun- 
dation or  fountain,  from  which  all  actions  and  affections  pro- 
ceed or  take  their  rise  ;  as  a  primary  cause  must  be  antecedent 
to  all  the  efl'd'cts  it  produces.  So  that  every  effect  can  be  traced 
back  to  this  primary  principle.  This  is  ajo^reeable  to  all  sound 
philosophy.  Hence  this  disposition  is  not  a  volition,  or  an 
exercise  ;  but  the  foundation,  the  fountain  of  them  ;  or  the  pri- 
mary, original  cau^e  in  moral  agents,  from  which  all  their  de- 
sires, affections  and  volitions  proceed. 

We  have  now  ascertained  two  thini^s — the  ultimate  object  of 
benevolence,  and  what  benevolence  is,  and  where  seated  ;  and 
■we  see  it  is  the  primary,  orij^inal  cause  or  active  principle  in 
moral  aErents  from  which  all  their  holy  affections  and  actions 
proceed. 

We  may  now  attend  to  some  objections  to  what  is  here  ad- 
vanced. 

1.  Some  say,  it  is  not  the  happiness  of  God's  Idnardora,  but 
his  glory,  which  is  the  idtimate  object  of  benevolence.  They 
say  the  scriptures   make  the   alorv   of  God  his  ultimate  end. 

Answer.  The  truth  of  this  affirmation  is  acknowledged. 
For,  it  is  believed,  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness  or  hicrhest  crood,  are  one  and  the  same.  No  one 
supposes  an  increase  of  God's  essenfial  p}r>ry  h  his  end  ;  but 
his  declarative  priory  is  his  final  object.  And  his  hichest  de- 
clarative g^lory  is  no  more,  than  a  perfect  display  of  his  attri- 
butes. Here  it  ouirht  to  be  observed,  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  a  di^nlay,  and  a  commuaication,  of  th^  essential  fulness 
«r  glory  of  God. 


287 

111  this  display  of  the  attributes  ot'God  in  the  material  crea- 
tion, there  is  no  image,  of  him  iiistamped  on  every  thing.  But 
in  the  moral  vrorid  the  image  or  the  likeness  of  God  exists. 
Man  was  made  in  his  likeness,  both  natural  and  moral.  Here 
a  communication  of  the  essential  fuhiess  is  made  ;  and  also  here 
is  a  display  of  his  attributes.  But  in  the  material  heavens  and 
earth  there  is  a  display  of  his  perfections,  but  no  communica- 
tion is  made  ;  we  no  where  see  his  imaj^e  existing,  either  nat- 
ural or  moral.  Hence  the  greatest  communication  of  the  di- 
vine fulness  is  the  highest  and  brightest  possible  display  of 
his  glory  ;  far  exceeding  any  displays  made,  wheie  there  is  no 
communication.  It  is  therefore  certain,  that  the  greatest 
connnunication  of  the  divine  fulness  is  the  brighest  possible  dis- 
play of  his  fulness  ;  and  this  is  the  same  with  the  highest  good, 
or  greatest  happiness. 

To  illustrate  this  we  may  observe,  that  an  unrenewed  ma» 
bears  the  natural  image  of  his  Maker,  but  not  his  moral.  In 
this  state  he  does  not  enjoy  the  highest  good.  In  order  to  this 
he  must  have  the  moral  image  of  God  instamped  on  him.  This 
teaches,  that  the  attributes  of  knowledge,  of^ou?er,  and  ofholi- 
v.ess,are  necessary  to  happiness.  And  men  are  endued  with  these 
properties,  that  the^'  may  be  happy.  This  is  the  end.  And 
this  is  the  reason  why  regeneration  is  necessarj'.  God  has 
communicated  his  natural  liheness  to  unrenewed  men.  And 
to  saints  he  has  communicateo  his  moral  iniage.  And  the  glory 
of  God  is  displayed  with  far  greater  brightness  in  saints  than 
in  sinners.  This  clearly  shows,  that  the  existence  of  the  natur- 
al &:  moral  image  of  God  in  man, is  necessary  to  the  greatest  dis- 
play of  his  glory.  It  is  also  evident,  that  the  brighest  display 
of  the  moral  image  of  God  constitutes  his  greatest  declarative 
glory  ;  and  the  greatest  display  of  his  goodness  or  benevolence 
is  the  brightest  displa}-  of  his  glory.  It  is  so  represented  in  the 
sacred  oracles.  But  surely  the  greatest  display  of  divine 
goodness  is  seen  in  the  enjo}  ment  of  the  greatest  happiness. 

Now  every  one  may  distinctly  see,  what  is  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  the  greatest  created  happiness.  1.  The  natural 
image  of  God,  and  2.  His  moral  image  ;  Or  an  understanding 
to  perceive  truth,  a  will,  or  power,  to  perform  actions,  and  a 
heart  to  feel,  and  enjoy  the  sources  of  endless  bliss.  A  created 
being  with  those  projx.'rties,  perfectly  happy,  enjoys  the  highest 
good  of  which  he  is  capable  ;  especially  when  in  view  of  those 
properties,  and  the  attendant  happiness  eternally  increasing. 
And  the  greatest  communication,  and  the  brightest  display  of 


288 

the  essential  fulceps  of  God,  are  not  made,  until  the  society  ex- 
ists in  wiiieli  Ins  image  natnrril  and  moral,  or  tlic  greatei>l  hap- 
piness, are  possessed.  This  society  iDnst  be  perfectly  blessed, 
in  order  to  the  greatest  display  of  his  goodness.  Hence  a  so- 
ciety', in  which  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  exists,  is  the 
brightest  displa\  of  the  glory  of  God.  In  this  society  we  be- 
hold the  greatest  display  of  God's  benevolence,  in  the  sum  of 
happiness  enjoyed  by  it.  If  this  society  was  ever  so  knowing, 
and  perfectly  holy,  yet  not  hippy;  the  dis[  1  lys  of  God 
Would  be  faint  and  obscure,  no  greater  than  what  we  behold  in 
the  m.:tcrial  creation.  For  the  bene\olence  of  God  is  the 
beauty,  glory,  and  excellency  of  his  character  ;  accordingly 
the  greatest  display  of  his  love  is  a  display  of  his  chiel'  glory, 
of  his  excellencx,  yea  the  brightest  emanation  of  the  Godhead. 
Hence  in  whatever  light  the  subject  is  viewed,  in  the  existence 
of  the  greatest  sum  of  hapj)iiicss  we  behold  the  brightest  possi- 
ble display  of  the  essential  glory  of  God. 

Suppose  a  vessel  to  contain  the  most  excellent  liquid,  and  a 
communication  of  it  to  be  its  highest  glory  ;  then  wlien  com- 
municated to  another  vessel,  its  greatest  glory  is  displased. 
Here  the  liquid,  which  is  in  the  vessel,  is  the  highest  glory  of 
the  vessel  from  which  it  was  communicated.  Ihe  liquid  com- 
municated, and  the  glor}  of  the  vessel  from  which  the  commu- 
nication was  made,  is  one  and  the  same  object. 

God  has  an  infinite  fulness  of  knowledge,  of  power,  of  good- 
ness, and  of  happiness.  This  is  communicated  to  the  heavenly 
society,  in  as  large  a  measure  as  it  cnn  receive  ;  ktmwledge, 
power,  goodness,  and  felicity,  are  communicated  ;  they  exist 
in  this  soci'^ty.  And  this  communication  is  the  brightest  pos- 
sible display  of"  God's  essential  glory.  And  as  knowledge, 
power,  and  goodness  are  necessary  to  happiness,  and  have  no 
value  onlv  when  considered  in  lelation  to  happiness  ;  it  is  evi- 
dent, that  the  happiness  of  this  society  is  especially  the  bright- 
est ray  of  his  glory.  In  the  enjoyment  of  this  happiness  by 
this  society,  he  is  glorified.  And  when  we  consider  this  hap- 
piness as  forever  increasing,  we  i.ee  his  glory  more  and  more 
displayed,  until  it  reaches  the  highest  possible  splendor.  Ac- 
cordingly the  perfect  and  increasing  happiness  of  the  heaven- 
ly society,  and  tlie  declarative  glor\  of  God, are  notdisiinct,  but 
one  and  tlie  same  obiect.  In  harmony  with  this  we  find,  when 
the  bible  speaks  of  the  glory  of  God  as  Ins  end,  it  considers  his 
his  glory  as  displayed  and  perfected  in  the  lehcity  of  heaven. 


^289 

So  that  the  brightest  glory  of  God  consists,  in  makinf>:  sinful 
men  perfectly  and  increasiiiirly  liappy  iu  heaven.  Herein  is 
love,  the  richest  displays  of  his  love,  which  is  the  sum  of  all  his 
glory.  In  no  way  is  God  so  much  g:lorified  as  in  the  displays 
of  his  love  or  grace  ;  and  in  no  way  is  his  love  so  brightly  dis- 
played as  in  the  final  happiness  of  all  the  elect  in  heaven.  So 
his  glory,  and  the  highest  good,  or  bliss,  are  the  same  object, 
or  linal  end.  In  the  possession  of  the  greatest  sum  of  happi- 
ness, the  greatest  declarative  glory  of  God  consists. 

2.  Some  object  and  say,  that  lioliness  is  the  supreme  good, 
and  the  ultimate  end  of  God  in  all  his  works. 

Answer.  If  it  is  the  supreme,  highest  good,  it  is  his  last 
end.  But  it  has  been  already  shown,  that  holiness  is  not  the 
highest  good.  And  there  is  no  way  to  make  this  more  evident, 
unless  by  some  illustrations,  vvhirh  will  lead  persons  to  look 
more  candidly  at  the  subject.  Those,  who  consider  holiness 
the  supreme  good,  generally  consider  holiness  and  happiness 
the  same,  and  especially  to  view  ihem  inseparably  connected. 
But  facts  provi;tiiey  are  not  insoparalily  connected.  For  Christ 
was  perfectly  holy,  yet  endured  much  suffering  and  pain.  And 
any  one  cannot  but  see,  that  if  events  would  finally  destroy  the 
highest  good,  this  would  give  the  most  pain  to  a  perfectly  holy 
being  ;  he  would  be  filled  with  painful  grief,  while  this  would 
occasion  no  pain  to  the  enemies  of  God.  Nothing  would  af- 
ford satan  more  satisfaction,  than  the  destruction  of  all  good. 
Hence  they  are  not  inseparably  connected.  Again.  If  the 
perfectly  holy  inhabitants  of  heaven  were  never  to  enjoy  any 
happiness,  why  would  their  condition  be  better,  than  a  state  of 
non-existence  ?  Without  the  enjoyment  of  happiness,  it  is  as 
well  not  to  be,  as  to  have  existence.  This  shows  that  holiness 
without  happiness  is  not  desiraf)le,  because  it  could  not  be  a 
benefit  to  any  one.  And  though  in  heaven  the  holy  will  be 
forever  happy,  yet  it  is  plain  they  are  not  the  same,  and  that 
holiness  is  not  the  highest  good.  And  it  is  needless  to  spet;  J 
more  time  in  proving  a  point  so  plain.  For  more  evidence 
would  not  convince  those,  who  are  now  unconvinced.  This- 
has  been  proved  in  other  essays. 

3.  Some  object  and  say,  that  being  in  general  is  the  ultimate 
end  of  benevolence.  They  view  being,  simply  considered,  as  the 
object  of  benevolence.  This  opinion  has  been  supported  by 
many.     Answer.     What  is  implied  in  love  to  being  in  general, 

12 


290 

by  lliose  who  embrace  this  sentiment,  I  do  not  know  certainly, 
and  hence  cannot  say  their  opinion  is  not  just. 

To  determine  ihis  point,  we  must  attend  to  the  exercises  of 
benevolence.  These  arc  two. — 1.  A  delight  in  the  object  ; 
and  2,  desires  lor  its  highest  good.  \^  lien  we  contemplate 
simple  being,  we  may  view  it  as  incapable,  or  capable  of  holi- 
ness and  iiappiness.  ?Iire  matter  is  being,  for  it  has  an  exis- 
tence. But  it  is  incapable  of  eithei  holiness  or  happiness. 
Hence  it  is  no  proper  object  of  benevolent  affection.  Ration- 
al beings  are  capable  of  both  holiness  and  happiness.  When 
they  are  considered  as  being  in  general,  if  love  to  them  means 
a  delight  in  their  happiness,  and  desires  that  they  may  be  per- 
fectly and  forexer  happy  ;  if  this  is  what  is  meant  by  love  to 
being  in  general,  the  sentiment  is  just  ;  or  the  very  same  with 
that  of  the  author.  For  here  the  happiness  of  being  in  general, 
is  the  object  of  benevolence.  Loving  in  this  seuse  is  only  de- 
siring the  greatest  happiness  to  exist,  and  delighting  in  it.  If 
this  be  not  the  meaning  of  iliose,  who  advance  this  opinion,  I 
know  not  \%hat  they  do  mean  ;  and  can  give  no  further  answer, 
iintil  they  explain  themselves  so  as  to  be  understood. 

In  connexion  with  this  opinion  the  advocates  of  it  say,  that  we 
ought  to  love  men  in  proportion  to  their  quantity  of  existence. 
They  say,  if  another  person  has  a  capacity  as  large  again  as 
mine,  and  one  or  the  other  must  die,  benevolence  will  lead  me 
to  surrender  life  voluntarily,  that  his  life  may  be  spared.  And 
they  use  man}  snudiiudes  to  illustrate  this  sentiment. — Hence 
they  insist,  that  if  others  contain  a  greater  quantity  of  being 
than  we  do,  we  ought  to  love  them  more  than  we  do  ourselves  ; 
and  we  ought  in  practice  to  prefer  them  to  ourselves,  to  die 
that  they  may  live.  This  sentiment  does  not  seem  to  accord 
either  with  the  laws  of  God,  or  his  government  of  the  world. 
The  law  says,  ihou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.  Now, 
allowing  this  to  n)ean  that  we  sh:)]l  kxe  our  neighbor  with  the 
some  kind  and  degree  of  love,  which  we  ought  to  have  for  our- 
selves ;  yet  no  one  can  construe  it  to  mean,  that  we  shall  love 
him  more  than  ourselves.  Also  God,  in  the  government  of  the 
woild,  does  not  exercise  love  to  nien  in  proportion  to  their 
quv^utity  of  existence.  For  ^«)nie  ol  ihe  greatest  capacitiesare 
taken  away  by  death,  and,  according  to  the  lives  they  have  led, 
are  made  forever  mi.-eiidjlc  ;  while  others  of  far  less  capacity 
are  permitted  to  live.  ;;nd  ai  newed,and  made  happy.  Ac- 
cording to  this  seuiiment  Paul  should  liavc  said,  for  }ou  see 


291 

your  calUnpr,  brethren,  that  not  many  poor,  or  despised,  or 
things  that  are  not,  are  called  ;  but  God  has  chosen  the  great, 
the  noble,  and  those  of  the  greatest  capacities. 

There  is  one  sense,  in  which  we  may  be  said  to  love  others 
more  than  ourselves.  Suppose  one  person  out  often  to  con- 
tain as  great  a  capacity  or  quantit}'  of  being,  as  all  the  other 
nine  ;  if  we  wish  each  of  them  as  much  happiness  as  their  ca- 
pacities will  admit,  or  wish  each  of  them  perfectly  happy,  which 
is  the  same,  the  sum  of  happiness  enjoyed  by  one  is  equal  to 
the  sum  of  the  other  nine  ;  and  we  have  wished  so  much  more 
good  to  one,  than  to  the  other.  Here  we  are  to  observe  two 
things — 1,  the  sum  of  good  we  wish  a  person  to  enjoy — and  2, 
the  wish  or  desire  itself.  We  may  desire  the  happiness  often  ; 
and  the  desire  for  the  happiness  of  each  one  may  be  the  same 
in  fervency  ;  that  is,  we  have  no  stronger  desire  for  the  happi- 
ness of  one,  than  we  have  for  the  others.  In  this  sense  we  have 
the  same  degree  of  love  or  desire  for  each  one.  One  is  loved 
no  more  than  the  other.  Our  desire  for  the  happiness  of  one  is 
no  greater  or  stronger,  than  for  another.  Yet  if  one  is  capable 
of  far  greater  happiness,  than  others,  the  quantity  of  good  we 
wish  him  to  enjoy  is  far  more,  than  the  quantity  we  wish  to  the 
other  ;  keeping  in  view  that  we  wish  all  to  enjoy  as  much  hap- 
piness as  their  capacities  will  contain.  Here  the  quantity  of 
good  we  wish  to  one  is  greater,  than  the  quantity  we  wish  to 
others  ;  and  in  this  sense  we  may  love  one  more  than  others. 
But  when  we  consider  the  desire  of  the  heart,  or  of  benevolence, 
we  love  one  no  more  than  others.  For  our  desire  for  the  hap- 
piness of  each  one  is  equally  strong.  But  I  suspect  the  advo- 
cates for  loving  beings  in  proportion  to  their  existence  mean, 
that  our  desires  for  the  happiness  of  some  ought  to  be  stronger^ 
than  for  the  happiness  of  oth*^rs.  If  this  be  their  meaning,  their 
sentiment  is  erroneous.  To  make  this  evident,  I  will  state  a 
case.  Twenty  persons  are  in  the  same  room,  and  their  happi- 
ness consists  in  eating  oranges.  One  of  the  number  has  oran- 
ges with  him,  and  proposes  to  distribute  them  according  to  the 
rules  of  benevolence.  He  has  then  in  the  first  place  to  ascer- 
tain the  quantity  of  each  person's  existence,  and  finds  on  inqui- 
ry, that  himself  contains  more  quantit}'  of  existence  than  the 
other  nineteen.  He  accordingly  says,  the  oranges  oup:ht  all  to 
beenjo3'ed  by  me  ;  and  they  all  must  acquiesce  in  his  decision. 
He  eats  and  is  bapp}'.     The  others  having  none^,  sit  without 


292 

any  thing  to  afford  them  any  satisfaction.     Does  this  lookHke 
beiu'volcnce  ? 

Let  us  now  proceed  on  the  g;vound,  that  the  happiness  of 
others  is  the  object  of  benevolence.  Then  the  person  who  has 
the  orang^es,  liinds  them  round  to  one  h  another  ;  and  each  one 
is  more  desirous  that  others  should  eat  them,  than  to  eat  them 
himself.  And  why  ?  Because  each  one  says,  I  take  more  de- 
light in  seeing  you  happ}'  in  eating  them,  than  I  experience  in 
eating  them  myself.  Here,  then,  each  one  is  for  giving  to 
others.  In  the  first  statement,  the  disposition  called  benevo- 
lence leads  a  person  to  monopolise,  to  possess  every  source  of  en- 
joyment, if  he  can  make  himself  believe  he  has  a  much  greater 
quantity  of  existence  than  others.  And  according  to  the  last 
statement,  benevolence  is  of  a  diffusive  nature;  it  prompts  per- 
sons to  give  away,  and  distribute  sources  of  happiness  far  and 
wide  as  they  are  able.  Because  what  he  aims  at  is  to  make 
others  happy.  And  his  greatest  happiness  consists  in  seeing 
others  happy.  Does  not  this  last  disposition  look  far  more 
like  benevolence,  than  the  first  ? 

Again.  The  sentiment,  that  we  ought  to  love  and  seek  the 
good  of  men  in  proportion  to  their  existence,  or  quantity  of  be- 
ing, is  impracticable.  To  be  convinced  of  this,  let  it  be  kept 
in  view,  that  benevolence  aims  ultimately  at  the  highest  good, 
or  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness.  Now,  according  to  the 
sentiment  we  are  opposing,  to  promote  the  highest  good,  a  per- 
son must  be  able  to  determine  two  things — 1,  who  has  the  great- 
est quanity  of  being,  and,  2,  that  to  seek  the  good  of  those 
most,  who  have  the  most  being,  is  necessary  to  the  highest  good 
ultimately, — But  in  many  cases  it  will  be  impossible  for  us  to 
judge  truly,  who  has  the  greatest  quantity  of  existence;  and 
where  we  cannot  determine  this  point,  we  cannot  know  what 
duty  is,  and  therefore  cannot  act.  And  if  we  could  always  de- 
termine, who  did  possess  the  greatest  capacities  ;  yet  we  could 
not  know  it  would  be  most  for  the  general  good,  to  seek  and 
promote  their  good,  more  than  we  do  the  good  of  those  of  far 
less  capacities.  For  we  have  reason  to  believe,  that  God  sees 
it  is  necessary  to  the  highest  good,  that  some  men  of  the  great- 
est abilities  should  be  miserable.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  de- 
termine with  certainty  what  is,  or  is  not,  tor  the  greatest  good. 
Hence  wecaimot  know  it  would  be  most  for  the  general  good, 
that  we  should  always  in  practice  seek  the  good  of  the  great-* 
est,  more  than  the  good  of  others.     For  aught  we  know  wp 


293 

a»ay  promote  the  greatest  sum  oflroppiness  ultimately,  by  seek- 
ing here  the  good  ol'  ihc  least,  more  than  we  do  the  good  of  the 
greatest  men. 

We  here  see  this  sentiment  cannot  be  reduced  to  practice. 
And  an  impracticable  sentiment  is  certainly  erroneous.  Out 
it  we  delight  in  the  happiness  of  others,  and  ultimately  seek  the 
highest  good  ;  then  it  will  be  our  object  to  promote  the  happi- 
ness of  every  individual,  as  far  as  we  have  opportunity  and  a- 
bility  ;  and  leave  it  with  God  to  determine,  wlio  shall  finally 
be  the  heirs  of  endless  life.  This  is  practicable.  And  in  this 
way  we  keep  the  law.  For  we  do  in  this  way  with  the  same, 
and  with  as  strong  a  desire,  seek  the  good  of  others,  as  we  do 
our  own  good  ;  and  love  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  This  is 
certain.  Because  our  happiness  consists  in  the  happiness  of  oth- 
ers. In  order  then  to  our  own  greatest  gratification,  we  must  seek 
and  increase  the  happiness  of  others.  Hence  our  desire  to  make 
others  happ3'  is  the  same,  and  as  strong,  as  the  desire  we  have 
for  our  own  gratification.  Hence  a  benevolent  man  in  reality 
always  has  just  as  much  love  for  others,  as  he  has  for  himself. 
So  that  when  he  is  cold  and  stupid,  and  but  little  engaged  to 
make  others  happy,  he  is  but  little  engaged  to  make  himself 
happy.  This  must  be  the  case,  so  long  as  benevolence  places 
its  own  happiness  or  gratification  in  the  happiness  of  others. 
Hence  I  think  this  objection  is  now  fully  answered. 

4.  Some  object  and  say,  that  all  love  is  resolvable  into  self 
love.  They  will  not  admit,  that  any  other  kind  of  love  has 
existence,  and  say  every  species  of  love  is  nothing  more  or  less, 
than  self  love  ;  and  some  distinguish  between  selfishness  and 
self  love  ;  ihey  admit  the  former  is  not  benevolence,  but  contend 
that  the  latter  is. 

Answer.  It  is  impossible  here  to  afiirm  or  den}*,  until  we 
distinctly  understand  the  term  self  love.  Every  species  of  love 
has  an  object  ;  in  loving  there  is  always  something  loved. 
And  love  must  always  have  some  ultimate  object,  or  objects, 
which  are  loved  on  their  own  account. — What  then  is  the  ulti- 
mate o!)ject  of  self  love?  Is  the  happiness  of  others,  or  of  God's 
kingdom,  its  ultimate  object  .''  If  it  is,  then  all  other  objerts 
are  sought  in  subordination  to  this  end.  For  all  agents  sub- 
ordinate every  thing  to  their  ultimate  end  ;  ever}'  thing  is  lov- 
ed and  sought  with  a  view  to  the  end,  which  is  agreeal)le  in  its 
own  nature.  Here  thon  self  love,  if  it  has  the  (greatest  happi- 
ness for  its  ultimate  object,  is  the  same  as  benevolence. 


294 

Antl  iftliis  is  not  the  ultimate  object  of  self  love,  what  is?  If 
it  be  said,  thai  \vorl(ll>  |)roporty,  honors,  and  the  pleasures  oC 
time  and  sense,  are  souajht  lor  their  own  sake  ;  then  other  ob- 
jects are  souehi  for  the  saiio  of  attaining:  these  ends.  Here 
suppose  the  authority  and  law  of  God,  and  the  {?ood  of  his  king- 
dom should  be  in  the  way  of  attaininj^  these  worldly  objects,  in 
the  view  of  the  accent.  In  this  case  he  will  certainly  disregard 
and  oppose  the  law  of  God,  and  the  interest  of  his  spiritual 
kingdom.  For  it  is  the  uniform  practice  of  moral  agents  to 
seek  whatever  is  necessary  to  their  ultimate  end,  and  oppose 
whatever  is  inconsistent  with  it.  This  is  the  reason  why  the 
divine  law  is  so  often  transe^ressed  ;  because  obedience  is  in- 
Consistent  with  the  ultimatf^  piu'suits  of  men.  On  the  same 
ground  civil  law  is  transgressed.  Hence  if  worldly  objects, 
whether  riches,  honors,  or  pleasures,  arc  the  ultimate  object  of 
self  love,  the  agent  must  oppose  the  law  of  God,  his  cause  and 
kingdom,  whenever  they  interfere  with  his  ultimate  pursuits. 
And  the  law  of  God  is  always  opposed  to  an  agent,  who  makes 
any  worldlj"  object  his  final  end.  An  ultimate  object  is  always 
chosen  as  a  portion,  is  supremely  li)ved,  and  the  highest  source 
of  happiness.  The  law  of  God,  therefore,  does  not  allow  any 
person  to  make  any  worldly  object  his  ultimate  end  ;  or  any 
object,  but  the  highest  c:ood  of  his  kingdom.  And  to  make 
any  object,  except  the  highest  good  of  God's  kingdom,  an  ulti- 
mate end,  is  idolatry;  it  is  making  that  supreme,  and  a  par- 
tion,  which  ought  not  to  be  thus  regarded.  Indeed  there  are 
but  a  few  objects,  which  are  ever  sought  as  ultimate  ends  by 
any  agent.  Riches,  worldly  honors,  and  pleasures,  and  the 
glory  of  God,  the  greatest  happiness  or  good,  may  be  sought  as 
ultimate  ends.  The  glory  of  God,  the  greatest  sum  of  happi- 
ness, and  the  good  of  the  universe,  I  suppose,  are  one  and  the 
same. 

Now  then  there  arc  four  objects,  worldly  riches,  honors, 
pleasures,  and  the  greatest  happiness,  which  may  be  sought  as 
ultimate  ends.  Can  any  one  name  a  fifth,  which  is  not  in- 
cluded in  one  of  these  ?  He  cannot.  If  an  agent  seeks  the 
riches,  honors,  or  pleasures,  of  this  world,  either  one  or  all  of 
them,  as  his  ultimate  end,  then  those  constitute  his  portion  ; 
they  are  the  objects  of  his  supreme  aflection,  and  of  course  they 
are  his  god  ;  and  he  is  an  idolater.  This  is  directly  contrar}- 
to  the  law  of  God.  And  while  seeking  those  objects  he  is  con- 
stantly transgressing  that  law.     And  if  these  arc  the  ultimate 


i>95 

*biects  of  self  love,  it  is  evidently  tho  same  with  selfishness;  if 
is  0  principle  m  the  hunjan  heart,  which  is,  in  it>:  nuturc  and  op- 
erations, contrary  to  tlie  law  of  God  ;  and  so  far  from  being  of 
a  benevolent  nature,  it  is  uircoiU  opposed  to  benevolence. 

But  if  it  is  said,  that  the  greatest  happiness,  or  the  glory  of 
God,  is  the  ultimate  object  of  self  love  ;  then  its  natnre  is  the 
same  with  benevolence  ;  yea  it  is  benevolence  itself;  and  it 
will  subordinate  every   wordly  pursuit  to  its  ultimate  object. 
But  in  this  case,  why  is  it  called  self  love.''     The  advocates  of 
this  sentiment  may  say,  because  the  highest  good,  or  happiness, 
is  sought  for  the  same  reasons  that  we  seek  every  other  object, 
or  final  end.     This  is,  the  pleasure  or  satisfaction  taken  in  the 
object.     The  satisfaction,  or  deliuht  in  an  object  on  its  own 
account,  is  the  reason,  or  motive,  which  excites  all  moral  agents 
to  seek  any  object  ultimately.     All  men,  they  say,  are  govern- 
ed by  the  same  ultimate  motives,  which  are  the  gratification  of 
our  desires  by  the  object  sought.     So  they  say  it  is  proper  to 
term  all  kinds  of  love  by  the  same  name  ;  and  to  call  it  self 
love,  because  our  personal  desires  are  gratified. 

Here  we  ought  to  observe,  that,  although  all  ultimate  ends 
are  sought  for  the  same  reason,  because  they  please  ;  yet  the 
ends  are  very  different  in  their  nature.  Worldly  riches,  and 
happiness,  are  very  diflerent  objects.  If  we  seek  the  former  as 
our  end,  it  will  lead  us  to  lessen  the  prop<'rty  of  others  to  in- 
crease our  own.  For  if  one  possesses  all  the  property  in  this 
world,  others  must  be  deprived  of  it,  and  left  to  li\  e  aud  die  in 
poverty  and  misery.  Hence  in  seeking  this  end  we  are  daily 
robbing  others  ;  and  while  increasing  our  own  happiness,  we 
are  lessening  the  felicity  of  others.  But  if  the  happiness  of  an- 
other is  our  ultimate  end,  the  only  way  to  promote  our  happi- 
ness is  by  increasing  his  ;  and  the  more  the  happiness  of  God's 
kingdom  is  increased,  so  much  the  moie  our  own  is  augmented. 
Hence  if  all  men  possessed  this  principle,  to  love  and  seek  the 
happiness  of  others,  all  would  be  united  in  mutually  promoting' 
each  others'  felicity  or  highest  good.  And  this  is  the  only  end, 
which  can  be  sought  us  an  ultimate  object,  and  which  can  be 
pursued  consistently  with  the  higliest  good  of  rational  beings; 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  it  ought  to  be  the  ultimate  end  of  all 
moral  agents. — Hence  when  we  view  worldly  properly,  and 
the  happiness  of  others,  as  two  distinct  ultimate  ends,  we  clear- 
ly see  the  wide  difl'erence  between  the  nature  and  operationjB 
of  those  prniciples  in  the  heart,  from  which  love  to  them  respee- 


296 

t'vely  proceeds.  And  there  is  no  other  way  to  leani  the  na- 
ture of  any  active  principle,  but  by  considering  the  nature  oiits 
uhiniatc  end.  So,  though  all  nun  seek  ultimate  ends  for  the 
same  reaion,  or  from  the  same  motive ;  yet  >ve  see  the  active 
governing  principles  within,  are  very  diiferent  in  their  nature 
and  operation,  and  ought  of  course  to  be  called  by  distinct 
names.  And  hence  self  love  is  either  the  same  principle  with 
benevolence,  or  it  is  of  the  same  nature  as  selfishness.  And  as 
all  beings  are  governed  by  selfishness  or  benevolence,  those 
diflcrent  active  principles  ought  to  be  distinguished  by  distinct 
names. 

Having  answered  the  principal  objections,  which  might  arise 
against  the  description  given  of  tlie  nature  of  benevolence,  which 
occurred  ;  I  now  proceed, 

II.  To  attend  to  the  operations  of  benevolence. 

The  ultimate  end  of  benevolence  is  the  greatest  sum  of  cre- 
ated happiness  ;  or,  which  is  the  same,  the  highest  possible 
good.  And  every  thing  which  exists,  whether  works,  creatures, 
or  events,  will  be  hostile  to  this  end,  or  friendly  to  it.  It  can- 
not be  said  of  any  thing,  this  will  never  promote  nor  oppose  the 
general  good.  For  all  things,  which  have  existence,  have  a 
tendency  to  this  end,  cither /or  it,  or  against  it.  It  is  granted, 
that  every  thing  has  a  nature,  which  is  good,  or  evil ;  and  the 
nature  of  all  things  is  according  to  their  ultimate  tendency.  If 
their  tendency  is  to  the  highest  good  ultimately,  they  nrc good ; 
if  their  tendency  is  ultimately  hostile  to  the  general  good,  they 
are  evil. 

Now  benevolence  will  always  love  or  hate  every  thing  ac- 
cording to  its  nature.  It  will  be  friendly  to  every  thing,  which 
is  in  its  nature  friendly  to  the  greatest  happiness  ;  and  oppose 
every  thing,  which  is  in  its  nature  hostile  to  it.  Let  it  also  be 
kept  in  view,  tnat  benevolence  is  a  disposition,  appetite,  or  rel- 
ish, to  be  pleased  with  the  happiness  of  others,  or  of  God's  holy 
kingdom.  It  is  an  abiding,  permanent,  active  principle  in  the 
heart.  It  is  not  strictly  speaking  an  exercise,  desire,  or  affec- 
tion ;  but  a  foundation  for  affections.  As  it  is  in  its  nature 
exquisitely  sensible,  every  object  seen  affords  a  pleasant  or 
painful  sensation,  from  which  desires  or  affections  proceed. 
Accordingly  desires,  or  what  are  generally  called  affections, 
are  the  operations  of  benevolence.  Desires  are  what  we  call 
affections.  And  every  aflection  has  an  object.  Where  Utere, 
is  a  desire,  there  is  some  object  desired  ;  where  there  are  love. 


297 

and  hatred,  there  are  objects  which  are  loved  or  hated.  Hence 
to  have  a  clear  and  distinct  view  of  the  operations  oT  benevo- 
lence, we  may  now  attend  to  their  several  objects. — The  ultimate 
object  of  benevolence  is  the  happiness  of  God's  kingdom.  Hence, 
God  will  be  the  first,  and  supreme  object  of  a  benevolent  heart. 
He  will  be  loved  with  supreme  affection.  He  will  have  the 
first  and  hiprhest  regard  or  place  in  the  heart ;  for  this  obvious 
reason,  that  he  is  the  source,  fountain,  and  original  efficient 
cause  of  all  crood.  All  happiness  is  from  him,  and  produced 
by  him.  And  being  infinite,  he  is  the  greatest  and  best  being 
in  the  universe  ;  and  accordingly  merits  the  supreme  regard 
and  affection  of  all  rational  creatures..  As  he  is  a  being  of  in- 
finite greatness  and  majesty,  he  will  he  feared,  and  reverenced. 
Being  infinitely  holy,  and  excellent,  he  will  be  loved ;  will  be 
an  object  of  the  liighest  delight  and  aflection.  As  he  is  the 
Ruler  of  the  universe,  who  cannot  err,  or  do  wrong,  the 
benevolent  soul  will  put  all  his  confidence  and  trust  in  God  ; 
feel  safe  In  his  hand,  and  rejoice  that  he  reigns. — He  will  be 
the  object  of  all  religious  worship,  and  adoration.  Such  in 
brief  are  the  feelings  or  affections  of  a  benevolent  heart  towards 
God. 

Next,  Christ  will  be  regarded,  and  honored,  equally  with  the 
Father.  Every  affection  exercised  towards  the  Father,  will  be 
also  given  to  the  Son.  And  here  the  benevolent  person  will 
deny  self,  renounce  all  sflf  righteousness,  and  sufiiciency ;  and 
as  a  sinful,  ruined,  helpless  creature,  come  and  put  all  its  trust 
and  dependence  on  the  merits  of  the  Savior,  for  the  pardon  of 
sin,  for  deliverance,  and  salvation  ;  and  rely  alone  on  his  al- 
mighty arm  to  be  preserved  by  faith  to  endless  life.  In  this 
way  the  saint  will  come  up  from  the  wilderness,  leaning  on  his 
beloved. 

Next  in  order  is  the  Holy  Spirit.  All  the  supreme  regard 
paid  to  the  Father  will  be  given  to  the  Spirit,  as  equal  with  God. 
And  as  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  his  office,  renews  and  sanctifies  the 
heart,  the  saint  will  look  to  the  Spirit  for  all  spiritual  light, 
peace,  comfort  and  joy,  and  for  the  perfection  of  sa^Jctification. 
Such  affections  will  be  exercised  towards  tlie  holy  Trinity  by 
the  benevolent  soul. 

Another  object  of  benevolent  aflection  is  man.  According  to 
the  requirement  of  the  law,  saints  will  love  all  men  as  their 
neighbors.  They  will  have  the  same  love,  in  kind  and  degree, 
they  have  for  themselves.     For  it  will  be  their  desire,  if  con- 

13 


298 

slstenr,  tjiat  all  may  1)p  perfectly  Iiappy-  And  they  can  have 
no  mt>ic  love  for  tlcinselves,  than  a  desire  for  their  own  perfect 
happiness.  And  as  they  have  this  desire  for  all  men,  if  God 
could  consistently  save  all,  they  have  the  same  kind  and  degree 
of  love  for  their  neighbor  they  have  for  themselves.  But  for 
real  christians  they  have  a  brotherly  affection.  They  not  on- 
ly wish  them  happy,  as  they  do  others,  but  they  also  love  their 
characters,  dolij^ht  in  the  holy  imag:e  God  has  instamped  on 
them.  When  men  are  the  objects,  such  are  the  affections  of 
benevolence  towards  them.  And  here  it  may  be  added,  that 
they  will  have  the  same  affection  for  holy  angels  they  have  for 
saints. 

The  moral  law,  also,  will  be  an  object  of  their  love.  This 
law,  in  all  its  requirements  and  prohibitions,  tends  directly'  to 
the  hi^j^est  good.  This  is  evident.  For  if  all  men  obcN'ed  it 
perfectly,  and  never  in  one  instance  transgressed  it,  all  would 
be  perfectly  happy.  Hence  it  may  be  pronounced  tp  be  holy, 
just  and  good  ;  and  all  saints  with  David  will  delight  in  it,  and 
esteem  it  more  precious  than  silver  or  gold,  and  sweeter  than 
honey.  Thus  the  law  will  be  loved  and  regarded  by  the  be- 
nevolent. 

And  all  the  doctrines  of  the  gospel,  as  well  as  its  precepts, 
will  be  the  objects  of  love.  Because  they  all  tend  to  exalt 
God,  and  humble  sinful  men,  and  advance  the  happiness  of 
God's  kingdom.  They  are  holy  doctrines  ;  aud  as  food  will 
delight  the  heart,  and  nourish  the  new  man.  Hence  the  reason 
why  saints  delight  in  a  preached  gospel,  and  are  edified,  and 
strengthened,  and  ripened  for  heaven. 

Again.  The  service  of  God  is  an  object  of  benevolent  affec- 
tion. And  why  ^  Because  its  tendency  is  to  the  greatest  hap- 
piness. It  is  a  lioly  service,  and  reasonable  ;  a  ser/ice  due  to 
God,  and  the  way  by  which  saints  actively  protnote  the  highest 
good  of  God's  kingdom.  Hence  saints  will  delight  in  the  ser- 
vice of  God,  and  esteem  it  as  their  meat  and  drink  to  do  his 
will,  as  Christ  did  ;  yea  they  will  account  this  yoke  of  service 
easy,  and  this  burden  light.  Such  are  the  feelings  the  benevo- 
lent have  for  that  service  and  obedience  which  are  required  of 
them.  We  h  we  now  exhibited  to  view  the  principal  objects  of 
holy  affections,  in  which  saints  take  peculiar  delight. 

Some  objects  they  will  hate:  and  sin  is  one.  The  tendency 
of  every  sin  is  to  destroy  that  happiness,  in  which  benevolence 
uUimateiy  delights.     Hence  sin  must  be  an  object  ©f  their 


299 

liatied  and  abhorrence.  All  remaining^  sin,  the  old  man  in  their 
own  heart,  they  hate.  They  loath  and  abhor  themselves,  and 
will  repent  ;  will  have  broken  hearts  for  sin,  and  be  humble, 
and  lie  in  the  dust,  ever  crying,  God  be  merciful  to  us  sinners. 
They  will  also  hate  sin  in  others,  as  the}'  do  in  themselves. 
Htnce  they  will  be  employed  in  fightinj^  against  sin,  and  sa- 
tan  ;  and  strive  with  all  their  might  to  have  the  kingdom  of 
darkness  demolished.  They  will  therefore,  while  in  this  life, 
ever  experience  a  warfare  within,  between  the  new  and  the  old 
man  ;  and  carry  on  a  war  against  all  the  works  of  darkness. 

This  is  sufficient  to  show,  in  general  at  least,  what  objects 
benevolence  will  love,  and  hate  ;  and  to  show  what  are  the  op- 
erations or  affections  of  a  holy  disposition  or  relish.  By  (hese 
operations  or  affections  of  benevolence,  we  may  know  what 
our  own  characters  are,  and  those  of  others.  For  these  are 
the  fruits  of  the  spirit  ;  those  fruits  by  which  all  men  are  to  be 
known.  As  the  fruits  of  lioliness  and  sin  are  very  different  in 
their  nature;  wherever  the  fruits  of  holiness  prevail  and  abound, 
it  is  easy  to  distinguish  between  saints  and  sii.ners.  But  if  the 
fruits  of  holiness  are  few,  faint  and  imperfect,  it  is  difricult  to 
discern  between  the  clean  and  unclean. 

III.  Describe  the  difference  between  benevolence  and  selfish- 
ness. The  nature  of  benevolence  has  been  already  delnieated. 
When  selfishness  is  described,  the  difference  between  them-  will 
at  once  be  evident.  The  selfish  man  has  appetites,  inclinations, 
and  desires.  And  he  daily  seeks  to  gratify  and  satiate  them.  In 
this  his  whole  happiness  consists.  The  objects  he  seeks  are 
those  which  are  agreeable,  which  please  and  gratify  his  desires. 
Whatever  they  are,  he  will  wish  to  possess  them  in  such  ahun- 
dance  as  to  gratify  every  desire;  not  only  for  a  day,  but  through 
life  ;  he  will  w  ish  for  power  to  obtain,  and  to  increase  the  sup- 
ply constantly  ;  he  will  wish  for  power  to  defend  himself  in 
the  possession  of  his  treasures  ;  and  for  power  to  enjoy  thrm 
with  impunity,  even  if  they  were  unrighteously  obtained.  Men, 
who  are  daily  accumulating  property,  and  use  unlawful  means 
to  obtain  it,  are  never  willing  to  be  called  to  an  account,  and 
punished  for  their  crimes.  And  thuy  nt'ver  would  suffer  them- 
selves to  be  thus  treated,  if  it  were  in  their  power  to  prevent  it. 
Hence  it  is  very  evident,  they  not  only  wish  for  puwer  to  obtain 
whatever  they  love,  but  to  have  power  also  to  possess  and  en- 
joy it  with  imnnnity.  To  be  in  a  state  or  condition,  in  which 
thevcan  po>s,^<sand  enjov  every  object  they  love  with  impuni- 

i 


300 

ty,  tlicy  must  render  thomsclvcs  inrfepcndcnt  of  all  beinc^s,  and 
possess  |>o\ver  unlinrued.  This  servos;  to  show  to  what  a  state 
sellish  men  would  exalt  themselves,  if  they  could  do  it.  And 
we  find  all  such  men  hate  a  state  of  dependence  ;  are  ever 
striving:  to  render  themselves  independent  of  men  ;  and  the  more 
independent  they  are,  the  more  they  are  suited.  And  they 
would  render  themselves  independent  of  God,  if  it  were  possi- 
ble. They  hate  as  much  to  be  dependent  on  him,  as  on  their 
fellow  men.  Hence  if  they  could  attain  unto  that  state  or  em- 
inence, which  is  most  desired  b}'  them,  they  would  render 
themselves  independent  of  all  beinjis  both  created  aud  uncreat- 
ed. Then  they  cou'd  enjoy  all  the  objects  of  their  pleasure 
and  deliffht,  without  any  fear  of  being  deprived  of  them,  or 
punished  for  any  crimes  the}'  had  committed. 

The}'  have  no  principle  within  to  restrain  them  from  seeking 
this  state  of  independence.  For  they  have  no  benevolence  ; 
no  love  for  God  or  for  men  ;  nothing  to  excite  them  to  seek 
the  glory  of  God,  or  happiness  of  any  of  their  fellow  men,  ex- 
cept those  for  whom  they  have  a  natural  aflection,  and  view  as 
a  part  of  themselves.  Being  totally  destitute  of  benevolence, 
they  pursue  the  objects  of  their  pleasure  without  any  regard  to 
Ood,  or  the  happiness  of  men  ;  they  care  not  how  often  they 
transgress  the  divine  law,  or  how  mucii  they  injure  their  fellow 
Hie'i,  if  they  can  do  it  so  as  to  avoid  punishment.  Nothing 
but  a  fear  of  disgrace  and  punishment  restrains  them.  And 
they  would,  if  possible,  reach  a  state  of  such  eminence  a)id  in- 
dependence, as  to  be  above  all  fear  of  punishment. 

Now  our  inquiry  is,  of  what  nature  arc  the  objects,  which 
please  and  gratify  the  desires  of  selfish  men  .''  Daily  facts 
prove  what  it  is  they  love  and  seek.  One  object  is  property. 
They  wish  for  food  to  eat  and  raiment  to  wear  ;  and  for  every 
other  object  necessary  to  their  convenience,  ease,  and  comfort. 
They  wish  to  have  property  suliicient  to  satiate  every  desire  ; 
and  to  have  a  lasting  store,  which  will  not  be  expended  while 
they  live.  Hence  they  are  earnest  in  their  pursuit  of  riches. 
And  however  rich  they  are, they  never  have  too  much;  yea  they 
never  have  enough.  Hence  there  is  no  end  to  their  pursuit  of 
riches.  Property  is  not  only  agreeable  to  their  natural  appe- 
tites and  desires,  and  is  sought  for  this  reason  ;  but  property  is 
power ;  the  more  they  have,  the  more  able  they  are  to 
acquire  more,  and  also  to  gratify  every  desire.  As  property  is 
in  one  sense  power,  they  love  it  for  this  reason,  and  seek  it.   As 


301 

with  property  they  gratify  their  appetites, their  bodily  cravings, 
it  is  agreeable  to  their  primary  feelings  ;  and  as  it  enables  them 
to  acquire  more  with  greater  ease,  it  is  a^creeable  to  their  sec- 
ondary  desires.  This  shows  at  once  why  riches  are  so  agreea- 
ble to  selfish  men,  and  arc  sought  by  them  with  so  much  assidu- 
ity and  zeal. 

Another  object  highly  pleasing  to  them  is  honor,  or  the  es- 
teem of  men,  and  high,  eminent  stations  of  office.  Wh}'  is 
honor  so  agreeable  to  a  selfish  man  ?  If  pride  is  a  primary 
appetite  or  principle  of  action  ;  the  reason  is  obvious.  Be- 
cause honor  gratifies  pride.  Then,  again,  an  office  is  power. 
A  man  in  office  is  invested  with  authority  ;  he  has  power  to 
rule  ;  and  with  the  help  of  this  power  he  can  more  readily  in- 
crease his  wealth  ;  and  especially  v.hcn  wc  consider,  that  profit 
is  annexed  to  his  office,  and  is  the  fruit  of  it.  Again.  The 
higher  they  are  exalted  by  any  office,  the  more  independent  of 
men  they  feel  themselves  to  be.  Now  when  we  consider  these 
facts,  it  is  not  strange  that  honor  is  an  object  so  pleasing,  and 
sought  with  so  much  zeal.  And  the  more  a  man  is  esteemed  by 
his  fellow  men,  it  he  has  no  office,  the  more  power  he  has  to 
gratify  his  desires.  For  if  esteemed,  all  around  him  will 
strive  to  please  him,  and  aid  him  in  his  pursuits.  Hence  he  en- 
joys a  more  favorable  opportunity  to  acquire  propert}',  than  a 
man  does,  who  is  hated  by  his  fellows.  This  men  find  is  a 
fact.  Hence  they  love  to  be  esteemed  ;  because  this  enables 
them,  with  more  ease  and  greater  success,  to  obtain  every  ob- 
ject agreeable  to  their  desires.  Hence  we  see  why  worldly 
honors  and  greatness  are  so  pleasing  to  men.  And  especially 
why  they  are  pleased  with  svprcmc  power  in  any  state  or  king- 
dom. If  a  person  has  authority  and  power  to  command,  to 
rule,  and  act  according  to  his  pleasure  with  impunity  ;  he  is 
so  far  above,  and  independent  of  men.  No  won>!er,  then,  that 
men  arc  so  ambitious,  apd  have  such  a  thirst  for  kingly  author- 
ity, and  to  possess  absolute  power.  For  he,  who  enjoys  abso- 
lute power  in  a  kingdom,  can  gratify  all  his  desires,  and  can 
live  and  act  according  to  his  pleasure,  with  impunity.  He  has 
so  far  attained  to  ihat  state  of  independence  which  all  seek,  in 
which  he  can  gratify  all  his  desires  with  impunity,  as  long  as 
he  possesses  this  power. — As  such  absolute  power  is  the  most 
tavorable  to  all  the  desires  of  natural  men,  and  enables  them  to 
live  as  they  please  ;  no  wonder  mankind  have  sought  it  with  so 
much  zeal  ;  and  have  spilt  the  blood  of  millions,  and  filled  the 
world  with  misery,  to  obtain  it. 


302 

Anothor  object  hig^hly  pleasins;  to  man,  is  the  enjoyment  of 
sensual  pleasures  or  {j^i'^iti'ications.  The  end  of  a  seihsli  man 
is  the  constant  gratification  of  all  his  flcsires.  In  this  liis  hap- 
piness consists.  So  the  constant  enjoyment  of  every  pleasure 
is  his  end  ;  in  this  his  desires  are  gratified.  Every  object  he 
seeks  is  with  a  view  to  this  end.  And  he  wishes  to  live  in  the 
enjoyment  of  every  pleasure  unmolested,  free  from  all  fear  of 
beiu!^  deprived  of  them,  or  punished  for  any  of  his  inilawful 
deeds.  And  if  he  can  possess  the  riches  of  this  world,  and  its 
honors,  and  rise  to  such  authority  as  to  rule  and  reign  accord- 
ing to  Irs  pleasure  ;  then  he  has  reached  the  highest  pinnacle 
of  greatness,  grandeur  and  felicity,  this  world  a/fords. — These 
observations  show  us,  what  is  the  end  of  a  selfisji  man,  what  ob- 
jects are  most  pleasing  to  him,  and  what  his  life  and  conduct 
will  be  as  far  as  he  has  power. 

All  we  now  have  to  do,  is  to  compare  selfishness  and  benev- 
olence with  each  other,  and  then  we  shall  see  the  dilfercnce  be- 
tween them.  The  primary  operations  of  selfishness  are  covet- 
ous, Covetousness  may,  with  great  pwpriety,  be  considered 
the  first  operations  or  exercises  of  selfishness.  If  a  person  is 
hungry,  he  covets  food  ;  this  is  only  a  de*ire  for  it  to  satiate 
his  appetite.  He  will  also  covet  or  desire  a  sufiicient  quantity 
to  satisfy  him,  not  only  for  a  day,  but  lhr')ugh  life.  When  he 
obtains  it,  he  will  covet  power  to  defend  his  possession,  that 
others  may  not  rob  him  of  it.  And  if  anj'  h mid  think  he  had 
obtained  any  of  it  by  fraud,  and  pursue  measures  to  have  him 
punished,  he  will  covet  or  desire  power  to  defend  himself,  and 
to  ward  off  the  stroke  of  justice,  and  to  enjoy  his  food  and  all 
his  possessions  with  impunity,  and  without  tear  of  being  de- 
prived of  them.  Such  are  the  operations  of  selfishness.  And 
then,  as  far  as  any  assist  him,  and  appear  friendly  to  him  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  objects  of  his  desires;  he  will  call  them  friends, 
and  treat  them  in  a  friendly  manner,  a§  far  as  is  consistent  with 
his  own  schemes  and  desires,&  no  further.  And  if  any  appear 
unfriendly,  and  oppose  him  iii  the  pursuit  of  his  dearest  objects, 
or  embarrass  him  in  executing  his  schemes,  this  opposition  will 
excite  in  his  heart  hatred,  anger,  r.evenge,  and  such  malignant 
passions  ;  which  will  lead  him  to  injure  them  as  far  as  he  can 
with  safety,  and  his  own  honor. 

Hence  the  selfish  man  has  a  disposition,  which  leads  him  to 
accumulate  property,  and  become  very  rich.  He  never  has 
cHoutrh.     The  accumulation  of* wealth  ordy  increases  his  desire 


303 

after  more.  His  desire  is  to  enarross  and  monopolise  all  the 
weilili  of  tills  WDrld,  and  reduce  all  his  fellow  men  to  the  con- 
dition ol'  tenants,  except  a  few  who  are  his  chddren  or  near  rel- 
atives, and  whom  he  views  as  a  part  of  liimself.  And  if  he 
succeeds  in  acquiring  riches,  and  multiplyinf?  the  number  of  his 
tenants  ;  then  his  desire  is  to  usurp  power  and  authority  suffi- 
cient to  defend  his  possessions,  and  to  enjoy  tin  m  with  iiiipuni- 
t\,  and  free  from  all  danger  or  fear  of  being  dispossessed  and 
punished.  So  he  will  covet  power,  and  monopolise  to  him  all 
authority,  that  he  may  rule  and  reign  ;  and  have  all  around 
him  revere  his  name,and  submit  to  his  will  h  pleasure.  In  such 
a  state  of  independence  he  views  himself  able  to  indulge  himself, 
and  to  gratify  every  desire  of  his  heart  ;  or  in  one  w  ord,  to 
live,  and  swim  in  an  ocean  of  worldly  pleasure.  And  so  far 
he  feels  himself  happy,  and  enjoying  all  the  felicity  this  world 
can  aflord.  In  this  state  of  independence  he  would  wish  to  live 
forever  ;  for  he  has  no  relish  for  any  other,  or  higher  pleasures, 
than  those  he  enjoys.  To  rule  and  reign  independently,  and 
enjoy  his  pleasures  free  from  all  danccer  and  fear,  is  that  high 
pinnacle  of  glory  and  bliss  to  which  his  heart  has  aspired. 

Hence  we  see  what  the  nature  of  selfishness  is,  in  all  its  op- 
erations. The  selfish  man  is  for  engi-ossing-,  monopolising,  all 
the  wealth  of  this  world,  and  usurping  all  power,  and  authori- 
ty ;  and  enjoying:  all  the  pleasures  this  world  can  afford,  with- 
out any  feeling  or  regard  for  the  happiness  of  any  of  his  fellow 
men,  except  those  relatives  whom  he  views  as  parts  of  himself. 
This  description  of  selfishness  and  its  operations  agrees  with 
facts,  and  the  word  of  God.  It  is  evident  from  the  history  of 
men,  and  what  we  daily  observe,  that  all  natural  men  pursue 
riches,  honors,  power,  and  earthly  pleasures.  It  is  evident, 
that  all  men  are  natmally  tyrants  ;  possessed  of  a  disposition 
to  act  according  to  their  pleasure  with  inipunity  ;  or  to  live 
independent,  and  above  all  controul.  This  disposition  is  ap- 
parent in  children,  and  is  manifested  by  their  lives,  unless  they 
are  renewed.  And  the  bible  testifies  that  men  have  forsaken 
God  the  fountain  of  all  good,  and  have  gone  after  broken  cis- 
terns ;  ^that  they  go  astray  fron)  the  womb  speaking  lies,  and 
have  worshipped  and  served  the  creature,  and  not  their  Crea- 
tor. 

But  benevolence  is  very  difi^'rent-in  its  nature  and  operations. 
The  happiness  of  others  or  of  God's  kingdom  is  its  ultimate  end. 
The  happiness  of  God's  kingdom  is  the  first,  and  greatest  sourcf; 


304 

uf  happiness  to  tlie  benevolent   heart.     Hence  the  good   mail 
cannot  promote  his  own  happhiess,  only  by  j)romoting  and  in- 
creasinc:  that  of  his  follow  men.      Hence   he  will   avoid   every 
thingr,  which  tends  to  the  misery  of  men,  and  seek  every  thing, 
which  tends  to  their  happiness.     It  is  the   nature    of  benevo- 
lence, instead  of  monopolising,  to  give  and   diffuse  the  means 
of  happiness  among  his  fellow  mortals.     Because    tlie  more 
they  rejoice,  or  tlie  greater  their  happiness,  so  much  greater  is 
his  own  joy.      Selfishness  and  benevolence  resemble  each  oth- 
er only  in  one  particular,  which  is  this ;  all  men  seek  the  ob- 
jects of  their  pursuit  for    the  same  reason,   because  they  arc 
pleasing  and  agreenble  to  their  hearts.     This  is  the  primary 
spring  of  action,  or  motive,  which  coverns  all  men, good  or  bad, 
and  which  puts  every  wheel  in   motion  in  the  moral  world. — 
But  as  the  objects  which  are  ultimately  pleasing   to  them  are 
very  diflerent  in  their  nature,  their  motives  differ  in   their  na- 
ture, and  excite  them  to  different  pursuits,  and  conduct  in  life, 
which   manifest   widely    different   characters.     Their  motives 
lead  them  to  bring  forth  very  different  ^rur^,  by  which  they  are 
known  and  distinguished.     The  benevolent  man   delights  in 
the  happiness  of  others.     This  affords  no  delight  to  the  selfish 
man.     The   latter  is  for  engrossing  and   monopolising  every 
thing  to  himself.     The  former  is  forgiving  away  and  diffusing 
the  sources  of  happiness  among  all  men,  as  far  as  can  be  con- 
sistent with  the  greatest  sum  of  felicity.     The  selfish  man  sub- 
ordinates religion  to  his  worldly  pursuits  ;  the  benevolent  sub- 
ordinates the  world  to  religion.     One  loves  God  and  all  men  j 
the  other  has  no  love  for  either.     One  hates  sin  as  the  greatest 
enemy  to  happiness  ;  the  other  loves  it,  and  rolls  it  as  a  sweet 
morsel  under  his  tongue.     One  seeks  heaven  as  his  home  ;  the 
other  wishes  to  live  here  forever.     One  believes  God  is  perfect, 
and  will  govern  the  world  in  the  wisest  and  best  manner,  to  ob- 
tain at  last  the  greatest  sum   of  happiness ;  hence   he  rejoices 
that  the  Lord  reigns.     The  other  opposes  the  character  and 
government  of  God,  because  he  knows,  he  will  call  him  to  an 
account,  and  punish  him  for  all  his  evils  deeds.     One  submits 
to  the  will  of  God  with  pleasure.     The  other  opposes  his  will, 
and  would  render  himself  Independent  of  God,   were  it  in  his 
power.     One  chooses  to  be  in  the  hand  of  God,  and  at  his  dis- 
posal, and  every  thing  he  possesses  ;  because  God  knows,  and 
he  does  not,  how  every  thing  should  be  ordered  for  the  gener- 
al good.     The  other  cannot  endure  the  thought  of  being  at  the 


505 

disposal  of  Jehovah.  One  chooses  to  he  dcpondent,  ?nd 
receive  every  gift  from  God.  The  other  hates  d<.'pendence, 
and  to  be  under  obligations  to  his  Maker.  One  delights  in 
prrj^er,  and  the  service  of  God  ;  ilie  other  hates  to  pray,  and 
rejects  the  service  of  God,  and  serves  sin  and  satan,  the  enemy 
of  God.  Thus  selfishness  and  benevolence  difi'er  in  their  na- 
ture and  operations.  Thisdilferencc  originates  from  the  nature 
of  those  object'^,  which  they  love  and  seek  on  their  own  account, 
and  as  their  ultimate  ends.  According  to  the  nature  of  die  ul- 
timate end  of  a  moral  auent,  will  his  character  and  conduct  be. 
Wehaveseen  what  is  thcnltimatecndof  the  benevolent  man,  &iof 
the  selfish  ;  and  what  of  course  niust  be  their  desires,  pursuits, 
and  conduct  in  life;  that  they  will  pursue  courses  as  wide  a- 
part  as  the  east  and  west,  and  as  different  from  each  other,  as 
light  and  darkness,  sin  and  holiness  ;  which  proves  that  the 
primary,  active  principles  which  govern  them,  are  diflerent  in 
their  nature  and  tendency. 

IV.  Attend  to  the  excellency  and  glory  of  benevolence. — 
The  nature  of  every  thing  is  such,  that  it  will  tend  ultimately 
either  to  good  or  evil,  to  promote  happiness  or  destroy  it. 
There  is  nothing  concerning  vvhicl:.  it  can  be  said,  that  it  exists 
in  vain.  Nothing  is  in  its  nature  indiflerent,  of  which  it  may 
be  said,  this  will  never  do  au}'  good,  or  any  hurt.  If  any  tiring 
in  its  nature  tends  ultimately  to  destroy  happiness  and  produce 
misery,  is  such  a  thing  useful,  beautifid,  and  excellent  ?  No, 
we  cannot  conceive  of  any  thing,  which  is  more  hateful  and  de- 
formed.— And  if  any  thing  tends  din^ctly  and  ultimately  to 
banish  misery  from  the  universe,  and  promote  the  greatest  hap- 
piness, what  shall  we  say  of  it  .'*  Would  it  not  be  an  aflront 
to  common  sense,  to  affirm  it  was  a  hateful,  deformed  thing  ? 
Must  not  all  w  ith  one  voice  pronounce  it  good,  both  beautiful 
and  excellent .'' 

And  notwithstanding  various  opinions  and  disputes  concern- 
ing what  constitutes  beaut}'  and  excellency  ;  all  will  at  least 
have  to  ac\inow\ci\ixc,tUnt  utility  h  beauty  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
that  every  thing  which  tends  in  its  nature  to  produce  the  great- 
est happiness,  is  beautiful  and  excellent  ;  and  every  thing, 
which  in  its  nature  tends  ultimately  to  produce  misery  only,  is 
deformed  and  hateful. 

Benevolence  tends  ultimately  to  the  greatest  possible  sum  of 
happiness.  This  is  its  nature.  And  as  it  is  the  primary,  effi- 
cient cause  of  happiness  in  existence,  and  the  cause,  which  con- 

14 


30« 

tinues  coustfintly  inrrcasiiiG,  it,  and  renders  every  thing  subser- 
vient to  it,  and  will  eternally  preserve  and  increase  it;  it  is  ev- 
idently the  most  useful,  beautiful,  good,  excellent,  and  glorious 
quality  or  attrilnite  in  hein^.  Nothing-  else  can  equal  it  in 
j^lory  ;  and  without  it  the  universe  would  be  full  of  darkness 
and  misery.  And  this  it  is  believed  will  appear  more  and  more 
evident  in  describiuif  the  beauty  and  excellence  of  benevolence. 
Hfiving'  now  shown  why  it  is  fit  and  proper  to  predicate  beauty 
of  bi^nevol'  ncc,  and  shown  in  what  it  consists,  we  may  attend 
to  a  particular  description  of  it. 

1.  It  is  the  primary,  efliiient  cause  of  all  the  happiness  ex- 
isting' in  theuniverse.  All  will  grant  there  must  be  a  first  cause, 
Avhirh  gives  existence  to  every  thing;  and  this  cause. must  be 
in  its  nature  active  ;  or  it  must  be  a  primary,  efficient  cause, 
from  which  the  existence  of  all  thing's  must  proceed.  This  first 
cause  must  have  an  ultimate  end.  For  every  agent  must  have 
an  ultimate  end,  as  we  have  seen.  And  this  ultimate  end  must 
be  happiness  or  misery.  For  there  is  nothing  else,  which  is  in 
its  nature,  or  on  its  own  account,  either  good  or  evil.  This 
has  been  proved.  Now  as  all  grant,  that  God  is  the  first,  f^- 
cicn/!ca«5eof  allthings,  heasan  agent  must  have  an  ultimate  end  ; 
and  this  end  must  be  the  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness  or 
mi'?Cry.  And  with  one  or  tho  other  of  these  ends  he  must  be 
ultimately  pleased.  Such  a  disposition  or  relish  he  must  have. 
For  nothing  else,  in  any  moral  agent,  can  be  the  subject  of 
pleasure  or  pain.  Where  there  is  no  disposition,  no  feeling, 
nothing  can  either  please  or  displease.  A  feeling  disposition 
then  he  must  possess.  And  he  must  be  pleased  ultimately  with 
either  happiness  or  misery.  As  it  is  not  the  object  here  to 
prove  the  moral  perfection  of  God,  1  shall  take  it  for  granted, 
that  God  is  pleased  with  the  greatest  sum  ofcreated  happiness;  this 
is  his  ultimate  end  in  all  his  works  and  operations.  And  when 
we  consider  how  much  happiness  he  has  already  produced,  how 
every  thing  is  adapted  in  its  nature  to  this  end  ;  and  consider 
the  great  work  of  redemption,  no  one  can  have  a  doubt,  but 
that  God  ultimately  seeks  the  greatest  happiness. 

From  eternity  God  saw  that  the  greatest  sum  of  created 
happiness  was  possible,  and  might  be  produced.  This  in  its 
own  nature  was  an  infinite  and  sublime  source  of  happiness. 
Nothing  which  he  could  create  would  afibrd  him  so  much  grat- 
ificaction  and  delight,  as  the  existence  of  such  a  sum  of  happi- 
ness.    To  please  himself,  to  jfiatify  to  the  full  this  disposition 


307 

«f  his  heart,  is  what  moved  and  excited  Him  to  produce  every 
thing  which  has  existence.  This  disposition,  in  scrij)ture  call- 
ed love,  is  active  in  its  nature  ;  is  the  primary,  eflicient  cause 
of  all  things.  Why  docs  he  create,  or  produce  any  event  ? 
To  please,  or  gratify  this  love,  this  disposition.  This  disposi- 
tion, then,  moved  him  as  an  agent  to  employ  his  knowledge, 
or  infinite  wisdom,  to  devise  and  form  a  plan  for  the  final  at- 
tainment of  his  end.  This  plan  is  as  extensive  as  the  works  of 
God,  both  of  creation  and  providence.  It  includes  all  the 
works  of  creation,  and  all  the  events  of  providence  ;  and  no 
work  will  exist,  or  event  be  produced,  which  is  not  necessary  to 
the  production  of  the  greatest  happiness  ultimately.  All  things 
are  made  by  him,  and  for  hisphasure  they  are  and  were  created. 

The  disposition  of  his  heart  moved  Him  to  employ  his  infi- 
nite power,  in  carrying  this  plan  formed  by  wisdom  into  final 
execution.  Hence  by  his  will  every  thing  is  produced.  He 
said,  let  there  be  light,  and  light  was.  In  like  manner,  his  will 
produces  every  event,  and  creates  every  world.  He  wills,  and 
it  is  done.  In  this  way  his  will  is  operating,  and  will  continue 
to  operate,  until  his  plan  is  fully  executed  in  all  its  numerous 
parts.  And  this  disposition  of  Jehovah  .subordinates  all  things, 
through  the  universe,  to  the  greatest  happiness.  In  producing 
and  increasing  this,  his  pleasure  is  done  ;  his  heart  is  gratified, 
and  his  happiness  is  infinite. 

Hence  this  love  or  disposition  of  God  is  the  primary  spring 
of  action,  the  first,  efficient  cause  of  all  things.  By  it  all  his 
natural  attributes,  his  wisdom,  his  power,  are  exercised  and  dis- 
played in  forming,  and  executing  the  best  possible  plan.  His 
understanding  and  will,  considered  as  faculties  or  attributes, 
are  controlled,  directed,  and  governed  by  his  heart,  or  his  love 
for  the  general  good.  The  attributes  of  God  are  all  comprised 
in  three  ;  benevolence,  knowledge,  and  power,  answering  to  the 
faculties  in  men  called  the  heart,  the  understanding,  and  will ; 
and  they  constitute  a  fulness  sufficient  for  the  accomplishment 
of  any  thing  which  h  possible,  or  which  implies  no  contradic- 
tion or  inconsistency.  They  constitute  an  infinite  fountain  of 
good.  In  order  to  the  existence  of  the  greatest  sum  of  created 
happiness,  this  fountain  must  flow  forth  in  streams  ;  it  must  be 
diffused,  and  communicated.  And  it  is  this  disposition,  which 
we  call  benevolence,  which  puts  it  in  motion  ;  which  diffuses 
and  communicates  itself  in  stream^  innumerabl  \  This  foun- 
t^n  contains  in  itself  au  active  principle,  which  diffuses  the 


30S 

fountain  in  the  displays  ofwisdom,  power,  coodncss,  and  linp- 
piness  ;  so  that  the  perfccl  difuisuju  or  couuminication  of  it  is 
llie  highest  good, or  greatest  sum  of  happiness  existing  ab  extra, 
or  out  of  itself.  The  sun  is  able  to  emit  rays ;  and  this 
emission  is  the  light  and  glory  of  the  sun,  which  emanation  ex- 
ists external  to  itself,  or  ab  cjctra,  as  some  phrase  it.  So  the  in- 
finite, eternal  fountain  of  all  good  contains  in  itself  a  self  mov- 
ing, active  principle,  which  emanates,  and  difl'usesthe  fountain. 
And  this  greatest  difiiision  is  the  highest  possible  declarative 
glory  of  God;  and  exists  in  that  holy  so(;iety  of  beings  in  heav- 
en, who  constitute  the  kingdom  of  God.  In  this  socict}'  will 
be  forever  seen  this  eternal  fountain,  diflused  perfectly,  and  iu 
its  endless  increasing  haiopiness,  the  brightest  display  of  all  the  ■ 
attributes  of  Jehovah.  So  that,  as  has  been  shown,  the  great- 
est sum  of  created  happiness  existing  externally  in  this  society, 
and  the  greatest  declarative  glory  of  God,  are  one  and  the  same. 

Here  then  we  see,  that  benevolence  is  the  primar}',  eternal, 
active,  efficient  cause  of  all  good,  of  all  the  liappiness,  wijic'i 
does  exist,  and  of  all  the  increasing  happiness,  which  will  exist 
through  endless  ages.  The  constaully  increasing  hap|)ir,css  of 
heaven  through  an  endless  duration,  is  the  end  at  which  benev- 
olence ultimately  aimed.  Hence  its  utility  is  infinite  ;  its 
beaut}',  excellency,  and  glory  are  unparallellcd.  If  this  active 
benevolence  had  not  existed  in  God,  no  happiness  wculd  finally 
have  had  existence.  Il",  instead  of  this,  his  heart  had  been  ma- 
levolent, had  delighted  in  misery,  as  satan  does,  all  his  attri- 
butes would  have  been  employed  in  producing  misery,  and  the 
universe  would  have  been  filled  with  it.  But  now  we  are  as- 
sured from  the  benevolence  of  God,  that  the  greatest  happiness 
will  be  enjoyed  in  heaven  forever.  Thus  glorious  is  benevolence. 

2.  It  prepares  created  intelligent  beings  for  happiness, 
and  prompts  them  to  seek  it. — Until  the  heart  is  renewed  by 
the  agency  of  the  Spirit,  men  arc  totally  depraved.  They 
have  no  moral  goodness  in  their  hearts.  For  benevolence 
comprises  all  moral  goodness  ;  but  they  have  a  love  for  this 
world.  Having  no  love  for  God,  and  a  love  for  this  world,  they 
forsake  G  >  1,  and  live  in  rebellion.  They  have  no  principle 
within  to  move  them  to  serve  G;)d.  Hence  the\'  never  serve 
hiin  until  born  again.  I:i  regeneration,  a  benevolent  disposi- 
tion or  relish  is  created  in  the  heart ;  and  the  sinner  becomes  a 
partaker  of  the  divine  nature.  Then  objects  which  he  hated  he 
loves  ;  and  thos,.'.  cvA  ways,  whicii  he  loved,  he  hates.     No\f 


500 

his  heart  delichts  in  God,  loves  the  Savior  as  his  best  friend  j 
he  rejoices  in  the  hoppiness  of  others,  and  takes  complacency 
in  the  holy  characters  of  saints  ;  he  loves  God  supremely,  and 
his  neig-hbor  as  himself. 

Thus  benevolence  prepares  him  to  serve  God.  Now  he  es- 
teems his  yoke  easy,  and  his  burden  light ;  and  it  Is  as  pleasant 
to  him  to  serve  God,  as  it  is  to  eat  and  drink.  He  is  a  member 
of  the  family  of  God  ;  his  heart  is  united  to  the  interest  of  the 
family  ;  and  t!ie  highest  good  of  God's  holy  kingdom  is  the  ul- 
timate object  of  his  pursuit.  He  therefore  renounces  the  ser- 
vice of  sin  and  satan  forever  ;  and  devotes  himself,  soul  and 
body,  with  all  his  talents,  and  all  the  blessings  and  privileges 
granted  him,  to  the  service  of  God  his  Father,  and  Christ  his 
Savior  and  friend.  Tims  benevolence- prepares  a  person  to 
serve  God  ;  and  it  is  the  onlj'  quality,  which  disposes  men  to 
serve  their  Maker  acceptably. 

Again.  Jt  is  benevolence  alone,  which  prepares  persons  to 
enjoy  God.  It  is  this  divine  relish,  which  qualifies  them  to  de- 
light in  the  sources  of  heavenly  felicit}'.  Without  it,  if  in  heav- 
en, persons  could  not  be  happy.  Benevolence  only  deliglits  in 
benevolence,  in  the  service  and  praise  of  God.  Except  a  man 
be  born  again,  he  cannot  see,  that  is  enjoy,  the  kingdom  of  God. 
And  without  holiness  no  man  shall  see  the  Lord. — The  unholy 
will  be  fore\er  excluded  from  the  kingdom  of  glory.  No  un- 
clean thing  is  to  enter  there. 

When  we  see  clearly,  that  holiness  is  the  onl}'  quality' which, 
prepares  persons  to  sc/tc  and  enjoy  God,  we  nuist  be  convinced 
of  its  utility,  excellency  and  beauty.  It  exceeds  diamo})ds,  ru- 
bies, yea  all  the  riches  and  most  precious  things  the  world  af- 
fords. Its  value  is  equal  to  a  state  of  endless,  increasing  hap- 
piness. Its  worth  equals  the  eternal  blesseduess  to  which  it  is 
necessary. — Next  to  happiness,  it  exceeds  in  value  c\ery  attri- 
bute and  blessinor. 

3.  Benevolence  is  moral  beauty.  Widiout  it  no  being  has 
any  moral  beauty,  but  is  clothed  with  the  deformity  of  sin. — 
Knowledcre  is  always  used  to  do  good  or  hurt,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  active  principles  of  the  hf^art.  A  benevolent  rel- 
ish will  govern,  and  improve  all  the  information  a  person  pos- 
sesses, in  devising  means  and  ways  to  promote  happiness.  And 
the  will  is  equally  under  the  inHuencc  of  the  heart.  Every 
choice,  or  exertion,  is  made  with  a  view  of  gratifying  tiie  heart. 
Hence   from  facts  and  daily  experience  we  iind  men  using 


310 

their  Unowledtje,  and  exertinc:  their  power,  to  gratify  the  pre- 
vailii)c:  iucliiiations  of  the  heart.  The  covetous  improve  all 
their  knowledge  and  power  in  amassing  wealtii  ;  and  the  proud 
and  ambitious,  in  usurping  authority,  extending  their  dominion, 
and  reducing  the  work!  to  a  state  of  subjection.  While  the  fal- 
len angels  were  holy,  every  power  was  exerted  to  serve  their 
king.  But  as  soon  as  they  were  deprived  of  this  disposition, 
and  hatred  governed,  all  their  knowledge,  subtlet}'  and  power 
have  been  used  in  opposing  God,  defacing  the  beauty  of  his 
kingdom,  and  destroying  its  peace  and  harmony. 

Before  they  sinned  they  were  briglit,  amiable,  glorious 
spirits  ;  reflecting  divine  rays,  and  sliining  with  the  splendors 
of  holiness  around  the  divine  throne.  But  the  moment  they 
lost  a  benevolent  disposition,  they  were  stripped  of  all  their 
glory  and  beautv,  were  clothed  with  deformity,  and  have  been 
to  this  day  hateful  demons.  As  soon  as  Adam  sinned,  his  glory 
departed  ;  and  the  divine  beautj'  with  which  he  was  adorned 
is  never  restored,  until  benevolence  is  reinstamped  on  the  heart. 
Benevolence  is  the  beauty,  the  excellency,  and  the  only  crown 
of  glory,  with  which  intelligent  beings  are  adorned.  Without 
it  tiiey  are  deformed,  lt)athsome,  and  hateful  characters  ;  and 
can  never  be  admitted  into  that  world  where  every  member  re- 
flects the  glorious  rays  of  divinity. 

4.  Benevolence  is  the  only  bond  of  union  and  harmony  in 
the  moral  world.  Those  who  are  adorned  with  this  spirit  aim 
ai  the  same  ultimate  end.  They  rejoice  in  each  other's  joy. 
Tiieir  hearts  ultimately  centre  in  the  same  object.  They  love 
God  supremely,  and  are  loved  by  him  ;  they  love  their  Savior, 
and  he  rejoices  in  his  bride  ;  their  love  to  each  other  is  mutual 
and  strong.  Thus  by  love  they  are  connected  with  their  king 
andhead,  and  perfectly  united  to  each  other. 

In  heaven,  where  benevolence  is  perfect,  all  are  one.  As 
Christ  prayed,  they  are  one  with  the, Father,  one  with  Christ, 
and  oneness  is  perfect  among  the  members.  There  is  no  dis- 
cord there.  They  are  one  in  sentiment,  one  in  pursuit  and  ac- 
tion, and  one  in  aflection.  All  hatred,  envy,  revenge,  malice, 
and  every  disuniting  and  jarring  passion,  is  eradicated.  Be- 
nevolence is  the  only  active  governing  principle  in  that  world. 
Ti^ough  the  members  of  the  heavenly  society  are  innumerable  ; 
yet  they  will  eternally  appear  as  one  united  body.  Actuated 
by  one  and  the  same  spirit,  they  will  move  around  the  throne? 
of  God  their  centre,  with  perfect  harmony  and  regularity.    As 


©ne  tliey  will  how  before  the  throne,  and  confess  all  they  have 
is  from  God  ;  as  one  tLey  cast  their  crowns  at  his  feet,  andac- 
knowlediie  their  allegiance  ;  as  one  they  will  unite  in  the  ne\ir 
song  of  prriisc  ;  and  as  one  will  ascribe  dominion,  power  and 
glory  to  God,  und  exalt  him  forever. 

How  useful,  beautiful,  and  glorious  is  that  principle  of  heart, 
which  thus  unites  millions  of  millions  in  perfect  bonds  of  end- 
less affection.  Its  beauty  and  glory  are  so  bright,  that  there  is 
no  need  of  sun  or  moon  in  heaven  ;  and  all  the  hosts  above 
shine  as  star>  of  the  brightest  splendor  around  the  throne,  with 
increasing  lustre  forever.  To  have  a  clear  view  of  the  glcr}  of 
any  thing,  we  ought  to  survey  it  in  a  perfect  stale.  For  this 
reason  I  have  represented  benevolence  as  operating  in  heaven. 

When  we  consider  that  benevolence  is  the  eternal,  primary, 
and  only  eflici'ent  cause,  of  all  good  existing  in  the  universe  i 
the  only  principle,  which  prepares  intelligent  creatures  iose:  .^e 
and  enjoy  God,  and  all  good ;  the  only  quality  which  constitutes 
the  moral  beauty  of  rational  agents  ;  the  only  uniting  principle 
in  heaven  ;  as  the  light  and  glory  of  the  universe  ;  we  must  pro- 
nounce its  utility,  glory  and  excellency  to  surpass  all  other 
things  in  worth  and  value.  Oh  how  excellent,  how  glorious  is 
this  divine  attribute.  It  is  the  divinity,  beauty  and  glory  of 
the  Godhead.  It  is  the  beauty,  glory  and  brightness  of  all  in- 
telligent beings.  With  it,  in  a  perfect  state,  endlessly  increas- 
ing happiness  is  inseparably  connected.  It  is  the  glory  of  the 
universe,  and  infinitely  exceeds  the  sun  in  its,  meridian  splendor, 
in  brightness,  and  in  vivifying,  blissful,  joyful  ra\  s. 

Objection.  If  benevolence  is  a  moral  virtue,  a  holy  affection, 
because  it  is  useful  ;  then  every  thing  which  is  useful  is  a  mor- 
al virtue.  The  light  and  heat  of  the  sun.  health,  food,  and 
raiment,  and  a  thousand  similar  blessings  are  useful,  and  tend 
nltitnately  to  happiness.  And  if  utility  constitute  the  nature  of 
moral  virtue  ;  every  thing,  which  has  a  final  tendency  to  happi- 
ness, is  of  course  a  moral  \irtue. 

Answer.  This  objection  seems  to  arise  eitli^r  from  igno- 
rance, or  negligence,  or  a  wish  to  conceal  and  pervert  the  truth. 
For  by  making  one  plain  and  obvious  distinction,  which  any 
one  might  see,  the  force  of  the  objection  disappears  at  once. 
It  is  only  necessary  to  make  a  distinction  between  natural,  and 
moral  good  ;  a  distinction  which  is  made  by  everv  one.  And 
why  has  not  the  obj'  ctor  mndo  thi>i  distinction  in  this  case,  as 
he  does  in  a  thousand  other  instances  ?     I  can  give  no  reason 


.    812 

for  this  omission,  but  one  or  the  othor  of  the  above  causes* 
It  is  granteiJ,  thnt  utility,  or  the  ttiidency  of  any  thing  to  pro- 
mote happiness  ultimately,  does  c<.nstitute  the  nature  of  pood. 
For  the  same  reason  one  thing  oucht  to  be  called  good,  every 
thing  of  the  same  natine  ought  to  be  thus  stiled.  There  is  no 
difference,  in  their  nature,  between  natural  and  moral  good. 
They  are  both  good,  because  their  ultimate  tendency  is  to  hap- 
iness.  And  every  thing  is  evil  for  the  same  reason  ;  because 
its  uUimate  tendency  is  to  misery.  Natural  good  is  not  so  call- 
ed for  one  reason,  and  moral  good  for  a  very  different  reason. 
This  is  not  the  ground  of  the  distinction  between  natural  and 
moral  good.  Moral  good  is  predicated  of  no  action  or  exer- 
cise, but  those  of  moral  agents.  The  light  and  heat  of  the  sun 
are  not  actions  of  a  moral  agent  ;  yet  being  in  their  nature 
good,  they  are  stiled  a  natural  good,  to  distinguish  them  from 
the  actions  of  moral  agents.  Indeed  every  thing  belonging  to 
a  moral  agent  is  not  a  moral  good  or  evil.  Knowledge,  or  the 
understanding  with  numerous  operations,  are  not  in  a  moral 
sense  good  ;  they  are  not  moral  virtues.  Neither  \s  povjer,  or 
the  will  and  its  operations.  Divines  have  always  made  a  dis' 
tinctioii  between  the  natural  and  moral  attributes  of  Deity. 
And  the  same  distinction  is  applicable  to  created  moral  agents. 
Moral  good  and  evil  are  not  predicable  of  every  thing  in  exis- 
istence,  but  of  active  principles  and  their  operations.  Nor  of 
active  principles,  unless  they  exist  in  a  being,  who  is  a  proper 
moral  agent.     The  reason  of  it  is  obvious. 

Now  benevolence  is  an  active  principle,  and  belongs  to  the  *j 
heart,  and  is  the  primar}'  efficient  cause  of  all  the  good  or  hap- 
piness which  exists  in  the  universe.  This  has  been  made  evi-  i 
dent.  It  is  then  a  moral  principle  ;  and  all  its  exercises  or  op-  I 
erations,  which  are  commonly  called  theafiections  and  passions, 
are  also  moral.  And  to  distinguish  all  other  actions,  exercises 
StoperatioBS  which  are  good,  they  are  called  natural ;  good  in  a 
natural  sense.  Hence,  although  all  things  are  good  for  the 
same  rea-^on,  because  they  tend  in  their  nature  to  produce  hap- 
piness ultimately,  or  are  useful ;  yet  is  it  proper  for  the  reasons 
assigned  to  distinguish  between  them,  and  call  some  of  them  a 
natural,  and  others  a  moral  eood.  This  fully  and  fairly  meets 
and  answers  the  objection.  So  that  we  may  now  say,  that  be- 
nevolence is  a  moral  virtue,  because  it  is  useful,  or  tends  to 
happiness  ultimately.  And  that  the  light  and  heat  of  the  sun, 
and  other  things  similar  ui  their  nature,  are  good,  because  they 


313 

tend  to  happiness  ultimately;  but  they  are  only  a  natural  good, 
or  natural  virtues,  if  so  railed.  And  the  ground  of  this  dis- 
tinction has  been  made  clear  and  evident  ;  and  the  objection 
is  answered. 

I  have  now  exhibited  my  sentiments  on  this  all  important 
subject.  And  if  any  understand  what  has  been  written,  they 
will  consider  benevolence  to  consist  in  a  disposition  or  relish  of 
the  heart ;  and  view  the  happiness  of  others,  or  the  greatest 
happiness  of  God's  holy  kingdom,  as  its  ultimate  end,  which  is 
sought  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  with  an  aim  to  any  other  ob- 
ject beyond  It  more  excellent.  In  this  light  they  will  see,  it  is 
the  most  beautiful,  excellent,  and  glorious  disposition,  which 
can  exist  in  an}-  moral  agent.  They  will  see  it  is  the  original, 
eternal,  efficient  cause  of  all  the  good  in  existence  ;  as  the  only 
active,  efficient  cause,  which  has  put  every  wheel  in  motion, 
and  continues  them  till  its  ultimate  end  is  obtained.  Benevo- 
lence is  the  cause  of  all  the  happiness  existing  forever  in  heav- 
en ;  and  also  the  source  of  the  perfect  gratification  of  every 
benevolent  desire.  It  is  the  first  cause  of  all  things,  and  its 
last  end  is  the  highest  possible  pleasure  of  benevolence.  It  is 
the  alpha  and  omega  in  causing  and  attaining  the  greatest 
sum  of  happiness. 


r}n!i*!(*****i(5 


ESSAir  SXIX. 

On  Regeneration. 

What  our  Savior  terms  being  born  again,  and  generally  by 
theologians  is  stiled  regeneration,  is  essential  to  future  happi- 
ness. It  is  a  subject  very  interesting  and  important.  The 
doctrine  is  very  differently  explained  by  the  ministers  of  Christ. 
And  no  wonder,  when  we  consider  that  each  one  describes  it  ac- 
cording to  the  views  he  has  of  the  mind  and  heart  of  man. 
Regeneration  is  a  change  which  takes  place  in  the  mind,  and 
the  heart  is  especially  the  subject  of  it.  And  if  any  persons 
have  erroneous  views  of  the  heart,  they  will  err  in  their  e.\pla- 


IS 


314 

nation  of  this  change.  This,  as  well  as  almost  every  otheJt 
doctrine  of  the  pospel,  requires  a  distinct,  consistent,  and  sys- 
tematic view  of  the  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind,  in  or- 
der to  explain  and  illustrate  it  according-  to  facts  and  experi- 
ence. And  to  pive  an  explanation  of  the  new  birth,  which 
will  agree  with  the  word,  with  facts,  and  experience,  requires 
just  views  of  the  h;  man  heart.  No  doctrine  requires  such 
knowledge  more  than  this.  And  this  will  appear  more  and 
more  evident,  as  we  proceed  in  a  discussion  of  the  subject. 

A  full  and  just  view  of  the  new  birth  requires  an  attention  to 
three  distinct  propositions.  These  are  the  following  :  Why  is 
this  change  necessary  ?  In  wliat  does  it  consist  .''  And  what 
are  its  fruits  .'*  If  a  person  embrace  false  views  concerning  eith- 
er of  these  heads,  he  lays  a  foundation  for  a  final  deception, 
and  endless  disappointment.  Feeling  the  necessity  of  clear 
and  just  views  of  this  subject,  and  how  fatal  an  error  here  may 
prove,  I  enter  upon  it  with  trembling  and  caution. 

1.  Why  is  regeneration  necessary  ?  Christ  says,  except  a 
man  be  born  again,  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  heav- 
en. 

That  change  is  amazingly  interesting  and  important,  which 
is  necessary  to  eternal  life.  And  a  distinct  understanding  of 
its  necessity,  will  prepare  the  way  to  a  just  view  of  its  nature. 
In  a  natural  state  men  are  unprepared  for  a  heavenly  state  of 
existence.  The  heart  is  such,  if  a  person  were  in  heaven,  he 
could  behold  no  object  which  would  aflbrd  him  any  delight,  or 
gratify  one  desire.  Regeneration  then  is  necessary,  to  pre- 
pare persons  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  objects  and  employments 
of  that  world.  To  this  end  a  new  creation  is  necessary.  This 
will  be  evident,  when  the  necessity  of  this  change  is  clearly  ex- 
plained. 

The  word  of  God  represents  unrenewed  persons  as«?ea(7,  hlind^ 
and  deaf ;  and  without  one  seiise  to  delight  in  divine  objects. 
They  have  eyes,  ears,  and  life,  and  all  the  senses  necessary  to 
relish  and  enjoy  worldly  objects  ;  but  not  one  sense  to  delight 
in  heavenly  sources  of  enjoyment.  Being  spiritually  dead,  if 
they  were  in  heaven,  they  could  not  enjo}'  any  object  there, 
any  more  than  a  dead  man  can  enjoy  ihe  objects  of  sense  in 
this  world.  And  if  the  happiness  of  heaven  consisted  in  be- 
holding the  light  of  the  sun,  and  the  numerous  colors  its  rays 
reflect,  and  in  hearing  melodious  strains  of  music,  it  is  evident 
the   blind  and  deaf  would  find  no  object,  which  could  aflbrd 


315 

ihem  any  pleasure.  Hence,  the  enjoyments  of  heaven  are  ol' 
such  a  nature,  that  siimers  could  no  more  be  happy  there,  than 
a  dead  person  could  experience  pleasure  from  earthly  objects, 
or  the  blind  from  the  liuht,  or  the  deaf  in  the  most  harmonious 
music.  Natural  men  have  not  one  sense,  which  is  a  necessary 
preparation  for  the  enjoyment  of  heavenly  objects.  Herethen 
is  the  inquiry,  what  has  man  lost ;  and  what  is  the  nature  of 
his  heart,  which  disqualifies  him  entirely  for  the  enjoyments  of 
a  heavenly  state  .'* 

TIjc  word  of  God  teaches  us,  that  Adam  was  made  uprijjht : 
created  in  the  image  of  God,  natural  and  moral.  As  benevo- 
lence, or  holiness,  or  love.,  is  the  only  moral  attribute  in  the  di- 
vine character  ;  Adam,  to  be  created  in  the  moral  image  of 
God,  must  be  endued  with  the  same  love,  the  same  benevolent, 
holy  principle.  And  as  an  attribute  in  God  is  not  simply  an 
exercise,  but  a  principle,  or  relish  for  the  existence  of  happiness 
as  the  only  absolute  good  ;  so  men,  to  be  holy,  must  have  a 
similar  attribute.  They  must  have  an  appetite,  or  relish,  to 
delight  in  happiness  as  an  absolute  good,  and  rejoice  in  it 
wherever  they  see  it.  Accordingly,  Adam  was  created  with 
tliis  holy  appetite  or  relish.  Those  who  are  born  with  e}  es, 
are  prepared  to  rejoice  in  light  and  colors  ;  and  those  who 
have  ears,  to  delight  in  melodious  sounds.  And  we  know  the 
five  senses  of  the  body  are  necessary,  to  prepare  us  to  enjoy  all 
the  objects  of  time  and  sense.  And  if  we  d'vide  all  objects  of 
enjoyment  in  the  universe  into  two  general  classes,  and  call  one 
natural  or  temporal,  and  the  other  moral  or  spiritual ;  then,  as 
our  bodily  senses  are  requisite  to  enjoy  the  former,  so  some 
attribute,  or  sense  must  exist  in  the  heart  to  prepare  us  to  en- 
joy the  latter.  All  men  do  or  may  know,  that  our  bodily  sen- 
ses do  not  prepare  us  to  enjoy  spiritual  objects.  The  onl} 
sense,  which  prepares  us  to  enjoy  moral  objects,  is  seated  in  the 
heart.  It  is  the  heart  only,  which  loves,  and  delights  in  spirit- 
ual things.  And  Adam  was  created  with  a  heart  to  love  God, 
and  rejoice  in  him  as  his  supreme  good. 

He  was  created  with  a  holy,  benevolent  appetite,  relish,  or 
disposition.  And  this  prepared  him  to  love  and  delight  in  ev- 
ery divine  object ;  in  every  object,  which  is  a  source  of  happi- 
ness to  holy  beings  in  heaven.  He  had  other  appetites  created 
in  his  heart,  to  prepare  him  to  love  worldly  objects,  and  seek 
them  as  far  as  would  be  necessary  to  his  preservation  and  com- 
fort in  this  life.     But  not  one  of  those  appetites  ever  loves  or 


316 

delights  In  spiritual  things.  Thus  Adam  was  created  holy, 
pur:^  and  upright;  endued  with  every  appetite,  necessary  to  en- 
joy God  as  his  supreme  fountain,  and  take  comfort  in  worldly 
objects. 

But  when  he  ate  the  forbidden  fruit,  he  forfeited  the  moral 
image  of  God,  and  was  deprived  of  it.  In  that  da}',  in  a  mor- 
al sense  he  died.  And  we  see  a  great  change  had  taken  place 
in  his  feelings.  Instead  of  delighting  in  God,  and  running  to 
meet  him  when  he  heard  his  voice  in  the  garden,  he  now  runs 
from  him,  and  endeavors  to  hide  himself  from  his  sight,  lie 
fears  his  jMaker,  and  trembles  before  him.  Now  nothing  re- 
mained in  his  heart  to  love  and  delight  in  God.  He  was  as 
fully  disqualified  for  the  enjoyment  of  spiritual  objects,  as  a 
person  in  a  natural  sense  di;ad,  is  in  that  state  unprepared  for 
the  enjoyment  of  worldly  objects.  And  as  all  his  posterity  are 
born  destitute  of  the  moral  image  of  God,  they  have  nothing  in 
their  heai'ts  which  prepares  them  for  the  enjoyment  of  spiritual 
objects.  They  are  as  really  disqualified  for  the  enjoyment  of 
heavenly  objects,  as  the  blind,  deaf,  or  dead,  are  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  light,  colors,  and  melodious  sounds.  Hence  the  rea- 
son why  they  are  in  scripture  represented  as  blind,  deaf,  and 
dead.  They  have  no  taste  or  relish  for  any  objects,  but  those 
of  a  worldly  nature,  such  as  property,  honor,  and  sensual  de- 
lights. 

Hence  we  find  it  is  a  fact,  that  when  a  door  of  mercy  is  open- 
ed to  sinners  by  the  death  of  Christ,  and  provision  is  made  for 
their  entertainment  and  salvation,  and  all  are  invited  to  come 
unto  the  supper  prepared  for  them,  and  not  o»ie  will  come  ;  all 
wish  to  be  excused,  aiid  make  light  of  the  invitation,  and  go 
their  ways,  one  tj  his  farm  and  another  to  his  nierchandise. 
Why  are  men  guilty  of  such  almost  unaccountable  conduct  .'' 
Reason  teaches,  that  when  perishing  sinners  are  dying,  they 
would  hear  the  invitaJion,  '  Come,  for  all  things  arc  ready,' 
with  joy  ;  and  that  all  would  flocU  to  the  marriage  supper  of  the 
Son  of  God,  in  haste,  and  with  gladness.  But  no,  they  prefer 
this  world  to  the  gospel  feast,  and  will  not  come  to  Christ  for 
life.  And  the  reasons  are,  they  have  no  appetite,  no  relish, 
for  earthly,  perishing  objec'is.  And  as  all  men  are  governed, 
not  by  reason,  but  by  their  hearts,  so  they  will  forever  act  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  the  appetites  which  govern  them. 
This  is  the  reason,  why  we  see  Gad  the  fountain  of  all  good 
forsaken,  Christ  slighted   and  rejected,  and  the  gospel  supper 


817 

Mpcrlectecl.  This  is  tlie  reason,  wbywe  see  mankind  so  earnest  in 
their  pursuits  alter  worldly  f?ooc!.  They  have  no  love  for  God, 
but  they  love  this  world.  Hence  they  worship  and  serve  the. 
creature,  and  not  the  Creator. 

The  supper  prepared  for  sinners  in  this  world  is  the  marriage 
supper  of  the  Lamb  in  heaven,  upon  which  saints  and  angels 
feast.  It  includes  every  source  of  happiness  enjoyed  in  heaven. 
And  for  the  reason  sinners  do  not  delight  in  it  on  this  earth, 
for  the  same  reason  they  would  not  enjoy  it  in  heaven.  Hence 
if  they  were  admitted  into  that  blessed  state,  they  would  not 
find  one  object  there  to  aftord  them  the  least  satisfaction.  They 
would  take  no  delight  in  the  marriage  supper  of  the  Lamb; 
and  they  would  find  no  earthly  objects  there  to  feast  and  enter- 
tain them.  So  that  heaven  would  not  aflord  them  one  object 
of  pleasure.  But  as  there  they  would  clearly  see,  that  God 
was  against  them,  that  saints  and  angels  hated  their  characters, 
and  every  thing  was  opposed  to  their  pride,  and  self  exalting 
dispositions  ;  and  that  they  were  really  only  fit  to  be  despif^cd, 
and  treated  as  enemies  to  all  good  ;  every  thing  would  be  a 
source  of  pain  to  them.  Inr^tead  of  being  happy,  they  would 
be  exceedingly  miserable.  The  reai-on  is,  they  have  no  relish 
for  the  plea?ures  of  that  world.  And  they  will  fird  there  no 
earthly  riches,  honors, or  pleasures,  to  afibrd  them  any  delight. 
As  they  cannot  be  happy  there  they  will  be  excluded,  i^ucl  <  on- 
fined  in  the  prison  of  darkness,  the  only  place  for  which  their 
hearts  are  prepased.  There  in  confinement  they  can  r.o  more 
disturb  the  peace  and  happiness  of  God's  kingdiim.  We  now 
see,  why  a  change  of  heart  is  necessary  to  heavenly  felicity  ; 
we  see  why  a  person,  unless  born  again,  cannot  enter  the 
kingdom  of  heaven.  The  reason  is,  men  in  their  natuj  al  state 
have  no  appetite,  no  relish,  fi)r  any  of  those  obje<ts  wlii(  h  (  on- 
stitutc  the  marriage  feast  of  the  Lamb,  and  which  arc  the  only 
sources  of  felicity  after  death. 

IL  Attend  to  the  nature  of  that  change,  which  is  e.Tected  in 
regeneration.  Recj-eneration  is  a  new  creation.  There  is  s(  me- 
thing  created  in  the  heart,  which  had  never  before  had  i;ny  ex- 
istence in  it.  This  is  a  tvutli  taught  in  many  pas>at;es  of  scrip- 
ture. The  apostle  saith.  If  any  man  be  in  Christ,  he  is  a  new 
creature.  Neither  circumcision  availcth  any  thir.g,  nor  uncir- 
cumcision,  but  a  new  creature.  And  that  whi(  h  is  created  in 
the  heart,  is  called  the  new  man,  the  inner  mnn.  So  we  are 
commanded  to  put  oft'  the  old  man,  and  put  on  the  new  man. 


;318 

And  as  in  re.eeneratlon  something' now  is  croatiHl,  henoe  all  who 
are  born  ajjaiii  arc  stiled  new  crcadirca,  and  are  said  to  be  cre- 
ated, to  be  the  sul)iects  of  a  creation.  "  We  are  his  workman- 
ship^ created  in  Christ  Jesus."  This  workmanship  is  a  creation. 
Saints  are  new  men,  created  after  God  in  rip-hteousness  and 
holiness.  And  have  put  on  the  new  man,  which  is  renew- 
ed in  knowlcdace  after  tiie  image  of  him  that  created  him.  So 
they  are  called  new  born  babes. 

As  regeneration  is  evidently,  according  to  scripture,  a  crea- 
tion ;  we  may  ask,  what  is  created '^  An  appetite,  relish,  or 
disposition  to  be;  pleased  with  djvino  objects,  is  what  is  created 
in  the  heart.  By  creating  this  relish,  the  lost  moral  image  of 
God  isrestoied;  the  holy  image  with  which  Adam  was  crea- 
ted. "  Put  on  the  new  man,  which  after  God  is  created  in 
righteousness  and  true  holiness."  Here  the  new  man  created 
is  after  God,  a  likeness  of  God,  which  consists  in  ritrhteous- 
wess  and  true  holiness.  And  the  new  man  is  said  to  be  after 
the  image  of  him  that  created  him.  Such  texts  make  it  evi- 
dent, that  in  regeneration  the  moral  image  of  God,  which  was 
lo^tby  the  fall,  is  restored.  The  moral  character  of  God  is 
love,  or  benevolence.  God  is  love.  His  moral  image  in  men 
is  the  same  disposition,  appetite,  or  relish,  which  is  styled  love; 
that  love  to  God  and  man,  which  the  law  requires. 

By  this  we  see  what  the  new  creation  is.  It  is  the  creation 
of  t!iat  relish,  which  prepares  a  person  to  be  pleased  and  de- 
lighted with  that  class  of  objects,  called  moral,  or  spiritual,  or 
divine.  It  is  an  appetite  or  di<=position  to  be  pleased  and  de- 
lighted with  the  character  of  God,  of  Christ,  with  the  law  and 
government  ofGod,  with  the  truths  or  doctrmes  of  the  gospel, 
with  the  service  of  God,  with  the  characters  of  saints  and  an- 
gels; and  all  those  objects,  wh'ch  are  the  sources  of  all  the 
joys  and  felicity  in  heaven.  Objects  of  this  class  infinitely  ex- 
ceed in  value,  beauty,  pc't)i'y5  ^^^d  excellence,  that  class  which 
is  generally  styled  earthly,  worldly,  temporal,  and  fading. 
We  have  shown  that  no  one,  antecedent  to  regeneration,  has 
any  delight  in  this  divine  class  of  objects.  So  far  from  it,  that 
as  they  are  opposed  to  the  desires  and  pursuits  of  men,  they 
excite  in  the  hearts  of  the  mirencwed  hatred  and  opposition. 
But  when  born  again,  with  this  new  relish  they  are  prepared  to 
be  pleased  with  them,  to  love,  and  desire  them  as  their  portion. 
This  new  appetite  created  in  the  heart  is  a  spiritual,  holy  life  ; 
jt  is  the  eye  of  the  iieart  by  which  it  discerns  the  beauty  of  di- 


3l» 

vine  objects ;  the  ear  by  which  they  hear  with  pleasure  the 
voice  of  G()<i  ill  all  his  dociviiies  aiul  prempts  ;  the  sense  of 
smelling,  by  which  they  smell  the  sweet  odor  of  divine  things; 
the  relish,  ov palate,  by  which  they  taste  superlative  sweetness 
in  spiritual  objects  ;  and  l\\e  feeling  or  sense,  by  which  they  re- 
joice in  God  will)  joy  unspeakable.  This  now  appetite  creat- 
ed in  the  heart  comprises  every  sense,  which  is  ascribed  to 
saints  in  the  word  of  God,  and  which  iv  peculiar  to  them. 
Hence,when  a  person  is  born  aerain,he  is  said  to  have  eyes  to  see, 
ears  to  hear,  and  a  heart  to  realize  and  love  all  the  beauties  and 
glories  of  divine  objects.  He  is  no  lonjjer  in  a  state  of  perfect 
spiritual  death,  darkness,  deafness,  and  brutish  stupidity.  The 
creation  of  this  new  appetite  is  brinjring  persons  from  darkness 
into  marvellous  lificht.  This  new  relish,  created  in  the  heart,  is 
light  infused  into  it.  This  is  the  way  by  which  God  shines 
into  the  heart.  And  this  new  appetite  is  a  principle  of  light  in 
the  heart,  b}'  which  christians  shine  as  lights  in  the  world. 
They  emit  rays  of  light ;  and  these  rays  are  a  reflexion  of  di- 
vine light,  as  the  moon  reflects  the  rays  of  the  sun.  And  by 
this  light  they  glorify  their  Father,  who  is  in  heaven. 

Hence  saints  are  called  children  of  the  light,  and  of  the  day. 
They  are  said  to  come  to  the  light,  and  walk  in  it.  They 
love  the  light,  and  hate  the  darkness  in  which  they  once  liv- 
ed. And  if  they  live  as  they  ought,  their  light  shines  more 
and  more  unto  the  perfect  day.  And  like  stars  they  will  shine 
around  the  throne  of  the  Lamb  forever,  reflectii>g  the  light  of 
the  sun  of  righteousness. 

When  persons  are  born  again  they  are  brought  into  a  new 
world  ;  as  really  so  as  a  person  born  blind,  and  afterward  has 
eyes  given  him  ;  or  as  one  born  deaf  has  ears  given  him  to 
hear  ;  or  as  one  raised  to  life  from  actual  death,  will  appear  to 
himself  to  be  in  a  new  world.  Now  they  see  beauties,  which 
they  never  saw  before  ;  they  hear  the  melody  of  God's  voice, 
which  they  never  beard  before  ;  and  they  have  neiv  iews,  new 
feelings,  affections  and  desires,  and  will  live  a  new  life.  With 
them  according  to  scripture,  old  things  are  done  away  ;  they 
DO  longer  place  their  affections  on  this  world,  nor  seek  it  as 
their  portion  ;  behold  all  things  are  become  new.  They  view 
divine  oi)jects  in  a  new  light,  and  experience  now  views,  feel- 
ings, aflections,  and  joys,  to  which  they  had  always  been  stran- 
gers. We  hence  see,  that  creatiiiir  this  new  holy  relish  in  the 
heart,  according  to  representations  in  the  bible,  makes  them 


320 

new  creatures  ;  it  is  givinp:  tliem  eyes  to  see,  ears  to  hear,  lifp 
from  the  dead  ;  brinainu;  them  into  a  new  world,  in  which  the 
beauties  and  glories  of  divine  objects  excite  in  them  new  views, 
aflections,  and  new  feelings  of  joy  and  delight.  Now  they 
walk  in  the  light,  love  it,  become  lights  themselves,  and  shine 
to  the  praise  of  divine  grace.  This  is  a  great,  and  blessed, 
wonderful,  and  glorious  change;  and  it  consists /•r.'wfl'rjVy  in 
creating  in  tiie  heart  this  new  appetite,  re^toiing  the  lost  image 
of  God.  They  hereby  become  the  children  of  God,  sustain  a 
new  relation  to  him  ;  and  are  now  prepared  to  love,  serve,  and 
•enjoy  him  here  and  forever. 

Again.  Creating  this  holy  relish  in  the  heart,  in  which  this 
great  change  consists,  is  effected  by  the  agency  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  It  is  the  office  work  of  the  spirit  to  renew  the  iie'art, 
and  then  carry  on  the  glorious  work  of  sanctificaiion,  till 
saints  arrive  to  the  stature  of  perfect  men  in  Christ.  Hence 
We  are  said  to  be  born  of  the  Spirit.  And  we  find  the  great 
work  of  renewing  and  sanctifying  the  heart,  is  generally  in 
scripture  ascribed  to  the  Spirit,  the  third  person  in  the  God- 
head. Hence  the  reason  whv  saints  are  called  spiritual  ;  why 
they  are  led  by  the  Spirit,  and  by  him  quickened,  purified,  and 
assisted.  The  sanctification  of  the  Spirit  begins  in  regenera- 
tion, and  is  carried  on  by  his  influences  to  the  perfect  day. 
By  the  Spirit  we  are  renewed,  created  anew,  purified,  enlight- 
ened, quickened,  and  filled  with  joy  and  consolation.  This  is 
a  most  glorious  work  of  the  Spirit,  a  work  absolutely  necessa- 
ry to  eternal  life.  How  great,  then,  is  the  promise'and  gift  of 
the  Spirit.  And  as  far  as  any  oppose  this  work  of  the  Spirit, 
they  are  said  to  resist  the  Holy  Ghost,  to  quench,  and  grieve 
the  Spirit.  And  this  is  one  of  the  greatest,and  most  dangerous 
sins  ;  because  there  is  danger  of  blaspheming  the  Spirit,  and 
committing  the  sin  which  will  never  be  forgiven. 

And  this  work  of  the  Spirit  is  instantaneous.  Creation  from 
nothing,  or  producing  something  new,  is  always  an  instanta- 
neous work.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  a  thing  to  be  only  in  part 
brought  into  existence.  God  said,  let  there  be  light,  and  light 
was.  It  was  not  some  time  rising  into  real  being,  it  existed  in- 
stantly. Every  person,  in  a  spiritual  sense,  is  either  dead  or 
alive.  He  is  not  a  day,  or  one  moment,  passing  from  death 
to  life.  By  the  agency  of  the  Spirit  this  new  appetite  is  in- 
stantly created.  Although  regeneration  is  an  instantaneous 
work,  yet  the  work   of  sanctification    is  progressive.     This 


321 

Work  bccrins  in  regenpration,  and  in  an  instant ;  and  others  it 
progress's  througli  life.  Saints  begin  to  live  in  a  moment ; 
but  this  life  is  increased,  and  invigorated  all  their  days,  till 
they  reach  heaven. 

It  will  be  well  also  to  observe  here,  a  few  things  more  in  re- 
lation to  this  change.  It  appears  evident,  when  all  die  passa- 
ges of  scripture  are  carefidiy  compared,  and  their  import  is 
understood,  that  the  only  thing  immediately  done  in  regenera- 
tion, is  the  creation  of  this  holy  appetite  in  the  heart.  This 
is  creating  anew,  and  restoring  the  moral  image  ol  God,  which 
was  lost  at  the  fall  of  Adam.  If  this  be  true,  then  some  ideas, 
which  many  bring  into  view,  are  erroneous.  Some  treat  the 
subject  as  though  they  believed  the  change  consisted  in  alter- 
ing the  nature  of  sin.  As  though  pride  was  changed  inio  hu- 
mility, selfishness  into  benevolence,  and  love  for  this  world  in 
a  love  for  heavenly  things  ;  opposition  to  God  into  love  to 
him,  hatred  to  men  into  love  for  them,  and  so  in  relation  to 
other  sinful  ailections  ;  as  though  their  nature  is  so  altered, 
that  from  being  sinful  they  now  become  holy.  But  this  senti- 
ment appears  to  be  contrary  to  scripture,  to  reason,  and  to  all 
sound  philosophy  of  the  mind.  Sin  may  be  subcued,  and 
eradicated  from  the  heart  ;  but  its  nature  cannot  be  changed. 
To  suppose,  that  pride  can  be  changed  into  humility,  or  any 
sinful  atlection  can  be  made  holy,  is  very  absurd.  Not  only 
so,  but  this  would  effectuall}'  destroy  that  warfare,  v,hich  all 
christlTUS  experience.  For  to  make  a  warfare  on  this  ground, 
the  same  aflection,  as  pride  for  example,  must  be  partly  pride, 
and  partly  humility,  or  partly  holy,  and  partly  sinful  ;  and 
then  the  contest  would  consist  in  paving  the  same  sinful 
affection  fight  against  itself.  The  proud  or  sinful  part,  fight- 
ing against  the  holy  or  humble  part.  This  is  representing  the 
same  affection  as  liaving  two  natures  op[)Osed  to  each  other. 
Every  affection  is  no  more  than  a  feeling  and  desire,  sinijile  in 
their  nature.  And  to  represent  an  affection  as  having  two  na- 
tures, and  opposed  to  itsell',  is  as  absurd  as  to  suppose  the 
same  drop  of  water  as  having  two  natures  j  one  part  a  fluid, 
and  the  other  a  solid.  This  is  so  absurd  every  one  will  reject 
the  sentiment,  as  soon  as  the  inconsistency  of  it  is  fairly  stated. 

Some  speak  in  such  a  tnanner  as  would  lead  one  to  suppose, 
they  considered  sin  as  wholly  subdued  and  eradicated  in  regen- 
eration. In  this  sense  they  seem  to  understand  the  passage,  in 
which  God  sa^s,  I  will  take  away  their  heart  of  stone  and  give 

16 


322 

them  a  heart  of  flesh.  Whatever  may  be  the  meaning  of  this 
passage,  it  cannot  mean,  that  all  sin  is  eradicated.  For  if  this 
were  the  fact,  christians  would  never  experience  any  warfare 
within.  For  this  warfare  consists  in  the  opposition  of  the  flesh 
to  the  spirit,  or  of  the  old  man  to  the  new  man.  But  according 
to  this  sentiment,  when  a  person  is  born  again,  the  flesh,  the 
old  man,  is  subdued,  eradicated,  no  longer  has  any  being  in  the 
heart.  The  scripture  every  where  represents  christians  as  hav- 
ing a  body  of  sin  and  death  remaining  in  them  ;  as  having 
flesh, and  spirit,  an  ok!  and  new  man,  fighting  against  each  oth- 
er. Hence  taking  away  the  stony  heart,  and  giving  a  heart 
of  flesh  cannot  mean,  that  sin  is  all  eradicated,  and  the  person 
is  now  perfectly  holy.  To  construe  it  consistently  with  other 
passages,  its  meaning  must  be,  that  the  power  of  the  siony 
heart  is  lessened,  has  received  a  deadly  wound,  will  no  more 
reign  without  opposition,  and  will  finally  be  wholly  subdued, 
anil  eradicated.  If,  then,  we  make  the  word  of  God  our  guide, 
we  must  still  view  a  person  who  is  born  again  as  having  every 
sin,  the  old  man,  as  still  remaining  in  him.  Not  one  sin  is  erad- 
icated. And  all  the  change  is  this  ;  a  new,  holy,  principle  is 
created  in  the  heart,  which  will  ever  fight  against  all  remain- 
ing sin,  and  daily  weaken  its  power,  and  keep  it  in  subjection,, 
until  the  day  arrives,  when  the  new  man  will  gain  the  victory, 
and  all  remaining  sin  will  be  wholly  and  forever  subdued  or 
eradicated.  Then  the  person  is  perfect,  perfectly  holy,  and 
has  no  sin  remaining  to  pollute  him,  or  disturb  his  pe?xe  and 
happiness. 

There  are  also  some,  who  consider  regeneration  as  immedi- 
ately afiecting  all  the  ^culties  of  the  ihind.  They  say,  that 
this  change  consists  in  enlightening  the  understanding,  renew- 
ing the  heart,  and  subduing  the  will.  Hence  regeneration 
does  not  respect  directly  one  faculty,  any  more  than  another. 
This  is  confounding  things,  which  ought  to  be  distinguished; 
and  sui  rounds  the  subject  with  mist  and  darkness.  It  is  true, 
that  this  great  change  afl'ects  all  the  faculties  indirectly  ;  but 
the  immediate  effect  produced  is  in  one  faculty  only.  The 
heart  is  the  subject  wrought  upon,  and  afTected,  as  has  been 
shown  in  all  that  has  been  said  on  this  subject.  In  the  heart 
a  new  appetite  is  created.  When  this  is  done,  a  person  is  pre- 
pared to  be  pleased  with  a  divine  class  of  objects.  Light  in 
the  understfinfling,  andthe  ')bedience  of  the  will,  are  consequen- 
ces, which  follow  this  change  in  the  heart.     The  understand- 


323 

\n^  and  tlie  will  are  ever  under  the  influence  and  p-overnment 
of  the  heart.  Hence  as  long  as  the  heart  continues  totally  cor- 
rupt, all  the  other  faculties  will  have  a  wrong-  dirrction.  But 
as  far  as  the  heart  is  renewed  and  right,  the  other  faculties 
will  then  have  a  right  direction.  A  reformation  in  every  per- 
son must  begin  m  the  heart.  And  creating  this  new  relish  in 
the  heart  will  incline  every  person  to  lead  a  new  life  ;  and  so 
far  as  he  is  governed  by  this  holy  relish,  all  the  exercises  and 
operations  oi  tlie  mind  will  be  directed  to  the  glory  of  God. 

When  the  heart  is  renewed  as  explained,  a  person  then  de- 
lights in  the  chDi-acier  of  God,  and  in  all  that  class  of  objects 
called  mora'  or  divine.  Now  the  person  will  delight  in  con- 
templating and  studying  them.  He  will,  therefore,  confine  the 
attention  of  the  under^landing  to  them.  Now  the  understand- 
ing beholds  new  beauties,  perceives  new  sensations  and  de.-ires, 
gains  clear  ana  distinct  \it  vs  of  every  gospel  doctrine,  and  will 
improve  in  knowledge  daily.  Previous  to  this  change  in  the 
heart,  and  while  secure,  he  seldom  attended  to  divine  objects  ; 
and  when  he  did,  the  disrelish  of  the  heart  to  the  truth  blinded, 
and  prejudiced  him  to  such  a  degree,  he  was  more  likely  to 
embrace  errors  than  the  truth.  The  heart  blinded  the  under- 
standing, and  by  its  influence  led  him  to  judge  of  every  thing 
so  as  to  please  the  heart.  Under  conviction,  previous  to  re- 
generation, persons  through  the  influence  of  fear  turn  their  at- 
tention to  divine  objects  ;  and  the  truth  is  so  obvious,  they  soon 
perceive  they  are  great  sinners,  justly  deserve  hell,  are  depen- 
dent, and  if  saved,  it  must  be  by  grace.  This  light  prepares 
the  way  for  a  change  of  the  heart.  Vet  they  see  no  beauty  in  di- 
vine objects  ;  and  instead  of  being  pleased  with  them,  opposi- 
tion is  excited  ;  fear,  and  the  distress  which  attends  it,  is  a  load 
too  heavy  to  be  borne  long  at  a  time.  But  as  soon  as  the 
heart  is  renewed,  then  divine  objects  please  him  ;  his  fears  and 
distress  of  mind  are  gone  ;  he  is  relieved  of  his  load  and  bur- 
den. And  these  objects,  which  before  gave  him  pain,  now 
please  him,  and  aflbrd  him  great  satisfaction.  The  new  sen- 
sations, joys,  and  desires,  which  he  experiences,  arc  new  objects 
of  perception.  He  now  knows  what  the  feelings  and  joys  of 
religion  are.  In  this  respect  the  iniderstanding  has  new  light, 
which  is  attained  by  experience,  as  the  greater  part  of  our 
knowledge  is.  Now  he  will  attend  to  the  truth,  will  make  it  a 
subject  of  study,  and  will  be  daily  growing  in  light  and  knowl- 
edge.    And  bis  understanding  will  be  more  enlightened  often, 


3X1 

in  one  month,  thnn  it  had  previously   been   in  many  years. 
But  nil  this  light  or  knowledge  is  the  consequence,  the  fruit,  of 
the  chanii^e  produced  in  the  heart.      Before  his  heart  is  changed, 
a  person's  lUKlorstandini;-  is  unimpaired,  is  sound  and  grood.     A 
person  in  a  dungeon  with  good  eyes  cannot  see  objects.     But 
the  fiiult  is  not  in  his  eyes.     So  a  person  in  an  unrenewed  state 
is  kept  by  his  evil  heart  in  darkness  ;  and  many  are  surprising- 
ly ignorant  of  divine  truth.     But  the  fault  is  not  in  the  under- 
standing ;  its  eyes   are  jound  and  good.     Remove  every  ob- 
stacle which  had  perverted  the  understanding,  and  kept  its  eyes 
closed  ;  then  it  will  perform  its  ofRce,  and  judge  of  divine  things 
according  to  truth,     As  the  understanding  is  not  impaired  by 
the  fall,   but  is  blinded  by  tiie  heart  as  our  natural  ejes  are  by 
a  thick  vail  ;  so  n^move  this  vail,  and  the  aversion  of  the  heart 
to  truth,  the  understanding  will  then  see  objects  as  they  arc, 
ami  improve  in   light  and  knowledge.     Henee  as  the  under- 
standing is  not  impaired  by  the  fall,  and,  considered  as  an  eye, 
is  in  a  sound  healthy  state,  it  needs  no  change  or  alteration. 
Ail  that  is  wanting  is,  to  remove  the  vail  which  blinds  it,  which 
intercepts  its  sight.     This  vail  is  the  heart.     Renewing  or  cre- 
ating tliis  holy  relish  in  the  heart,  is  removing  this  vail,  as  far 
as  a  person  is  governed  by  this  new  appetite.     As  sin  still  re- 
mains in  the  heart,  30   far  as  this  governs,  his  understanding 
will  be  still  blinded  ;  but  so  far  as  liis  new  taste  governs,  it  will 
see,  and  judge  of  things  as  they  are.     Hence  the  light  of  the 
nnderstanding  is  the  consequence  and  fruit  of  regeneration.   So 
that  this  change  mal;os  no  alteration  in  l!ie  understanding  ;  it 
respects  the  heart  solel}-  and  primarily,  and  light  in  the  intellec- 
tual part  is  a  consequence  of  it. 

With  respect  to  the  will,  it  is  always  obedient  to  the  heart. 
It  is  always  exerted  according  to  the  pleasure  of  the  heart.  The 
design  of  ever}'  volition  is  to  obtain  the  object,  which  is  pleas- 
ins:  J^'id  gratifying  to  the  heart.  Hence  the  way  to  subdue  the 
Avill  is  to  renew  the  heart.  It  is  said,  "  Thy  people  shall  be 
willing  in  the  day  of  thy  power."  When  that  day  arrives,  in 
which  the  power  of  God  is  exerted  to  renew  the  heart,  then  the 
will  is  obedient.  As  the  heart  has  a  new  pleasure,  so  now 
there  will  be  a  new  train  .of  volitions.  It  is  also  said,  his  ar- 
rows shall  be  sharp  in  the  heart  of  the  king's  enemies.  When 
the  C'lemies  of  God  see  their  wickedness  and  danger,  this  light 
in  the  understanding  excites  painful  sensations  in  the  heart ; 
sensations  keen  as  those  produced  by  arrows,  when  they  wound 


325 

and  pierce  the  heart  of  the  body.  When  Christ  says,  Ye  mil 
not  come  unto  me,  every  one  would  be  ready  to  ask,  why  will 
thcv  MOt  come  ?  The  reason  is,  the  character  of  Christ  does 
not  ploasc  the  natural  heart,  but  is  offensive  to  it.  So  th-^  will, 
ever  obedient  to  the  heart,  rejects  him.  Renew  the  hsr.rt,  then 
the  will  readily  chooses  hitn  as  a  Savior.  Creatinfj  a  new  rel- 
ish in  the  heart  is  the  way  by  which  persons  are  drawn  to  Christ, 
and  made  willing-  to  come  unto  him  for  life. 

The  will  viewed  as  a  facult}'  is  not  impaired,  nor  its  nature 
altered,  by  the  fall.  After  Adam  sinned  he  was  just  as  cnpable 
of  choosing  and  refusing  objects,  as  he  was  previous  to  his  fall. 
But  a  very  great  change  took  place  in  his  heart.  He  lost  his 
holy  relish,  and  was  no  mor^  pleased,  as  he  had  been,  with  mor- 
al and  divine  objects.  Now  his  heart  was  imperfect,  sinful,  and 
corrupt.  It  now,  like  a  vail,  blinded  the  understanding,  and 
commanded  the  will  to  reject  God,  and  choose  this  world  for  a 
portion.  But  when  the  heart  is  renewed,  it  is  ac^in  pl-^asf^d 
with  divine  objects  ;  the  vail  being  removed,  the  imdorsf:in<J- 
ing  is  filled  with  light,  and  the  will  is  directed  to  reject  the 
world,  and  seek  God  as  the  best  portion  and  fountain  of  living 
waters.  The  motion  of  every  faculty  will  b^  ton  ards  God  as 
its  centre,  as  far  as  a  person  is  influenced  and  'roverne  J  by  this 
new  and  holy  appetite.  This  is  th^'  way  in  v. huh  I'x  under- 
standing and  will  are  affected,  in  regeneration.  The  h^art  or 
taste  is  the  subject  of  t'.ie  operations  of  the  Hil}  Sp'nt,  and  the 
only  subject  directly  and  immediately  aflected.  Ir  th".- facul- 
ty a  great  and  glorious  change  is  elfccted  by  ere  r'i,-g  in  ji  a 
new  and  benevolent  appetite.  In  consequeice  of  which  ihf  un- 
derstanding is  greath'  enlightened,  and  the  will  Is  obedien'  to 
the  heart,  and  conformable  to  the  iaw  of  G*)d  ;  and  the  life  and 
conduct  of  the  person,  from  that  day  he  is  renewed,  will  har- 
monise with  the  doctrines  and  precepts  of  the  gispel,  as  far  as 
he  is  governed  by  this  new  relish  created  in  him. 

Again.  Some  suppose  regeneration  is  eflectcd  by  light, 
and  moral  persuasion.  They  suppose  that  light  and  proper 
motives  are  suflicient  to  change  the  heart,  and  produce  an  en- 
tire reformation  in  any  person. 

But  surely  such  persons  have  no  correct  views  of  the  human 
mind,  or  of  the  nature  of  moral  depravity.  If  they  had,  they 
would  agree  with  the  scriptures  in  viewing  regeneration  to  be 
a  new  creation  ;  so  that  all,  who  are  born  again,  may  with 
propriety  be  styled  new  creatures.     But  has  light  in  the  intellect 


326 

power  to  create  sometliing-  from  notlihig  ?  Have  any  inolivci 
power  to  create  soiucthiiig  new  ?  \t'  any  can  !)elieve  this,  lliey 
betra3'  great  ignorance  respecting  the  natuie  of  liglit,  and  the 
influence  of  motives,  and  the  faculties  and  operations  of  ihc 
mind  of  man.  Facts  and  experience  both  prove  ihai  light,  in- 
stead of  rectifying  the  corrupt  heart,  excites  its  opposition  to 
God  and  tne  truth.  This  is  the  eficct  of  light  on  a  depraved, 
corrupt  heart,  as  is  dail}'  j)r()vcd  by  facts  and  experience.  And 
no  motives  will  ever  influence  a  person  to  choose  or  reject  ob- 
jects of  volition,  contrary  to  the  pleasure  of  the  heart.  The 
will  has  no  power  over  the  heart.  The  will  does  not  govern 
the  heart,  but  is  governed  and  influenced  by  it.  This  also  is 
evident,  from  facts  and  experience.  We  may,  therefore,  as 
.«;oon  expect  water  will  run  from  the  centre  of  gravitation,  as 
expect  light  and  motives  will  change  the  heart,  or  produce  any 
radical  change  in  the  feelings  and  desires  of  men.  As  the  will 
is  governed  by  the  heart,  motives  will  ne^er  influence  the  will 
to  choose  contrary  to  the  pleasure  of  the  heart.  And  light  will 
here,  as  it  forever  will  in  hell,  excite  opposition  against  God,  in- 
stead of  producing  any  friendly  feelings,  as  long  as  the  pleasure 
of  the  heart  remains  unrenewed. 

If  all  that  has  feeen  suggested  on  this  subject  is  true,  and 
harmonizes  with  the  word  of  God,  and  agrees  with  facts  and 
experience,  as  has  been  made  evident ;  every  one  must  be  con- 
vinced, that  the  Holy  Spirit  in  regenerating  men  does,  immedi- 
ately and  directly,  no  more  than  create  in  the  heart  that  holy 
relish  or  moral  image  of  God  lost  by  the  fall.  And  this  crea- 
tion is  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  new  views,  feelings,  de- 
sires, and  J03S,  which  the  regenerate  experience  ;  and  for  the 
new  life,  which  tliey  live.  And  this  will  be  further  confirmed 
and  illustrated,  by  what  will  be  said  inider  the  next  general 
bi'anch  of  this  subject. 

III.  Describe  the /rMtV*  of  regeneration. 

These  fruits  are  internal  and  external.  When  internal 
fruits  appears  in  the  life,  actions,  and  conduct  of  persons,  they 
are  then  external  and  visible.  It  will  be  most  instructi^'e  to  at- 
tend in  the  first  place  to  those  internal  fruits,  which  all  renew- 
ed persons  experience.  It  has  been  made  evident,  that  all  the 
change  effected  immediately  ii"^  regeneration  consists  in  the  cre- 
ation of  that  new,  holy  appetite,  which  was  lost  by  the  fall  of 
our  first  parents. 

This  was  created  in  Adam,  when  God  gave  him  being.     It 


327 

constituted  one  part  of  bis  b«^ing.  This,  and  the  other  appe- 
tites created  in  liis  heart,  were  active  principles,  and  prepired 
him  for  all  the  exercises  and  actions  necessary  to  his  being  and 
happiness  in  thhs  life,  and  the  Vile  to  succeed.  Wlien  this  was 
lost,  he  had  no  relish  for  the  class  of  objects  styled  moral  or  di- 
vine. But  when  it  is  anew  created  in  tlie  heart  of  any  of  his 
posterity,  then  such  person  is  prepared  to  relish  and  feed  on  di- 
vine objects. — As  the  appetite  of  hung:er  prepares  persons  to 
relish  food,  and  all  the  different  species  of  it  ;  so  thFs  holy  ap- 
petite prepares  a  person  to  relish  and  delight  in  divine  objects. 
And  in  attending  to  the  operations  or  exercises  of  this  appetite, 
we  must  carel'ully  observe  its  primary,  its  secondary,  and  its 
third  class  of  affections.  For  its  operations  are  divisible  into 
these  three  distinct  classes.  And  by  attending  to  these  classes 
every  one  will  be  better  able  to  judge,  whether  he  has  ever  pass- 
ed from  death  unto  life.     And, 

1.  Attention  will  be  given  to  the  primary  operations  of  this 
holy  appetite. 

Every  reader  will  readily  see,  th^  no  object  can  affect  the 
heart,  unless  seen  or  known  ;  or  unless  it  is  in  view  of  the  mind. 
When  a  person  is  renewed,  and  divine  objects  pass  in  review 
of  the  mind,  he  will  have  feelings  and  affections  correspondent 
to  their  nature.  When  his  attention  is  fixed  on  the  character 
of  God,  of  Christ,  or  of  saints,  he  will  feel  an  inward  delight, 
v/hat  some  call  joy.  They  appear  to  him  beautiful,  and  he 
never  saw  them  in  this  light  before.  And  such  persons  often 
say,  that  every  thing  they  see  appears  new  to  them  ;  they  seem 
to  be  in  a  new  world.  This  u  occasioned  entirely  by  ^new 
sensation.  They  never  before  experienced  that  kind  of  de- 
light, joy,  or  satisfaction  in  viewing  divine  objects,  which  they 
now  feel.  As  they  have  a  new  and  most  pleasant  sensation 
within,  and  as  they  do  not  reflect  that  this  is  caused  by  a  change 
in  their  hearts,  their  first  thought  is  apt  to  be,  that  the  things 
they  see  arc  altered  ;  and  they  are  of  course  in  a  new  world. 
It  may  be  compared  to  this.  A  person,  who  never  delighted 
in  music,  but  had  painful  sensations  when  he  heard  it,  we  will 
suppose  has  his  ear  so  altered  as  to  relish  music.  He  hears  it, 
and  experiences  delightful  aotl  transporting  sensations.  He 
would  be  apt  to  say,  the  music  he  heard  was  a  new  kind,  such 
as  he  never  heard  before.  And  this  is  the  occasion  of  his  new 
sensations.  Yet  on  reflection  he  would  soon  be  convinced,  that 
his  new  sensations  arose  from  a  change  in  his  ear.     When  a 


person  is  born  again,  the  first  alteration  he  experiences  is  fl 
new  sensaiiuu,  which  lie  considers  very  |)ieasant  ;  and  so  sweet, 
ait«l  tiiiltient  Irom  any  he  had  ever  t'vh,  he  wishes  to  have  it 
continued,  ^is  pleasure  is  such,  he  cannot  conceive  it  possi- 
ble lor  him  or  any  one  to  experience  any  which  would  be  sweet- 
er in  their  >uature.  Now  it  seems  to  him  that  he  has  found 
true  happiness,  which  he  had  been  always  seeking",  but  had 
never  found.  Now,  as  Chiist  said,  lie  will  thirst  no  more  ;  he 
will  no  more  thirst  after  any  other  sp<'cies  of  happiness,  or  any 
other  water  tlian  that  which  afl'ords  liim  such  dt-light. 

But  he  Mill  desire  the  continuance  and  increase  of  his  pres- 
ent [ileasure.  As  he  has  a  new  sensation,  so  divine  objects 
appear  new  to  him.  The  divine  character,  the  character  of 
Cliiist,  the  law  and  government  of  God,  saints,  and  gospel 
doctrines,  appear  new,  beautiful  and  glorious.  Some  experi- 
ence this  new  md  pleasant  sensation,  in  a  greater  measure  than 
others  do.  But  'iil  feel  it  in  a  greater  or  less  degree. — This 
in.vai'd,  deligliiful,  iat^gfying  sensation,  is  \\tC  first  primary  op- 
eration of  this  hul}'  appetite.  In  an  active  sense  the  person 
may  say,  his  heart  delights  in  God,  in  Christ,  in  divine  objects, 
as  they  succeed  each  other  in  view  of  the  mind. 

From  this  new  sensation  a  new  class  of  desires  or  affections 
will  arise.  He  will  desire  the  continuance  and  increase  of  the 
satisfaction  he  then  feels.  He  will  desire  to  have  daily  com- 
munion with  God,  to  have  increasing  and  clearer  views  of  his 
glory,  to  serve  and  glorify  him.  It  will  be  his  desire  to,]uit 
all  his  trust  in  Christ,  to  have  a  greater  sense  of  his  beauty  and 
preciousness,  to  be  one  with  him,  and  enjoy  him  as  h*s  belov- 
ed. He  will  desire  to  enjoy  the  society  and  conversation  of 
saints,  and  to  unite  with  them  in  acts  of  worsliip.  He  will  de- 
sire their  g'rowth  in  grace,  and  the  increase  of  their  happiness. 
He  will  desire  the  salvation  of  all  men,  as  far  as  is  consistent. 
It  will  be  his  desire  to  have  all  come  to  Christ,  and  feel  what 
he  (eeh.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  be  any  more  particular. 
Suffice  it  to  say  here,  that  for  every  divine  object,  which  af- 
fords liim  inward  delight,  he  will  have  a  desire  corresponding 
with  the  nature  of  his  sensation.  And  these  desires  will  be 
numerous  ;  and  will  constitute  what  is  called  in  scripture,  pant- 
ing after  God,  hungering  aud  thirsting  after  righteousness. — 
And  this  new  sensation,  with  the  desires  which  immediately 
arise  from  it,  and  are  connected  with  it,  are  intended  by  love ; 
love  to  God,  to  Christ,  to  saints,  to  enemies,  and  to  the  truth. 


S2^ 

Such  sensations,  with  their  attendant  desires,  constitute  that 
love  which  tlie  h\w  requires  towards  God  and  man  ;  that  gos- 
pel charity,  without  which  nothing  can  profit  us.  What  other 
sense  can  any  one  affix  to  the  term  love  to  God  and  men  ?  t)o 
not  those,  who  have  that  love  for  God  the  law  requires,  delight 
in  his  character,  and  desire  to  have  him  glorified  ?  Do  they 
not  desire  to  be  conformed  to  God,  to  enjoy  him  dailj',  and  with 
increasing  satisfaction  ?  And  caH  any  person  be  said  to  love 
God,  who  does  not  delight  in  him  ;  and  who  has  no  desires  for 
his  glory,  or  to  be  like  him,  and  serve  him  ?  If  not,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  by  love  to  God  iS  meant,  delight  in  his  character, 
with  every  desire  correspondent  with  it.  And  the  same  exer- 
cises or  operations  are  included  in  the  term  love,  when  any  di- 
vine things  are  the  objects  of  it.  Hence,  in  the  sense  now  ex- 
plained, love  to  God,  to  Christ,  to  saints,  to  all  men,  and  to  the 
doctrines  and  precepts  of  the  gospel,  and  the  service  of  Jeho- 
vah, is  the  first,  jormary  operation  of  this  holy  appetite.  And 
of  any  persons  find  they  have  not  those  primary  exercises,  they 
may  rely  on  it,  they  have  not  any  of  the  fruits  of  regeneration  ; 
and  are  not  renewed  in  spirit.  For  they  must  have  the  prima- 
ry, before  they  can  have  any  of  the  secondary  fruits  of  the 
Spirit. 

It  is  proper  now  to  observe,  that  some  objects,  which  belong 
to  the  class  of  moral  objects,  instea;d  of  affording  pleasant 
sensations,  eicite  directly  the  contrary.  This  is  true  with  re- 
spect to  every  species  of  sin.  When  a  person  is  born  again, 
when  he  has  a  view  of  sin  in  others,  especially  in  himself,  it  ex- 
cites in  him  a  disagreeable  sensation,  a  sensation  more  or 
less  painful.  A  desire  immediately  arises  to  have  sin  sub* 
dued,  and  eradicated  from  his  heart,  tt  appears  to  him  in 
a  new  light;  as  odious,  hateful,  and  one  of  the  greatest  or  most 
awful  evils  that  has  existence.  He  feels  a  decided  opposition 
against  it.  It  is  his  most  formidable  enemy,  and  he  views  it  in 
this  light,  and  hates  it.  The  reasons  wh}'  sin  is  thus  hateful  to 
him  are  many,  and  it  may  be  he  has  never  reflected  on  them. 
He  hates  it  in  reality,  because  it  separates  between  him  and 
God;  is  an  obstacle  in  the  way,  wliich  prevents  his  serving  and 
enjoying  Him  as  he  wishes  ;  renders  him  unlike  his  Maker ;  le- 
moves  him  to  a  great  moral  distance  from  the  fountain  of  all 
good;  and  hardens,  blinds  and  stupifies  his  heart,  and  unfits 
him  for  the  services  and  enjoyments  o{'  hea\  en.  These  are  the 
reasons  why   sin  is  so  painful  and  haieful.     And    though  he 

17 


330 

cannot  perhaps  tell  why  he  hates  it,  yet  he  feels  this  aversion 
to  it.  A)i(i  the  more  he  becomes  acquainted  with  its  pernicious 
nature,  on  his  journey  through  tlie  worlfl,  the  more  lie  will  hate 
it,  groan  under  it  as  the  greatest  burden,  and  more  fervently 
desire  its  destruciion.  Now  the  painful  sensations  sin  occasions, 
and  the  desires  he  immediately  has  to  be  delivered  from  its  pow- 
er, and  to  be  washed  from  its  pollution,  are  the  primary  opera- 
tions of  this  holy  appetite  towards  it.  These  primaiy  exercises 
arc  in  scripture  denominated  sorrow,  grief,  hatred  and  repent- 
ance. By  these  terms  is  meant,  that  to  the  new  born  soul 
sin  is  a  painful,  hateful  object;  the  destruction  of  which  he 
desires  more  fervently  than  the  ruin  of  any  other  enemy.  And 
it  is  thus  painful  and  hateful  to  him,  and  an  object  of  his  great- 
est aversion,  for  the  reasons  which  have  been  given.  Hence, 
if  he  knew  he  should  never  be  punished  for  sin,  yet  his  aversion 
to  it  would  be  the  same,  and  of  the  same  nature  that  has  been 
represented.  We  now  see  what  the  primary  operations  of  this 
holy  appetite  are.  This  appetite  delights  primarily  in  no  ob- 
jects, but  those  included  in  the  class  of  moral  objects.  These, 
especially  God,  it  regards  with  supreme  ail'ection.  They  are 
to  the  renewed  the  sweetest  sources  of  their  happiness.  They 
esteem  them  as  their  portion ;  and  are  ready  now  to  renounce 
every  other  object,  for  the  sake  of  enjoying  forever  these  wells 
of  salvation.  Under  the  influence  of  the  pleasant  sensations  they 
feel,  and  the  desires  which  attend  them,  they  do  and  will  turn 
about,  and  tread  the  narrow  path,  and  seek  heaven  as  their 
home.  Having  given  this  view  of  the  primary  fruits  of  regene- 
ration, we  may 

2.  Attend  to  the  operations  of  this  new  appetite. 

As  every  person,  when  renewed,  will  delight  in  divine  ob- 
jects, he  will  experience  a  desire  for  the  continuance  and  in- 
crease of  the  happiness  he  now  experiences.  And  as  these  de- 
pend on  the  increase  of  his  appetite  for  such  objects,  he  will 
desire  to  grow  in  grace.  And  as  the  growth  of  every  thing, 
and  the  performance  of  every  work,  is  efi'ected  by  vicans,  so  he 
finds  means  are  requisite  to  his  growth  in  grace  and  happiness. 
Hence  from  his  pleasure  in  divine  objects  will  arise  a  seconda- 
ry class  of  aftectious  or  desires.  And  these  desires  have  for 
their  object  all  those  things  which  are  the  means  of  their  ad- 
vancement in  knowledge  and  grace.  Accordingly,  every  thing 
which  is  really  a  means  of  a  christian's  growth  in  grace,  from 
infancy  to  manhood,  will  be  an  object  of  his  desire.     In  such 


331 

means  he  takes  satisfaction,  and  desires  them,  not  on  their  own 
account,  but  for  tlie  sake  of  t'.iose  objects  which  are  in  them- 
selves pleasant,  and  are  the  primary  sources  of  his  happiness. 
A  person  loves  food  for  the  body  for  two  reasons.  One  is,  he 
finds  it  is  necessary  to  preserve  life,  health,  the  increase  of 
strengfth,  and  vigor.  Another  is,  the  food  suits  his  taste,  and 
he  takes  satisHiciion  in  eating;  it  is  one  source  of  his  happiness. 
Then  when  he  finds  certain  means  are  necessary  to  obtain  food, 
and  preserve  a  sufficient  supply,  he  will  delight  in  using  them; 
he  will  desire  them,  and  attend  to  them.  Hence  the  reason 
why  men  love  land,  cattle,  labor,  money,  and  every  other  ob- 
ject needful  to  preserve  life  and  promote  tlieir  comfort.  But 
these  means  are  not  desired  on  their  own  account,  but  merely 
for  the  sake  of  procuring  food,  and  otlier  gratifications  for  the 
bodily  appetites. 

So  when  persons  are  raised  from  moral  death  to  life,  they 
experience  a  new  kind  of  pleasure,  and  delight  exceedingly  in 
the  character  of  God,  the  living  fountain  of  waters,  in  Christ, 
and  in  the  happiness  of  all  in  his  kingdom.  These  objects  are 
in  tliemselves  very  pleasant  and  delightful.  They  know  these 
objects  are  a  fountain  of  bliss ;  they  know  that  their  essential 
excellencies  cannot  be  increased  ;  but  they  very  soon  learn 
that  their  glories  may  be  displayed,  and  that  their  happiness 
in  them  may  be  increased ;  and  they  find  the  increase  of  their 
happiness  depends  on  the  appetite,  the  relish  they  have  for 
them.  Hence  the  increase  of  this  relish,  their  growth  in  grace, 
and  conformity  to  God,  is  by  them  fervently  desired.  And  as 
means  are  appointed  by  God  for  them  to  use,  and  to  promote 
their  growth  in  grace,  these  means  are  objects  of  their  desire 
and  love,  not  on  their  own  account,  but  for  the  sake  of  pro- 
moting their  conformity  to  God,  and  happiness  in  Him. 

The  means  which  God  has  appointed  for  the  growth  in  grace 
of  his  children,  are,  the  doctrines  and  precepts  of  the  gospel;  a 
preached  gospel,  by  which  doctrines  and  precepts  are  explain- 
ed and  enforced  ;  the  holy  Sabbath ;  all  divine  ordinances ;  re- 
ligious conference  and  society ;  meditation  on  divine  subjects  ; 
prayer;  watching;  self-denial;  maintaining  the  christian  war- 
fare. These,  and  similar  things  are  the  means  by  which  the 
growth  of  grace  is  promoted,  till  we  reach  a  perfect  stature  in 
Christ.  These  means  afford  satisfaction,  are  objects  of  fervent 
desire,  for  the  sake  of  attaining  unto  perfection  in  holi- 
ness and  bliss.     And  till  persons  love    God,  they  hdtve  n» 


332 

jlove  or  desire  for  these  means  of  grace,  which  are  holy, 
But  as  soon  as  tliey  love  and  delight  in  God,  then  we 
find  these  secondary  desires  operate.  Now  they  love  the 
word  of  God,  its  doctrines  and  precepts.  Now  they  love  the 
preaching  of  the  word.  Thc\  love  prp\er,  lia\e  fervent  desires 
to  come  hefore  God  and  supplicate  for  mercy.  They  earnestly 
desire  reliqious  conference  and  society.  The  Sabbath  is  their 
delight.  They  love  all  ordinances,  and  all  the  means  of  grace, 
and  desire  the  enjoyment  of  these  means  and  privileges,  ?nd 
%vill  diligently  use  them,  and  cry  to  God  for  a  blessing  to  attend 
them,  that  they  may  promote  their  growth  in  grace,  and  de- 
light in  God,  and  prepare  thepi  for  a  heavenly  state.  Before 
persons  are  renewed,  they  have  no  real  love  for  the  Bible. 
Hence  they  seldom  read  the  word,  seldom  pray,  or  use  other 
means.  And  as  far  as  they  do  use  them,  they  are  either  influ- 
enced by  fear,  or  custom,  or  some  other  selfish  and  unhallowed 
motive.  But  as  soon  as  persons  are  born  again,  and  have  once 
tasted  that  the  Lord  is  good,  and  experienced  new  and  ravish- 
ing delight  in  Him,  they  then  have  a  new  class  of  feelings,  and 
of  desires  for  all  the  appointed  means  of  grace.  Now  they  love 
to  read  and  meditate  on  the  word  of  God,  it  is  more  precious 
to  them  than  silver  or  gold,  sweeter  than  honey  ;  they  delight 
in  the  Sabbath,  in  hearing  the  word  preached;  one  day  in  God's 
courts  is  better  than  a  thousand  spent  ta  sin  and  worldly  pur- 
suits. Now  they  love  their  closets,  and  enter  them  to  converse 
and  commune  with  God.  Now  they  love  to  meet  with  the 
saints  of  God,  for  religious  conference,  society  and  prayer. 
They  love  to  draw  near  to  God  in  all  his  ordinances.  They  love 
to  watch,  deny  self,  fight  against  sin,  and  press  forward  towards 
perfection.  This  love  for  the  means  of  instruction  and  grace, 
and  their  desires  to  enjoy  and  use  them  diligentl}',  are  fruits  of 
the  Spirit.  They  are  properly  secondary  J ruiis  ;  because  if  they 
had  not  the  primary  fruits,  such  as  delight  in  God,  they  would 
not  have  this  secondary  class  of  desires  and  afieetions.  The 
secondary  are  inseparably  connected  with  the  primary;  and  so 
united,  that  their  satisfaction  in  the  use  of  means  will  never  be 
greater  than  this  delight  in  God.  And,  indeed,  in  proportion 
as  a  person's  relish  for  the  living  fountain  of  waters  and  his 
delight  in  it  varies,  at  one  time  strong  and  fervent,  and  at 
another  weak  and  faint;  in  the  same  proportion  he  will  find  his 
satisfaction  and  dilijeuce  in  using  means  will  vary  ;  and  in  hi$ 


833 

Attendance  on  means,  he  will  be  alive  and  engaged,  or  cold  and 
formal,  just  as  his  relish  is,  either  strong,  or  faint. 

Heuce  ih?se  secondary  fruits  of  the  Spirit  are  real  evidences 
of  grace,  as  well  as  the  primary   fruits.     If  then  persons  find 
they  do  not  delight  in  reading   and  meditating  on  the  word  of 
God,  nor  in  hearing  it  preached,  nor  in  prayer,  nor  in  divine 
ordinances,  nor  in  religious  conference  and  society,  nor  any  of 
the  appointed  means  of  their  salvation;  they  may  rest  assured 
they  have  never  passed  from  death  to  life.     If  they  say  they 
have  tasted,  all  things  have  appeared  new  to  them,  they  have 
been  greatly  elated  with  joy,  and    felt  more  happiness  in  an 
hour,  than  in  all  their  life  before;  yet  after  this  do  not  fervently 
desire  the  means  of  their  growth,  and  do  not  take  satisfaction 
in  them,  and  are  not  careful  to  use  them  with  diligence;  they 
may  conclude  all  th**  pleasures  they  have  experienced,  and  con- 
cerning which  they  have  so  much  to  sny,  is  no  more  than  the 
experience  of  stony    ground  hearers,  or  of  those  mentioned 
Hebrews  vi,  who  fell  away,  and  drew  back  unto  perdition.  All 
may  rely  on  it,  that  if  they  do  not  experience  the  secondary 
fruits  of  the  Spirit,  they  have  never  had  the  primary  fruits;  and 
if  they  still  retain  this  hope,   the}'  are  deceived,  and  will  hear 
Christ  at  last  say,  I  never  knew  you.     Hence  it  is  all  import- 
ant to  be  well  acquainted  with  the  secondary',    as  well  as  the 
primary  fruits  of  the  Spirit,  in  order  to  judge  correctly  con- 
cerning our   spiritual  state.     If  persons  have  the  secondary 
fruits  of  the  Spirit,  they  will  labor  as  earnestly  for  the  bread  of 
life,  as  men  of  the  world  do  for  bread  for  th"  body.     For  their 
whole  work  in  this  life  consists  in  their  using  the  means  God 
has  appointed  for  their  growth    in  knowledge  and  grace,  and 
ripeness   for  heavenly  mansions.     And  tiieir   desires  for  these 
means,  that   they  may  grow,  are  so  fervent,  they  will  prompt 
them  to  use  them  diligently.   It  will  be  their  daily  work.  Hence 
they  persevere,  hold  on  and  hold  out  to   the  end,  and  finally 
conquer,  and  receive  a  crown  of  life.     But  those  who  have  not 
these  secondary  fruits,  soon  lose  their  fir<;t  counterfeit  relish  ; 
and  then,  though  various    motives  may  induce  them  to  lead  a 
moral  life  like  the  Pharisees,  yet  they  will  be  formal,  cold  and 
barren  in   religion,  without  ever  manifesting  the  life  or  power 
of  it.     And  some  will  not  persevere  in  this  cold,  moral,  formal 
course,  but  return  again  to  their  former  mode  of  liviug,  and 
wallowing  in  the  fdth  of  sin.     Wherefore,  let  all  examine  whe-j 
rher  they  have  these  secondary  fruits  of  the  Spirit. 


5.  There  is  one  more  class  of  holy  desires  and  aftections  to 
be  considered,  as  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit,  or  new  birth. 

To  understand  this  part  of  our  subject  distinctly,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  remark,  that  Christ  tlie  King  in  Zion  has  enemies, 
and  these  arc  enemies  to  his  kingdom,  and  to  all  his  subjects 
and  friends.  Tiiey  are  determined,  violent,  numerous  and  pow- 
erful enemies.  Their  aim  is,  to  dethrone  Christ  if  possible, 
destroy  his  kingdom,  all  his  subjects  and  disciples.  Tliose 
enemies  are  satun  with  all  his  legions,  all  remaining  sin  in  the 
Iicart,  all  infidels  and  unrenewed  persons,  the  charms  and  flat- 
teries of  this  world,  powerful  temptations,  all  errors  in  doctrine 
and  practire.  These  are  inimical  to  Christ,  to  his  caujc,  and 
to  his  real  friends  and  followers.  They  aie  constantly  oppo- 
sing Christians,  fighting  against  them,  and  aiming  at  their  de- 
.<;truction.  Can  real  Christians  view  these  enemies  with  indif- 
ference.^ Will  not  their  opposition  to  every  thing  which  the 
saint  loves,  highly  prizes,  and  seeks  as  his  treasure,  excite 
feelings  and  desires  in  their  hearts  of  some  kind  or  other.''  But 
what  are  the  feelings  and  affecions  which  opposition  from  such 
enemies  will  excite  ?  The  word  of  God  teaches  how  we  shall 
feel  towards  them.  We  should  hate  them,feel  a  holy  indignation 
against  them,  experience  strong  desires  to  have  them  defeated, 
destroyed,  bound  and  confined,  that  they  may  not  injure  the 
blessed  cause  in  which  we  are  engaged. 

We  shall  hate  sin  in  our  own  hearts,  as  well  as  in  others ;  and 
feel  a  decided  opposition  to  it.  We  shall  fight  ajjainst  it ;  never 
feed  or  indulge  it ;  nor  make  peace  with  it,  or  ever  rest  content- 
ed with  any  thing  short  of  its  perfect  eradication  from  the 
heart.  We  shall  be  opposed  to  Satan,  to  all  his  works,  and  all 
his  temptations.  We  shall  resist  him,  and  fight  against  him, 
and  never  give  place  to  him.  We  shall  desire  the  day  to  come, 
when  he  shall  be  bound,  and  confined  forever,  and  wholly  de- 
feated. We  shall  desire,  that  even  enemies  to  God  may  be 
renewed  and  become  his  friends.  And  if  they  continue  ene- 
mies, we  shall  desire  to  have  them  defeated  and  confined  with 
devils,  that  they  may  no  more  disturb  the  peace  of  God's  king- 
dom. We  shall  resist  every  temptation,  and  guard  against  the 
allurements  of  riches,  honors  and  vain  pleasures.  We  shall 
oppose,  every  error  in  doctrino  and  practice,  and  contend  ear- 
nestly for  the  truth.  We  shall  fervently  desire  the  day  to  ar- 
rive, when  Christ  will  triumph  over  his  and  his  people's  ene- 
mies, when  we  shall  gain  an   endless  victory,  when  death  will 


335 

be  destroyed  ;  and  all  enemies,  and  'evils  of  every  kind,  shall  be 
forever  banished  from  the  holy  kingdom  of  Christ;  when  peace, 
and  love,  and  harmony,  shall  forever  prevail ;  and  all  the  friends 
of  God  enjoy  perfect  good,  without  any  enemy  to  disturb  or 
interrupt  their  enjoyments.  Such  feelings  and  affections  the 
opposition  of  enemies  will  excite  in  the  hearts  of  all  who  are 
born  again. 

Those  who  make  a  portion  of  this  world,  if  they  are  oppos- 
ed in  their  pursuits,  view  their  opponents  as  their  enemies. 
Their  opposition  to  them  in  the  pursuit  of  objects  which  they 
love,  produces  in  them  hatred,  anger,  revenge,  and  such  pas- 
sions, towards  their  opposers  or  enemies. 

So  in  this  case,  all  beings  and  things  which  are  opposed  to 
the  happiness,  glor}',  purity,  and  peace  of  God's  kingdom,  will 
be  considered  by  saints  or  enemies,  opposed  to  the  objects  of 
their  supreme  delight.  And  such  opposition  to  all  their  pri- 
mary and  secondary  feelings  and  desires,  and  to  their  pursuit 
of  the  highest  good  of  Christ's  kingdom,  will  excite  in  their 
hearts  a  decided  opposition  to  such  enemies.  And  these  are 
holy  desires,  such  as  we  ought  to  have,  and  are  the  fruits  of  the 
Spirit,  or  the  effect  of  regeneration. — If  we  do  not  experience 
them,  we  have  no  ground  to  hope  we  are  born  again.  If  we  do 
not  feel  a  hatred  to  sin,  and  strong  desires  to  overcome  it  ;  if 
we  do  not  hate  and  fight  against  satan,  and  resist  his  tempta- 
tions ;  if  we  do  not  hate  sin  in  others,  and  desire  to  reclaim 
them  ;  if  we  do  not  hate  every  error,  and  guard  against  the 
allurements  of  this  world  ;  if  we  do  not  fight  against  such  ene- 
mies, desire  to  overcome,  and  be  crowned  with  victory  ;  what 
evidence  have  we  that  we  are  born  again  ?  If  remaining  sin  is 
not  a  grief  to  us,  and  our  greatest  burden  in  life  ;  if  we  are  not 
warmly  engaged  in  the  christian  warfare  ;  if  the  abounding  of 
sin,-  and  the  success  of  satan  on  the  earth,  are  not  hateful  j  if 
our  desires  for  a  final  victory  over  all  evil  are  faint ;  we  have 
little  or  no  ground  to  hope  we  are  christians. 

Here  then  is  another  class  of  affections,  which  all  will  experi- 
ence who  arc  born  again.  By  them  we  may  try  and  examine 
ourselves. 

I  have  now  described  the  fruits  of  regeneration,  or  of  the  Spir- 
it ;  and  have  divided  these  fruits  into  three  distinct  classes,  to 
help  all  to  form  a  correct  judgment  of  their  real  character.  In 
the  first  class  is  included  a  new,  holy,  spiritual  appetite  ;  which 
delights  in  the  character  of  God,  of  Christ,  in  the  happiness  of 


38« 

nis  kintrrlom,  and  desires  for  the  continuance  and  increase  of 
those  pi"  isurts.  Tlie  lirst  pleasures  and  joys  of  renewed  per- 
sons, with  their  innnediate  desires,  when  every  thing  appears 
new  to  them,  form  the  first  class  of  holy  affections.  From  this 
t\'ill  arise  desires  for  the  continuance  and  increase  of  grace,  and 
for  all  the  means  God  has  appointed  for  our  improvement  in 
knovvlodpe  and  prowth  in  pirace.  Those  desires  constitute  the 
second  class  of  holy  desires  or  fruits  of  the  Spirit.  And  from 
these  will  arise  a  hatred  of  sin,  of  every  spiritual  enemy  ;  and 
dr-sires  for  them  to  be  subdued,  and  a  final  victory  gained. 
These  desires  to  overcome  all  spiritual  enemies  form  a  third 
class  of  holy  affectimis.  All  these  are  those  fruits  of  the  Spir- 
it, by  which  we  may  know  what  our  characters  are.  Biit  one 
thing  more  remains  under  this  head,  which  is  to  show, 

4.  That  those  who  have  these  fruits  will  manifest  them,  in  a 
life  and  conduct  agreeing:  with  their  nature. 

Every  person's  external  and  visible  conduct,  is  under  the 
influence  and  govemment  of  the  heart,  or  affections.  The 
heart  is  the  only  primary  active  principle  in  man,  which  pro- 
duces all  the  visible  fruits  in  person's  actions  and  conduct. 
The  heart  is  every  persons'  moral  nature  ;  and  his  external 
conduct  is  the  fruit  this  nature  brings  forth.  Hence  the  rea- 
son why  Christ  conjpares  men  to  trees.  He  says  trees  bring 
forth  f.'uit,  according  to  their  nature  ;  and  he  says,  that  men 
will  do  the  same.  This  is  the  way  by  which  we  learn  what  the 
nature  or  moral  character  of  man  is.  We  infer  his  nature 
from  his  fruit,  as  we  judge  of  the  nature  of  a  tree  by  its  fruit. 
In  this  way  every  person  must  learn  his  own  nature  or  charac- 
ter. Here  we  take  into  view  a  person's  internal,  as  well  as  ex- 
ternal, or  visible  fruit.  We  may  then  adopt  this  as  a  true 
maxim,  that  if  our  external  fruit  does  not  agree  with  the  word 
of  God,  we  are  not  christians. 

A  person's  external  conduct  may  exhibit  negative  and  pos- 
itive evidence,  that  he  is  a  saint.  By  necative  evidence  is  in- 
tended mere  morality.  If  a  person's  life  is  immoral,  it  give* 
positive  evidence  that  he  was  never  born  again.  If  he  is  strict- 
ly moral,  he  gives  negative  evidence  of  piety.  His  actions  and 
words  agree  with  the  rule  of  duty.  And  we  may  have  no  evi- 
dence to  support  us,  in  saying  he  is  not  a  real  saint. 

By  positive  external  evidence,  is  meant  those  actions  and 
condnct,  which  manifest  a  real  benevolent  spirit.  He  not  only 
abstains  from  evil,  and  avoids  immoral  conduct  ;  but  he  goes 


337 

tarther,  and  manifests  lovo,  kindnes-^,  and  otiier  lioly  afitcdcrii!, 
by  his  actions  and  conduct  in  lile. — So  Cliiist  ri>prcsents  the 
final  trial.  I  was  sick,  and  ye  visited  nic  ;  to  another  he  says, 
Twas  sick  and  ye  visited  me  not.  Here  one  gave  positive  evi- 
dence of  love  to  Christ ;  the  other  gave  only  negative  evidence. 
And  we  learn,  that  negative  evidence  is  not  sufHcicnt,  if  posi- 
tive evidence  is  wanting.  For  one  is  i>y  Christ  blessetl,  mui 
the  other  condemned.  Yet  the  one  condemned  is  not  accused 
of  any  immoral  conduct. 

When  a  contribution  is  proposed  to  send  t!ie  gospel  to  the 
heathen,  one  professor  says  nothing  apninst.  and  docs  nothing 
to  prevent  it ;  but  though  able  he  will  not  give  any  tiling  to 
promote  the  object.  Another,  no  more  able  to  give,  encour- 
ages all  to  give,  and  gives  freely  and  liberally  himself.  Ouc 
gives  only  a  negative,  but  the  other  positive  e;vidence  of  piety. 
This  show  s  us  tliat  those  who  gi\'e  no  more  than  negative  evi- 
dence of  piety,  dt^not  bring  forth  the  fruit  wiiich  gains  the  ciiar- 
ity  of  others.  Any  person  unrenewed  may  do  all  this ;  he 
may  live  a  moral  life,  so  that  no  person  can  have  any  reason 
to  speak  evil  of  him,  or  charge  him  with  any  crime.  But  chris- 
tians are  to  do  more  than  others  ;  and  must,  in  order  to  gain 
charity.  They  must  not  only  avoid  sinful  courses,  be  careful 
not  to  cast  stumbling  blocks  in  the  w  ay,  or  do  any  thing  to 
hinder  the  salvation  of  souls,  and  the  advaficement  of  Christ':- 
kingdom  ;  but  they  must  be  actively  engncod  in  afiordir.g  as- 
sistance to  fellow  travellers,  and  in  proniotini-;  the;  kingdosn  of 
Christ.  A  christian  must  not  only  avoid  every  thing,  whic!) 
may  prevent  his  brother's  rising,  when  he  laJN  or  stumbles  : 
but  he  ought  to  help  him  rise.  He  should  not  only  refrain 
from  every  thing  wliich  may  prevent  his  return,  when  he  goes 
astray  ;  but  go  after  him,  find  him  and  bring  him  back  to  the 
fold,  if  it  be  possible.  He  must  not  only  refrain  frou)  evil,  but 
do  good  ;  not  only  avoid  works  of  darkness,  but  shine  as  u 
light  in  the  world.  Some  trees  are  full  of  leaves,  and  bear  evil 
fruit  ;  others  have  leaves,  but  no  fruit  ;  and  others  are  full  of 
leaves  and  laden  with  good  fruit.  So  a  good  profession  is  Iik« 
a  tree  with  leaves  ;  and  if  such  are  only  tiogatively  good,  they 
ore  as  trees  full  of  leaves,  which  bear  no  fruit.  But  a  real  saint 
is  not  only  beautiful  with  the  leaves  of  a  proiession,  but  is  more 
or  less  laden  with  good  fruit.  This  may  siiow  what  of  external 
^  islble  fruit  wc  must  bring  forth,  to  give  evidenceof  real  friend- 
,sMiip  to  Cod.     If  professors  arc  not  ne^alivelv  holv,  are  not 

18  ■     ' 


'3SS 

moral,  but  inuiioral,  it  is  very  certain  tliey  are  not  chvistians, 
Ivowevcr  good  their  story  of  experiences  may  be.  If  they  are 
moral,  and  thus  negatively  cfood,  and  profess  a  cliang-e  of  lieart.. 
we  have  not  sufiicient  ground  to  say  they  are  not  saints.  But 
if  they  exhibit  onl}'  this  negative  evidence,  our  charity  for  them 
Avill  be  faint. 

Kilt  if  their  relation  is  good  and  they  bear  fruit  positively 
P;.0(hI>  they  train  our  charity  at  once  ;  and  we  shall  have  warm 
and  full  confu'cuce  that  they  are  what  they  profess,  according: 
t9  the  measure  of  good  fruit  which  they  bear.  Now  whatevei' 
M'C  have  felt  inwardly,  even  though  we  have  been  elated  seem- 
ingly to  heaven  with  good  feelings,  yet  if  our  visible  life  and 
conduct  do  not  harmonize  herewith  ;  if  we  have  only  a  nega- 
tive, but  no  positive  evidence  ;  we  have  not  ground  to  support 
that  hope  which  purifies  the  heart.  Hence,  to  have  that  I'ruit 
which  the  word  of  God  describes  as  good  fruit,  we  must  expe- 
rience all  those  internal  aflections,  which  have  been  illustrated  ; 
and  our  external  con<iuet  and  life  must  agree  herewith^  other- 
wise we  have  not  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit,  which  we  may  rest  on. 
with  safety. 

After  all,  persons  may  be  deceived.  They  may  exhibit 
much  positive  good  fruit  externally,  yet  not  be  christians.  Be- 
cause all  those  external  good  things  may  be  performed  from 
bad  motives ;  from  pride,  or  a  desire  to  appear  well,  and  gain 
an  honorable  name  in  the  world.  This  is  clearly  taught  by 
Christ  and  his  apostles. 

Our  liord  says,  that  some  at  the  great  d-ay  will  plead,  they 
bave  wrought  nnracles  in  his  n:une,and  eaten  and  drunk  in  his 
])resencejto  Ai'hom  ije  will  declare  that  be  never  knew  them.  And 
Paul  signifies,  that  persons  may  speak  with  the  eloquence  of  an- 
gels, fticd'  the  poor,  work  miracles,  and  give  their  bodies  to  be 
burned,  yet  not  have  charity  ;  and  if  they  have  not  charity. 
ihey  are  notiiing.  And  this  agreeswith  his  description  of  cer- 
tain characters  in  the  6th  of  Hebrews,  and  with  what  Christ  ob- 
sei'ves  concerning  stony  ground  hearei^s.  And  it  agrees  with 
the  dictates  of  reason.  For  however  good  and  useful  actions 
and  words  are,  if  they  arc  n«t  j>erformed  with  right  motives, 
and  do  not  proceed  from^  a  benevolent  principle  of  heart,  they 
cannot  be  pleasing  in  the  sight  of  that  God,  who  looketh  at  ihr 
heart,  and'  requires  sincerity  in  the  inward  part. 

1  have  iww  ex'iibited  to  view  those  fruits  of  the  Spirit,  or  of 
the  new  birtru  which  all  will  biJnir  forth,  more  or  less  \^ bo  ^^'^ 


339 

■♦)orii  rif^ain.  It  is  by  these  fruits  we  are  to  form  our  (>|jiulon  oL 
others,  and  judge  concerning  onr  own  characters.  For  Christ 
has  given  the  same  rule,  by  which  ue  are  to  judge  ourselves 
and  our  fellow  men,  whether  we  and  they  are  indeed  the  chiUi- 
Ten  of  God.  By  their  fruits  3  e  shall  know  them  ;  and  by  our 
fruit  we  must  know  ourselves.  For  we  have  no  intuitive  view 
of  our  nature,  an}'  more  than  we  have  of  the  nature  of  other 
persons.  And  of  course  we  have  no  way  to  know  ourselves, 
only  by  our  fruits.  How  important,  then,  that  we  should  form 
consistent  views  of  the  nature  of  gospel  liuit.  For  if  we  arc 
wrong  in  this  particular,  we  may  form  fake  opinions  of  our  own 
hearts  and  moral  characters. 

Rrfleciions.  1.  No  person  can  tell  the  minute,  or  hour,  or 
•day  in  vhich  he  wns  born  again. 

Regeneration  is  thex:reation  of  a  new  nature.,  or  a  holy,  be- 
nevolent, active  principle  of  action,  or  appetite.  And  there 
are  but  three  ways,  by  which  we  can  know  whether  such  a  prin- 
ciple is  created  in  us.  One  is  by  intiji|ion  ;  another  by  feeling 
the  operation  of  divine  power,  at  the  instant  the  creation  is  per- 
formed ;  and  the  last  is,  by  the  fruits  which  will  follow.  ^Ve 
eertaiul}'  cannot  tell  this  by  intuition.  To  have  a  naked  view 
of  the  heart,  is  the  prerogrative  of  God  only.  And  it  is  as  cer- 
tain, that  no  pej-sou  can  know  this  by  feeling  the  agenc}'  of  the 
Spirit.  The  agency  of  God  is  constantly  operating  upon 
christians,  in  preserving  life,  in  sanctifying  the  heart,  and  in 
many  ways.  But  no  person  feels  this  agency ;  no  one  has  a 
conscious  feeling  of  that  power,  which  causes  his  lungs  to  heave, 
and  his  blood  to  How  in  his  veins.  It  is  then  only  by  the  fruits, 
w  hich  the  new  nature  will  bear,  that  we  can  have  a  knowledge 
of  this  great  change.  To  learn  by  the  fruit,  there  must  he 
more  or  less  time  intervene,  before  we  can  infer  that  we  are  re- 
newed. 

It  is  granted,  persons  may  know  tJie  hour  and  place  in  which 
they  experienced  a  change  in  their  feelings  ;  when  things  ap- 
peared new  to  them  ;  wljeu  they  lelt  other  joys,  and  sensations, 
and  desires.  But  those  feelings  are  not  the  change  itself ;  tliey 
are  only  the  fruits  of  it.  A  new  nature  or  appetite  must  pre- 
cede these  seusations  and  desires.  And  from  them  we  may  in- 
fer, that  a  change  has  been  produced  in  us,  if  those  feelings  are 
genuine.  JJut  we  cannot  infer  from  them  that  wc  were  at  that 
instant  born  again.  It  might  be  at  that  instant,  and  it  might 
Jiavc  been  an  hour  or  day  previous.      Ho-w  lonj^  ilic  hp;u(  nvj-y 


340 

Iiavr  been  created  anew,  before  we  experience  any  of'tlie  linity, 
ju)  person  can  tell.  It  is  probable,  that  some  experience  lliosfc 
(ruiis  more  iiiuiiediately  than  others  ;  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  objects  in  view  of  the  mind  at  the  time  the  change  is  ef- 
fected. As  it  is  by  the  fruit  only  a  person  can  know  he  is  born 
again  ;  and  as  no  one  can  infer  from  the  fruit  the  instant  when 
the  new  creation  was  produced  ;  so  no  one  can  tell  the  day  or 
iiour,  when  his  heart  was  renewed.  He  can  tell  when  he  ex- 
perienced new  sensations,  desires,  and  pleasures  ;  but  cannot 
tell,  when  that  new  principle  was  produced,  which  brings  forth 
those  fruits.  And  it  may  be  that  the  fruit  is  realixed  very  soon 
after  llic  change  is  produced  ;  but  not  certain. — This  corrects 
and  confutes  un  error,  which  is  often  attended  with  dangerous 
consequences. 

Some  persons  believe  they  can  tell  with  certaint}'  the  very 
instant,  or  moment,  when  they  were  born  again.  And  on  this 
ground  it  is,  that  they  are  positive  and  certain  that  they  are 
new  creatures.  Hence,  whatever  their  feeling  and  fruits  are 
afterwards,  they  are  stilfconfident  they  are  saints.  They  will 
say,  I  know  1  am  renewed  ;  for  I  knov/  the  moment,  when  this 
was  done  ;  and  if  grace  cannot  be  lost,  I  am  still  a  renewed 
man.  So  they  niainlnin  their  hope,  though  tiieir  present  fruit 
condemns  them.  While  a  person,  who  says  he  cannot  tell 
whether  he  is  born  again  only  by  bis  fruit,  will  doubt  concern- 
ing his  state  so  far  as  his  fruit  will  not  warrant  him  to  hope. 
He  can  say,  I  know  the  very  hour  when  a  great  char.ge  took 
place  in  my  feelings,  and  1  had  some  hope  tlien  that  1  was  a  new 
creature.  But  as  all  my  feelings  then  may  have  been  spurious, 
and  false  ;  so  it  may  be  1  was  not  then  renewed,  or  have  been 
since,  seeing  I  do  not  bring  forth  the  genuine  fruits  of  a  new 
heart.  If  my  feelings  were  genuine  on  which  I  first  built  my 
hope,  I  should  still  bring  forth  good  fruit.  As  my  fruit  is  not 
!5uch  as  the  bible  represents  christians  as  bringing  forth  daily, 
1  have  reason  to  fear  my  first  fruits  were  false,  only  such  as 
stonv  ground  hearers  experience  ;  and  hence  the  reason  why  I 
have  generally  been  so  barren.  Thus  different  will  be  the 
reasoning  of  persons,  when  one  is  certain  he  knew  the  moment 
when  he  was  born  again,  and  the  other  relies  not  on  this,  but  on 
the  fruit  he  bears,  as  the  only  sure  evidence  of  a  change  ol 
heart. 

Persons  of  the  f  rmer  class  are  generally  antinominians  ; 
they  maintain  their  hope  firm,  when  tli^ir  daily  fruit  fondcif,i>n 


341 

them.  How  can  iliey  do  this,  only  on  the  principle  that  per- 
sons nja}'  have  a  saving  faith,  yet  not  bring  forth  good  fruit  ? 
There  is  reason  to  fear  many  have  been  deceived  to  their  final 
ruin,  who  have  imbibed  the  erroneous  idea  of  which  1  am  speak- 
ing. While  those  who  depend  on  their  fruit  as  an  evidence  of 
a  real  change,  according  to  the  direction  of  Christ,  will  doubt, 
examine  themselves,  and  feel  assured  no  further  than  their  fruit 
witnesses  in  their  favor.  And  they  will  make  it  a  business  to 
live  holy  lives  every  day  ;  while  those  of  the  other  sentiment 
will  give  very  little  attention  to  the  fruit  they  hear.  For  their 
hope  from  day  to  day  is  not  founded  on  their  fruit,  but  on  the 
certainty  that  at  such  a  moment  they  were  renewed. 

2.  Great  transports  of  joy  are  uncertain  evidence  of  a  change 
of  heart.  Some  lay  great  stress  on  such  jo\  ful  sejisations.  As 
soon  as  they  feel  them,  they  are  sure  of  a  change  of  heart.  Yet 
perhaps  there  is  no  feeling,  no  alicction,  which  satan  can  more 
easily  counterfeit,  than  this.  For  according  to  the  known  laws 
of  our  nature,  by  which  we  are  always  governed,  it  is  certain 
that  joy  will  attend  a  deliverance  from  danger  or  distress, 
whether  it  be  real,  or  existing  only  in  the  icZie/*of  the  mind. 
For  if  a  person  believes  he  is  delivered  from  the  danger,  the  en- 
em}',  or  the  evil,  which  he  greatly  dreaded,  his  deliverance  is 
in  his  view  real;  and  will  be  attended  with  the  same  joyful 
feelings  as  a  real  salvation,  though  in  fact  he  is  deceived,  be- 
lieving he  is  safe  when  he  is  not. 

Satan  is  a  cunning  and  subtle  adversary.  His  object  is  the 
ruin  of  souls.  To  eli'cct  this  he  will,  if  possible,  keep  sinners 
in  a  state  of  peace  and  security  all  their  days.  If  at  any  time 
the}'  are  alarmed  with  a  sense  of  their  danger,  lie  will  try  every 
method  he  can  to  lull  tiieir  fears  asleep  again.  If  he  cannot 
effect  this,  his  next  step  is  to  deceive  them  ;  and  make  them  be- 
lieve they  are  real  saints,  when  they  are  not.  And  this  is  the 
most  dangerous  ground,  upon  w  hich  he  can  bring  them  to  rest. 
For  it  is  seldom  any  person  is  brought  to  renounce  his  hope, 
though  it  be  false.  Many  secure  soiiis  are  alarmed  and  renew- 
ed, while  not  one  hypocrite  is  brought  to  see  his  deception,  re- 
ject his  hope,  and  build  anew.  It  is  by  deception  satan  brought 
sin  into  this  world  at  first ;  and  it  Is  by  deception  he  has  ever 
since  maintained  his  kingdom.  This  is  the  grand  means  by 
which  lie  ruins  so  many  souls.  To  this  end,  we  are  info»'me<l. 
he  may  and  ofien  does  transform  himself  into  an  angel  of  light.  - 
*V'h1  v.hen  he  does  this,  there  is  no  angel  in  heaven,  who  mani- 


342 

fests  a  greater  zeal  for  religion  than  he.  He  then  labors  to 
have  sinners  attend  to  religion  with  great  assiduity.  For  a 
proof  of  this  we  may  produce  as  witnesses  the  Heathen,  tlie 
Jews,  and  Mahometans.  How  zealous  they  are  in  religion. 
But  their  systems  are  such  as  satan  has  invented  for  them  to 
embrace.  Satan  finds  that  mankind  in  general  cannot,  rest 
easy,  unless  they  have  what  they  call  religion.  He  according- 
ly forms  systems  for  them,  and  persuades  them  to  embrace  them ; 
and  the  more  engaged  they  are  in  supporting  their  religious 
rites,  the  more  safe  and  secure  they  feci,  and  so  much  the  more 
satan  is  pleased.  For  if  by  such  ways  he  can  blind,  and  de- 
ceive, and  ruin  souls,  he  is  satisfied.  He  then  is  their  god,  and  h 
full  of  religious  zeal  himself. 

Now  in  a  christian  land  satan  has  to  take  a  different  course, 
in  many  respects.  While  men  admit  the  bible,  he  persuades 
them  to  embrace  damnable  errors,  and  support  them  with  all 
the  zeal,  and  false  learning  and  reasoning  in  their  power.  If 
any  remain  orthodox  in  head,  and  he  cannot  ruin  them  by  dan- 
gerous errors  in  sentiment,  he  will  bring  them  to  believe  they 
are  christians  when  they  are  not,  and  so  rest  on  a  false  hope. 
Hence,  when  sinners  are  alarmed  and  exercised  in  mind,  and 
even  have  a  genuine  conviction  of  sin,  he  will  persuade  them  to 
believe,  that  remarkable  dreams,  visions,  bodily  agitations,  texts 
of  scripture  occuring  sundenly,  and  in  a  way  unaccountable  to 
the  mind,  and  such  like  things,  are  sure  evidences  of  a  change 
of  heart.  He  sets  them  to  reason  in  this  way.  'This  dream, 
this  vision,  this  bodily  feeling,  this  text  of  scripture,  is  no  part 
of  my  agency.  I  cannot  produce  such  things,  nor  prevent 
them.  They  are  produced  by  some  invisible  agent,  and  this 
agent  is  the  Spirit  of  God.  For  satan  cannot,  and  if  he  could, 
he  would  not,  do  these  things.  They  must  be  from  the  holy 
Spirit,  and  by  them  the  Spirit  informs  ns  we  are  born  again.' 

Now  it  is  easy  for  satan,  if  permitted,  to  produce  such  strange 
dreams,  visions,  and  bodily  afiections  ;  and  whisper  texts  of 
scripture  to  their  minds.  He  quoted  scripture  to  Christ ;  he 
had  great  power  over  men's  bodies  in  that  day  ;  and  he  can 
raise  storms,  as  in  the  case  of  Job,  and  do  man;,'  such  wonder- 
ful things,  when  permitted.  When,  therefore,  men  are  persuad- 
ed to  believe,  that  such  wonders  are  always  produced  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  are  sure  signs  of  u  change  of  heart,  he  has 
Jhem  in  jjis  power,  and  can  deceive  them  at  his  pleasure.     And 


343 

pei'sons  wko  believe  tbusmay  rely  ou  it,  they  will  hav'e  visions 
and  revelations,  more  or  less. 

And  some,  who  profess  to  be  ministers,  know  so  little  concerU" 
ing  huninn  nature,  and  the  deceitful  workings  of  sata.i,  tliat  they 
do,  by  laying  much  weight  on  sucli  appearances  themselves^ 
persuade  many  to  believe  in  them,  and  rely  on  them.  Hence 
in  places  where  such  things  are  preached  and  believed,  if  there 
is  any  revival,  persons  experience  these  things  very  often.  One 
has  had  a  dream  ;  another  a  vision ;  another  a  text  occuring  he 
cannot  tell  how  ;  others  have  felt  great  weakness  of  body,  so 
as  to  lose  their  strength,  and  apparently  their  life.  Converts 
are  multiplied  very  fast  ;  almost  every  one  has  a  dream  or  vi- 
sion, or  some  such  wonder  to  relate,  and  then  is  pronounced 
converted.  Thus  satan  deceives  many.  While  in  other  places 
where  there  are  revivals,  and  persons  are  taught  difl'erently, 
and  do  not  believe  in  such  things  as  signs  of  conversion,  it  is  very 
rare  that  they  occur  among  the  converts.  Why  not  ?  Because 
satan  knows,  that  he  cannot  deceive  such  persons  in  this  way. 
Such  works  therefore  do  not  answer  his  end  ;  and  of  course  he 
does  not  produce  them.  Hence  the  reason  why  the  weak,  the 
ignorant,  and  those  most  likely  to  believe  in  such  strange  things, 
are  most  apt  to  experience  them.  Because  in  such  persons  sa- 
tan is  more  likely  to  succeed  in  deceiving. 

Now  when  persons  are  under  serious  impressions,  and  have 
a  sense  and  conviction  of  sin,  satan  will  deceive  them,  if  possi- 
ble. He  will  lead  them  to  settle  down  on  a  false  hope.  And 
if,  in  this  state  of  mind,  they  have  an  idea  that  they  are  born  a- 
gain,  whether  they  obtain  this  by  dreams,  visions,  or  any  other 
wa}',  they  will  experience  an  alteration  in  their  feelings.  As 
soon  as  they  believe  they  are  renewed,  whatever  may  occasion 
this  belief,  they  will  feel  joyful ;  their  burden  will  leave  them, 
and  their  mind  will  become  in  some  degree  tranquil.  And  those 
feelings  are  occasioned  by  the  idea,  or  the  belief  they  have, 
that  their  heart  is  renewed.  And  the  joy  they  feel,  their  relief 
♦»f  the  burden  they  had  experienced,  and  the  consequen(  peace 
of  mind,  confirm  their  belief;  and  this  again  increases  their  joy, 
and  this  increase  satisfies  them  still  more  fully  that  they  have 
passed  from  death  to  life.  So  in  this  way  they  soon  have  ;». 
settled  am!  confirmed  hope.  Yet  their  hearts  remain  unrenew- 
ed ;  and  this  great  change  in  their  feelings  was  occasioned 
wholly  by  their  being  led  to  entertain  a  belief  that  they  had  be- 
come new  creature?.     If  a  person  views  himself,  as  ho  really  is, 


311 

n  tthe  gif atest  dnn^tT,  and  even  exposed  to  eternal  death  ;  li' 
this  view  excites  (ear,  anxiety,  and  distress,  and  sinks  him  under 
the  burden  ;  if,  by  a"y  means,  he  g;ains  belief  that  he  is  deliver- 
ed from  danger,  and  the  death  he  feared,  his  fears,  and  distress, 
and  burden,  will  leave  him.  And  this  deliverance,  which  he 
considers  as  real,  will  excite  in  him  greater  or  less  joy  and  glad- 
ness of  heart.  Yet  he  is  deceived  ;  no  such  deliverance  has 
been  wrought  for  him,  as  he  believes.  But  with  him  it  is  a  re- 
ality, and  produces  the  same  eff(>ct  it  would  in  case  it  had  been 
real.  And  his  relief  of  his  burden,  and  joy  of  heart,  he  will 
tiew  as  evidences  of  a  real  deliverance  ;  and  of  course  will  hi- 
crease  and  strengthen  his  previous  belief  or  hope. 

Thus  how  easy  it  is  for  satan  to  deceive  persons,  when  they 
embrace  such  erroneous  ideas  of  evidence  of  convention.  It 
was  in  a  way  similar  to  this,  the  stony  ground  hearers  were 
filled  with  joy,  and  their  joy  conlirmed  their  hope.  Similar  to 
this  was  the  joy  the  Jews  experienced  at  the  Red  sea.  The 
day  before  they  were  burdened  with  fears  and  distress,  occa- 
sioned by  their  enemies.  vVs  soon  as  they  had  safely  crossed 
and  saw  their  enemies  overwhelmed  in  the  mighty  deep,  their' 
burden  left  them  ;  and  their  hearts  were  filled  with  joy,  which 
they  expressed  in  songs  of  praise  to  God  their  Savior.  Yet 
their  hearts  were  full  of  rebellion,  which  they  manifested  a  few 
days  after,  in  murmurs  and  complaints. 

Hence  joy  is  no  sure  evidence  of  a  change  of  heart.  And 
false  joy  is  commonly  greater,  than  that  which  is  genuine. 
And  it  is  dangerous  for  persons  to  place  much  dcpendance  up- 
on it,  especially  when  they  first  obtain  a  hope.  And  general- 
ly, if  not  always,  if  persons  find  on  examination,  that  a  hope 
they  had  met  with  a  change  preceded  their  joy,  they  may  con- 
clude that  this  hope  is  the  cause  of  their  joy  and  the  relief  they 
feel,  and  not  the  fruit  of  any  real  change  of  heart.  Where 
there  is  a  real  change  of  heart,  attended  with  joy  and  a  release 
from  their  burdens  of  mind,  it  is  commonly  some  time  before 
persons  do  or  can  consider  this  a  warrantable  evidence  of  a  sav- 
ing change.  Hence  if  their  hope  precedes  their  joy,  they 
ought  not  to  rely  on  it  as  an  evlclcnce  of  grace  in  the  heart. 
It  may  also  be  well  to  observe,  that  gospel  ministers,  instead 
of  teaching  people  to  pay  attention  to  dreams  and  visions,  bod- 
ily feelings,  or  the  remarkable  occurrence  of  scripture-  texts  to 
the  mind,  ought  to  show  them  the  great  danger  of  laying  any 
weight  on  such   things,  and  warn  ihcm  to  guard  against  being" 


ilecfeived  by  such  delnsions.     This  particular   njay  be   clost'u 
with  the  following  observations.  ' 

Within  the  course  of  my  ministry,  which  is  now  forty-three 
years,  I  have  been  particularly  acquainted  with  a  number  of 
revivals  among  my  own  people,  and  also  in  towns  adjacent ; 
and  have  frequently  noticed  two  kinds  of  converts,  whose  first 
experiences  have  been  difl'crent.  One  class  is  composed  of  those, 
who  have  manifested  a  great  and  sudden  alteiation  in  their 
feeling'*.  They  have  suddenly  experienced  great  joy,  and  en- 
tire relief  of  their  burden,  and  manifested  much  warmth  of  af- 
fection, great  zeal  in  the  cause  of  Christ,  and  almost  a  Adl  and 
sure  confidence  of  a  saving  change  free  from  doubts  and  fears. 
The  other  class  have  manifested  a  lively  sen^e  of  the  great  de- 
pravity and  sinfulness  of  their  hearts  ;  after  a  season  theif 
burden,  as  they  call  it,  has  left  them  ;  they  have  felt  a  pleas- 
edness  with  the  character  of  God,  inward  satisfaction  in  his 
sovereignty,  a  willingness  to  be  in  his  hand  and  at  his  disposal ; 
but,  on  account  of  the  creat  sinfulness  of  their  hearts,  cannot 
for  a  considerable  time  persuade  themselves,  that  they  are  new 
creatures.  They  begin  at  last  to  entertain  a  hope,  with,  fear 
and  trembling  ;  yet  at  no  time  have  they  been  much  elated  with 
joy.  This  class  of  converts  have  generally  persevered  in  the 
christian  course,  and  given  increasing  evidence  of  real,  and  gen- 
uine piety,  shining  with  greater  light  from  year  to  year  ;  and 
it  is  seldom,  that  one  of  them  finally  proves  to  be  a  hypocrite. 
While  numbers  of  the  other  class,  after  a  few  davs,  begin  to 
decline,  grow  cold,  and  finally,  like  stony  ground  hearers,  un- 
'der  trials  fall  away,  and  embrace  dangerous  errors  of  some 
kind,  or  return  to  their  former  course  of  life  ;  many  of  them, 
give  decided  proof  of  hypocrisy.  And  those  of  this  class,  who 
do  persevere  and  support  a  christian  life,  after  a  few  days  or 
weeks  from  the  time  of  their  change,  manifest  but  little  of  the 
joy  they  first  felt,  lose  their  confidence,  and  begin  to  doubt, 
whether  all  they  have  experienced  is  not  a  delusioti.  They 
begin  to  become  more  and  more  acquainted  with  their  remain- 
ing corruptions,  and  complain  of  their  depravity,  coldness,  and 
stUfHdity  ;  and  thou,  with  humility  and  trembling,  they  perse- 
vere in  working  out  their  salvation.  Hence  converts,  who  are 
elated  with  joy  at  first  and  on  this  account  have  great  conli- 
dence  and  assurance,  who  are  warm,  forward,  and  full  of  zeal, 
are  not  very  promising,  and  there  is  much  reason  to  fear  they 
xvill  prove  no  l)ettor  than  stony  ground   hearers.     But   those^ 

19 


346 

■ftlio  have  a  ilecp  scn?c  of  tlicir  depravity,  and  obtain  a  hope 
bv  ■'^low  dej;recs,  and  with  many  tears  :  who  show  great  ten- 
derness of  heart,  lest  they  should  wound  the  cause,  and  many 
fears  that  they  are  deceived  ;  these  are  persons,  who  sliinc 
brightest  on  their  journey  to  the  heavenly  land.  And  with 
this  representation,  it  is  believed,  ministers  who  have  been 
inuch  acquainted  with  revivals,  will  agree.  Let  us  then  leara 
not  to  consider  great  and  sudden  joy,  confidence,  and  boldrjcss, 
so  great  evidences  of  piety,  as  many  seem  to  do,  and  especial- 
ly those,  « iio  are  less  acquainted  with  the  operations  of  the 
Holy  Spirit. 

3.  All  persons,  who  believe  the  entire  depravity  of  the  lieart, 
and  the  necessity  of  a  change  by  tiie  agency  of  the  Spirit,  to 
be  consistent,  must  embrace  the  doctrine  of  particular,  person- 
al election. 

It  is  the  depravity  of  the  heart,  which  leads  men  away  from 
God,  to  travel  the  broad  road  to  death.  This  path  they  will 
continue  to  travel,  till  they  are  renewed.  And  if  not  renewed, 
all  will  perish.  And  regeneration  is  a  change  wrought  by  the 
creating  agency  of  God.  Also  it  is  a  plain  truth,  that  no  be- 
ing can  act  without  determination.  A  determinaiion  to  do  a 
thing,  to  produce  an  event,  must  precede,  in  the  order  of  na- 
ture, the  event  to  be  produced.  Indeed  the  heart  of  every  mor- 
al agent  must  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  indifference,  with  respect 
to  any  action  to  be  performed,  or  must  be  determined  against 
it,  or  for  it.  For  we  cannot  conceive  of  an}'  other  state  in 
which  the  heart  can  be.  If  God  is  perfectly  indillerent  wheth- 
er any  one  is  renewed  or  not,  he  will  not  exert  his  agency  to 
renew  any  heart.  If  determined  not  to  renew  one  soul,  then 
lie  never  will  save  one.  It  follows  then,  that  he  is  determined 
to  renew  a  person's  heart,  previous  to  effecting  the  change,  and 
then  his  agency  is  employed  in  producing  it.  It  is  plain  a  de- 
termination to  do  any  particular  thing  must  precede,  in  the 
jjrder  of  nature,  the  peribrinance  of  it. 

Again.  As  we  see,  that  a  divine  determination  to  renew  and 
save  a  soul,  must  precede  the  exertion  of  power  for  this  pur- 
))o?e  ;  so  it  is  as  obvious,  that  God  is  determined  to  renew  the 
liearts  of  all  men  ;  or  not  to  renew  the  heart  of  one  ;  or  to  re- 
new the  hearts  of  a  part  only.  No  other  supposition  can  be 
admitted.  It  is  certain  from  his  word,  that  he  will  not  save  all 
juen  ;  and  as  certain,  that  he  will  renew  and  save  some.  Then 
the  determination  of  God  is  to  renew  and    save    some,    a  part, 


347 

of  the  fallen  race  of  men  ;  and  leave  the  others  to  act  their 
pleasure,  and  embrace  or  reject  Chirst.  And  we  know  they 
will  reject  him  forever.  Suppose  God  is  det(;rmined  to  exert 
his  agency  to  renew  some  heart,  the  present  hour  ;  must  he 
not  have  in  view  some  particular  person,  whom  he  designs  to 
renew  ?  Or  will  his  agency  be  exerted  to  renew  a  heart  at 
random,  or  as  chance  may  direct  ? 

Is  such  a  view  of  God's  agency  consistent  with  wisdom,  and 
love  ?  God  never  acts  in  this  manner.  If  he  is  to  renew  some 
heart  this  day,  he  knows  whose  heart  it  is,  and  where  he  lives. 
Hence  it  is  evident,  that  as  God  is  determined  to  renew  the 
hearts  of  some  only  of  the  human  race,  he  must  and  does  know 
the  particular  persons  to  be  renewed.  And  this  Christ  teach- 
<'S.  He  says  he  knows  his  sheep  by  name,  and  can  call  them 
byname  ;  this  you  will  learn  by  reading  the  10th  chapter  of 
John.  If  God  must  know,  who  the  individual  persons  are, 
whose  hearts  he  is  determined  to  renew  and  save,  he  knows 
them  by  name,  where  they  reside,  and  in  what  age  of  the  world 
they  live.  These  are  truths,  which  all  must  admit  to  be  con- 
sistent, who  grant  men  are  totally  depraved,  and  must  be  re- 
liewed  by  the  creating  agency  of  God.  And  if  they  believe 
these  truths,  they  embrace  the  doctrine  of  particular,  person- 
al election  of  individuals  to  eternal  life.  For  by  the  doctrine 
of  election  all  that  is  intended  is,  that  God  is  determined  to  re- 
new and  save  some  of  the  fallen  race ;  and  he  knows  who  the 
individual  persons  are,  whom  he  will  save,  and  when  and  where 
they  live.  These  are  all  the  ideas  contained  in  the  doctrine  of 
election,  with  this  belief  that  this  determination  of  his  is  eter- 
nal. Those  then  who  deiiy  i-iis  doctrine,  yet  believe  in  total 
depravity,  and  the  need  of  creathig  power  to  renew  the  heart, 
are  very  inconsistent.  But  if^ersons  only  see  clearly  the 
truths  expressed  under  this  particular,  and  are  capable  of  com- 
paring, and  seeing  their  agreement,  the}-  must  admit  the  doc- 
trine of  election.  And  if  a  person  has  not  a  knowledge  of  these 
truths,  or  is  not  capable  of  comparing  them,  and  seeing  their 
agreement  and  consistenc}',  he  is  either  so  deficient  in  knowl- 
e<lge,  or  weak  in  intellect,  as  to  be  unfit  to  teach  others  the 
doctrines  of  the  gospel,  and  the  way  of  salvation. 

4.  Is  it  by  our  fruits  only  we  can  know  what  our  moral  char- 
acters, and  the  characters  of  others,  are  .''  Then,  if  we  would 
avoid  deception,  and  form  a  correct  judgment,  we  must  have 
clear  and  distinct  vifws  of  gospel  friiit.     Tf  we  err   in  this,  wo 


;548 

may  jiulge  a  tree  to  be  good,  which  is  evil  ;  and  a  tree  evil, 
which  is  good.  How  iinpoitaiit  then  it  is  for  all,  and  especial- 
ly teachers,  to  study  tiie  scriptures,  and  acquire  a  clear  and 
consistent  knowledge  of  all  the  tVnits  of  the  holy  Spirit,  or  ol'a 
new  heart.  To  obtain  this  knowledge,  let  all  with  prayer  for 
light  and  insaiiction  read  the  beatitudes  of  our  Savior,  Math. 
5th,  nnd  what  the  aposile  says  in  Galatiant,  where  the  fruits  of 
the  Spirit  and  of  the  flesh  are  enumerated,  and  other  passages 
in  all  of  the  epistles.  And  every  professor  is  not  only  request- 
ed to  obtain  right  views  of  gospel  fruit  ;  but  compare  himself 
with  the  iruli),  and  candidly  examine  himself.  Deception  is 
ruinous  to  the  soul.  And  it  Is  wiih  fear  and  tremblinp-,  we  are 
to  work  out  our  salvation.  We  cannot  give  too  much  atten- 
tion, to  make  our  calling  and  election  sure.  And  to  attain 
mito  assurance,  is  one  great  privilege  and  blessing.  Let  us 
then  examine  daily,  with  candor  and  impartiality,  to  learn 
vhether  we  are  trees  of  righteousness,  which  are  laden  with  the 
glorious  fruits  of  the  gospel. 

5j  The  children  of  God  are  under  the  greatest  obligations  to 
bless  and  serve  God,  in  return  for  his  infinite  love  to  them. 

God  not  only  so  loved  you,  as  to  give  his  Son  to  die  for  you  ; 
but  when  you  despised  the  ofiers  of  life,  and  setChrist  at  nought, 
and  were  in  the  road  to  final  ruin,  he  so  loved  you  that  he  in- 
terfered, renewed  your  hearts,  and  saved  you  from  eternal 
death.  You  are  born  of  God,  are  his  sons  and  daughters, 
lieirs  of  God,  and  jointheirs  with  Christ  to  all  the  riches,  glo- 
ries, and  joys  of  his  heavenly  kingdom.  In  thi!^  God  has  man- 
ifested far  greater  love  to  you,  than  he  would,  had  he  givfn 
you  all  the  kingdoms,  crowns,  riy'ies,  and  glories  of  this  world. 
His  love  to  you  is  inconceivably  great,  precious,  and  unmer- 
ited. For,  instead  of  deservi^  such  gracious  treatment,  you 
justly  merited  his  endless  displeasure.  You  have  been  the  ob- 
jects of  unmerited,  and  unlimited  love  and  grace.  You  are 
infinitely  indebted  to  jour  gracious  sovereign.  You  owe  him 
all  the  love,  gratitude,  prai^e,  and  service  you  are  able  to  ren- 
der hiuj.  And  you  can  never  repay  fully  the  debt  of  love, 
praise,  and  service. 

Do  you  feel  those  truths  f  Is  it  your  constant  and  earnest 
desire,  to  render  to  God  according  to  benefits  received  r  Is 
your  life  daily  devoted  to  God  ?  Do  you  daily  glorify  him,  by 
peflecting  the  rays  of  his  glory  .'  Ohmakeityonrstudious  v.atch- 
ful   and  prayerful  endeavor  to   ihcn   every  sin,  to  grow   in 


i540 

^race,  and  ripen  for  heaven.  You  are  born  from  above,  arff 
the  sons  of  God,  nuMnbevs  of  his  famil}'.  Then  place  your  af- 
fections on  things  above,  seek  heaven  as  your  homa  ^nd  earn- 
estly desire  to  joiniho  ueneral  assembly  above  in  their  songs  of 
])rai^e  lor  such  boundlcs?  love  and  grace.  Pray  for,  and  assist 
each  other  on  your  journey  ;  with  zeal  sock  the  salvation  of 
souls,  and  the  extension  of  Christ's  kingdom  through  this 
world.  Live  in  actual  readiness  to  meet  death,  to  stand  before 
your  Jud^e,  to  be  acfjuittcd  there,  and  welcomed  forever  into 
the  joy  of  your  Lord.  Then,  as  a  star  among  innumerable 
stars,  you  will  shine  around  the  throne  of  the  Lamb,  and  as  one 
body  with  perfect  harmony  tune  your  voices,  and  loud  as  thun- 
der shout  his  praise  for  redeeming  love. 

6.  What  madness  reigns  in  the  hearts  of  all,  who  yet  reject 
the  Savior  of  sinners. 

The  impenitent  are  desired  to  reflect,  and  consider  how  vile 
their  hearts  are ;  how  rebellious  their  lives,  and  hoW  inconceiv- 
ably stupid,  blind,  and  mad  they  are.  You  are  deaf,  naked, 
blind,  and  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins.  You  travel  the  road  to 
hell  witli  pleasure,  and  every  day  are  treasuring  up  wrath  a- 
gainst  the  day  of  v/rath.  Christ  has  died  for  you,  is  able  and 
ready  to  save  you,  and  calls  unto  you.  Come  unto  me,  I  will 
not  reject  you  ;  turn  ye,  for  why  will  you  die  ?  But  you  turn 
a  deaf  ear.  When  your  danger  is  set  before  you,  you  remain 
nnmoved,  and  stup'd  as  beasts  that  perish.  Why  do  you  thus 
despise  Christ  and  his  blood,  and  pursue  a  course  which  you 
know  will  ruin  you  ?  Why  do  you  act  this  part  of  folly  and 
madness .''  To  excuse  and  justify  yourselves,  you  often  say 
you  cannot  help  it.  Yet  nothing  but  attention  is  wanting,  in 
order  for  you  to  see  your  vileness,  your  danger,  your  just  desert 
of  death,  and  your  dependence  on  sovereign  mercy.  And  if  you 
saw  all  tills,  could  you  live  a  secure,  quiet  life.**  If  a  person 
found  himself  in  a  pit,  into  which  he  had  plunged  himself,  and 
saw  that  there  he  must  die,  if  he  remained,  would  he  feel  easy  in 
that  condition  .'^  If  lie  knew  he  was  unable  to  deliver  himself, 
would  this  quiet  his  fears  ?  Would  not  this  dependence  on  an- 
other for  help,  and  the  uncertainty  of  being  assisted  and  saved, 
increase  his  fears,  and  cause  him  to  cry  aloud  for  mercy  .''  Look 
then,  and  learn  that  you  are  deaf,  blind,  naked,  dead  and  lost ; 
and  are  dependent  on  Christ  for  help.  Then  yon  will  begin  to 
bog  and  cry  for  mercy,  and  not  till  then.  Then,  lilie  the  sick, 
the  lame,  the  dejifaad  l)li:id.in  Christ's  day,  you  will  come  and 


350 

cry  to  liim,  as  they  did,  Lord  Jesus,  have  mercy  on  us.  And 
till  you  do  thus  see  your  ruined  state,  your  dependence  on  un- 
merited grace,  and  do  come  and  cry  lor  mercy,  there  is  no  liope 
you  will  escape  death. 


:ia|rli"l=f!4<»>M>4i 


ESSAY  XXX. 

^  Summarif  View  of  the  si/stcm,  advanced  and  //- 
lustrated  in  these  Essays. 

Every  science  is  founded  on  what  are  generally  called ^r*? 
jprinciples.  And  as  far  as  persons  difler  in  their  views  of  these, 
they  will  embrace  different  systems.  And  yet  first  principles 
are  commonly  self  evident  propositions. 

Mathematicks  is  a  science  founded  on  first,  self  evident  pro- 
positions or  axioms.  And  all,  who  reason  correctly  from  them, 
agree  in  their  results  and  conclusions. 

Theology  and  Ethics  are  founded  on  first  principles.  And 
so  far  as  persons  distinctly  perceive  and  understand  the  first 
principles,  if  they  reason  correctly  and  consistently',  they  will 
be  agreed  in  the  system  of  sentiments  resulting  from  them.  For 
the  process  of  reasoning  is  only  inferring  one  proposition  from 
another.  How  then  is  it  possible  to  form  a  true  system  of  sen- 
timents, unless  we  are  acquainted  with  the  self  evident  proposi- 
tions on  w  hich  they  are  founded  .'' 

Every  science  has  a  begiyininir.  To  understand  and  teach  it 
correctly,  we  must  start  from  the  beginning,  or  self  evident 
propositions.  When  we  trace  scntinicnis  back,  to  learn  wheth- 
er they  arc  well  founded,  we  shall  con>e  to  first  principles  from 
"which  they  follow  as  inferences  ;  or  continue  to  run  back  ad 
infinitum.  And  in  reasoning  and  proceeding  forward,  we  must 
begin  with  a  self  evident  propo>ition  from  \\hich  we  infer  a  sec- 
ond, from  that  a  third,  and  in  this  way  progress  in  the  field  of 
science.  Unless  we  reason  in  this  manner  we  proceed  in  the 
dark,  or  reason  in  a  circle. — When  trndis  are  thus  inferred  one 
cf  another  from  self  evident  propositions^  c\ory  step  in  the  pro- 


351 

cess  is  demonstralcd.  \iy  this  mode  of  reasoning,  a  finite 
mind  in  the  boundless  field  of  knowledge  may  progress  forev- 
er and  ever.  And  how  transporting  is  the  thought,  that  our 
limited  minds  may  improve  in  knowledge  through  an  endless 
duration  ;  and  especially  in  the  science  of  Theology,  which  ex- 
ceeds all  others  in  sublimity,  to  which  other  sciences  are  only 
hand-maids,  if  rightly  improved,  and  which  contains  the  most 
refreshing,  delightful,  and  joyful  food  for  an  immortal  spirit. — 
If  we  can  ascertain  the  first  principles  of  Theology  and  Ethics, 
and  reason  correctly  from  them,  diflierent  persons  will  harmo- 
nize in  sentiments.  To  proceed  directly  to  the  subject  before 
us,  it  may  be  asserted, 

1.  That  happiness  is  an  ahsoluie  good,  and  this  is  one  first 
principle  in  Ethics.  As  happiness  is  considered  a  good  in  it- 
self by  all  rational  beings  ;  and  as  no  one  can  give  a  reason, 
why  he  thus  esteems  it,  the  proposition  is  self  evident.     And, 

2.  That  pain  or  misery  is  an  absolute  evil,  is  another  self  ev- 
ident truth.  All  fear  and  dread  pain,  and  no  one  can  give  a 
reason  why  he  does.  These  are  two  of  the  self  evident  propo- 
sitions, on  which  the  whole  system  is  founded.  It  is  well  known 
that  self  evident  propositions  admit  of  no  proof.  As  soon  as 
they  are  distinctly  state^l,  and  perceived,  if  a  person  does  not 
give  his  assent,  he  must  be  left  to  wonder  ;  for  conviction  can- 
not be  produced  in  him  by  any  thing  more  evident ;  for  nothing' 
can  be  more  evident,  than  a  self  evident  truth.  Such  truths 
may  be  illustrated  and  explained  by  other  propositions  witli- 
which  persons  may  be  acquainted,  but  can  never  be  proved. 

Some  pretend  to  make  a  distinction  between  pleasure,  and 
happiness.  But  when  nothing  more  is  taken  into  view,  thai> 
their  simple  nature,  who  can  show  a  difference  between  them  ? 
Happiness,  pleasure,  in  their  simple  nature,  are  nothing  but  a- 
greeable,  pleasant  sensations.  A  pleasant  sensation,  emotion, 
or  feeling,  is  happiness,  and  it  is  pleasure.  Though  all  pleas- 
ant sensations  are  alike  in  their  simple  nature  ;  yet  they  may 
diflei  in  degree,  and  intenseness,  and  may  be  excited  by  objects 
difl'ering  much  from  each  other.  The  objects  which  please  are 
very  different  from  each  other  in  many  respects.  And  it  is 
granted,  that  no  objects  or  sources  of  enjoyment  can  aflbrd  as 
durable,  satisfying  happiness,  as  full  as  our  capacities  will  ad- 
mit, but  those  which  are  infinite  and  eternal.  The  happiness 
derived  from  such  objects  may  be  styled  true,  real,  and  substau- 


352 

rtal  ;  while  plcasuros  given  us  by  fiidinc,',  fleelinf^, and  uncciliiiii 
objects,  can  never  fill  or  satisfy  the  mind. 

If  we  ask  any  persons  \^hp|ll^r  tlicy  esteem  happiness  a  g:ond 
thing  ?  All  will  answer  in  the  aflirmative.  Ask  them  to  assit^n 
reasons,  why  they  thns  esteem  it ;  they  can  pive  none.  Do 
30U  wish  to  enjoy  any  greater  good,  than  perfect,  uninterrupt- 
ed happiness  ?  Tiiey  must  answer,  no  ;  for  (hey  cannot  <-on- 
ccive  of  any  greater  good  to  be  enjoyed  than  this. — Hence  thf!; 
greatest  sum  of  happiness,  «hi«li  rational  beings  can  enjoy,  is 
the  highest  good  any  individual,  or  society  can  possess.  As 
societies  are  composed  of  individuals,  and  as  the  greatest  hap- 
piness an  individual  can  enjoy  is  his  highest  good  ;  so  the  sum 
total  of  the  perfect  happiness  of  the  individuals  constituting  a 
society,  is  the  iiighest,  the  greatest  good,  which  can  exist  in  it. 
This  is  so  evident,  no  one  can  cotisistenily  deny  it. 

Let  us  then  reason  correctly  from  the  propositions,  which 
have  l)cen  stated  as  self  eviflcnt,  and  wc  cannot  err  respecting 
the  nature  of  right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  both  j)atural  and 
moral,  or  concerning  praise  and  blame.  This  will  be  clearly 
seen  very  soon.  But  here  let  it  be  observed,  tliat  to  the  ex- 
istence of  happiness  a 

3.  Proposition  must  be  admitted  as  self  evident,  which  is  this, 
that  a  feeling  faculty  capable  of  pleasant  and  painful  sensations 
existing  in  a  rational  mind,  is  absolutely  necessary. 

This  camiot  be  proved,  because  it  is  self  evident.  But  it  can 
be  explained  and  illustrated,  and  made  clear  to  every  person. 
Can  a  stone,  a  tree,  or  any  part  ol'the  inanimate  creation,  enjoy, 
or  be  the  subjects  of  hapj)iness  ?  And  why  not  ?  Because 
they  are  not  endued  with  a  feeling  faculty,  are  incapable  of  all 
pleasant  and  painful  emotions.  And  as  such  a  faculty  is  neces- 
sary to  happiness,  to  the  existence  of  the  greatest  good,  so  but 
one  faculty  of  this  nature  is  necessary  in  the  same  individual. 
Wc  therefore  find,  that  man  is  endued  with  only  one  feeling 
faculty.  The  uiulerstanding  can  see,  or  perceive  objects,  their 
properties,  qualities,  relations,  and  connexions  ;  and  the  will 
can  choose,  and  execute  the  plea^ure  of  the  heart  ;  but  neither 
of  them  is  the  subject  oi'pleasantor  painful  emotions.  All  pleas- 
ant and  painful  sensations  must  exist  antecedent  to  volition. 
Were  not  this  a  fact,  volitions  could  never  have  any  existence 
in  the  mind,  as  it  is  hoped  has  been  fully  proved.  These  expla- 
nations show,  it  is  self  evident  that  a  feeling  faculty  is  requisite 
to  the  existence  of  iiappincss. 


353 

And  if  the  other  faculties  of  the  mind  and  liberty  arc  not 
considered  trutiis  in  relation  to  happiness,  yet  it  must  be  grant- 
ed they  are  essential  to  it,  when  all  things  are  consideied,  which 
are  needful  to  its  existence.  No  one  will  deny,  but  what  the 
existence  of  objects,  not  only  to  pli-ase,  but  lo  allbrci  tlie  grcijt- 
esl  satisfaction,  is  necessary  to  the  highest  good.  To  be  liap- 
py  there  must  be  objects  of  enjoyment,  each  of  which  may  be 
termed  a  source  of  haj)piness.  And  the  faculty  of  the  under- 
standing to  perceive  nbjects  is  rcqui.-.ite.  For  objects  cannot 
please  unless  seen  or  known.  As  our  bodily  palate  never  sees 
the  food  it  relishes  ;  so  our  mental  taste  is  not  a  perceiving,  but 
a  feeling  and  relishing  faculty.  And  as  objects  unknown  can- 
not please,  they  must  exist  in  view  of  the  mind  by  perception, 
to  aHect  the  heart.  Hence  without  this  faculty  objects  could 
never  be  enjoyed,  and  happiness  c(»uld  have  no  existence. 

Again.  The  will,  if  not  requisite  to  the  being  of  happiness, 
is  surely  necessary  to  the  increase  of  it.  For  objccts,when  per- 
ceived, inay  please,  or  appear  agreeable  ;  yet  to  a  full  enjoy- 
ment of  them  we  must  have  have  possession  of  them.  By  the 
will,  producing  external  actions,  we  get  possession  of  the  ob- 
jects of  our  desire;  and  by  it  we  select  the  pleasing,  and  reject 
the  painful.  By  this  faculty  we  use  the  means  adapted  to  the 
attainment  of  sources  of  happiness.  All  will  readily  see,  that 
when  we  have  a  view  of  future  and  distant  objects,  and  wish 
to  enjoy  them,  and  form  our  plans  to  obtain  them,  it  is  by  the 
will  our  plans  are  executed,  and  desires  are  gratified.  Also,  if 
we  did  not  enjoy  liberty  wecould  never  accomplish  our  pleasure. 
If  we  acted  continually  under  restraint  or  constraint,  we  mit;ht 
not  be  able  at  any  time  to  follow  and  gratify  our  desires.  We 
might  be  made,  by  some  foreign  jjower,  to  go  directly  against 
our  pleasure  and  inclinations.  Liberty,  freedom  from  restraint 
and  constraint,  to  follow  the  way  our  desires  lead  us,  and  per- 
form the  actions  conducing  to  our  pleasure,  it  will  be  acknowl- 
edged, is  necessary  to  our  highest  good  or  happiness. 

Do  not  these  remarks  make  it  evident,  that  not  only  a  facul- 
ty for  pleasure  and  pain,  but  also  a  faculty  to percci  e  objects, 
and  a  faculty  to  choose  and  refuse^  and  perform  actions,  and 
liberty,  or  freedom  from  restraint,  are  each  of  them  essential  to 
the  existence  of  happiness  ?  And  a  being,  endued  with  these 
faculties,  is  an  entire  moral  agent.  Such  a  being  man  is  ;  for 
he  is  possessed  of  these  faculties.  And  do  we  know,  or  can  we 
invent,  any  other  or  more  properties,  necessary  to  constitute  a 

20 


354 

xompletc  moral  agelit,  or  requisite  to  as  great  a  measure  of  hap- 
piness as  our  nature  will  admit  ?  We  now  see  what  things 
are  essential  to  the  highest  felicity,  or  misery  of  man,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  or  inclination  of  his  heart.  And  these  truths 
are  so  evident  that  when  clearly  stated,  and  explained,  who  can 
deny  them,  or  withold  his  assent  from  them  ?     Now, 

4.  Another  proposition  may  be  advanced  as  self  evident  j  or 
if  not,  the  nearest  akin  to  it ;  which  is,  that  happiness,  being 
the  only  absolute  good,  ought  to  be  the  ultimate  end  of  every 
moral  agent. — This  does  not  need  proof,  so  much  as  it  does 
explanation.  Indeed,  when  distinctly  illustrated,  enough  will 
be  said  to  gain  the  assent  of  candid  minds. 

Can  any  one  see  any  difference  between  existence  and  non- 
existence, in  relation  to  good  enjoyed,  if  no  happiness  is  experi- 
enced ?  Though  a  society  might  be  formed  of  innumerable 
individuals,  and  each  of  them  be  perfectly  holy,  yet  if  they 
should  never  feel  one  pleasant  sensation,  experience  no  pleas- 
ure, no  happiness  ;  would  existence  on  this  supposition  be  de- 
sirable, or  preferable  to  annihilation  ?  It  must  be  granted,  that 
happiness  is  the  only  final  good,  which  renders  existence  de- 
sirable. This  being  granted,  there  is  no  greater  good,  which 
can  be  sought.  And  when  happiness  is  obtained,  we  have 
then  arrived  at  an  ultimate  end,  to  the  last  exertion  in  our  pur- 
suit ;  and  here,  in  the  enjoyment  of  this  good,  we  rest  satisfied. 
And  as  this  is  an  absolute  good,  and  the  greatest  good^  we 
ought  to  delight  and  rejoice  in  it,  wherever  we  see  it  existing. 
But  here  an  important  inquiry  presents  itself ;  whether  our 
own  personal  happiness,  or  the  happiness  of  other  rational  be- 
ings, ought  to  be  our  ultimate  end  of  pursuit.  In  attempting  to 
reflect  some  light  on  this  subject,a  distinction  ought  to  be  made 
between  an  end  and  the  reason  or  motive,  which  influences  us 
in  seeking  it.  Every  one  does  not  at  once  discern  this  distinc- 
tion. Yet  it  is  very  important  to  distinguish  properly  between 
the  nature  of  sejjishness,  and  that  of  benevolence. 

Here  then  it  may  be  observed,  that  our  personal  individual 
happiness  ought  not  to,  neither  can  be,  the  ultimate  object  or 
end  of  our  pursuit. 

For  the  reader  to  apprehend  this  aright,  let  us  suppose  a  be- 
ing created  with  all  the  faculties  or  powers  requisite  to  consti- 
tute him  a  complete  moral  agent,  as  was  in  fact  the  case  with 
Adam.  Suppose  for  a  time  his  faculties  are  not  in  operation, 
■no  exercises  are  excited.     He  does  not  feel  one  pleasant  or 


355 

^dainful  sensation.     In  this  condition  it  is  not  possible  for  hiu), 
on  supposition  his  underslaudin^  were  in   operation,  to  havft 
■any  idea  of  happiness,  or  of  good,  or  of  evil,  in  any  sense.     In 
this  state  his  own  happiness  cannot  be  an  object  of  his  pursuit ; 
because  it  has  no  existence,  and  he  knows  not  what  it  is.     At 
this  moment,  let  it  be  supposed  his  understanding  has  a  clear 
perception  of  some  object ;  and  in  view  of  it  he  experiences,  for 
the  first  time,  a  very  pleasant  sensation.     This  puts  all  the  fac- 
ulties of  his  mind  in  operation.     Now  he  begins  to  act,  and 
aim  at  some  end  ?     The  object,  which  is  the  source  of  his  pleas- 
ure, or  tlie  pleasant  sensation  itself,  one  or  the  other,  must  be 
considered ashisendultimately.  The  pleasant  sensation,  or  his 
happiness, cannot  be  his  end.  Because  the  pleasure  felt  must  ex- 
ist before  it  can  be  sought  as  an  end.  And  when  it  has  existence, 
it  is  already  possessed?     And  what  propriety  is  there  in  seeking 
that  as  an  object  or  end,  which  is  already  attained,  is  now  in 
our  possession.     The  truth  then  is  this  ;  the  object  which  af- 
fords the  pleasure  experienced  is  his  end ;  and  the  pleasure  it 
gives  him  is  the  reason  or  motive,  by  which  he  is  influenced  or 
excited  to  seek  that  object.     He  aims  at  it  as  an  end,  and  strives 
by  proper  means  to  obtain  possession  of  it,  that  the  pleasure  it 
gave  him  may  be  increased  and  continued.     And  the  increase 
and  continuance  of  the  happiness  he  enjoys,  is  what  gives  the 
object  its  influence,  considered  as  a  motive.     The  moment  he 
felt  pleasure  in  view  of  the    object,   a  desire  arose  to  possess 
and  enjoy  it.     And  when  it  is  obtained,  and  all  the  pleasure  is 
realized  which  it  is  capable  of  aflbrding,  so  far  his    desire  is 
gratified,  and  his  end  obtained. 

It  is  in  this  manner  that  all  mankind  arc  influenced  and  gov- 
<^rned,  in  all  their  actions  and  pursuits.  The  object  which  is  in 
itseli",  and  for  its  own  sake,  agreeable,  is  sought  as  an  ultimate 
*nd  ;  no  object  beyond  it  is  in  view ;  here  the  mind  rests  in  the 
pleasant  gratification  experienced.  And  the  expected  satisfac- 
tion it  will  give  invests  the  object  with  the  influence  of  a  motive. 
As  all  will  grant,  if  the  object  did  not  please,  it  would  not  have 
any  influence  as  a  motive,  and  would  not  be  an  object  of  at- 
tention or  pursuit  in  its  own  nature  considered. 

According  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  all  objects,  which  are 
on  their  own  account  agreeable,  are  always  sought  as  ultimate 
ends  ;  and  those,  which  are  not  in  themselves  pleasant,  are  used 
as  means  to  the  attainment  of  ends,  which  on  their  own  account 
are  agreeable.     Hence,  if  a  person's  heart  is  wholly  destitute  ©f 


^56  * 

every  benevolent  feeling  ;  if  the  Imppiness  of  other  beings  i# 
not  any  source  of  pleasure  to  him,  lie  will  never  seek  their  fe- 
liclt}-.  He  will  never  aim  at  any  hif:lier  objects,  than  tliosc 
Vhicli  gratify  his  personal,  individual  desires.  All  his  pursuits 
will  ukimately  centre  in  personal  self  gratification.  This  is 
the  true  idea  of  s.  Ifishness.  Hence  the  objects  on  their  own 
account  agreeable,  and  those  he  uses  as  means  to  his  ends,  he 
will  engross  and  monopolize  to  himself  as  far  as  he  is  able.  He 
would  possess  all  ihe  riches  and  honor  of  this  world,  were  it  in 
his  power.  If  other  beings  are  by  this  means  deprived  of  hap- 
piness, and  rendered  unhappy,  this  will  give  him  no  uneasiness, 
unless  their  misery  should  in  some  way  lessen  his  happiness. 
Because  he  has  no  feeling  for  their  happiness  on  its  own  ac- 
count, and  because  their  pains  will  afibrd  him  no  uneasiness,  if 
his  own  pleasure  is  not  aflected  or  lessened  by  it. — In  unrenew- 
ed men,  each  individual  appetite  of  the  heart  never  aims  at  any 
other  or  higlier  end,  than  its  own  gratification.  The  appetite 
of  hunger  desires  fond  ;  when  tiie  food  is  enjoyed  and  his  ap- 
petite full}'  gratified,  his  end  is  answered.  He  aims  at  no  high- 
er end,  than  the  satisfaction  of  the  appetite.  If  natural  afi'ec- 
tion  governs,  and  he  desires  the  happiness  of  his  w  ife,  or  his 
children,  in  the  enjoyment  ofworklly  prosperity  and  c;rcatness, 
as  far  as  they  enjoy  those  blessings  his  de>ires  are  gratified,  and 
he  aims  at  no  higher  end.  If  he  covets  riches  and  honors,  as 
far  as  he  is  able  to  attain  them,  his  desires  are  satisfied.  In 
pursuit  of  such  objects  he  never  aims  at  any  other,  or  higher 
ends,  than  those  objects  which  afford  personal  gratification; 
Selfishness  then  is  predicablo  of  each  appetite,  belonigng  to  the 
heart  of  unrenewed  men.  For  under  the  government  of  each 
appetite  his  end  is  to  obtain  the  object  or  objects,  which  on 
their,  own  account  aflbrd  to  each  full  gratification.  This  gives, 
in  few  words,  a  general  idea  of  the  nature  of  selfishness  ;  and 
it  is  not  designed  in  this  essay  to  enlarge  any  farther  on  this 
subject.  And  this  representation,  it  appears  to  me,  agrees  with 
facts,  experience,  observation,  and  what  the  word  of  God  says 
concerning  human  depravity. 

But  benevolence  delights  in  the  happiness  of  others,  or  of  ra- 
tional beings.  And  as  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  is  the 
highest  good  of  the  universe,  this  is  the  end  in  which  a  benevo- 
lent heart  delights  on  its  own  account,  and  w  hicli  it  seeks  as  its 
ultimate  end.  And  from  this  it  is  evident  that  the  only  direct 
way  for  a  benevolent  person  to  promote  his  own  happiness,,  is 


357 

to  Increase  tlic  felicity  of  intclliccpnt  belnp^s.  Their  liappinos.^ 
is  an  objoct  of  pursuit,  and  of  deligiit.  This  object  is  liis  ulti- 
mate end,  and  the  pleasure  it  affords  gives  the  iullucnce  of  a 
motive,  which  stimulates  him  to  promote  the  blessedness  of  God's, 
holy  kingdom  to  his  utmost  ability.  Hence  while  a  benevolent 
person  is  promoting  and  increasing  the  happiness  of  others,  he 
is  augmenting  his  own.  For  lie  rejoices  in  their  joy,  and  the 
more  they  rejoice  the  greater  is  his  joy.  This  shows  that  be- 
nevolence is  a  most  excellent  and  amiable  appetite.  This' view 
makes  it  evident,  that  the  greatest  measure  of  happiness  will, 
and  ought  to  b«',  the  ultimate  end  of  benevolence.  This  ex- 
plains and  establisihes  the  proposition  acvanced,  that  the  great- 
est happiness  of  rational  existence  ought  to  be  the  ultimate  end 
of  m  ;ral  apents. 

This  will  aflbrd  conviction  respecting  the  o-i£?in  of  moral  ob- 
ligation. For  the  sake  of  brevity  and  persfiruity,  permit  me 
here  io  personify  the  general  good,  and  represent  her  as  address- 
ing moral  agents. 

"  Happiness  is  the  only  absolute  good  enjoyed  by  individ- 
uals, and  by  societies  composed  of  them.  And  the  greatest 
measure  of  enjoyment  is  the  highest  good  of  intelligent  agents. 
This  ought  to  be  sought  on  its  own  account,  as  an  ultimate 
end.  And  until  moral  agents  learn  what  this  blessing  is  by  ex- 
periencing or  feeling  it,  they  can  form  no  idea  of  what  the 
terms  good  and  evil  ought,  and  ought  not,  to  mean.  The  hour 
in  which  they  feel  internal  and  joyful  sensations,  they  will  say, 
to  be  filled  with  this  bliss,  is  the  highest  good  our  nature  will 
admit.  And  to  seek  and  promote  the  highest  blessedness  of  ra- 
tional existence,  is  promoting  the  highest  good.  Then  ihej' 
will  know,  that  every  thing  tending  in  its  nature  to  lessen  or 
destroy  this  good,  is  evil  ;  and  all  things  tending  ultimately  to 
promote  and  increase  it,  are  properly  termed  good.  Then 
they  will  clearly  perceive  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
ought  and  ought  not  ;  one  means,  it  is  a  duty  or  an  ohligntion 
of  every  agent,  to  seek  and  increase  happiness  to  the  highest 
possible  degree  as  their  ultimate  end,  and  opposition  to  this  is 
doing  what  they  ought  not,  or  what  duty  forbids.  I  therefore 
command  all  moral  agents  to  aim  at  me,  as  their  ultimate  ob- 
ject or  end,  in  all  their  actions  and  pursuits.  \(  any  oppose 
and  transgress  this  command,  they  are  enemies  to  me,  and  as 
such  will  deserve  to  be  banished   from  my  presence  forever. 


35« 

For  there  is  no  authority  above  mine  to  control  me,  because  I 
am  the  highest  possible  t^ood,  which  ran  have  existence." 

Is  it  not  clear  from  this  address,  that  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness  being  the  highest  possible  good,  this  is  the  end,  which 
all  arc  under  obligations  to  aim  at  and  seek  ultimately  ;  yes 
ultimately,  because  there  is  no  greater  good,  which  can  be  aim- 
ed at  or  sought  ? 

The  propositions  advanced  are  so  evident,  as  to  gain  the  as- 
sent of  all  as  soon  as  they  understand  them.     They  are  these: 

1.  Enduing  a  being  or  beings  with  a  feeling  faculty,  is  ne- 
cessary to  the  very  existence  of  hapiness  and  misery. 

2.  That  happiness  is  an  absolute  good,  and  the  greatest  sunt 
of  it  the  highest  possible  good. 

3.  That  pain  or  misery  is  an  absolute  evil. 

4.  That  the  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness,  \Vhich  can 
have  existence  in  God's  holy  kingdom, (where  alone  it  can  exist,) 
eaght  to  be  the  ultimate  aim  and  end  of  moral  agents. 

With  these  propositions  many  other  truths  are  so  evidently 
connected,  they  will  gain  assent  as  soon  as  they  are  distinctly 
perceived.     A  few  of  them  will  row  be  stated. 

1.  That  every  thing  which  tends  directly  in  its  nature  to  pro- 
mote the  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness,  may  and  ought  to 
be  called  good.  And  as  all  things,  which  have  this  tendency 
are  intans,  by  which  happiness  is  promoted,  that  may  and  ought 
10  be  termed  relative  goods.  And  all  relative  good  possesses 
greater  or  less  value,  in  proportion  to  its  influence  in  promoting 
happiness. 

2.  Holiness  or  benevolence  is  a  relative  good,  and  the  great- 
est good  except  happiness,  because  none  can  be  truly  and  for- 
ever happy  without  it ;  and  because  it  has  the  greatest  influence 
in  promoting  and  increasing  happiness.  No  relative  good  can 
exist,  which  is  so  excellent,  beautiful,  sweet,  and  inviting,  as  a 
holy  disposition. 

3.  That  all  things  which  tend  directly  and  ultimately  to  de- 
stroy or  lessen  the  sum  of  happiness,  and  to  produce  misery, 
are  relative  evils.  And  those  evils  are  greater  and  less,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  influence  they  have  in  diminishing  or  destroying 
liappiness. 

4.  Sin  is  the  greatest  relative  evil,  because  its  influence  is 
greater  in  lessening  happiness  and  producing  misery,  than  any 
ethery  in  being. 

From  the  propositions  advanced,  many  other  inferences  or 


359 

Ivuths  will  follow.  But  the  farther  we  proceed  in  drawing  in- 
fereuces  from  self-evident  propositions,the  less  evident  they  are, 
and  require  more  prools  h  arguments  to  trace  their  connexion 
with  self-e\ident  truths.  But  if  any  person  will  trace  the  in- 
ferences, which  follow  from  the  propositions  here  stated,  in  all 
their  branches  from  the  nearest  to  the  most  remote,  he  will  in 
this  way  form  a  system  of  Ethics,  and  also  of  Theology.  For 
by  following  them  in  their  connexions  and  relations,  he  will  be 
led  to  embrace  all  the  leading  doctrines  contained  in  the  Bible, 
and  iu  the  stupendous  work  of  man's  redemption  by  Chri  »t 
Jesus. 

Here  is  a  proper  place  in  connexion  with  what  precedes  to 
observe,  that  in  God  all  good,  both  absolute  and  relative,  exists 
in  an  infinite  fulness. 

God  is  an  uncreated,  infinite,  eternal  being.  As  he  is  infi- 
nite in  knowledge,  goodness,  and  power,  it  is  evident  he  is 
possessed  of  the  same  powers  or  faculties  with  which  he  has 
endued  moral  agents.  These  attributes  constitute  his  essential 
glory  and  fulness.  He  has  an  ultimate  end  in  view  in  all  his 
operations.  This,  as  may  soon  appear,  is  the  greatest  mea- 
sure of  created  happiness.  This  in  itself  is  pleasant  to  his  heart. 
This  end,  by  affording  him  the  greatest  delight,  has  the  influ- 
ence of  a  motive,  which  induced  him  to  employ  his  under- 
standing in  forming  the  best  plan  to  reach  his  end,  and  his 
will  in  executing  it  ;  iu  the  accomplishment  of  this,  his  good- 
ness, or  benevolence,  is  infinitely  displayed  and  diffused. 
Hence,  as  an  infinite  moral  agent,  he  is  influenced  as  created 
moral  agents  are.  The  difierence  between  divine  moral  agen- 
cy, and  created,  is  this.  God  is  an  uncreated,  infinite,  inde- 
pendent, eternal  agent.  Men  are  created,  finite,  dependent 
agents.  But  the  agency  of  each  is  similar  in  its  nature  or  kind, 
differing  only  in  degree.  If  God  then,  is  a  moral  agent,  men 
are. 

God  is  infinitely  happy  and  blessed.  He  accordingly  en- 
joys absolute  good,  in  an  infinite  measure.  His  essential  ful- 
ness, being  infinite,  cannot  be  increased.  But  his  fulness  can 
be  communicated  and  difi'used.  The  only  sense  in  which  his 
infinite  happiness  can  be  increased,  is  by  diffusing  it.  By  a 
diflfusion,  emanation,  or  communication  of  absolute  good,  or 
of  his  happiness,  is  meant  one  and  the  same.  He  can  difluse 
his  own  infinite  blessedness,  by  creating  beings  capable  of  hap- 
piness, and  by  renderings  them  perfectly  holy  and  happy.     In 


3G0 

rtris  way  lie  is  continually  doing  good,  and  displaying,  or, 
which  is  the  same  thuig,  dill'using  or  coniniunicating  his  own 
essential  glory  and  fulness.  It  seems  that  Jehovah  cannot  ef- 
fect and  produce  any  greater  good,  than  to  make  a  perfect  dif- 
fusion of  his  own  infinite  fulness.  Hence  the  highest  possible 
diffusion  of  his  infinite  fulness, is  the  ultimate  end  of  God  in  all 
his  works  and  operations.  He  not  only  aims  at  a  display  or 
difTusion  of  his  fulness,  but  at  a  perfect,  and  infinite  diffusion. 
Then  his  fulness  exists  ah  extra,  as  some  express  it.  By  this 
infinite  difiusion  of  his  fulness,  when  made,  the  greatest  created 
good  or  happiness  will  be  produced,  and  all  his  attributes  will 
be  perfectly  displayed  ;  which  is  his  highest,  declarative  glorj'. 
When  the  greatest  possible  sum  of  created  happiness  exists,  it 
Avill  be  seen  that  the  highest  possible  diffusion  of  his  fulness, 
and  the  brightest  display  of  his  perfections  are  made  ;  and 
this  is  his  greatest  declarative  glor}'.  Hence  the  greatest  sum 
of  created  happiness,  or  infinite  diffusion  of  the  divine  fulness, 
and  the  hr'ighcst  disjjlay  of  his  attributes,  which  all  consider  his 
declarative  glory,  are  one  and  the  same,  viewed  as  an  ultimatt 
end.  As  light  diffused  by  the  natural  sun  is  its  glory,  so  a 
full  and  perfect  difl'usion  of  its  light  would  be  its  brightest  pos- 
sible glory.  As  God  is  light,  its  highest  possible  diffusion 
would  be  its  greatest  glory,  and  this  glory  would  be  seen  in  the 
light  diffused.  So  we  behold,  in  the  greatest  sum  of  created 
happiness,  the  highest  diffusion  and  glory  of  God.  According- 
ly,  when  we  say  the  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness,  or  the 
highest  diffusion  of  his  fulness,  or  the  brighest  display  of  his 
essential  glory,  is  his  ultimate  end  in  all  his  operations,  the 
meaning  is  precisely  the  same.  And  as  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness  is  God's  ultimate  end,  and  as  all  rational,  created  be- 
ings are  finite,  we  may  safely  conclude  their  happiness  will  be 
forever  increasing.  For  in  no  given  period  can  it  be  said,  that 
the  greatest  good,  or  an  infinite  difiusion,  or  disply  of  God's- 
essential  glory,  has  an  actual  real  existence.  It  follows  from 
this,  that  God  will  be  forever  difi'using  his  fulness,  and  display- 
ing his  perfections  more  and  more,  by  the  constant  increase  of 
created  bliss.  Hence  his  glory  will  shine  with  an  increasing 
brightness  through  eternity,  in  view  of  which  saints  and  angels 
will  have  their  blessedness  augmented.  The  greatest  sum  of 
happiness,  is  the  phrase  which  has  been  used.  Because  it  is 
not  certain,  that  in  order  for  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  to 
exist,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  the  greatest  number  of  indi- 


361 

viduals  happ3\  Also  the  word  of  God  assures  us,  that  many 
of  the  fallen  race  of  Adam  will  be  forever  lost.  We  may  there- 
fore safely  conclude,  that  the  happiness  of  the  greatest  number 
is  not  necessary  to  the  greatest  sum  of  created  felicity. 

To  brinq;  what  has  been  advanced  under  this  head  distinctly 
to  view,  let  it  be  carefully  observed,  that  the  infinite  blessed- 
ness of  God  is  an  infinite  measure  of  absolute  good,  existing  in 
his  fulness.  And  the  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness  is  an 
absolute  good,  and  the  highest  s^ood  of  created  beings,  and  of  his 
holy  kingdom.  And  this  greatest  sum  of  happiness,  enjoyed 
by  holy  created  beings,  is  the  absolute  good  in  God  ;  or  his 
blessedness,  difl'used  or  communicated.  And  when  we  view 
the  attributes  of  God  in  relation  to  this  end,  they  constitute  a 
sufficient  ability  in  him  to  devise  and  execute  a  plan  of  operation 
however  great  and  extensive,  to  reach  and  obtain  his  ultimate 
end.  When  viewed  in  this  light  his  attributes,  and  all  the 
means  included  in  his  plan,  however  many,  are  in  a  relative 
sense  good.  This  explains  what  is  intended  and  implied  in  say- 
ing that  the  being  or  fulness  of  God  includes  all  good,  both  ab- 
solute and  relative.  He  is  then  the  infinite  and  eternal  source  of 
all  good.  And  all  the  created  good,  both  absolute  and  rela- 
tive, which  has,  or  ever  will  have  existence,  is  no  more  than  a 
difl'usion,  emaration,  or  communication  of  this  infinite,  eternal 
fountain.  Hence,  God  is  a  being  of  infinite  majesty,  excellen- 
cy, greatness,  and  glory.  He  ought,  therefore,  to  be  loved 
supremely,  worshipped  and  served  perfectly,  by  all  his  intelli- 
gent subjects,  for  his  intrinsic  excellenc}'  and  beauty. 

From  the  propositions  which  have  been  advanced,  it  follows, 
that  the  moral  law  is  hoi}',  just,  and  good.  That  it  neither 
requires  or  forbids  any  thing,  which  the  highest  good  does  not 
cither  require  or  prohibit.  Also  it  follows,  that  the  work  of 
redemption,  which  Christ  is  accomplishing,  is,  in  all  its  parts, 
glorious  and  excellent.  For  its  ultimate  tendency,  in  all  its 
parts,  is  to  produce  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness.  And  the 
sum  of  all  the  gospel  requires,  is  love  to  God  and  our  neigh- 
bor. Hence  it  harmonizes  with  the  moral  law,  and  tends  ulti- 
mately to  the  same  end.  The  gospel  contains  a  glorious  sys- 
tem of  relative  good  ;  and  is  a  ministration  of  life. 

The  propositions  explained  teach  us  also,  in  what  sense  we 
•ught  to  understand  the  terms  fitness  and  unfitness,  on  which 
some  place  great  weight.  Some  embrace  the  opinion,  that 
there  is  a  fitness  and  an  unfitness,  existing  independent  of  the 

21 


362 

n  ill  of  God.  An<J  as  far  as  they  can  be  understood,  they  seero 
to  consider  it  as  the  rule  or  ultimate  standard,  by  which  we  arc 
to  judge  what  is  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong.  They  make 
it  the  standard,  or  origin,  of  moral  obligation.  By  their  rea- 
soning they  seem  to  consider  it  an  eternal,  independem,  immu- 
table standard,  existing  antecedent  to  the  will  of  Ged,  by  which 
he,  and  all  his  rational  creatures,  oughi  to  be  governed.  Ou 
this  foundation  they  erect  a  system  of  Metaphysics  and  Ethics, 
if  they  are  rightly  understood. 

Do  they  mean  by  it,  that  happiness  is  an  absolute  good,  and 
misery  an  absolute  evil ;  and  that  all  things  are  fit,  or  unfits 
according  as  they  tend  ultimately  to  promote  or  destroy  happi- 
ness ?  If  this  be  their  meaning,  then  they  agree  w  ith  the  scheme 
advanced  and  explained  in  the  preceding  essays.  For  it  has 
been  made  sufficiently  evident,  that  on  supposition  no  happi- 
ness had  ever  been  experienced  by  creatures,  they  could  no 
more  have  any  idea  of  good  and  evil,  or  of  the  terms  fit  and 
unfit,  than  a  person  born  blind  could  have  a  clear  idea  of  light 
and  colors.  If  then  they  mean  something  entirely  difi'erent 
from  what  has  been  termed  absolute  and  relative  good  and 
evil  ;  their  language  either  has  no  definite  sense,  or  their  views 
and  system  are  erroneous,  and  built  on  the  sand.  Hence  if 
the  terms  fit  and  unfit  have  any  clear  and  definite  meaning,  their 
sense  is,  that  all  things  are  fit  or  unfit  according  to  their  ulti- 
mate tendency  in  promoting  or  destroying  the  happiness  of 
God's  kingdom. 

Again.  Some  make  utility  the  standard,  by  which  we  are  to 
determine  what  is  good  and  evil.  This  is  a  foundation  on 
which  some  have  erected  a  system  of  Ethics,  if  understood 
aright.  Doe*  not  the  term  utility,  as  commonly  used,  have 
reference  to  some  ultimate  end  ?  And  do  we  not  call  things 
useful  or  hurtful,  according  to  their  ultimate  tendency  ?  So  it 
seems.  For  those  who  proceed  on  the  plgn  of  utility,  seem  to 
consider  the  public  good  as  the  ultimate  end  to  be  sought,  ac- 
cording to  their  system  ;  and  hence  consider  every  thing  as 
useful  or  hurtful,  as  it  tends  to  promote  or  destroy  this  end,  the 
public  good.  If  by  the  public  good  they  mean  the  greatest 
liappiness  of  a  community,  or  society  of  beings  ;  and  if  in  such 
society  they  mean  to  include  God  as  the  supreme  head,  and 
all  created  beings  as  his  subjects,  forming  one  entire  whole,  or 
society  of  beings  ;  and  then  say  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness 
diey  can  enjoy  is  their  highest  good  j  and  all  riiings  are   us«- 


363 

lul  or  liuitful,  as  they  tend  to  this  end  ultimately  ;  then  they 
agree  with  the  system,  which  has  been  exhibited.  Then  the 
real  difference  between  us,  would  consist  in  the  use  of  different 
terms.  By  the  terms  utility  and  inutility  ihoy  would  nriran, 
what  has  been  called  all  along  relative  good  and  e\il.  And  it" 
this  be  not  their  meaning,  and  their  system  is  essentially  differ- 
ent from  ours,  as  has  been  explained  ;  then  it  must  be  consid- 
ered as  erroneous,  like  the  system  of  the  fitness  and  unfitness  of 
things. 

Before  this  essay  is  closed,  a  few  further  reflections  appear  to 
be  necessary.  One  sentiment,  whi(  h  has  already  been  advan- 
ced respecting  moral  agency,  ought  to  be  deeply  impressed  on 
every  mind.  Because  it  might  silence  some  object'ons  often 
made  against  the  Calvinistic  views  of  depravity.  To  bring  it 
distinctly  into  view,  this  question  may  be  stated.  Did  infinite 
wisdom  and  benevolence  require  the  creation  of  moral  agents  .'' 
All  created  beings  had  a  beginning.  And  as  the  Creator  is 
perfectly  wise  and  good,  he  would  give  existence  to  as  many 
things,  as  are  necessary  to  the  higiiest  good,  and  no  more.  On 
this  principle,  it  is  generally  granted,  it  was  requisite  to  the 
general  good  a  race  of  beings  should  be  created,  endued  with 
all  the  properties  essential  to  moral  agency.  In  order  to  the 
existence  of  such  a  class  of  creatures,  they  must  be  endued  with 
z  feeling  faculty,  or  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain.  For,  if 
they  have  not  this  property,  they  are  not,  neither  can  be, 
agents. 

It  has  been  made  evident,  that  such  a  faculty  constitutes 
agency  ;  and  is  the  primary,  and  only  active  principle  in  mor- 
al agents.  Divest  them  of  it,  and  mankind  would  remain  as 
inactive  as  the  inanimate  ceation  is.  Hence,  if  moral  agents 
are  created,  they  must  be  endued  with  that  faculty,  which  is 
denominated  taste.  And  this  faculty  must  have  a  nature  ;  by 
which  I  mean,  it  must  be  pleased,  or  the  contrar}^,  with  the  di- 
vine character,  and  with  the  whole  system  of  moral  or  divine 
objects,  whenever  they  are  distinctly  perceived  and  known. 
As  it  is  a  feeling  faculty,  it  cannot  be  in  a  state  of  indiflerence 
when  objects  are  in  view,  and  especially  such  impressive  ob- 
jects as  the  divine  character,  and  the  system  of  truths  God  has 
revealed.  Will  not  this  be  granted  ?  Surely  it  must  ;  and  of 
course,  if  a  moral  agent  is  created,  he  must  have  this  faculty, 
and  in  view  of  the  divine  character  he  must  experience  pleasure 
er  pain  in  a  greater  or  less  degree.     If  the  character  of  God, 


364 

and  revealed  doctrines,  please  him,  are  ap^reeable  to  bis  leei- 
jngs,  he  will  have  a  desire  t.j  honor  Him,  defend  the  truth,  and 
promote  the  good  of  his  kingdom.  If  his  character  is  disagree- 
able to  liim,  his  heart  or  taste  is  opposed  to  God,  and  will 
lead  him  to  act  the  part  of  an  enemy.  This  feeling  faculty,  if 
it  exists,  will  be  pleased  or  disgusted  in  view  of  God's  charac- 
ter and  will  influence  man  to  pursue  a  line  of  conduct,  which 
will  ultimately  tend  to  promote  or  destroy  the  happiness  of 
God's  kingdom  ;  and  this  tendencj'  is  what  is  meant  b}'  its  na- 
ture. And  if  created,  it.  must  have  such  a  nature,  and  its  nature 
must  be  holy  or  sinful.  For  «!uch  a  nature  as  described,  is  ne- 
cessarily good  or  evil,  sinful  or  holy,  according  to  its  tenden- 

Can  a  tree  be  created  to  bring  forth  a  particular  species  of 
fruit,  without  giving  it  a  nature  to  produce  it  ?  Must  not  all 
created  things  be  adipted  to  the  end  for  which  they  were  made, 
or  have  a  nature  given  them  to  answer  their  designed  end  .'' 
Here  is  a  wide  field  open  for  enlargement,  and  illustration  of 
the  subject  before  us.  But  I  stop  with  this  request  to  all,  to 
consider  whether  any  thing  can  be  created  without  a  nature, 
which  will  have  a  good  or  evil  tendency,  if  nothing  prevents 
its  operating  according  to  its  nature ;  and  whether  we  can 
name  one  thing,  which,  in  this  sense,  is  not  endowed  with  a 
nature.''  If  not,  then,  if  a  moral  agent  is  created,  he  must  have 
a  feeling  faculty  given  him,  and  this  must  have  a  nature,  which 
is  good  or  evil,  or  which  will  tend  to  promote  or  destroy  hap- 
piness ultimately. 

These  observations  are  made,  because  some  suppose  moral 
agents  may  be  created  without  any  nature,  either  good  or  evil, 
and  may  have  objects  in  view,  and  even  contemplate  the  di- 
vine character,  and  remain  in  a  state  of  perfect  indnfference ; 
and  be  inclined  no  way,  to  good  or  evil,  or  even  to  remain  as 
they  are.  In  this  state  they  are  like  inert  matter,  and  have  no 
more  feeling.  Are  such  beings  agents.''  No  ;  and  as  they  are 
now  indiflerent  towards  all  divine  objects,  on  this  ground  they 
must  remain  so  forever,  and  never  act.  They  may  be  acted 
upon  by  some  foreign  agent,  as  the  earth  is,  but  they  can  nev- 
er act  as  agents.  Such  a  view  of  a  moral  agent  is  inconsistent 
I  with  analogy,  with  experience,  with  facts,  and  the  word  of  God  ; 
«nd  it  is  as  unphilosophical  as  to  say,  God  has  created  trees  to 
bring  forth  particular  kinds  of  fruit,  but  he  has  not  given  them 
a  nature  to  bear  any  kind  of  fruit.     It  is  a  matter  of  indiirerence 


365 

with  them  what  kind  of  fruit  they  bear,  or  whether  they  bring' 
forth  fruit  of  any  kind  ;  and  of  course  they  never  will  or  can  be 
fruit  trees. 

As  it  is  now  evident,  if  moral  afjcnts  are  created,  tliey 
must  be  endued  with  a  feehng,  active  facuU} ,  and  tills  faculty 
must  have  a  nature  good  or  evil ;  so  we  find  from  revelation, 
that  when  God  created  Adam,  he  did  endue  him  with  this  ac- 
tive faculty,  which  made  him  an  agent ;  and  this  faculty  had  a 
good,  a  holy  nature.  He  was  made  in  the  likeness  of  God,  nat- 
ural and  moral  ;  and  was  as  completely  a  moral  agent  as  Je- 
hovah himself.  And  we  read  of  no  mornl  agents,  but  such  as 
were  at  first  endued  with  a  holy  nature.  This  was  the  fact  with 
respect  to  all  created  angels,  and  with  respect  to  Adam.  With 
this,  it  is  supposed,  no  one  will  find  any  fault.  They  are  will- 
ing God  should  create  moral  agents  with  a  holy  nature.  At 
least  all  are  willing  for  this,  except  those  who  wish  to  have  a 
race  of  moral,  indifferent  agents  created ;  that  is  to  have  beings 
created,  who  arc  agents,  yet  without  agency,  or  active  princi- 
ples. They  would  have  them  active,  yet  all  the  time  in  a  state 
of  perfect  indifference.  They  wish  to  have  God  do  what  is 
morally  impossible.  Many  are  pleased  with  God's  creating 
Adam  with  a  holy  nature  ;  yet  they  cannot  peaceably  endure 
the  idea  of  necessary  holiness,  or  sin.  Though  they  are  more 
satisfied  with  the  former,  than  with  the  latter.  Yet  the  nature 
of  every  thing,  if  it  exist,  must  be  good  or  evil.  As  no  fault 
can  be  found  with  God,  in  creating  Adam  at  first  as  he  did,  un- 
less it  is  because  he  was  necessarily  holy  ;  the  next  inquiry  is, 
whether  blame  can  be  imputed  to  Him  for  suffering,  or  permit- 
ting Adam  to  eat  of  the  forbidden  fruit.''  And  then  in  conse- 
quence of  this  to  take  from  lilm  the  holy  nature,  or  benevolent 
appetite,  with  which  he  had  been  created.''  That  such  a  change 
did  take  place,  that  holy  Adam  became  a  sinner,  is  generally 
granted.  As  God  might  have  prevented  it,  the  question  is, 
whether  it  was  wise  and  holy  for  Him  to  permit  this  change  te 
take  place.  As  this  is  a  question,  which  the  scheme  advanced 
in  these  essays  does  not  require  me  to  answer,  any  more  than 
others  whatever  their  system  is,  no  further  attention  will  be  giv- 
en to  it.  The  author  will  here  o.ily  observe,  that  he  has  a  dis- 
sertation on  the  fall,  or  introduction  of  sin,  which  aims  at  a  so- 
lution of  the  rllfilriiltios,  which  have  ever  attended  this  subject. 
But  whether  it  will  ever  be  laid  before  the  public  eye,  depend!? 


360 

luucli  on  the  approbation  or  disapprobation  these  essays  may 
receive  from  the  community  in  general. 

Furthermore.  Some  consider  the  doctrine  of  total  depravi- 
ty, as  explained  and  dt-fended  by  reputed  and  orthodox  divines, 
to  he  physical.  And  being"  physical  in  its  nature,  the  opponents 
consider  it  as  destroying  agency  and  blamewortlnness.  View- 
ing the  doctrine  in  this  light,  they  pronounce  it  very  alarming 
and  appalling.  It  is  not  designed  hereto  inquire,  whether  some 
have,  or  have  not,  so  e.xplamed  it  as  to  imply  71  physical  defect; 
or  in  what  precise  sense  opponents  use  the  word  physical.  They 
scorn  to  consider  any  defect  in  the  soul,  which  incapacitates  it 
for  holy  exercises,  to  be  a  physical  defect.  They  therefore,  in 
opposition  to  this,  represent  our  race  as  born  with  capacities, 
which  are  inclined  neither  to  vice  nor  virtue,  oras  destitute  of 
any  moral  nature  ;  and  are,  like  clean  paper,  liable  to  receive 
impressions,  which  are  holy  or  sinful  according  to  the  influence 
motives  have  upon  them.  In  connexion  with  this  sentiment, 
they  affirm  men  are  the  efficient  causes  of  all  their  exercises  and 
actions  of  a  moral  class.  Is  the  doctrine  of  depravity,  which 
has  been  expressly  or  implicitly  exhibited  in  these  essays,  so 
appalling  as  represented  ^  According  to  the  system  advanced, 
it  is  admitted  that  Ariam  was  created  in  the  moral  image  of  his 
Maker,  or  perfectly  holy.  When  first  created,  he  was  endued 
with  several  distinct  appetites  or  propensities.  Each  of  these 
was  a  primary,  active  principle  in  his  constitution,  and  consti- 
tuted him  an  agent.  One  of  those  appetites  was  benevolent  in 
its  nature,  m  which  the  moral  image  of  God  consisted.  And 
his  other  appetites  or  propensities  were  given  and  implanted  in 
him,  as  active  principles,  which  prepared  him  to  propagate  the 
human  race,  nourish  and  protect  them  in  infancy,  to  provide 
means  for  the  support  and  comfort  of  the  body  or  the  whole 
man,  while  he  remains  an  inhabitant  of  the  earth.  And  while 
ihese  appetites,  inferior  in  their  nature,  were  under  the  control 
^nd  direction  of  his  benevolent  propensity,  or  love  to  God, 
their  operations  would  harmonize  in  a  regular  course  of  conduct, 
and  no  sin  or  disorder  could  prevail  in  paradise. 

But  Adam,  by  eating  the  prohibited  fruit,  forfeited  into  the 
hand  of  his  benefactor  that  moral  image  in  which  he  was  creat- 
ed, and  which  was  his  glory,  and  it  was  taken  from  him.  From 
that  day  he  had  no  propensity  or  love  in  his  heart  towards  his 
Maker.  All  his  other  appetites  remained  unaflected  and  unal- 
tered, as  principles  of  action.     Here  it  may  be  asked,  w  as  he 


367 

not  as  really  a  moral  accent  after  his  fall  as  before  ?     Had  he 
not  active  principiei  in  his  heart,  which  constituted  him  a  com- 
plete agent  for  action  ?     And  \vhen  this  moral  image  or  benev- 
olent appetite  is  restored   to  man  in  regeneration,  is   he  any 
more  an  agent  for  action,  than  he  was  previous  to  this  change  f 
If  any  man  is  born  blind,  or  after  his  birth   becomes  blind,  is 
he  not  still  a  man,  as  really  as  those  who  have  eyes  ?     And  if 
eyes  arc  given  him,  is  he  on  this  account  any  more  a  man,  than 
before  ?     All  that  can  be  said  of  the  blind  man  he  is,  not  in  all 
respects  so  perfect,  as  those  who  have  all  their  senses  entire. 
He  labors  under  a  defect  or  imperfection  ;  still  he  is  a  man. 
Adam  by  eating  was  deprived  of  one  sense,  or  appetite,  with 
which  his  Maker  had  adorned  him ;  yet  he  was  an  agent,  and 
had  all  the  properties  or  capacities,  which  constitute  a  complete 
moral  agent.     Hence  he  had   all  the  qualifications,  necessary 
to  render  him  a  proper  object  of  praise  or  blame,  according  to 
the  moral  nature  or  state  of  his  heart.     If  opponents  consider 
this  loss  in  Adam  a  physical  defect,  incapacitating  him  for  holy 
exercises  ;  yet  it  does  not  in  the  least  destroy,  or  impair  the 
powers  requisite  to  moral  agency,  or  to  render  him  a  proper 
object  of  blame.     Hence  what  is  there  alarming  or  appalling 
in  this  description  of  total  depravity  ?     Though  man  in  all  re- 
spects is  not  so  perfect  a  moral  agent,  as  before  this  defect  ex- 
isted ;  yet  he  is  as  complete  a  moral  agent  as  ever.     He  ha? 
the  faculty  of  understanding,  and  of  will  ;  he  has  a  faculty  to 
which  active  principles  belong,  and  which  constitute  agency  ; 
and  he  may  and  will  be  influenced  and  c^overned  by  motives, 
and  act  with  aim  and  design,  as  Adam  did  before  his  fall,  and 
as  men  do  after  they  are  regenerated,  and  have  this  moral  de- 
fect repaired.     This  defect,  which  opponents  caW  physical,  is  in 
fact  no  more  than  a  moral  defect.     Hence  they  give  it  a  wrong 
name.     And, it  is  presumed,  that  orthodox  divines  in  general 
will  contend  for  no  other  defect  in  man,  than  the  one  here  de- 
scribed.    While  this  defect  continues,  man  is  totally  depraved  ; 
or  he  is  destitute  of  every  holy  principle  of  action,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  all  his  other  active  principles  will  lead  him  a- 
way  from  God  the  living  fountain,  after  broken  cisterns  orearth- 
ly  enjoyments,  which  never  satisfy  the  soul.     Hence  orthodox 
divines  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  attack,  by  which  they  are 
represented  as  imputing  to  man  a  physical  defect,  which  is  in 
truth  no  more  than  a  moral  defect. 

If  mankind  are  born  with  an  efficient  power,  which  is  not  in- 


368 

cliuCd  either  to  vice  or  virtue,  but  is  in  fact  indiflercnt  to  both  J 
it  is  believed  to  be  impossible  to  show  how  this  efficient  power 
can  exercise  itself,  without  implying  the  previous  existence  of  a 
disposition  either  to  sin  or  holiness.  And  if  a  previous  disposi- 
tion must  exist,  to  put  this  power  into  exercise,  then  all  the  ends 
supposed  to  be  answered  by  it  are  defeated.  But  concerning 
what  might  have  been  said  to  show  the  absurdity  of  this  scheme, 
the  reader  for  farther  light  is  referred  to  essay  twenty  first. 
But  if,  by  a  sel:  determining  power,  and  an  efficient  power  to  pro- 
duce all  our  exercises  and  actions,  no  more  is  intended  than 
this,  that  in  order  for  mankind  to  be  agents,  they  ought  to  be  en- 
dued with  Si  feeling,  active  faculty,  by  which  the  whole  man  is 
governed,  and  from  which  all  his  exercises  and  actions  proceed, 
it  must  be  granted,  that  men  do  possess  this  faculty  or  power. 
Then  all  the  actions  and  exercises  of  men  may  be  traced  back  to 
this  faculty  as  the  primary  active  principle  from  which  they 
proceed,  or  flow  as  streams  from  a  fountain.  And  as  they  can- 
not be  traced  back  any  farther,  or  to  any  previous  active  prin- 
ciple in  men,  this  faculty,  which  has  been  denominated  the  taste, 
is  the  primary  active  power,  wh\ch  constitutes  agency,  and  gives 
rise  to  all  our  voluntary  exertions  and  actions.  I  say,  if  such 
a  faculty  is  what  others  mean  by  a  self  determining,  efficient 
power,  it  is  granted  ;  and  some  pains  have  been  taken  to  prove, 
that  mankird  are  in  fact  endued  with  it  ;  and  that  without  it 
they  would  not  be  agents,  and  could  not  be  considered  as  moral 
agents. 

If  opponents  admit  this,  then  the  dispute  is  ended,  concerning 
the  nature  and  degree  of  power  requisite  to  constitute  a  moral 
agent,  and  nothing  further  need  be  said  on  either  side. 

But  if  they  advance  an  idea  of  an  efficient  power,  which  has 
no  nature,  inclined  to  neither  good  nor  evil,  and  is  in  itself  in- 
different, they  are  laboring,  it  is  fully  believed,  to  establish  and 
prove  the  existence  of  an  impossibility.  For  an  active  power, 
or  efficiency,  must  necessarily  have  a  nature  to  be  influenced  by 
motives,  to  be  pleased  or  the  contrary  with  moral  objects.  And 
ifit  have  not  such  a  nature,  it  is  no  active  power,  and  can  nev- 
er operate  in  any  other  way,  than  an  instrument  used  by  some 
other  external  and  foreign  agent.  This,  it  is  thought,  has  been 
proved  in  the  previous  essays. — Before  this  essay  is  concluded 
a  few  things  may  be  suggested  for  the  notice  of  the  public. 

The  author  is  is  not  so  vain  as  to  expect  the  sentiments  ad- 
vanced will  meet  with  universal,  or  perhaps  with  general  appro- 


369 

i)atioQ.  Some  may  think  the  leading  sentiments  exhibited  are 
erroneous  and  dangerous.  With  this  belief  some  opponent  may 
attempt  an  answer,  and  confutation.  If  any  should  judge  this 
to  be  his  duty,  it  is  hoped  his  attention  will  be  confined  exclu- 
sively to  the  sentiments,  which  are  considered  dangerous.  Fon 
it  is  often  the  case  when  an  answer  is  written  against  a  book, 
that  much  time  and  labor  are  spent  in  searching  after,  and  no- 
ticing inconsistencies.  And  there  are  but  few  books  of  much 
magnitude,  which  are  entirely  free  from  inconsistencies  less  or 
greater.  Pointing  out  these,  is  not  confuting  an  author.  For 
his  leading  sentiments  may  be  true,  although  inconsistencies 
may  have  escaped  his  notice.  Showing  a  writer  is  inconsistent, 
is  proving  his  mind  to  be  finite,  liable  to  err,  and  unable  to 
comprehend  a  whole  system  so  as  to  see  at  one  view  the  agree- 
ment of  all  the  parts.  But  does  this  show  his  leading  senti- 
ments to  be  erroneous .''  By  no  means.  Hence  time  and  labor, 
spent  in  noticing  inconsistencies,  are  in  a  great  measure  lost, 
A  writer  may  be  consistent  with  himself  in  propagating  errors, 
though  inconsistent  with  truth.  Therefore,  until  the  sentiments 
advanced  are  confuted,  a  book  is  not  answered. 

Every  attentive  reader  will  see,  that  the  system  exhibited  in 
these  essays  rests  on  a  few  plain  propositions,  or  obvious  truths. 
If  these  are  shown  to  be  false  and  dangerous,  the  book  is  an- 
swered. If  then,  an  opponent  can  make  it  evident,  that  a  feel- 
ing faculty,  or  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain,  denominated 
taste,  does  not  constitute  agency,  but  something  else  distinct 
from  it  ;  if  he  can  prove  that  such  agency  has  no  nature,  no  in- 
clination or  tendency  to  good  or  evil,  but  is  indifierent  as  any 
unfeeling  property  ;  if  he  can  show  that  happiness  is  not  an  ab- 
solute good,  nor  misery  an  absolute  evil  ;  and  that  means  or 
things  are  not  called  good  and  evil  according  to  their  ultimate 
tendency  to  promote  or  destroy  happiness  ;  if  he  can  prove, 
that  benevolence  is  not  an  appetite  or  love  for  the  greatest  good 
of  God's  kingdom,  and  this  is  not  its  ultimate  end  ;  also,  that 
those  desires  of  the  heart,  which  tend  ultimately  to  diminish 
and  destroy  happiness,  are  not  evil  or  sinful  ;  then  it  h 
granted  he  has  shaken  the  foundation  on  which  the  system  ad- 
vanced rests.  And  if  he  should  accomplish  this,  it  is  fully  be- 
lieved he  will  make  it  evident,  that  men  are  not  moral  agents,  or 
proper  objects  of  praise  and  blame,  and  future  rewards  ;  in  a 
M'ord,  that  they  are  not  accountable  beings,  anv  more  than  in- 

22 


370 

aninjatc  lliliij^s.      Doiuir  all  this,  would  cflectually  serve  the 
cause  of  infidelity. 

But  if  after  all  his  labor  these  truths  shall  remain  firm,  that 
a  primary  active  principle  docs  constitute  agency  ;  and  that  no 
property  or  faculty  can  be  active  in  its  nature,  if  incapable  of 
feeling,  or  of  pleasure  and  pain  ;  and  of  course  that  the  faculty 
of  taste,  as  it  has  been  e.\j)lained,  has  a  feeling  nature,  is  the  sub- 
ject of  pleasant  and  painful  sensations,  and  does  constitute  that 
agency  which  is  a  primary  active  principle  by  which  men  arc 
governed  in  all  their  actions  ;  if  after  all  it  does  remain  true, 
that  happiness  is  an  absolute  good,  and  misery  an  absolute  evil ; 
and  that  other  things  are  denominated  relativeUj  good  or  evil, 
according  to  their  ultimate  tendency  in  promoting  or  destroying 
happiness  ;  and  accordingly  that  benevolence  aims  ultimately 
at  this  higliest  good,  and  all  the  desires  of  the  heart  of  unrenew- 
ed men  tend  ultiujatel}'  to  misery  ;  if  these  truths  remain  un- 
shaken, and  unconfuted  ;  then  the  main  pillars  of  the  system 
remain  entire  and  firm,  and  the  building,  which  rests  upon 
them,  is  not  demolisiied. 

This  will  be  a  fact,  although  an  opponent  may  show  some 
small  errors,  and  some  inconsistencies,  interspersed  here  and 
lliere  in  difi'erent  parts  of  the  book.  It  is  then  the  earnest  re- 
quest of  the  author,  if  it  is  judged  reasonable,  that  an  opponent 
who  may  attempt  an  answer  would  confine  himself  to  these 
leading,  fundamental  truths,  on  which  the  whole  system  rests. 
This  would  be  keeping  to  the  point,  and  would  sooner  bring  the 
dispute  to  a  close.  When  persons  suffer  themselves  to  wander 
from  the  real  questions  disputed,  a  controversy  may  be  protract- 
ed without  any  conclusion. 

The  book  is  now  committed  to  the  public,  whose  property  it 
is.  Let  it  be  read  with  candor,  free  from  every  prejudice.  If 
it  should  reflect  any  light  on  the  first  and  leading  and  fundamen- 
tal principles  of  Ethics  and  Theology,  and  should  give  a 
lead  to  further  investigations,  and  the  enlargement  of  our  knowl- 
edge of  these  important  sciences,  and  the  good  and  prosperity  of 
the  Redeemer's  kingdom,  the  prayers  of  the  author  will  be  thus 
far  ansAvercd. 


*Oii  the  happiness  of  heaven,  shoicing  in  ichat  if 

consists. 

Hebrew?!,  4.  9.       Tlure  rrmainfth.  therefm-c,  a  rrst  vnio   the  ■people   of    God. 

This  rest  is  licavcn,  u  state  of  perfect  felicity. 

This  is  a  subject  very  interesting-.  For  unless  uc  know 
what  heaven  is,  we  can  never  determine  whether  we  are  real 
Saints  or  not.  The  eljsium  of  the  heather,  and  the  paradise 
of  tlic  Alahomctans,  are  places  of  great  happiness,  as  they  be- 
lieve. Still  the  sources  of  happiness  are  such,  as  described 
b\'  them,  that  no  change  of  heart  is  necessary  to  enjoy  them. 
Indeed  the  most  voluptuous,  and  carnal,  those  most  fond  of  ev- 
ery kind  of  animal  pleasure,  may  be  happy  in  the  heavens 
they  describe. 

If  a  person  should  form  an  idea  of  a  country  on  this  earth, 
where  all  the  inhabitants  are  perfectly  happy  ;  yet,  if  he  had 
no  knowledge  of  the  particular  sources  of  their  felicity,  he 
might  conclude,  if  he  lived  there  he  should  also  enjoy  all  the 
bliss  of  the  inhabitants.  And  from  a  belief  that  all  in  that 
country'  are  happy,  he  might  have  a  very  ardent  desire  to  re- 
move to  it.  Yet,  when  he  arrives  there,  he  finds  the  particular 
sources  of  their  happiness  are  very  disgustful  to  him.  To  him, 
instead  of  happiness,  it  is  a  place  of  misery.  Had  he  inquired, 
and  obtained  a  distinct  knowledge  of  the  particular  sources  of 
happiness  in  that  land,  he  might  have  convinced  himself,  that 
he  could  not  delight  in  such  objects.  And  he  would  have  no 
desire  to  remove  there,  unless  his  relish  could  be  suited  to  those 
particular  sources  of  happiness. 

Many  bv  reading  the  bible  learn  that  heaven  is  a  land  of 
perfect  bliss.  Being  convinced  it  is  a  place  of  happiness,  thev 
inquire  no  further  ;  but  conclude,  if  they  were  admitted  there 
they  should  certainly  be  happy.  As  they  have  no  distinct  idea 
of  the  sources  of  happiness  in  that  world,  or  of  the  relish  ne- 
cessary to  enjoy  them,  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  say  whether 
they  could  or  could  not  be  happy  if  admitted  there.  And  if 
they  conclude  they  are  saints,  merely  from  the  idea  that  they 
wish  to  live  there,  the^^  may  be  deceived. 

•This  cssfiv  liiis  no  necessary  connexion  wltli  those  wliich  precede,  to  ehieidote 
the  autlior's  ■philotophintl  system.  It  shew.'s,  however,  the  practical  anpiicnlion  of 
his  principles  ;  niid  ns  it  relates  to  an  important  subject,  it  is  herr  subjoined  to  aiakn 
the  volume  more  complote. 


AH  men  wisli  to  be  happy.     And  bocaiise  heaven  is  a  Ian«I 
of  pure  bliss,  many  conclude  they  should  be  liappy,  if  admitted 
to  live  there.     But  this  is  false   reasoning.     To  be  happy  ii\ 
Heaven  we  must  have  a  relish  for  the  particular  sources  of  hap- 
piness in  that  world.     And  we  cannot  determine  with  any  cer- 
tainty, whether  we  are  prepared  for  that  country,  only  by  as- 
certaining in  the  first  place  clear,  distinct  and  just  ideas  of  the 
particular  sources  from  whence  all  derive  their  happiness  ;  and 
then  by  inquiring,  whether  we  have  such  a  relish  ior  them,  as 
to  prefer  them  to  all  other  objects  of  delight.     Hence  it  is  a  mat- 
ter of  the  last  importance,  to  obtain  a  distinct  knowledge  of  the 
sources  of  heavenly  bliss.     A  mistake  here  may  prow  fatal. 
And  all  our  knowledge  of  heaven  must  be  from  the  word  of 
God.     No  one  has  lived  there,  and  returned,  to  give  us  a  de- 
scription of  tiiat  world.      God  in  his  word  has  described  it.     If 
we  can  clearly  understand  the  description  he  has  given,  we  may 
know  what  heaven  is. 

And  it  is  more  or  less  difficult  to  understand  the  description 
he  has  given.  It  is  given  generally  in  figurative  language. 
One  question  of  importance  is,  whether  we  are  to  understand 
his  description  in  a  literal,  or  figurative  sense.  Many  things 
serve  to  show  thoy  are  to  be  understood  in  a  figurative  sense. 
Then  the  next  difficulty  is,  to  explain  the  figures  according  to 
their  true  sense. 

In  order  to  remove,  in  some  measure,  these  difficulties,  sev- 
eral preliminary  remarks  are  necessary,  before  we  proceed  to 
a  particular  description  of  the  heavenly  sources  of  felicity. 

As  the  terms,  sources  of  happiness,  will  be  frequently  used  in 
this  essay,  it  is  requisite  to  show  what  is  meant  by  them.  Three 
things  are  requisite  to  the  existence  of  happiness.  First,  a  rel- 
ish of  heart  to  feel  and  enjoy  ;  or  a  relish  to  be  pleased  and  dc" 
lighted  with  objects.  2.  Objects  to  please  and  delight  us. 
3.  The  objects  must  exist  in  the  view  of  the  mind. 

For  example.  If  a  person  has  an  ardent  thirst  for  water,  he 
cannot  have  it  gratified,  unless  he  can  find  water  to  drink. 
Water  may  exist  in  great  plenty,  yet  he  not  know  where  to  find 
it.  Hence  he  may  thirst,  and  there  may  be  water  to  gratify  it, 
yet  he  may  not  have  his  thirst  quenched.  He  must  have  a 
knowledge  of  it.  Tlicn  he  can  drink  find  be  satisfied.  Here 
the  water,  which  satisfies  his  thirst,  is  what  I  mean  by  a  source 
C)(  happiness. 

0f  course  all  the  objects  in  heaven,  which  aflibrd  joy  to  tliP 


373 

\nhahitanls,  are  what  I  mean  by  sources  of  liappincss.  Ob- 
jects of  pleasure,  and  sources  of  pleasure  are  used  to  mean  the 
same  thing.  Hence,  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  heaven,  a  per- 
son roust  have  a  relish  for  heavenly  objects  ;  he  must  see  them  ; 
then  while  in  view  his  relish  is  gratified,  and  in  this  his  happi- 
ness consists. 

The  preliminary  remarks  to  be  made  are  the  following. 

1.  All  our  animal  appetites  and  natural  affections  will  cease 
at  death,  we  shall  have  none  of  them  in  heaven. 

Our  bodily  appetites  are  many.  So,  also,  are  our  natural 
affections,  such  as  those  termed  parental,  conjugal,  filial,  and 
fraternal.  These  were  implanted  in  us  for  certain  purposes, 
such  as  the  preservation  of  life,  the  propagation  of  our  species, 
the  relief  of  persons  in  distress,  and  our  comfort  and  well-being 
in  this  life. 

If  we  had  not  conjugal  affections,  there  would  be  nothing  to 
prompt  us  to  propagate  our  species  ;  without  pa-ental  affec- 
tion, infants  would  suffer  and  die  ;  without  filial  affection, 
there  would  be  nothing  to  excite  to  obedience  of  parents  or 
support  of  the  aged  ;  without  the  affection  children  have  for 
each  other,  there  would  be  no  peace  in  families  ;  and  without 
natural  pity,  there  would  be  nothing  to  move  us  to  relieve  and 
afford  help  to  the  weak,  infirm,  and  objects  of  affliction  and  dis- 
tress. All  these  natural  principles  of  action  are  absolutely  ne- 
cessary to  the  being  and  comfort  of  the  human  race.  For 
mankind  naturally  have  no  benevolence,  to  stimulate  them  to 
seek  each  others'  good.  These  affections  are  requisite  to  sup- 
ply the  want  of  benevolence,  while  this  earth  is  to  be  our 
abode. 

These  natural  principles  of  action  are  the  fountain,  from 
which  all  the  other  affections  we  have  flow.  But  they  will 
cease  at  death  ;  because  there  will  be  no  use  for  them,  or  need 
of  them,  in  the  other  world.  That  they  will  be  eradicated  at 
death  in  the  saints,  (and  I  speak  only  of  them,)  is  evident 
from  several  considerations. 

1.  After  death,  saints  will  be  as  the  angels  of  heaven.  Not 
equal,  hut  like  them.  They  have  none  of  these  natural  affec- 
tions ;  if  we  are  like  them,  we  shall  not  have  them.  This 
teaches,  that  these  natural  feelings  then  cease  to  exist. 

2.  It  is  necessary  they  should  be  eradicated,  otherwise  saints 
would  not  be  perfectly  happy.  In  that  world  we  are  Inform- 
ix they  never  marry.     If  the  same  inclinations  prevailed  there 


374 

as  here,  as  they  would  not  be  c,^ratlfied,  they  would  render 
saints  unhappy.  Uncpsiness  would  be  excited,  without  any 
means  of  removinp:  it.  If  they  have  the  same  aflection  there 
as  here,  the  misery  of  wives,  husbands,  and  children,  would 
excite  more  or  less  painful  feelings.  It  seems,  then,  to  be  re- 
quisite, to  perfect  happiness,  that  these  feelings  should  be  erad- 
icated at  death. 

3.  The  nature  of  the  body,  when  raised,  teaches  the  same 
truth.  At  the  resurrection,  the  body  will  be  raised  immortal, 
incorruptible,  and  spiritual.  Hence  it  will  never  hunger  or 
thirst,  or  be  diseased,  or  weary.  Of  course,  it  will  never  need 
food,  clothing,  sleep,  rest,  or  medicine.  Hence  there  will  be 
no  use  for  those  natural  aflections  we  have  here.  Also  this 
world  will  be  destroyed.  And  there  will  be  an  end  to  all  la- 
bor for  food  and  clothing. 

These  considerations  teach  us  clearly,  that  all  our  natural 
and  bodily  affections  will  be  eradicated  at  death  ;  or  at  least 
that  they  will  never  operate,  or  be  felt  in  heaven.  Because 
there  will  be  need  of  them  there  ;  and  if  they  were  to  remain 
and  operate  in  that  world,  they  would  lessen  and  interrupt  the 
happiness  of  saints,  and  render  that  state  imperfect. 

And  if  these  natural  aflections  all  cease  to  exist  at  death,  it 
follows,  that  in  heaven  there  will  not  be  any  worldly  sources 
of  happiness.  Thcie  will  be  no  bread,  water,  or  food  of  any 
kind  ;  because  none  will  be  needed.  There  will  be  no  natural 
pity,  because  there  will  be  no  objects  of  distress  to  relieve. 
There  will  be  no  houses,  or  lands  ;  because  none  of  these 
things  will  be  needed  there.  No  part  of  the  happiness  of  hea- 
ven will  be  derived  from  the  gratification  of  such  natural  aflec- 
tions ;  because  such  aflections  will  not  exist  there.  Hence, 
from  the  consideration  that  all  these  natural  principles  of  ac- 
tion, which  operate  here,  will  cease  at  death,  it  is  evident  the 
descriptions  of  heaven  in  the  bible  are  not  to  be  construed  liter- 
alhj  hwX  figuratively.  To  be  convinced  of  this,  is  one  thing 
necessary  to  form  just  views  of  a  heavenly  state  ;  and  to  un- 
derstand the  word  of  God  according  to  its  true  import  and 
meaning. 

How  can  we  form  right  and  just  ideas  of  the  happiness  of 
heaven,  so  long  as  we  know  notwhctlier  the  descriptions  given 
us  of  that  world,  are  to  be  construed  literally,  or  figuiatively .'' 
We  must  first  know  in  what  sense  to  understand  the  description 
given  us  of  heaven,  before  we  can  form  any  true  conceptions  of 


375 

that  world.  This  remark  therefore  is  made,  lo  show  that  the 
description  of  heaven  in  the  word  of  God  must  be  understood 
Jiguratively. 

2.  If  the  descriptions  given  us  of  heaven  are  to  be  under- 
stood literally,  why  may  not  sinners,  without  any  change  of 
heart,  be  happy  there  ?  If  in  heaven  there  will  be  cities,  with 
walls  and  gates  made  of  the  precious  stones  ;  streets  paved 
with  gold  ;  houses  rich  and  elegant  ;  rivers  of  water,  and  all 
manner  of  fruits  ;  and  every  thing,  which  suits  the  taste  and 
relish  of  natural  men  here,  why  may  they  not  be  happy  there, 
as  they  now  are  here  ?  If  the  descriptions  given  us  of  heaven 
are  to  be  understood  in  a  literal  sense,  it  is  a  place  every  way 
suited  to  the  relish  of  men  of  this  world  who  love  nothing  else. 
It  would  suit  their  pride  and  ambition,  to  be  made  kings  and 
priests  ;  to  possess  riches,  and  inherit  a  kingdom  in  the  literal 
sense. 

Those  objects  in  this  world,  which  are  the  most  valuable^ 
precious,  beautiful,  and  ddightful,  are  represented  as  being  iii 
heaven  in  a  great  abundance,  and  in  a  perfect  state.  Those 
things  in  this  world,  which  in  the  most  perfect  manner,  suit 
their  relish,  and  gratify  their  love  of  riches,  the  pride,  and  am- 
bition of  men  here,  are  to  be  enjoyed  in  heaven  in  a  far  more 
perfect,  uninterrupted  manner,  than  they  are  here  ;  if  we  are 
to  construe  the  description  literally.  If  wicked  men  in  heaven 
should  find  some  things  disagreeable  ;  they  would  experience 
many  other  things,  which  would  afl'ord  them  great  satisfaction. 
So  that  if  they  would  not  be  perfectly  happy  there,  they  would 
be  far  more  happy  and  contented,  than  they  are  here. 

But  we  are  given  to  understand,  that  the  unrenewed  would 
not  be  happy  in  heaven,  if  admitted  to  live  there.  Christ  says 
except  a  man  be  born  again,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of 
heaven.  He  does  not  mean  that  they  would  not  have  any 
knowledge  of  that  world,  or  of  the  objects  existing  in  it.  This 
is  not  what  he  means  by  seeing.  For  the  unrenewed  are  capa- 
ble of  this  speculative  knowledge,  and  in  fact  have  it  in  a  great- 
er or  less  degree.  He  means  then,  that  they  cannot  enjoy  the 
objects  of  that  world,  because  they  are  not  suited  to  their  relish. 
But  if  the  descriptions  of  heaven  are  to  be  understood  literally. 
they  may  enjoy  them  there,  as  well  as  they  do  here. 

And  why  is  not.  the  description  Mahomet  has  gi^  en  of  liea- 
ven  in  general  just,  if  the  descriptions  of  the  bible  are  to  be 
construed  literally,  as  some  contend  ;  and  why  may  not  sinncrf 
Onjoy  it,  and  be  happy  there,  witliout  any  chaiige  r 


376 

Honcc  llie  bible,  by  teacirui':^  us  that  a  change  ol'  heart  i* 
necessary  to  the  happiness  of  heaven,  and  that  the  unrenewed 
would  not  enjoy  heavenly  objects  if  admitted  there,  assures  us 
that  the  description  given  us  of  that  world  must  be  understood, 
not  in  a  literal,  but  a  figurative  sense. 

3.  Saints  in  heaven  will  be  perfectly  holy,  as  God  is  holy. 
This  will  teach  us,  that  the  descriptions  of  heaven  arc  figura- 
tive, and  not  literal.  By  the  fall  of  man  all  have  lost  the  mor- 
al image  of  God.  No  trace  of  his  moral  likeness  remains  in 
man. 

We  are  assured  that  this  moral  image  is  restored  in  regener- 
ation. We  are  born  of  the  Spirit.  And  that  which  is  born  of 
the  Spirit  is  spirit.  That  which  is  created  in  the  heart  when 
men  are  renewed,  is  spiritual  in  its  nature.  The  nature  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  produced  in  the  heart.  So  we  become  partak- 
ers of  the  divine  nature,  as  we  are  taught.  That  is,  the  moral 
image  of  God  is  restored.  But  God  is  love.  Love,  or  benev- 
olence, is  the  moral  perfection  of  God.  This  is  the  sum  of  all 
his  moral  attributes 

When  the  same  benevolent  disposition  is  created  in  our  heart, 
then  his  moral  image  is  restored.  This  is  the  new  man  which 
is  to  grow  until  we  arrive  to  the  stature  of  a  perfect  man  in 
Christ.  Saints  in  heaven  are  perfectly  holy — this  moral  im- 
age will  be  perfected  in  them. 

Hence  in  heaven  the  only  principle  of  action  needed,  and  the 
only  one  which  will  operate,  is  benevolence,  or  love.  By 
this  only  saints  are  governed,  or  influenced,  as  God  is.  But 
the  nature  of  benevolence  is  such,  it  does  not  delight  in  any 
worldly  sources  of  felicity.  The  only  objects  of  its  delight 
are  divine,  heavenly,  and  spiritual  in  their  nature.  It  has  no 
delight  in  worldly  riches,  or  honors,  or  pleasure,  (which  are 
the  only  objects  of  sinners'  love,)  except  as  means  to  obtain 
these  divine  objects,  which  are  its  source  of  felicity.  But  in 
heaven  the  riches  and  honors  of  this  world  will  not  be  needed, 
as  means  to  obtain  spiritual  objects  and  enjoyments.  Hence 
benevolence  in  heaven  has  no  delight  in  such  worldly  objects. 
It  is  pleased  and  gratified  with  the  same  divine  objects,  which 
are  the  sources  of  God's  blessedness  ;  or  in  which  his  benevo- 
lence delights. 

Accordingly  the  very  nature  of  benevolence  is  such,  which 
will  be  the  only  governing  principle  in  heaven,  that  no  objects 
will  afford  it  delight  there,  but  those  which  are  spiritual  and 


377 

divine ;  such  as  those  in  which  divine  love,  or  benevoleruie 
delights.  This  serves  to  show,  that  ihe  happiness  of  heaven  is 
not  derived  from  any  worldly  objects,  but  wholly  from  those 
which  are  divine.  And  hence  no  wo-ldly  objects  will  be  need- 
ed, or  be  enjoyed  there.  And  if  not,  then  the  description  of 
heaven  must  be  construed  in  a  figurative,  and  not  in  a  literal 
sease. 

Are  not  these  remarks  sufnclent  to  convince  every  one,  that 
when  we  find  heaven  represented  in  the  bible  by  terms  which 
belong  to  worldly  objects,  we  are  not  to  understand  such  des* 
•riptions  in  a  literal  sense  ? 

And  is  it  not  evident,  that  we  can  never  have  any  true  and 
just  conception  of  a  heavenly  state,  of  that  rest  which  remair>» 
eth  unto  the  people  of  God,  until  we  know  whether  the  descrip- 
tions given  us  of  heaven  are  to  be  understood  in  a  literal  or 
6gurative  sense  ?  And  if  not,  then  every  one  cannot  but  see 
that  the  remarks  made  are  pertinent,  and  necessary  in  order  tO 
a  just  view  of  the  heavenly  world.  For  they  serve  to  convince 
ns  we  must  construe  such  passages,  generally,  in  a  figurative 
sense.  If  we  can  ascertain  the  true  meaning  of  such  figures, 
we  shall  then  form  just  conceptions  of  heaven.  It  is  granted 
great  care  ought  to  be  used  in  construing  figures.  We  must 
not  follow  a  lively  imagination,  but  attend  carefully  to  their 
obvious  import  and  meaning.  And  as  benevolence  is  the  only 
governing  principle  in  heaven  ;  and  of  course,  as  the  happi- 
aess  of  that  world  must  consist  in  gratifying  this  benevolent 
disposition  ;  just  views  of  the  nature  of  benevolence  will  serve 
to  guide  us,  and  teach  us,  w  hat  the  sources  of  happiness  in 
heaven  are.     It  is  then  designed 

II.  To  attend  to  the  nature  of  benevolence,  as  far  as  is  ne- 
cessary to  understand  the  sources  of  heavenly  felicity. 

This  being  the  foundation  of  the  happiness  of  heaven, under- 
standmg  its  nature  will  lead  us  to  a  correct  knowledge  of  hea- 
venly blessedness.  We  may  rely  on  it,  that  whatever  suits, 
delights,  and  gratifies  a  benevolent  reli>h,  is  a  source  of  hap- 
piness in  heaven.  Every  object  in  the  world,  which  delights 
and  gratifies  this  divine  love  or  taste,  is  a  source  of  happiness. 
So  far  as  any  person's  happiness  in  this  world  is  derived 
from  food  and  drink,  we  cannot  tell  what  will  make  him  hap- 
py, until  we  learn  what  kind  of  food  will  suit  his  taste.  Then 
we  know  in  what  his  happiness  consists,  and  how  to  suit  and 
please  him.     So  when  we  learn  in  what  benevolence  delights, 

23 


378 

•vve  learn  in  what  heavenly  felicity  consists.     Hence  it  is  very 
important  to  learn  the  nature  of  divine  benevolence. 

To  do  this  we  may  proceed  to  observe,  that  every  moral 
agent  must  have  some  ultimate  end  in  view  in  all  his  actions. 
That  ultimate  end  must  be  some  object,  on  its  own  account 
agreeable  ;  and  in  which  the  highest  good  of  the  universe  con- 
sists. For  all  will  agree,  that  benevolence  is  friendly  to  the 
highest  good,  will  seek  it,  and  rejoice  iu  it.  Happiness,  not 
his  own  but  that  of  others,  is  the  highest  good  of  a  benevolent 
individual ;  and  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  in  God's  king- 
dom is  that  greatest  good  which  he  will  seek  as  his  ultimate 
end.  And  it  is  the  nature  of  benevolence,  whether  in  God  or 
in  men,  to  seek  the  highest  happiness  of  the  universe  as  its  ul- 
timate end.  This  truth  is  made  evident  in  the  essay  on  the 
nature  of  holiness  or  benevolence  ;  and  the  remarks  need  not 
be  here  repeated.  This  prepares  the  way  for  us  to  see  clear- 
ly and  distinctly  what  must  be 

III.  The  positive  sources  of  happiness  enjo3^ed  in  heaven. 

If  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  is  the  greatest  good  ;  and 
the  nature  of  benevolence  is  such  as  to  seek  and  delight  in  it, 
as  its  ultimate  end,  as  has  been  shown,  then, 

1.  The  happiness  of  God's  heavenly  kingdom,  is  the  first 
and  greatest  source  of  felicity  to  all  who  surround  his  throne. 

A  saint  in  heaven,  when  he  contemplates  the  happiness  of 
that  society,  beholds  each  one  perfectly  blessed  ;  his  own  heart 
will  have  a  feast,  and  he  will  experience  joys  which  are  un- 
speakable. 

Nothing  in  this  world  fills  the  heart  of  a  benevolent  king 
with  so  great  joy,  as  to  see  all  his  subjects  prosperous  ancf 
Jiappy.  And  nothing  affords  benevolent  parents  so  much  pure 
delight,  as  the  happiness  of  all  the  members  of  the  family. 
And  children,  if  benevolent,  rejoice  in  no  object  in  this  world 
so  much,  as  in  beholding  their  parents  and  all  around  them  com- 
pletely happy.  And  what  in  this  world  ever  gives  such  pure 
and  great  joy  to  a  saint,  as  to  see  a  sinner,  when  renewed,  re- 
joicing in  God  .'* 

And  Paul,  when  Titus  returned,  and  informed  him  of  the 
happiness  of  the  church  at  Corinth,  rejoiced  greatly.  He  re- 
joiced in  their  joy.  Their  joy  was  the  source  of  his  joy. 
And  when  the  profligal  returned,  and  was  joyful  in  his  father'^ 
house,  the  whole  fimily  were  feasted  with  joy  and  gladness^ 
«»xcept  his  elder  brother. 


37* 

!  livery  person,  who  is  a  real  saint,  can  testify  by  experience, 
that  the  spiritual  joys  and  comforts  of  his  brethren,  is  the 
sweetest  source  of  happiness  to  himself.  Reason,  experience, 
and  scripture  all  unite  in  sayinc,  that  the  happiness  of  others' 
is  the  greatest  source  of  joy.  No  other  object  the  saiuts  be- 
hold, aflbrds  them  so  great  and  pure  delight. 

Let  us  then  in  this  light  take  a  view  of  heaven.  There  saints 
surround  the  throne  of  God  and  the  Lamb.  When  they  con- 
template the  infinite  blessedness  of  their  heavenly  Father,  what 
joy  they  must  experience.  They  love  him  with  all  their  heart, 
and  to  behold  the  object  of  their  love,  and  the  fountain  of  all 
the  good  they  possess,  infinitely  happy,will  fill  their  souls  with 
joy.  Suppose  he  appeared  to  them  unhappy  ;  this  would  fill 
them  with  grief  and  pain.  If  so,  then  his  perfect  bliss  must 
aflbrd  them  great  joy. 

When  they  contemplate  the  infinite  happiness  of  Christ  their 
friend  and  beloved,  will  not  this  excite  in  them  the  sweetest  de- 
light ?  The  joys  of  heaven,  which  he  was  to  experience,  was 
the  prize  set  before  hinj.  here  on  earth.  When  they  behold 
him,  who  for  the  joy  set  before  him,  endured  the  cross,  now 
teceiving  his  reward  in  the  infinite  bliss  he  experiences,  this 
will  fill  every  heart  with  joys  unspeakable. 

All  the  saints  in  heaven  are  the  sons  and  daughters  of  God, 
and  the  bride  of  the  Lamb.  And  their  happiness  is  the  great 
end  God  sought,  and  an  object  of  his  delight ;  and  the  Sou 
will  rejoice  in  his  bride  ;  nothing  will  afford  him  more  satisfac- 
tion, than  her  happiness.  In  her  happiness  he  sees  the  fruit  of 
the  travail  of  his  soul  for  her.  If  the  Father  and  Son  rejoice 
in  the  happiness  of  saints  ;  saints,  who  have  the  same  heart, 
will  rejoice  in  the  infinite  blessedness  of  the  Trinity.  To  see 
the  Holy  Spirit,who  sanctified  h  prepar.^d  them  for  heaven,infi- 
ifiiely  blessed,  will  afford  them  the  greatest  satisfaction. 
Hence  the  boundless  happiness  of  all  the  persons  in  the  Trini- 
ty, will  feast  the  hearts  of  saints  with  joy  unspeakable  and  full 
of  glory. 

Again.  When  saints  in  heaven  behold  each  other's  happi- 
ness ;  when  they  see  all  around  them  perfectly  blessed,  enjoy- 
ing that  bliss,  which  will  continue  and  increase  forever,  what 
iuward  satisfaction  they  will  experience.  And  the  feelings  and 
desires  of  their  hearts  will  be  perfectly  gratified.  They  will 
rejoice  in  each  other's  joy.  And  the  happiness  of  angels,  who 
ministered  t©  them  here,  will  also  be  a  source  of  joy  to  them. 


380 

In  heaven  there  is  but  one  society,  composed  of  a  head  an^ 
-members.  God  is  the  head  ;  saints  and  angels  the  members. 
They  are  perfectly  united  to  their  head,  and  to  each  othei,  by 
mutual  love  and  affection.  The  greatest  good,  which  can  be 
obtained,  they  possess  and  enjoy  ;  which  is  perfect,  enduring^ 
iand  increasing  felicity.  When  they  see  each  other  in  the  full 
possession  of  tiiis  highest  good,  they  will  experience  the  most 
pure,  refined,  and  sweet  delight. 

Oh  how  blessed  is  that  society,  where  the  happiness  of  oth* 
ers,  instead  of  exciting  envy  and  opposition,  as  is  often  the 
case  in  this  world,  is  a  source  of  exquisite  joy.  This  is  bliss^ 
in  the  highest  possible  degree. 

2.  The  holiness  of  others  will  be  another  source  of  happi* 
flcss  in  heaven. 

When  saints  enter  heaven,  they  will  be  perfectly  holy.  For 
no  sin,  or  any  thing  which  defdeth,  is  ever  to  enter  there. 
And  holii.ess  is  the  moral  image  of  God  ;  the  beauty  and  glo- 
ry of  every  character.  There  is  no  other  object  in  the  uni- 
verse, which  equals  holiness  in  beauty,  glory,  and  utility  ;  and 
Oo  one  equals  it  in  worth  but  happiness ;  this  exceeds  it  in  value. 

Holiness,  tho  so  excellent,  is  not  a  good  in  itself ;  it  is  not 
loved  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  happiness,  of  which 
it  is  the  greatest  means.  If  it  be  asked,  why  is  holiness  so 
beautiful  and  valuable  ?     It  is  answered. 

1.  Because  it  prepares  persons  for  everlasting  felicity. 
Without  holiness  no  man  shall  see  God.  Heaven  is  a  per- 
fectly holy  state.  None  can  enter  there,  but  the  perfectly  be- 
nevolent. Hence,  without  it  no  person  is  prepared  in  the 
temper  of  his  heart  for  heaven,  or  to  enjoy  holy  objects,  or  to 
spend  his  time  in  holy  employments.  Without  holiness  no  ra- 
tional being  can  be  happy.  Benevolence,  which  is  holiness, 
is  the  only  quality,  which  prepares  for  a  state  of  endless  bliss. 
Is  not  that  of  infinite  worth,  which  prepares  a  person  for  eter- 
nal felicity  ^  What  else,  in  this  view,  can  equal  it  in  value  .'' 
If  we  were  infinite  in  knowledge  and  power,  jet  had  no  be- 
nevolence, we  should  be  fit  for  no  place,  but  hell.  It  is  holi- 
ness, and  this  only,  which  prepares  a  person  for  heaven,  and 
the  enjoynjent  ol  holy  objects.  Hence  it  exceeds  in  value  gold, 
diamonds,  and  rubies.  Nothing  can  purchase  it,  but  the  pre- 
cious blood  of  Christ. 

It  is  holiness  only,  which  prepares  and  inclines  persons  to 
be  useful,  to  seek  and  promote  the  happiness  oi  God's  king- 
dom; 


381 

When  any  bavc  this  temper  of  heart  cheated  in  them,  they 
ilelijrht  in  the  happiness  ofotliers,  and  of  God's  kingdom. 
This  then  will  incline  and  prompt  them  to  promote  and  in- 
crease the  bliss  of  heaven.  It  inclines  them  to  exert  all  their 
powers  and  faculties,  to  improve  their  time,  and  every  blessing 
of  God,  in  promoting  happiness.  Paul,  before  his  conversion, 
did  all  he  could  to  destroy  the  souls  of  men.  But  when  a  bcr 
nevolent  disposition  was  given  him,  then  with  a  zealous  em- 
ployment of  all  his  powers,  he  labored  to  promote  the  salva- 
tion of  souls.  In  like  manner  it  inclines  all  to  devote  them- 
selves wholly  to  the  service  of  God,  and  the  promotion  of  the 
happiness  of  his  kingdom.  In  this  view,  what  is  there,  which 
ean  equal  it  in  worth  i*  It  is  the  most  active  principle  which 
can  exist,  and  which  will  forever  exert  itself  in  making  men 
happy,  and  increasing  the  felicity  of  heaven.  For  these  two 
reasons,  tho  holiness  is  not  excellent  on  its  own  account,  but 
merely  as  a  means  of  happiness,  we  see  its  value  and  glory 
are  infinite.  Happiness  excepted  there  is  nothing  else,  whicb 
equals  it  in  value.  It  is  this,  which  inclines  God  to  employ  all 
his  attributes  in  promoting  infinite  and  eternal  happiness.  It 
prepares  persons  for  a  state  of  endless  bliss  ;  and  to  exert  aU 
their  powers  in  promoting  the  eternal  felicity  of  heaven. 
Therefore  its  beauty,  glory,  loveliness,  and  excelleBcy,  exceed 
all  description,  and  conception. 

In  heaven,  the  individuals  who  compose  an  innumerable 
host,  are  perfectly  holy.  Hence  they  are  perfect  in  beauty  j 
perfectly  resemble  their  Maker  j  and  as  stars  shine  with  the 
brighest  possible  rays. 

When  a  saint  beholds  the  infinite  holiness  of  God,  sees  he 
is  love  itself,  what  joy  this  will  difl'use  through  his  soul.  Whea 
he  contemplates  the  holiness  of  Christ,  he  beholds  a  sun  shin- 
ing with  infinite  brightness.  This  is  the  glory  of  the  godhead, 
which  is  the  light  of  heaven  ;  and  w  hich  far  exceeds  the  sun 
in  brightness,  so  that  there  is  no  need  of  sun  or  moon  there. 
Saints  will  dwell  forever  in  the  rays  of  this  glory. — The  rays 
of  divine,  infinite  holiness,  will  warm,  soften,  and  quicken  their 
hearts,  and  fill  then  with  joys  pure,  sweet,  and  extatic. 

And  how  beautiful  and  glorious  will  saints  and  angels  appear 

to  each  other.     When  one  saint  beholds   another,    he  sees   a 

star,  which  shines  with   a  golden  lustre,  whose  rays  are  mild, 

pleasant,  and  joyful.     They  are  beautiful  in  each  other's  sight^ 

yea  perfect  in  beaaty. 


1382 

Here  ou  earth,  notbinc;  affords  prcntpr  joy,  tlian  to  see  iu 
another  this  benevolent  spirit.  This  excites  the  mutual  love 
of  saints,  and  unites  them  together  by  the  strong  bonds  of 
brotherly  afi'ection.  They  are  near,  and  dear,  and  precious  to 
each  otiier  ;  delighting  in  each  other's  society  and  conversa- 
tion^  How  much  greater  will  be  their  joy  in  each  other  in 
heaven,  where  holiness  is  made  perfect. 

Wherever  they  turn  their  eyes,  they  behold  the  holiness  of 
the  Trinity,  of  saints,  of  angels,  shiring  with  such  beauty, 
mildness,  brightness  and  glory,  as  diffuses  life  and  joy  through 
their  souls,  and  fills  them  with  divine  pleasures.  Here  are 
joys  flowing  forcvermore  at  the  right  hand  of  God,  of  which 
the}'  drink  their  full  draughts.  Behold  what  glories  fill  hea- 
ven. Beauties  innumerable,  perfect,  and  infinite,  employ  their 
fyes,  and  feasts  their  hearts,  day  and  night  forever. 

3.  The  glory  of  God,  will  be  another  source  of  felicity  i|i 
heaven. 

This  is  included  m  part  in  what  has  been  already  said  ;  but 
weeds  some  enlargement  in  one  particular.  For  other  attri- 
butes, beside  holiness,  and  this  in  its  various  operations,  will  be 
a  source  of  pleasure. — Indeed,  the  glorj  of  God,  and  thp  high- 
est good  of  his  kingdom,  are  one  and  the  same.  The  highest 
good  obtained  is  the  greatest  declarative  glory  of  God  Fof 
in  the  attainment  of  this  end,  all  his  attributes  are  displayed^ 
and  his  fulness  communicated  ;  and  the  holy  society  of  heaven 
enjoy  this  communicated  fulness.  But  here  a  more  particular 
attention  is  necessary,  to  the  glor}'  displayed  in  producing  the 
greatest  sutn  of  happiness,  which  is  the  highest  good. 

In  heaven  all  the  works  of  God  will  be  the  study  of  saints. 
As  they  delight  in  studying  his  works  here,  which  are  a  glass 
in  which  he  is  seen  ;  much  more  will  they  delight  in  survej'- 
ing  them  in  heaven.  The  works  of  God  are  a  boundless  field 
for  saints  to  explore,  in  doing  which  their  knowledge  will  in- 
crease, and  their  capacities  enlarge  and  expand. 

In  the  works  of  creation  they  will  see  the  wonderful  displays 
of  infinite  knowledge  and  power.  They  will  see  clearly  tlie 
end  of  all  these  works.  They  will  see  clearly  how  all  the 
parts,  from  the  least  atom  to  the  greatest  world,  have  unitedly 
promoted  the  ultimate  end  of  God.  For  when  all  the  elect  of 
Christ  are  assembled  in  heaven, his  ultimate  end  is  then  attain- 
^.  Now  saints  have  only  to  look  back,  and  learn  how  all  his 
works  have   been  perfectly  adapted  to  his  end.     They  witl 


383 

gee  tfie  manner  in  which  they  have  been  arranged  and  con- 
nected, aiMJ  rtiih  united  inflience  have  in  the  best  way  promote 
ed  the  happiness  of  his  kingdom.  In  this  way  they  will  have 
clear  views  of  his  infinite  knowledge,  power,  goodness,  and  all 
his  prlorious  attributes. 

When  a  mechanic  is  makincr  a  clock,  we  may  view  the  parts, 
and  see  much  ingenuity  displa3'ed.  But  when  he  has  finislied 
it,  then  we  clearly  see  the  end  and  use  of  it ;  we  see  how  all 
the  parts  are  arranged,  connected,  and  adapted  to  their  end. 
We  then  see,  if  one  cog  in  the  wheel  were  wanting,  it  would 
render  the  whole  imperfect.  But  now  we  behold  and  admire 
the  great  ingenuity  of  the  artist. 

The  created  universe  is  a  grand  and  sublime  machine.  The 
worlds  and  particles  which  compose  it,  are  innumerable.  God 
is  now  making  and  putting  the  parts  together  ;  arranging  and 
connecting  them,  with  a  view  to  the  greatest  happiness  ulti- 
mately. In  heaven  saints  will  view  them  in  a  finished  state. 
And  the  more  their  knowledge  of  the  parts  increases,  of  their 
arrangement  and  connection,  and  perfect  adaptedness  to  their 
end,  the  more  distinct  their  views  will  be  of  all  his  attributes. 
Now  they  clearly  see,  that  his  boundless  knowledge,  wisdom, 
power,  goodness,  and  every  attribute,  have  been  employed  in 
promotingthe  greatest  possible  happiness  of  his  holy  kingdom. 
They  see  every  part  has  contributed  to  this  end  ;  and  if  one 
5mall  thing  had  been  either  added  or  diminished,  his  works 
Would  have  been  imperfect.  As  we  see  in  a  clock,  if  one  wheel 
had  one  more  or  less  number  of  cogs,  it  would  have  injured  the 
whole  machine.  In  thus  studying  the  works  of  creation,  they 
will  have  enlarged  and  exalted  views  of  the  greatness  of  God  5 
and  will  be  fdled  with  wonder,  and  joy,  and  ascribe  greatness 
to  him  forever.  Thus  the  study  of  the  works  of  creation  will 
be  a  constant  source  of  delightful  ejitertainment,  and  contribute 
to  the  increase  of  the  happiness  of  saints. 

Then  the  study  of  the  works  of  providence  will  afford  them 
still  greater  delight.  These  works  are  like  a  building.  God 
has  been  collecting  the  materials,  arranging  and  connecting 
them,  from  the  beginning  of  time,  and  will  finish  it  at  the 
close.  Then  saints  can  survey  the  building  in  a  finished  state. 
It  will  be  one  part  of  their  delightful  study,  to  examine  all 
the  parts,  their  order,  and  connection,  and  adaptedness  to  their 
end.  Here  they  will  see  the  work  of  redemption  is  the  prin- 
cipal part  in  this  building  ;  that  all  the  other  parts  have  ref- 


384 

ejence  t«  tlils,  an^  are  subordinated  to  it.     "'They  will  clearly 
Sfee  ihe  attributps  of  God  displaced  in  these  works. 

When  God  was  executing  the  part  of  his  plan,  which  relat- 
ed to  Jacob  and  his  family,  every  thing  appeared  dark  and 
mysterious  to  Jacob  ;  which  made  him  say,  all  these  things 
are  against  me.  But  now,  when  that  partis  finished,  we  loolc 
at  it,  and  behold  its  perfection,  and  the  wonderful  displays  of 
iwisdom,  power  and  goodness.  From  this  we  learn,  that  we 
«tennot  form  correct  views  of  the  character  of  a  workman,  while 
tie  is  making  his  work;  but  when  it  is  finished,  then  we  can 
see  his  design,  and  the  perfection  and  wisdom  of  his  plan.  So 
at  is  with  respect  to  the  works  of  providence  ;  now  many 
events  appear  dark  and  mysterious,  which  gives  occasion  to 
jSie  wicked  to  murmur,  to  censure  the  works  of  God,  and  pro- 
nounce them  unwise,  and  thus  blaspheme  their  Maker. 

But  when  viewed  by  saints  in  heaven,  in  their  finished  state^ 
they  will  see,  as  in  a  glass,  the  glorious  and  astonishing  dis- 
plays of  his  attributes  ;  especially  in  the  work  of  redemption. 
They  will  have  increasing  views  of  his  boundless  greatness, 
"majesty,  glory  and  benevolence  ;  and  see  that  he  alone  is 
qualified  to  fill  the  throne  of  the  universe,  to  rule  and  govern 
all  worlds  according  to  his  pleasure.  In  the  same  proportion 
they  will  see  their  own  comparative  nothingness,  weakness  and 
<lependence  ;  and  forever  when  they  fall  at  his  feet,  will  as- 
cribe wisdom,  honor,  power,  dominion,  and  greatness  to  God, 
saying  wonderful  are  thy  works,  Lord  God  almighty ;  and  to 
the  Lamb  they  will  say,  worthy  art  thou  to  receive  the  same 
ascriptions  of  glory  ;  for  thou  hast  redeemed  us  with  thy 
Wood.  In  heaven,  they  will  see  that  all  the  works  of  God, 
l)oth  of  creation  and  providence,  are  parts  of  one  plan,  perfect- 
ly harmonising  in  promoting  the  same  end  ;  and  perfectly 
agreeing  with  every  thing  revealed  in  the  word  of  God. 

In  heaven,  they  have  the  three  great  volumes,  of  creation^ 
providence,  and  the  word,  open  before  them.  Here  they  see 
the  same  character  displayed  in  actions  and  \n  words.  His 
■works  are  his  actions,  and  the  bible  contains  his  words,  by 
which  he  has  revealed  and  displayed  himself. 

These  volaraes  contain  an  infinite  fund  of  knowledge,  and 
»pen  to  view  a  boundless  field.  Reading  and  studying  them 
will  be  one  of  the  employments  of  heaven  ;  all  employment, 
which  will  afford  them  continual,  and  increasing  joy  ;  and  here 
ft  one  source  of  the  happiness  of  that  world.    This  study  will 


385 

be  a  source  of  delight,  because  they  see  more  and  more  dis^ 
tiuctly  the  displays  of  the  di' ine  glory  in  them. 

Hence  the  reason  why  John.,  when  in  vision  he  saw  a  part  of 
the  works  of  God  completed,  as  the  ruin  of  the  beast  and  his 
power,  he  and  the  heavenly  hosts  in  chorus  ascribe  greatness, 
power,  dominion  and  glory  to  God.  Here  they  saw  his  attri- 
butes displayed,  and  his  benevolence  in  promoting  the  happi- 
ness of  heaven,  and  defeating  all  opposition  made  to  it. 

4.  Another  source  of  happiness  in  heaven  will  consist  iti 
praising  God. 

Manki.id  here  delight  in  praising  those,  whom  they  love 
and  highly  esteem.  And  it  is  especially  a  joyful  work  to 
saints,  here  to  give  praise  to  God  for  his  benefits.  Much  great- 
er satisfaction  this  employment  will  afibrd  them  in  heaven. 

Let  any  one  read  the  revelation  of  John,  especially  the  4th, 
5th,  and  19th  chapters,  there  he  will  find  the  heavenly  hosts 
united  in  praise  to  God  and  the  Lamb,  for  his  wonderful  works 
and  still  more  wonderful  love. 

We  have  seen  that  one  source  of  pleasure  will  consist  in 
studying  the  works  of  God,  the  volumes  he  has  written  ;  be- 
cause in  these  works  they  behold  the  glory  of  God.  His  glo- 
ry clearly  seen  is  the  great  sourceof  their  joy.  They  will  be 
continually  making  new  discoveries  in  their  studies  of  his  glo- 
•ry  ;  and  those  will  be  followed  with  songs  and  anthems  of 
praise. — So  it  is  represented  by  John  in  his  visions.  For 
example  ;  when  John  in  vision  saw  anti-christ  destroyed,  he 
then  saw  and  heard  all  the  heavenly  hosts  praising  God,  for 
the  glorious  attributes  displayed  in  the  overthrow  of  enemies, 
for  the  happiness  of  his  friends. 

These  predicted  events  are  not  all  as  yet  accomplished. 
When  they  are  iiilfilled,  and  all  the  elect  assembled  in  heaven 
studying  the  works  of  God,  they  will  see  step  by  step  the  way 
in  whicli  he  has  defeated  and  destroyed  anti-christ,  and  all  en- 
emies ;  and  how  in  this  way  he  has  advanced  the  happiness 
of  heaven.  Through  the  whole  his  glorious  attributes  of  pow- 
er, wisdom,  justice,  and  benevolence,  shine  with  amazing  lus- 
tre and  brightness.  They  will  see  the  greatness  and  majesty 
of  God,  his  unerring  perfection  ;  that  he  alone  is  worthy  to 
fill  the  throne,  and  sway  the  sceptre  of  universal  government. 
Clearly  discerning  all  this  in  studying  his  works,  they  will 
then  unite  in  one  general  anthem  of  praise  ;  and  fall  at  his  feet. 

24 


380 

and  ascribe  to  him  all  tlio  glory,  which  is  his  due.     This  em- 
ploymcnit  ol"  prai.so  uill  till  them  with  imsprnkahlc  plensnre. 

As  they  are  constantly  studying",  and  n)aKing  new  «liscove- 
ries  of  his  e:lor\  and  greatness  ;  this  will  afi'ord  increasing 
maiter  fc  praise  ;  and  add  fresh,  and  augmented  delight  to 
a]'  their  songs  and  anthems  of  praise  to  Jehovah  and  the 
Lamb. 

This  shows  us  that  the  studij  of  God's  works,  and  their  an- 
thems of  praise  are  connected  ;  that  the  latter  follows  the  for- 
mer. And  as  the  field  of  study  is  boundless,  there  is  room 
for  fmife  minds  to  he  making  new  discoveries  forever  ;  and  of 
course  there  will  be  new  matter  of  course  for  ascription  of 
power,  dominion,  and  glory  to  God  and  the  Lamb.  Here  ^tu- 
dy  and  praise  will  be  forever  united  ;  and  these  will  be  dis- 
tinct employments,  and  sources  of  joy  to  them.  And  in  this 
way  their  happiness  will  be  forever  increasing. 

5.  Prrforming  special  commissions  and  mandates  will  be 
another  source  of  joy. 

There  is  much  reason  to  believe,  that  saints  will  be  employ^ 
ed  on  messages  to  the  other  worlds  ;  as  many  departed  saints 
have  been  thus  eniployed  to  this  world. 

A  messenger  from  heaven  is  generally  called  an  angel.  If 
departed  saints  were  emplojed  in  any  bu';iness  to  this  world, 
thpy  would  he  styled  angels.  We  accordingly  find  they  are 
so  called.  One  being,  employed  in  relating  to  John  the  events 
wo  cli  were  to  take  place  in  this  world,  is  called  an  angel,  in 
19th  and  22d,  chapters.  When  John  was  about  to  worship 
him  he  said,  do  it  not- — for  I  am  thy  fellow  servant,  and  of  thy 
brethren  the  prophets  ;  worship  God.  He  thus  acknowledg- 
es he  was  one  of  the  ancient  prophets.  And  Moses  and  Elias 
appeared  and  conversed  with  Christ  on  mount  Tabor. 

It  is  evident  from  scripture  that  angels  are  the  ministers- 
and  servants  of  God,  who  wait  upon  iiim  continually,  and  he 
employs  them  often  on  special  messages  to  this,  or  any  other 
world.  And  why  should  not  saints  in  heaven  be  thus  employ- 
ed, as  well  as  those  spirits  commotdy  meant  by  the  term  angels  f 
They  may  and  have  been  thus  employed  as  messengers,  who 
are  styled  angels.  Hence  we  have  reason  to  conclude  that 
God  employs  any  of  the  holy  spirits  around  his  throne  as  nies- 
sencrers  to  this,  and  other  worlds,  according  to  his  pleasure. 

And  a? the  worlds  created  are  very  numerous,  and  without 
any  doubt  are  all  inhabited  Uy  different  orders  of  bemgs,  to- 


38^ 

wards  whom  God  exercises  the  same  benevolent  attention,  a» 
he  does  towards  tiiis  world,  according;  to  their  various  cliarac- 
ters  and  wants  ;  we  may  conclude  safely,  that  holy  spirits  are 
sent  on  special  errands  to  them,  as  they  have  been  to  us;  and 
that  saints  will  be  thus  employed. 

This  will  be  one  part  of  their  employment  as  servants  in  his 
kingdom,  to{::o,  when  commanded,  on  messages  of  love  or  ven- 
geance to  other  worlds,as  events  may  require.  These  errands 
to  other  worlds  they  will  perform  with  great  delight.  For 
this  is  one  way  b3'  which  they  may  enlarge  their  knowledge 
of  thr  -vorks  and  ways  of  God. 

Ui.  —  btedly  angels,  who  visit  this  world,  and  minister  to 
the  heirs  of  salvation,  learn  much  concerning  the  work  of  re- 
demption, and  works  of  providence.  And  by  this  knowledge 
are  greatly  benefitted  by  God's  dealings  with  men.  They  are 
so  much  benefitted,  and  interested  in  what  God  is  doing  for 
men,  that  the  great  work  of  redemption  is  a  subject  of  their 
constant  study.  So  it  is  said,  which  things  tlie  angels  desire 
to  look  into.      And  these  desires  are  very  strong. 

Saints  in  heaven,  when  tjjey  go  on  messages  from  God  to 
other  worlds,  become  acquainted  w  ith  the  characters  of  tjie  in- 
habitants ;  their  conduct,  and  the  dealings  o:  Jehovah  with 
them.  And  while  thus  extending  their  knowledge  in  this  way, 
their  happiness  is  increasing.  And  serving  their  king  in  this 
way,  will  be  a  source  of  delight  to  them. 

We  are  informed  that  spirits  are  very  active,  like  fire  ;  hi^ 
ministers  are  like  a  flame  of  fire.  Also,  they  serve  him  in  this 
active  manner  day  and  night,  and  never  rest.  When  we  con- 
sider that  the  host  of  heaven  is  innumerable,  and  each  servant 
is  thus  actively  employed,  what  an  amazing  amount  of  service 
they  render  every  day.  What  are  the  services,  which  this  in- 
numerable host  perform  .''  They  praise  God,  we  are  told. 
But  there  are  many  ways  of  praising  him.  One  is  in  doing 
his  will.  While  employed  on  errands  from  world  to  world, 
they  serve  and  praise  him.  And  this  will  be  one  of  their  em- 
ployments. We  love  to  serve  our  friends,  whom  we  love  in 
this  world.  We  delight  in  activity  when  our  work  is  agreea- 
ble. So  in  heaven  the  active  services  performed  for  God  will 
be  one  source  of  their  happiness,  and  one  great  source  ;  espe- 
cially when  we  consider  how  much  knowledge  they  obtain  of 
<3od's  ways  and  character  in  such  employments. 

What  joy  it  gave  the  angels  to  announce  to   the   shepherdv 


388 

tlie  birth  ol"  Christ.  With  what  pleasure  they  ministered  to 
him  in  this  world,  and  do  minister  unto  saints  on  their  journey 
home.  With  similar  pleasure  will  saints  in  heaven  obey  and 
serve  their  God.  In  whatever  service  they  may  be  em- 
ployed, it  will  be  a  source  of  pleasure  and  happiness  to  them. 

6.  The  society  of  heaven  will  be  another  source  of  happi- 
ness to  saints. 

We  know  that  mutual  acts  of  kindness,  conversation,  giving 
and  receiving  information,  and  mutual  intercourse,  arc  in  this 
World  one  great  source  of  our  daily  felicity.  The  society  of  a 
family,  of  parents  and  children,  and  of  friends,  is  one  of  our 
sweetest  joys.  And  the  society  of  perfectly  holy  beings  will 
be  unspeakably  pleasant.  This  is  represented  in  scripture  by 
the  metaphor  of  a  feast,  at  which  the  bridegroom  and  bride  re- 
gale themselves.  The  society  of  husband  and  wife  is  a  source 
of  great  consolation.  Far  more  delightful  will  be  iheconimu- 
uion  and  social  intercourse  of  the  bride  with  Christ  in  heaven. 

The  sweetest  joys  on  earth  flow  from  communion  with  the 
.  Father  and  Son.  Christ  rejoices  in  his  bride,  and  his  bride 
in  him.  They  will  be  one.  This  intercourse  and  intimacy 
will  be  blissful,  and  dear  ;  like  that  of  husband  and  wife,  in  a 
spiritual,  not  carnal  sense.  Their  joys  will  be  mutual.  And 
this  proves  a  social  intercourse  in  heaven.  For  persons  aflbrd 
each  other  no  joy  or  comfort,  if  they  have  no  social  intercourse. 
In  that  case,  they  would  belike  persons  who  live  alone,  v^ithout 
any  connexion  or  intercourse.  Such  persons  never  afi'ord  each 
other  any  comfort. 

But  the  union  and  intercourse  of  Christ  with  his  bride  in 
heaven,  is  represented  b\  the  union  of  husband  and  wife  here. 
And  when  saints  are  called  the  children  of  God,  brethren  and 
sisters,  composing  a  family,  and  enjoying  family  blessings  ;^ 
such  descriptions  clearly  teach,  that  in  heaven  they  will  enjoy 
intimate  intercourse,  which  will  aflbrd  them  the  greatest  de- 
light. Only  consider  how  much  comfort  parents  and  children, 
husbands  and  wives,  brethren  and  sisters,  enjoy  in  each  oth- 
er's society. 

In  heaven  saints  are  tlie  children  of  God,  the  bride  o(^  Christ, 
brethren  and  sisters.  Such  arc  the  relations  subsisting  there, 
in  a  state  of  perfection.  And  their  society  will  be  as  much 
more  intimate  and  dear,  as  their  union  is  more  close  and  per- 
fect, than  on  the  earth. 

How  great  then  will  be  the  happiness  of  the  children  of  Go  d, 
arising  from  intercourse  with  him  ;  and  of  the  bride  in  her  in- 


38» 

t.ercourse  with  Christ  j  and  of  the  brethren  and  sisters  with  eacfc 
©tlier.  From  these  relations,  and  the  mutual  intercourse  and 
society  connected  with  them,  will  flow  the  sweetest  joys  forev- 
er, in  ways  almost  innumerable,  and  concerning  which  we  have 
but  a  faint  conception  here. 

Paul  teaches  us,  that  in  heaven  some  will  shine  brighter 
than  others  ;  they  will  differ  in  this  respect,  as  one  star  diflers 
in  glory  from  another.  Hence  some  will  be  greater  and  wiser 
than  otiiers,  and  be  teachers  to  those  of  less  knowledge.  With 
what  pleasure  they  will  communicate,  and  others  hear  and  re- 
ceive instruction  ;  and  in  this  way  assist  each  other  in  making 
progress  in  knowledge. 

Indeed,  when  we  reflect  that  in  heaven  a  love  of  benevolence 
will  be  perfect,  and  perfectly  unite  all  to  Christ  their  head, 
and  to  each  other,  so  that  their  harmony  will  be  complete 
wiihoutone  jarring  note  ;  that  they  will  be  all  one  ;  their  inter- 
cou»'se  and  society  must  be  inconceivably  pleasant  and  sweet. 
But  one  soul  and  spirit  will  animate  and  govern  that  innumer- 
able host.  So  that  we  may  well  say  with  Paul,  that  eye  hath 
not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  heart  conceived  the  things  God 
haih  prepared  for  those  who  love  him. 

Not  to  enlarge,  those  mentioned  are  so  many  positive  sour- 
ces of  happiness  to  saints  and  angels  in  lieaveu.  And  these 
show  that  the  happiness  and  glory  of  that  world  are  so  great, 
blessed  and  sublime,  that  in  describing  them  the  boldest  fig- 
ures must  be  used.  The  description  must  be  taken  from  ob- 
jects in  this  world  most  highly  esteemed  for  their  value,  rich- 
ness, beauty,  sweetness,  greatness,  and  sublimity.  Such 
figures  are  used,  which  we  have  endeavored  to  explain  under 
the  several  particulars  of  this  essa3\  Yet  they  come  so  far 
short  of  a  full  description,  that  Paul  says  eye  hath  not  seen,  Sic. 
We  now  see  the  description  given  us  of  heaven  is  not  to  be 
imderstood  literally,  but  figuratively  ;  and  these  figures  we 
have  attempted  to  explain ;  and  I  would  add  only  one  or  tWQ 
more  particulars  to  complete  the  description. 

7.  In  heaven  saints  will  love  each  other  as  theimehes,  and  be 
united  in  perfect  bonds  of  friendship. 

This  command,  thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,  has 
never  been  perfectly  obeyed  on  earth.  But  in  heaven  saint? 
will  love  each  other  as  themselves.  This  love  will  render 
them  true,  sincere,  and  faithful  friends.  Such  friendship  rare- 
ly exists  in  this  world.  A  faithful  man,  who  can  find,  was  the 
(complaint  of  one  of  the  greatest  of  men.     Here  men  are  de- 


390 

oeitful,  wnfaithful,  insinspre  ;  so  that  they  seldom  put  modi 
trust  or  confidence  in  each  other.  But  in  heoven  it  will  be 
very  different.  No  deceit,  insincerity,  nne^cr,  envy,  or  re- 
venpre,  or  any  evil  passion,  will  ever  be  exercised  there.  Their 
words  and  actions  will  flow  from  perfect  love  to  each  other. 
They  will  have  no  desig^n  to  deceive  or  injure  each  other,  but 
to  increase  each  others'  felicity.  Of  this  they  will  give  full 
evid«  nee.  Heuce  they  will  put  entii'e  and  perfect  trust  and^ 
confidence  in  each  other,  and  without  disappointment.  They 
vill  believe  every  word  spoken  to  be  true,  every  action  de- 
sif^ned  to  do  good.  Hence  a  fear  of  being  deceived,  and  in- 
jured by  some  ill  design,  will  never  be  realized.  They  will 
live  together  in  perfect  fi*iendship,  striving  to  contribute  to 
each  others'  felicity.  The  sweet  pleasures  and  joys,  flowing 
from  such  love  and  friendship,  was  never  experienced  in  this 
world.  But  in  heaven,  when  nothing  but  perfect  love  and 
friendship  are  seen,  when  the  ties  of  kindred  souls  make  them 
one,  their  intercourse  will  produce  the  most  refined  pleasures. 
All  the  pleasures  and  joys  of  friendship  will  be  experienced  in 
perfection,  without  any  thing  to  embitter  them.  This  friend-' 
ship,  consisting  in  mutual,  perfect  love  to  each  other,  is  one 
blessing  Christ  often  prayed  for,  and  promised  Co  his  disci- 
ples. He  prayed  they  might  be  one,  one  in  him,  one  in  the 
Father,  one  together,  as  he  and  the  Father  are  one.  This  is 
only  praying  that  their  love  and  friendship  might  become  per- 
fect. Hence  Christ  called  them  his  friends.  He  considered 
this  love  ard  friendship  to  be  one  source  of  the  most  sublime 
happiness. 

8.  In  heaven,  mutual  conversation  will  be  a  source  of  great 
and  constant  pleasure. 

The  mode  by  which  saints  will  communicate  their  thoughts, 
views,  and  feelings  to  each  other,  is  not  revealed.      Wheiher 
by  words,  or  some  other  signs,  we  know  not.     But  as  to  the 
fact,  that  they  will  converse,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

Abraham  and  the  rich  man  conversed.  And  bodies  are  not 
necessary  to  conversation.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  Moses  and 
Elias  talked  with  Christ,  and  created  angels  have  conversed 
with  man,  as  with  Daniel,  John,  and  Manoah  and  his  wife. 
They  have  a  way  to  articulate,  and  use  words  as  signs  of  their 
ideas. 

We  know  that  conversation  here  is  one  means  of  the  in- 
crease of  knowledge,  one  source  of  happiness,  and  necessary 


1  >>  .o 

301 

lo  the  intereourse  of  society,  and  our  hiohest  e^ood.  If  vfe 
couid  h;ivo  no  Jiiicrcoursc  by  coiiversntion,  our  condition  would 
be  very  unhappy,  As  mutual  conversation  is  necessary  to  the 
pleasures  and  perfection  of  society,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but 
that  this  privilege  will  be  enjoyed  in  heaven,  in  the  highest 
perfection. 

And  when  we  consider,  that  our  minds  are  capable- of  im- 
provement in  knowieflge  and  bliss,  and  are  daily  expanding 
&£  enlarging  ;  that  heaven  is  a  place  where  the  mind  will  grow 
and  enlarge  with  greater  rapidity  than  it  does  here  ;  we  may 
conclude,  that  Abraham  and  Moses  and  others  now  greatly  ex- 
ceed us  in  knowledge.  They  have  been  for  several  thousand 
years  studying,  and  improving  their  minds,  in  a  knewledge  of 
the  wot-ks  of  God. 

When  a  saint  enters  hcaven,by  conversation  with  such  char- 
acters very  important  information  is  soon  acquired.  The 
themes  o<f  discourse  will ;  e  innume-able.  And  it  will  be  the  de- 
light of  all  to  give,  as  well  as  receive,  information.  As  the 
works  of  creation,  of  providence,  of  the  word  of  God,  and 
spiritual,  intelligent  beings,  will  be  the  subjects  of  study  ;  so 
concerning  these  they  will  mutually  convey  instruction.  In 
these  works  God  is  manifested,  and  seen  ;  and  the  better  they 
are  understood  in  all  their  parts,  the  clearer,  and  more  enlarg- 
ed, will  be  the  views  all  will  have  of  the  character  of  Jehovah, 
and  hereby  their  happiness  will  be  greatly  increased. 

Suppose  a  rational,  benevolent  being  should  arrive  in  hea- 
ven from  some  other  world,  who  had  never  had  any  knowledge 
of  the  earth  ;  and  by  conversation  with  saints  from  this  world 
should  obtain  a  knowledge  of  this  material  globe,  of  the  works 
of  provideMice,  of  the  plan  of  redemption,  and  the  wonderful 
things  God  has  done  for  our  race  ;  would  he  not  have,  at  once, 
far  more  exalted  views  of  God  ;  and  b.  filled  with  wonder  and 
joy,  and  with  great  delight  join  with  the  redeemed  in  their  an- 
them of  praise  ?  And  he  might  give  us  a  knowlede^e  of  the 
works  of  God,  and  the  wonders  he  had  wrought  for  his  race, 
in  the  world  from  which  he  came,which  would  fill  us  with  won- 
der and  joy,  and  excite  us  to  unite  with  him  in  hymns  of  praise 
to  the  great  Eternal.  Such  suppositions  will  without  doubt 
be  realised  in  that  glorious  state. 

For  there  is  but  one  heaven  ;  and  in  that  the  greatest  sum 
of  created  happiness  is  to  exist.  And  Christ  is  to  gather  to- 
gether in  heaven  all  things  in  one.     This  and  similar  passages 


392 

seem  to  signily,  tlial  as  he  is  exalted  «bove  every  name  in  hea- 
ven and  in  the  universe,  and  is  made  head  over  all  things  to 
the  church,  the  blessed  society  above  ;  so  he  will  collect  to- 
gether in  heaven  al'  holy  beings  from  all  the  worlds  they  in- 
liabit,  and  there  make  them  one  ;  unite  them  by  ihe  bonds  of 
perfect  benevolence.  Beings  from  diflerent  worlds,  when  they 
meet  in  heaven,  animated  by  the  same  spirit  and  soul,  will  by 
their  conversati' n  and  intercourse,  aflord  each  other  great  de- 
light and  satisfaction.  By  such  conversation  among  pure 
friends,  what  information,  what  new  wonders,  what  exalted 
views  of  God,  what  refined  and  sublime  joys,  they  will  afford 
each  other.  As  the  divine  plan  of  operations  is  infinite,  in- 
cluding all  worlds  and  beings  in  existence,  composed  of  innu- 
merable parts,  all  unitedly  aiming  at  the  same  ultimate  end, 
the  happiness  of  heaven;  the  inhabitants  above  will  afford 
each  other  amazing  assistance  in  studying,  and  acquiring  a 
knowledge  of  it.  By  their  intercourse  and  mutual  help,  each 
mind  will  make  rapid  improvements  in  a  knowledge  of  the  di- 
vine plan  in  all  its  parts,  arrangements,  and  connexions. 

When  inhabitants  from  other  worlds  learn  from  saints  here 
what  wonders  God  has  wrought  in  every  age,  especially  by  the 
work  of  redemption ;  and  when  they  see  that  all  the  parts  of 
this  plan  operating  here  have  terminated  in  the  increasing  feli- 
city of  the  heavenly  society  ;  what  exalted  views  they  must 
have  of  God ;  what  pleasure  will  his  character  afford,  when 
seen  in  so  many  new  lights,  and  displayed  in  such  variety  of 
ways.  And  equal  delight  must  saints  from  this  world  feel, 
when  they  see  the  new  and  numerous  ways  by  whicl.  he  has 
jrfisplayed  himself  in  works  and  words  to  other  worlds  ;  and 
when  they  see  all  these  displays  are  parts  of  the  same  plan,  and 
that  all  terms  note  in  the  same  end.  Such  information  ac- 
quired by  conversation  will  fill  every  mind  with  exalted,  and 
reverential  views  of  God,  and  with  wonder  and  joy. 

9.  In  heaven  benevolence fWhh  all  its  affections  and  operations, 
vill  be  in  perfect  exercise. 

In  that  world  there  will  be  no  darkness  to  obscure  the  sight ; 
no  stupidity  to  cool,  and  blunt  enjoyment ;  no  sluggish  inac- 
tivity to  interrupt  pleasure.  The  views  of  every  mind  will  be 
clear  and  bright  ;  they  will  not  see  through  a  veil,  but  face  to 
face  ;  their  feelings  will  be  acute  and  strong  ;  their  activity 
equal  to  their  powers  ;  every  affection  will  glow  like  a  flame. 
This  prepares  them  to  experience  the  greatest  pleasure  itoifi 
oyery  object  and  employment- 


398 

Their  love  to  God,to  Christ,  to  each  other,\vill  bs  in  a/Iamc  ; 
their  gratitude  glow  like  fire ;  their  reverence  will  be  pro- 
found ;  their  joys  exquisitely  sweet  ;  yes,  the  whole  heart  will 
display  the  most  lively  and  active  exercises,  and  prepare  them 
to  drink  pleasures  from  every  stream,  and  from  the  eternal 
source  of  bliss.  Here  theheartls  so  cold,  stupid,  and  insensi- 
ble, as  to  render  great  enjo}  ments  next  to  impossible.  And 
in  proportion  to  the  lively  glow  of  holy  aflections,  our  happi- 
ness is  increased.  How  then  will  the  fervid  glow  and  heat  of 
holy  affections  in  heaven,  prepare  all  the  inhabitants  to  enjoy 
every  source  in  full  perfection,  and  to  as  high  a  degree  as  the 
powers  of  the  mind  will  admit.  With  a  heart  hungering  and 
thirsting  with  intense  desires,  the  sublime  feast  of  heaven  will 
afford  them  perfect    bliss  and  joy. 

10.  To  form  some  adequate  and  just  views  of  the  blessed- 
ness of  the  heavenly  society,  we  must  consider,  who  is  the  au- 
thor, with  his  design  of  that  world. 

The  greatest  sum  of  created  happiness,  including  its  endless 
increase,  is  the  ultimate  end  of  God  in  all  his  operations.  And 
this  sum  of  happiness,  with  its  endless  increase,  is  to  exist  in 
heaven.  And  God  is  the  author  and  cause  of  all  this  blessed- 
ness. He  has  but  one  plan,  and  this  is  the  end  at  which  it 
ultimately  alms.  This  plan  includes  all  worlds  and  beings  in 
existence.  And  all  the  innumerable  parts  of  it  are  unitedly 
promoting  this  end,  and  will  terminate  in  it. 

Hence  it  is  the  design  of  God  to  make  heaven  a  state  of  such 
blessedness,  glory,  sublimity,  and  joy,  as  is  worthy  of  himself 
So  that  in  the  happiness  and  glor}'  of  that  world,  all  the  di- 
vine attributes  of  power,  knowledge,  and  love,  will  be  displayed 
to  the  highest  possible  degree.  There  will  be  seen  the  essen- 
tial, infinite,  and  eternal  fulness  of  God,  perfectly  communi- 
cated. So  that  all  will  say,  here  as  great  happiness  and  glory 
exist,  as  the  infinite  Jehovah  was  able  to  produce.  There  God 
wil!  be  seen  displayed  ;  his  infinite  fulness  displayed  and  com- 
mnnicated.  In  the  blessedness  and  glor}'  of  that  state  he  has 
glorified  himself  perfectly,  in  the  highest  possible  degree. 

When  all  these  things  are  considered,  what  must  heaven  be. 
W'hat  astonishing  bliss,  what  inconceivable  glory,  what  sub- 
limity, what  consummate  perfection  of  all  things,  will  there  ex- 
ist, and  be  forever  increasing.  In  that  world,  every  being  will 
behold  all  the  happiness  and  glory  of  the  universe  concentrat- 
ed ;  and  the  sight  will  fill  each  one  with  wonder  and  joy  ;  ami 

25 


304 

this  delighttiil  \ronder  and  joy  will  Increase  as  the  pjorles  oT 
that  state  will  forever  shine  with  greater  and  greater  bright- 
ness and  splendor. 

No  wonder  then,  that  the  images  and  figures  used  in  scrip- 
ture to  describe  this  state,  are  so  various,  numerous,  rich,  and 
sublime  ;  and  then  they  fall  short  of  giving  an  adequate  view  of 
it  ;  so  that  after  all  that  is  revealed,  it  may  be  said,  that  hi  re, 
eye  hath  not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  what  will  be  realized  by  all 
in  that  paradise  of  glory  and  pleasure. 

We  may  now  attend  to  the  negative  description  given  us  of 
heaven.  We  are  assured  that  the  body  will  finally  rise,  be 
re-united  to  the  soul,  and  partake  in  union  with  it  of  tht  feli- 
city of  that  world.  It  will  be  raised  immortal,  incorruptible, 
spiritual,  and  made  like  unto  Christ's  glorious  body.  Hence 
it  will  never  be  subject  to  any  disease,  pam,  decay,  weariness^ 
or  death.  It  will  ever  remain  the  same  glorious  body  ;  ever 
fresh,  beautiful,  young  and  blooming.  It  will  be  capable  of 
the  most  refined,  and  sublime  sewsations.  And  by  this  union 
it  is  agreed  the  happiness  of  saints  will  be  increased  Other- 
wise, no  reason  can  be  assigned  for  the  resurrection  of  the  bo- 
dy.     But  if  it  will  add  to  their  felicity,  this  is  reason  sufficient. 

We  are  also  assured,  that  there  will  not  any  evil,  natural  or 
moral,  enter  heaven.  All  who  defile,  or  make  a  lie,  are  to  be 
excluded.  None  but  perfectly  holy  characters  will  be  admit- 
ted to  live  there.  And  if  evil,  both  natural  and  moral,  are  to 
be  forever  excluded,  then  no  evil  or  suflering  of  any  kind  will 
ever  be  there  experienced.  For  the  terms  natural  and  moral 
include  all  kinds  of  evil. 

But  to  givp  us  the  highest  assurance,  God  informs  that  there 
will  be  no  sickness,  pain,  sorrow,  crying,  or  death  in  heaven. 
All  kinds  of  particular  evils  are  mentioned,  and  declared  to  be 
excluded  from  that  world. 

There  will  be  no  darkness,  no  night  there  ;  no  gloominess 
or  fear,  or  any  thing  to  excite  fear.  By  the  rays  of  the  sun  of 
righteousness,  saints  will  enjoy  one  bright  eternal  day.  How 
glorious  and  perfect  is  that  state,  in  which  no  evd  is  felt ;  from 
which  every  thing,  which  creatures  dread,  hate,  and  fear,  will 
be  forever  excluded. 

This  homcver,  is  only  giving  us  a  negative  view  of  the  glory 
of  heaven.  For  if  saints  there,  though  freed  from  every  evil, 
could  find  no  objects  in  existence  to  aflord  them  pleasure,  they 
would  not  be  happy.     W  here  there  is  no  evil,  there  is  no  mise- 


395 

jljr.  9o  in  heaven  they  would  not  be  miserable,  er  feel  aiy 
pain  ;  yet  they  would  not  be  happy,  unless  ihe\  found  posi- 
tive sources  of  good,  or  of  pleasure.  Such  sources  tl)e\  will 
find,  and  we  hav  shown  what  they  are  ;  and  from  these  all 
their  happiness  is  derived.  If  they  enjoyed  these  sources,  yet 
suffered  many  evils  as  they  do  here,  their  happiness  would  be 
greatly  interrupted  ;  it  would  not  be  complete  and  perfect. 
To  perfect,  uninterrupted  happiness,  positive  sources  of  plea- 
sure must  be  enjoyed,  free  from  evil  to  interrupt  and  lessen  it. 

Hence,  though  freedom  from  all  evil  will  not  render  any  be- 
ing happy,  yet  this  exemption  is  necessary  to  perfect  felicity. 

According  to  the  description  here  given  of  heaven  ;  which 
accords  with  the  description  John  gives  in  the  20th,  21st,  and 
22d,  chapters  of  his  revelation  ;  how  glorious  is  that  state  ; 
that  world,  which  is  to  be  the  eternal  habitation  of  God,  and 
his  people.  According  to  this  description,  there  shall  in  no 
wise  enter  it,  any  thing  that  defileth,  or  ^orketh  abomination, 
or  maketh  a  lie. 

In  that  world  there  will  be  no  deception,  no  pollution,  noth- 
ing to  excite  disgust,  fear,  or  abhorrence.  Every  sinner,  and 
every  sin  will  be  forever  excluded.  Rebellion  will  be  forever 
subdued,  the  trumpet  having  blown  its  last  blast,  and  the  shout 
pf  battle  ceased,  and  destructions  come  to  a  perpetual  end.  In 
heaven  saints  will  never  be  assaulted  with  temptations  ;  lusts 
will  never  operate  to  disturb  internal  peace ;  there  will  be  no 
enemies  to  seduce  them.  Private  interests  will  be  known  no 
more ;  the  general  good  will  allure  every  eye,  engross  every 
heart,  and  move  every  hand. 

Peace  of  minds,  harmony  of  views,  union  of  affections,  will 
be  enjoyed  by  the  innumerable  host  above  ;  and  diffuse  an  uni- 
versal and  eternal  serenity  within  and  around  the  whole  soul. 

Here  all  will,  in  the  most  perfect  sense,  live.  Death  and 
sorrow,  disease  and  pain,  crying  and  tears,  will  be  felt  no  more. 
There  will  be  nothing  to  destroy,  nothing  to  impair,  nothing 
to  disturb.  Every  being  will  live  the  most  happy  life;  and 
not  merely  live,  but  grow,  flourish,  and  bloom  forever. 

Life  in  the  sublimest  sense,  life  vernal  and  immortal,  will 
impregnate  every  source  of  happiness,  and  animate  the  bodies 
and  souls  of  the  children  of  God. 

What  an  amazing  different  there  will  be,  between  heaven 
and  our  present  state  of  being.  This  w  orld  is  a  vale  of  tears, 
^vils  await  and  beset  us  herC;  ia  a  thousand  forms.     Without 


396 

are  lightings  ;  within  are  fears.  Here  we  have  a  thousand  un- 
gratified  desires  ;  experience  daily  disappointments,  reproach- 
es ol"  conscience,  and  distressing  apprehensions  of  the  wrath  of 
God.  We  are  subject  to  hunger  and  thirst,  to  cold  and  heat, 
to  weariness  and  languor,  sickness  and  pain,  decay  and  death. 
Our  friends  and  relatives  suffer  with  us  ;  they  sicken  and  die  ; 
their  sins  disgrace  them,  and  wound  us  ;  and  awaken  painful 
apprehensions  concerninjj  their  destiny  beyond  the  grave. 
Wars  also  spread  far  and  wide  the  miseries  of  dismay,  plunder, 
slaughter,  and  destruction.  Fires,  famine,  and  pestilence  of- 
ten desolate  cities,  and  depopulate  kingdoms. 

To  beings,  who  sufler  here  so  many  great  and  distressing 
evils,  how  great  and  wonderful  the  change  they  experience, 
when  the  ransomed  of  the  Lord  shall  return,  and  come  to  the 
heavenly  Zion,  with  songs  ;  when  they  shall  obtain  joy  and 
gladness,  and  sorrow  and  sighing  shall  flee  away  ;  when  they 
enter  heaven,  the  seat  of  unalloyed  happiness  ;  where  beauty, 
grandeur,  sublimity  and  glory  meet  the  eye  ;  w  here  harmony 
salutes  the  ear,  and  raptures  of  joy  fill  the  soul  j  raptures  un- 
mixed, increasing,  and  endless. 

Thus  far  it  has  been  designed  to  give  a  clear  and  distinct 
view  of  heaven,  so  far  as  it  is  revealed  in  the  bible.  We  see 
accordingly,  heaven  is  a  world  of  perfection  ;  every  beauty, 
glory,  and  excellency  reign  there  in  perfection.  Every  char- 
acter is  perfect,  beautiful  and  divine.  The  employments  of 
that  world  are  study,  obedience,  and  praise.  And  endless,  in- 
creasing happiness,  without  any  interruption  from  evil  of  any 
kind,  will  dwell  there,  and  render  all  the  inhabitants  inconceiv- 
ably blessed.  It  will  be  a  state  as  glorious  as  an  infinite  au- 
thor can  make  it. 

I  shall,  thei-efore,  conclude  with  an  exhortation  to  all  topre- 
jjare  for  that  world  w  ithout  delay.  You  now  see  clearly  the 
piize  which  is  set  before  you.  All  you  can  acquire  or  enjoy, 
in  your  pursuit  after  worldly  good,  is  vanity  compared  with 
heaven.  And  all  are  running,  wrestling,  and  striving  to  obtain 
a  prize.  And  the  prize  sought  is  either  such  enjoyments  as  this 
world  affords,  or  the  enjoyments  of  heaven.  And  heaven,  in 
duiable  riches,  in  unfading  honors  and  glories,  and  in  refined 
pleasures,  as  far  exceeds  all  the  riches,  honors,  and  pleasure 
of  this  world,  as  light  exceeds  darkness,  or  happiness  misery. 

To  spend  our  days  here  in  pursuit  of  worldly  good,  to  the 
neglect  of  running  for  the  prize  in  heaven,  is  the  greatest  wick- 


mi 

illness  and  folly.  And  when  the  uncertainty  of  life  is  consideiv 
ed,to  delay  preparation  for  heaven,  is  the  height  of  folly.  And 
that  depravity  of  heart  must  be  great,  which  causes  men  to 
pursue  a  course  to  their  own  ruin,  when  they  might  win  a 
prize  so  glorious  as  heavenly  and  endless  felicity. 

From  this  day,  let  all  turn  into  the  narrow  way,  run  the 
christian  race,  and  so  run  as  to  secure  success.  Delay  not. 
If  you  do,  and  ruin  overtakes  you,  how  must  you  lament  your 
conduct,  as  you  make  your  eternal  bed  in  outer  darkness  ; 
when  you  behold  afar  off  the  bliss  of  heaven,  lost  to  you  by 
your  folly  and  madness,  forever  lost  by  your  own  perverse- 
ncss. 


V70TTIS 

Referring  to  different  parts  of  the  xvorTc. 


A  Page  31. 

The  term  judgnfnt  is  often  used  in  an  indefinite  and  popular 
sense,  without  any  regard  to  metaphysical  accuracy.  Estimat- 
inc;  articles  of  daily  traffic  and  commerce,  or  giving  an  opinion 
concerning  their  value,  is  called  judging.  Yet  here  two  objects 
are  perceived,  and  when  compared  with  some  standard,  it  is  dis- 
tinctly seen  that  one  is  of  more  value  than  the  other.  Perceiv- 
ing this  difi'erence  in  their  worth,  when  compared  with  the  stand- 
ard, is  the  judgment  formed,  or  conclusion  of  the  person  con- 
cerning their  value.  Again.  Judicial  officers  and  referees 
give  judgment  in  cases  submiHed  to  their  decision.  Here  the 
Understanding  is  employed,  in  investigating  the  real  truth  in  the 
cases  before  them.  And  when  every  witness  is  heard,  and  ev- 
ery fact  or  truth  is  perceived,  in  relation  to  the  cause  pending, 
the  judge  comes  to  a  conclusion  ;  and  perceiving  what  is  true  or 
false,  right  or  wrong  in  the  case,  he  pronounces  a  decision  up- 
on it  to  the  parties  concerned.  In  this  process,  the  final  per- 
ception of  the  real  truth  in  the  cause  before  him,  and  declaring 
this  in  words,  is  called  his  judgment.  Hence  in  every  sense  in 
which  the  word  judgment  may  be  used,  it  is  the  understanding 
which  is  exercised,  in  perceiving  or  taking  a  view  of  all  the  ob- 
jects necessary  to  come  to  a  final  conclusion  and  result,  which 
is  his  judgment.  And  this  is  nothing  more  than  a  clear  percep- 
tion of  the  value  of  an  article  compared  with  its  standard,  or 
the  truth  of  a  cause  referred  to  him.  And  no  generic,  a*id  no 
more  than  a  specific  diflerence  is  discernible,  between  the  numer- 
ous operations  of  the  understanding.  All  its  operations  are  no 
more  or  less,  than  perceptions  of  objects,  whether  the  objects 
are  things,  or  properties,  or  qualities,  or  relations,  or  connex- 
ions between  antecedents  and  consequents. 


B  Pasre  46. 


»' 


The  word  of  God  informs  us,  it  is  the  office  of  conscience  to 
accuse  and  condemn,  or  to  excuse,  approve,  and  justify,  accord- 
ing as  our  hearts,  actions  and  lives,  acrree  or  disagree  with  the 
moral  law,  our  rule  of  conduct.     And  it  must  be  obviousto  can* 


400 

did  miods,  tliat  no  other  llian  specific  operations  of  the  under- 
standing are  employed,  in  accusing  and  condemning,  or  in  ap- 
proving and  justifying.  And  it  will  be  granted,  that  the  tari- 
ous  operations  of  the  mind,  when  brought  into  view  in  the  scrip- 
tures, are  not  presented  in  an  accurate  and  systematic  manner, 
as  metaphysicians  in  examining  the  operations  of  the  mind 
arrange  them  methodically. 

Hence  it  is  sometimes  the  case,  that  in  the  word  of  God  we 
find  one  faculty  of  the  mind  used  for  another,  as  the  understand- 
ing for  the  heart,  and  heart  for  the  understanding.  And  some- 
times what  is  in  the  word  predicated  of  one  facult}',  in  strict 
truth  belongs  to  another.  By  observing  these  things,  we  may 
readily  see  that  every  thing,  which  is  aflirmed  of  conscience  in 
the  word,  will  agree  with  the  view  given  of  it  in  this  essay.  We 
read  of  a  pure,  a  good,  a  peaceable,  an  inofiensive  conscience  ; 
and  of  an  evil,  defded,  and  seared  conscience.  When  conscience 
does  not  condemn,  but  justify  us,  it  is  called  good,  and  without 
offence.  This  is  what  Paul  means,  when  he  said  he  had  lived 
in  all  good  conscience  ;  had  maintained  a  conscience,  not  only 
good,  but  without  offence.  Whatever  the  reason  was,  his  con- 
science indifferent  periods  of  his  life  did  not  condemn  but  justi- 
fy him.  A  conscience  x?,  pure,  when  free  from  error  in  its  deci- 
sions. When  coBScience  is  said  to  be  purged  from  dead  works, 
to  be  alive,  and  washed,  it  is  then  awake  to  perform  its  office 
faithfully  ;  to  condemn  or  justify,  according  to  a  person's  real 
conduct  or  deserts.  And  when  persons  have  for  a  long  time 
stifled  and  silenced  the  voice  of  conscience,  and  refused  to  re- 
gard its  decisions  and  remonstrances  ;  when  it  is  silent,  and 
ceases  to  perform  its  office  in  accusing  and  condemning,  it  is  then 
styled  a  seared  conscience.  As  when  the  warnings,  admonitions, 
and  counsels,  we  give  to  persons  for  evil  conduct,  have  been 
long  disregarded,  we  become  silent,  cease  to  warn  them  any 
longer,  but  give  them  up  to  ruin.  So  conscience  ceases  to 
warn,  and  the  person  is  left  to  the  dominion  of  an  evil  heart,  to 
effect  his  own  destruction.  Here  the  fact  is,  the  heart  is  become 
so  hardened  in  a  course  of  sin  and  rebellion,  that  the  voice  of 
conscience  produces  no  effect,  and  makes  no  impression  upon  it. 
Then  this  hardness  of  heart  is  predicated  of  conscience,  which 
is  expressed  by  the  term  scared.  When  the  true  meaning  is, 
conscience  is  silent,  no  longer  performs  its  office  towards  a  per- 
son so  hardened  in  sin.  This  is  the  awful  case,  it  is  feared,  with 
many  persons. 


401 

It  is  certain  that  conscience  may  err  and  misjudge,  through 
the  blinding  influence  of  the  heart.  Paul,  while  a  pharisee, 
lived  in  all  good  conscience  ;  during  this  time  it  did  not  con- 
demn, butjustify  him,  in  persecuting  the  church.  All  this  time 
liis  conscience  erred,  or  pronounced  a  false  sentence.  But  when 
he  was  converted,  it  condemned  him  for  the  very  deeds  for 
which  it  had  before  justified  him.  When  it  thus  errs  it  is  blind- 
ed, evil,  and  polluted,  precisely  as  a  judge  is,  when  he  is  led  to 
■wrong  decisions,  through  the  influence  of  bribes,  or  prejudices 
of  heart.  Here  the  A^.ult  is  not  in  the  conscience,  but  the  heart, 
which  binds  it  to  e\\e  erroneous  decisions.  In  all  instances 
where  moral  good  and  evil  seem  to  be  predicated  of  conscience, 
these  and  similar  terms  arc  used  figuratively  for  the  heart. 
And  if  the  term  heart,  in  such  instances,  had  been  used  instead 
of  conscience,  the  sense  would  have  been  clear  and  obvious. 
If  conscience  always  enjoyed  sufficient  light,  and  judged  entirely 
free  from  the  influence  of  a  wicked  heart,  it  would  alwaysjudge 
correctly.  If  it  errs,  and  its  decisions  are  wrong,  it  is  owing  to 
the  deficiency  of  liglit,orthe  influence  of  an  evil  heart.  AJLidgc 
on  the  bench,  if  he  has  sufiicient  light  on  every  cause,  and  is 
wholly  free  from  the  influence  of  bribes,  and  of  an  evil  heart, 
will  render  a  just  sentence.  When  the  judgment  he  renders 
is  unjust,  it  is  imputed  to  the  want  of  sufiicient  light,  and  then  he 
is  not  censured  ;or  to  an  evil  heart,  which  has  prejudiced  and 
blinded  him,  in  which  case  he  is  always  blamed  and  condemned 
by  public  opinion.  Yet  the  fault  for  which  he  is  condemned,  is 
not  the  erroneous  judgment  pronounced  ;  but  the  wickedness 
of  his  heart,  which  led  him  to  it.  If  we  say  his  sentence  is  un- 
just, we  yet  consider  the  real  crime  for  which  we  blame  him  to 
be  an  evil  heart,  which  led  to  this  decision.  Error  of  judgment 
is  not  considered  a  crime.  For  criminality  in  the  case,  we 
search  for  the  exciting  cause  of  this  error  ;  and  for  this  a  judge 
is  blamed.  This  applies  to  conscience,  when  it  judges  of  moral 
conduct.  Hence  nothing  said  in  this  essay  on  conscience,  will 
be  found  inconsistent  with  the  word  of  God,  if  we  keep  all  the 
illustrations  here  given  clearly  in  view. 


C.  Page  70. 
Some  may  find  it  diflicult   to  perceive  a  difference  between 
an  appetite,  and  the  faculty  called  taste.     The  real  difference 
li  the  same,  as  bctwern  a  speric.i  and  ge7ivs. 

26 


40« 

A  gknus  includes  all  the  species  under  it.  The  faculty  of 
taste  is  a  genus,  which  includes  all  the  appetites.  Hence  an 
appetite  differs  from  the  taste,  as  a  species  does  from  its  genus. 
If  all  objects  of  perception  were  separated  into  distinct  classes, 
then  one  appetite  is  suited  to  one  class  of  objects,  and  another 
appetite  to  another  class,  and  all  the  appetites  prepare  the  mind 
to  be  affected  with  pleasure  or  pain  by  all  objects,  which  are 
objects  of  perception.  Hence  the  taste  is  a  fitness  to  feel  plea- 
sure or  pain  in  view  of  all  objects  5  and  a  single  appetite  is 
suited  to  be  affected  with  only  one  class  of  objects. 

This  distinction  is  verified  by  experience  and  facts.  All 
men  by  experience  know  their  feelings  vary,  alter,  and  change, 
very  frequently.  Such  changes  are  produced  by  the  ascen- 
danc}',  which  one  appetite  gains  over  another.  And  it  is  a 
fact,  that  mankind  are  very  changeable  in  their  pursuits.  One 
hour  a  love  for  their  off^-pring  governs  ;  then  they  are  frugal. 
The  next  hour  their  love  or  appetite  for  pleasure  in  excessive 
indulgence  governs  ;  then  they  waste  their  property,  though 
it  reduce  their  children  to  poverty.  This  also  agrees  with  the 
word  of  God.  When  the  guests  were  invited  by  Christ  to  the 
gospel  supper,  why  did  they  not  all  make  the  same  excuse  ? 
Because  different  appetites  predominated  in  them,  and  each 
went  away  in  pursuit  of  that  object,  wiiich  was  then  mo^t  val- 
ued. Another  day  their  excuses  might  have  been  reversed, 
if  the  taste,  or  what  some  call  a  capacity  for  pleasure  and  pain, 
Avere  a  simple  faculty,  why  are  not  all  mankind  pleased  or  dis- 
gusted with  the  same  objects ;  why  are  not  thtir  pursuits  the 
same  witiiout  any  change  ?  It  has  always  been  a  mystery, 
why  men  are  so  differently  affected  in  view  of  the  same  objects. 
But  admitting  the  existence  of  different  appetites,  it  is  verj' ea- 
sy to  account  for  the  various  feelings  excited  by  the  same  ob- 
jects, and  the  changes  in  the  conduct  of  the  same  person  from 
time  to  time  ;  and  especially,  when  we  consider  that  the  appe- 
tites are  capable  of  different  cultivation  and  improvement,  for 
the  better  or  the  worse  ;  and  more  especially  when  we  consid- 
er the  secondary  affections,  which  arise  from  those  primary  in 
the  heart.  The  attachment  of  the  heathen  to  the  same  idol  is 
a  secondary  feeling,  which  arises  from  their  primary  love  to 
created  objects,  and  the  direction  given  to  this  primary  appe- 
tite by  education. 

Again.     Admit  that  distinct  appetites  are  implanted  in  us  by 
»ur  Creator  for  wise  ends,  wc  may  then  see,  that  the  appetites 


403 

constitute  the  faculty  of  taste  or  heart,  as  several  species  con- 
stitute a  genus.  Also  the  loss  of  an  appetite,  and  the  restora- 
tion of  it,  no  more  afl'ect  the  taste  as  a  faculty,  than  the  des- 
truction »f  one  species  of  animals  or  vegetables  aflects  the 
genus  under  which  they  are  included  ;  or  than  the  loss  of  an 
appetite  for  one  article  of  food,  destroys  the  palate.  The 
genus  remains  the  same,  though  one  species  belonging  to  it  is 
annihilated  ;  and  the  bodily  taste  would  remain,  though  one 
appetite,  for  instance  an  appetite  for  honey,  should  be  lost. 
And  if  an  appetite  to  be  pleased  with  the  character  of  God  is 
lost,  the  taste  as  a  faculty  remains,  and  governs  the  man  accord- 
ing to  the  ascendancy  of  the  remaining  appetites,  which  were 
implanted  in  him  at  his  creation.  The  more  candidly  and  at- 
tentively any  person  considers  this  subject  in  all  its  relations, 
the  more  he  will  be  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  its  agreement 
with  experience,  facts,  and  the  word  of  God.  If  a  person  is 
deprived  of  any  particular  appetite,  the  others  which  remain 
will  govern  ;  and  as  the  person  is  endued  with  all  the  faculties^ 
and  powers,  which  are  necessary  to  render  him  a  fit  object  of 
praise  or  blame,  he  will  be  worthy  of  one  or  the  other  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  and  operation  of  those  appetites,  still  remain- 
ing in  his  heart.  This  will  remain  true  as  long  as  he  is  pos- 
sessed of  appetites,  which  as  active  principles  govern,  whether 
their  number  is  greater  or  less  ;  whether  any  one  is  lost  or  re-^ 
stored,  he  is  still  a  moral  agent. 


D.   Pase  106. 

Some  readers  n>ay  Hiink  it  is  a  new  idea,  and  very  erroneous, 
to  assert  that  the  faculty  of  taste  is  of  a  moral  nature,  the  seat 
of  all  vice  and  virtue. 

But  if  they  had  that  intuitive  view  of  the  heart  of  an  infant, 
which  God  hath,  and  clearly  saw  it  had  a  heart  or  taste  of  such 
a  nature  as  would  prompt  it,  if  unrestrained,  as  it  advanced  in 
life,  to  deceive  men,  oppress,  steal,  rob,  and  murder;  would  they 
not  consider  the  heart  of  this  infant  morally  depraved,  and  very 
wicked  ? 

Now,  facts  prove  that  mankind  are  born  with  such  hearts, 
and  do  commit  such  crimes,  if  not  restrained.  Their  lives  dai- 
ly manifest  this  depravity.  And  such  characters  are  deemed 
very  vile,  whether  knowing  or  ignorant,  whether  the  powers 
©f  their  minds  arc  very  strong  or  weak.     This  proves  that  we 


404 

estimate  their  moral  character  according  tottie  nature  of  their 
Jiearts,  nnd  not  according  to  their  knowledge  or  ignorance, 
their  power  or  weakness  ;  though  it  is  granted,  that  light  and 
power  may  aggravate  their  guilt.  And  the  reason  why  all 
men  do  not,  until  renewed,  daily  perpetrate  such  crimes,  is  not 
any  diilerence  in  the  malignity  of  their  hearts  ;  but  the  nu- 
merous restraints  laid  on  some,  which  are  not  on  others.  This 
is  true  according  to  scripture  declarations  ;  and  if  we  had  a 
clear  view  of  sinners  in  hell,  where  all  restraints  on  the  wicked 
heart  are  taken  ofi',  we  should  see  no  difference  in  their  moral 
characters.  And  did  we  see  the  heart  as  God  docs,  we  should 
be  convinced,  that  all  vice  and  virtue  do  belong  to  ih'is  feeling 
faculty,  which  is  the  primarj'  principle  of  action  in  all  moral 
agents. 


E.  Page  146. 

It  may  be  readily  perceived,  from  what  has  been  said,  on 
supposition  man  is  endued  with  only  two  faculties,  the  under- 
standing and  the  will,  that  no  one  can  act  with  design,  or  under 
the  influence  of  motives.  For  aim  and  design  imply,  that  an 
agent  has  an  end  in  vievi^,  and  means  to  attain  it.  If  the  end 
is  pleasing  to  his  heart,  by  this  he  is  influenced  and  excited  to 
«se  the  means  necessary  to  reach  the  end,  and  while  acting,  his 
aim  and  design  is  the  end  he  seeks.  He  keeps  the  end  steadi- 
ly in  view.  And  the  end,  by  its  agrecableness  to  his  heart,  is 
the  motive  by  which  he  is  governed. 

Hence,  if  he  has  only  the  faculties  of  the  understanding  and 
will,  there  is  nothing  existing  in  him  on  which  motives  can 
have  any  influence.  Motives  cannot  ^iffeei  past  volitions,  for 
the}'  are  past  and  gone,  like  fleeting  moments  ;  and  have  no 
continued  existence.  They  cannot  have  influence  on  the  voli- 
tion to  be  exercised,  for  that  is  future,  and  has  no  existence, 
until  it  is  exercised  ;  and  surely  motives  cannot  affect  that, 
^^;hich  has  no  being ;  and  w  lien  it  exists,  then  it  is  too  late  for 
the  influence  of  motives. 

Proceeding  on  the  supposition  we  have  only  the  t\\o  fac- 
ulties named,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  be  governed  bv  motives. 
And  if  we  are  not  influenced  by  them,  we  must  act  without  de- 
sign. And  a  being,  who  is  not  governed  by  motives,  and 
does  not  act  by  design,  is  not  an  agent,  and  surely  he  is  not  a 
moral  agent  ;  for  a  moral  agent  acts  with  aim  and  design,  antJ 


405 

h  influenced  hy  motives  in  all  his  voluntary  actions,  as  all  will 
grant.  Hence,  whatever  theory  of  the  niiiul  is  ad-iiittcd,  if  a 
third  faculty,  the  taste,  is  rejected,  the  theory  followed  in  its 
eonsequenees  destroys  moral  agency,  and  contradicts  experi- 
ence. For  our  experience  testifies,  that  we  do  act  by  design, 
and  under  the  influence  of  motives.  Tiie  ideas  of  actiiig:  by 
design,  and  bc'iii'^  governed  by  inotives,  are  inseparably  con- 
nected. If  one  is  denied,  the  other  must  be  rejected.  And  as 
it  is  now  evident  that  mankind  cannot  be  influenced  by  motives, 
unless  tliey  are  endued  v.  1th  something  capable  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  whether  it  is  called  taste,  or  by  any  other  particular 
name  ;  excluding  from  the  theory  of  the  mind  this  something, 
or  feeling  faculty,  it  will  follow  that  we  arc  not  moral  agfuts. 
Such  a  feeling,  governing  facnlty  is  the  most  essential  proper- 
ty, in  constituting  man  a  moral  agent.  Without  this  he  is 
not  a  moral  agent. 


F.  Page  178. 

While  in  this  world,  we  have  bodies,  which  we  have  to  sup- 
port. And  the  appetites,  which  have  been  enumerated  and 
described,  are  active  principles,  prompting  us  to  seek  the 
things  and  pursue  the  ends,  requisite  to  the  lite  and  comfort  of 
our  bodies,  and  of  our  posterity. 

We  have  also  souls,  for  which  we  ought  to  make  everlasting 
provision,  that  we  may  be  happy  after  death.  A  benevolent 
appetite  is  necessary,  to  excite  us  to  nse  the  meaus  appointed 
for  the  good  of  the  soul,  here  and  forever.  As  Adam  at  his 
creation  was  endued  with  all  the  appetites,  needful  to  seek  the 
good  of  the  body  and  soul  here  and  hereafter,  he  was  perfect : 
no  other  active  principles  were  necessary,  in  order  to  his  sub- 
sistence in  time,  and  his  endless  bliss  beyond  the  grave. 

When  he  ate  the  forbidden  fruit,  he  was  deprived  of  his  be- 
nevolent appetite,  which  constituted  the  moral  image  of  God  ; 
but  his  other  appetites  remained  entire,  and  unaltered,  as  facts 
prove.  While  he  remained  holy,  his  love  to  God  was  the  gov- 
erning principle  of  his  heart  ;  and  all  his  other  appetites  op- 
crated  in  subordination  to  the  ends  and  designs  of  his  supreme 
regard  for  God  ;  and  all  the  distinct  faridties  of  his  mind  har- 
moniously aimed  at  the  glorv  of  his  Maker.  But  when  de- 
prived of  the  moral  image  of  God,  his  remaining  appetites  had 
ihc  entire  government.     As  these  were  given   him,   to  move 


406 

him  to  make  provision  for  the  body  while  in  this  world,  it  is* 
evident,  as  fads  prove,  that  he  would  forsake  God,  and  seek 
happiness  in  broken  cisterns,  or  created  worldly  objects. 

But  philosophers,  through  mistaken  views  of  the  nature  of 
sin,  and  not  distinguishing  as  they  ought  between  absolute  and 
relative  good  and  evil,  have  made  themselves  believe  that  our 
natural  appetites  and  propensities  are  not,  neither  can  be  con- 
sidered as  evil ;  so  are  ready  to  exclaim,  what,  is  hunger  a 
sinful  appetite  ?  Here  let  every  one  candidly  consider  what 
sin  is.  Now  all  will  grant,  that  a  propensity  to  evil  is  an  evil 
propensity  ;  and  if  this  is  an  active  principle,  inherent  in  a  be- 
ing who  is  a  proper  moral  agent,  it  is  a  moral  evil  ;  and  mor- 
al evil  is  sin.  It  is  generally  granted,  that  our  appetites  may 
be  gratified  either  lawfully  or  unlawfully. 

When  a  person  eats  no  more  than  is  necessary  to  the  life 
and  sjipport  of  the  body,  he  gratifies  his  hunger  no  more  thaa 
God  allows.  But  if  he  eats  to  excess,  is  intemperate,  all  say  he 
is  wrong,  and  has  done  what  the  law  forbids.  And  it  is  as 
wrong  to  gratify  any  other  appetite  to  excess. 

Again.  Every  agent,  in  all  he  does,  aims  at  some  ultimate 
end  ;  otherwise  he  aims  at  no  end  in  any  thing  done.  He 
must  aim  at  some  end  ultimately,  or  do  one  thing  for  the  sake 
of  another,  ad  infinitum  ;  which  is  aiming  at  nothing  ;  and  is 
a  thing  impossible  in  a  moral  agent.  And  if  an  agent's  ulti- 
mate end  is  evil,  it  must  be  granted  all  be  does  with  such  an 
aim  is  wrong.  What  then  is  the  ultimate  end  of  all  men,  while 
unrenewed  .''  Let  any  person  give  a  full  attention  to  this  sub- 
ject, and  he  will  say,  no  unrenewed  man  aims  at  any  thing 
higher,  than  the  gratification  of  his  own  personal  desires  ;  self 
gratification  is  his  end  as  far  as  he  is  able,  without  any  regard 
for  the  glory  of  God,  or  the  happiness  of  his  kingdom. 

Now  then,  what  is  the  ultimate  end  of  unrenewed  persons  in 
eating  .''  On  examination,  every  one  must  come  to  this  conclu- 
sion ;  that  he  eats  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  food  aflbrds,  or 
to  gain  strength  and  preserve  life  with  a  view  to  further  ends  ; 
and  his  last  end  is  to  gratify  some  personal  desire,  without  any 
regard  to  God  or  the  happiness  of  man.  Is  not  his  aim  then 
in  eating  sinful  ?  Do  not  the  desires  of  this  appetite  lead  him 
to  pursue  a  course,  which  is  hostile  to  God,  and  the  general 
good  ?  And  as  this  appetite  will  operate  in  all  unrenewed 
men  ;  in  the  same  manner  all  his  other  appetites  will  operate  j 
and  whether  he   gratifies  them  to  excess  or  not,  his   ultimate 


407 

aim  IS  the  gratification  of  some  personal  desire,  without  any 
regard  to  the  authority  or  honor  of  God  ;  and  hence  in  all  he 
does,  while  such  is  his  end,  he  is  committing  sin. 

But  to  represent  our  appetites,  such  as  hunger,  thirst,  and 
what  are  termed  natural  affections,  as  sinful  or  evil  in  their  ten- 
dency and  operation,  appears  so  shocking  to  man}',  that  they 
discard  the  sentiment  at  ollce  ;  and  scarcely  any  will  give  the 
subject  a  candid  examination.  Yet,  as  the  word  of  God  and 
facts  prove  that  mankind  are  governed  by  corrupt  principles, 
they  adopt  some  other  theory  to  account  for  the  prevalence  of 
sin.  Hence  some  have  believed,  that  when  Adam  ate  the  for- 
bidden fruit,  he  not  only  lost  the  moral  image  of  his  Maker, 
but  had  produced  in  him  a  principle  of  selfishness,  which  is  the 
root  or  fountain  from  which  all  sinful  acts  proceed  in  moral 
agents. 

This  selfishness  has  been  defined  and  described  in  different 
ways.  Some  say  it  is  self-love,  or  a  love  for  self ;  or  setting 
lip  a  private  interest  in  opposition  to  public  good.  However 
it  may  be  defined,  we  ought  to  inquire  what  ideas  the  terms 
communicate.  Is  this  selfishness  an  active  principle  distinct, 
and  diflerent  in  its  nature,  from  the  appetites  we  have  consid- 
ered ? 

All  must  grant  selfishness  has  some  ultimate  end  ;  this  end 
must  be  agreeable  to  the  feelings  of  this   principle  ;  desires 
must  arise  from  it  to  obtain  its  end  ;  and  those  will  govern  the 
person  in  all  his  pursuits  and  actions.     What  then  is  its  ulti- 
mate end  .''     Is  it  the  glory  of  God,  or  happiness  of  mankind, 
or  good  of  God's  kingdom  .''     No.     What  then  .''     It  maybe 
answered,  it  is  the  person's  own  individual  good  or  interest. 
And  what  is  this,  only  the   gratification   of  his  own  desires  .'' 
Suppose  riches  be  his  end.     What  good   occurs  to  him  from 
them  ;  except  the  gratification  of  his  numerous  desires  .''     In 
this  all  the  happiness  he  enjoys  consists.     And  as  far  as  his 
desires  are  gratified,  he  has  obtained  all  he  does,  or  in  fact, 
can    desire.      So    far    he  has    arrived   to  his    ultimate    end. 
Here  this  selfishness   aims  at   the  gratification    of  its   desires 
as  its  final  end.     The  same  is  true  of  the  appetites,  as  they  have 
been  described.     Selfishness  may  be  gratified,  as  is  necessary 
for  the  support  and  comfort  of  the  body,  and  no  further  ;  and  as 
its  ultimate  end  is  sinful  in  all  its  operations,  it  is  itself  sinful. 
What  then  is  the  dlflerence  between  this  selfishness,    in  its  na- 
ture and  operations,  and  the  nature  and  operations  of  the  ap- 


408 

pelites,  as  tlicy  have  been  represented  ?  According  to  each 
theory,  it  is  wrong  to  gratify  these  active  principles  to  an  ex- 
cess ;  and  to  aim,  in  all  that  is  done,  at  a  wrong  or  bad  end 
ultimately.  Of  course,  there  is  no  difference  in  their  nature 
and  operation.  And  no  one  can  conceive  of  any  selfishness 
more  ruinous  to  the  general  good,  than  those  appetites  are, 
when  they  operate  without  any  re|[ard  to  the  authority,  and 
glory,  or  happiness  of  Goil's  kingdom, as  they  always  do,  when 
there  is  no  benevolent  principle  to  govern  and  regulate  them. 
And  if  we  consult  experience,  we  shall  find  it  testifies  in  favor 
of  the  sentiments  advanced. 

Are  mankind  conscious  of  any  active  principle  in  them,  en- 
tirely distinct  in  its  nature  and  operations,  from  the  appetites 
which  have  been  described .''  When  they  cat,  is  It  hunger 
which  prompts  them,  or  some  selfish  principle  distinct  from  it.^ 
When  parental  affection  moves  parents  to  promote  the  good  of 
their  children,  are  they  conscious  of  some  other  principle  as 
governing  them,  distinct  from  the  affection  they  have  for  their 
offspring .''  And  the  same  question  may  be  asked  in  relation 
to  all  their  other  appetites.  Experience  does  not  teach  men, 
that  they  are  governed  by  any  other  active  principles,  than 
these  appetites.  We  know  it  is  hunger,  which  prompts  us  to 
eat ;  it  is  a  feeling  of  love  parents  have  for  their  children, 
which  leads  them  to  seek  what  thev  view  as  necessary  to  their 
good.  W^e  know  it  Is  a  natural  propensity,  which  inclines  the 
difl'erent  sexes  to  unite  in  matrimony.  And  neither  experi- 
ence nor  observation  teaches,  that  mankind  are  governed  by 
any  other  principles,  than  these  several  appetites.  These  are 
selfish  in  all  their  operations  ;  and  aim  ultimately  at  nothing- 
higher  or  better,  than  the  gratification  of  the  desires  arising 
from  them,  as  far  as  men  are  able.  And  no  principle  can  be 
conceived,  more  ruinous  to  happiness  finally,  than  the  efl'ects 
these  appetites  have  produced,  and  will  continue  to  province. 

Hence  as  soon  as  Adam  lost  the  moral  image  of  God,  the 
appetites,  created  In  him  with  a  view  to  his  good  in  this  world, 
were  the  only  active,  governing  principles  remaining  in  him. 
From  that  day  he  loved  the  objects  of  this  world  supremely. 
He  at  once  experienced  a  desire  to  accumulate  property,  to  be 
esteemed  by  men  ;  and  he  pursued  the  means  necessary  in  his 
view  to  these  ends;  and  as  he  had  no  love  for  God,  his  heart 
was  in  fact  placed  supremely  on  this  world.  He  served  the 
creature,  and  not  the  Creator :  he  forsook  God,  the    living 


409 

fountain,  and  sought  broken  cisterns  to  satisfy  his  thirst.  In 
like  manner  his  posterity  liavc  lived.  These  appetites 
were  now,  in  their  operation,  positively  wrong  or  sinful.  But 
this  did  not  constitute  his  primary  depravit}'.  A  total  want 
of  love  to  God  was  that,  in  which  his  imperfection,  or  moral 
depravity,  primarily  consisted.  As  long  as  love  to  his  Maker 
governed,  all  he  did  was  in  harmony  with  the  law,  authority, 
and  lienor  of  his  God.  And  as  soon  as  this  love  ceased,  all  he 
did  terminated  in  self  gratification  ultimately,  and  was  sinful. 

I  know  many  ridicule  the  idea  of  placing  any  part  of  our  de- 
pravity in  a  mere  pi-ivation.  But  is  the  body  perfect,  if  eyes 
are  wanting  ^  Does  not  the  privation  of  this  sense  constitute 
a  great  imperfection  .''  If  a  man  as  long  as  he  has  eyes,  would 
walk  in  the  right  way,  and  would  certainly  deviate  from  it,  as 
deprived  of  this  sense,  would  not  all  consider  eyes  to  see  a 
great  blessing,  and  the  want  of  them  a  great  evil .''  So  the  want 
of  a  benevolent  appetite  is  a  great  moral  imperfection  and 
evil  ;  in  consequence  of  which,  all  the  other  senses  or  appetites 
lead  us  astray  from  God,  as  both  facts  and  experience  have 
abundantly  proved,  from  the  day  in  which  man  revolted  from 
God. 


G.  Page  184. 

The  kind  and  degree  of  power,  necessary  to  constitute  a 
moral  agent,  or  fit  object  of  praise  and  blame,  has  long  been  a 
subject  of  dispute  ;  and  there  is  not  much  hope  of  bringing  it 
soon  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion.  With  a  view,  however,  to 
this  end,  this  note  is  added.  Two  ideas  are  implied  in  all  the 
actions  of  a  moral  agent.  One  is,  that  he  is  governed  by  mo- 
tives ;  and  the  otlier,  that  in  all  his  actions  he  has  some  aim 
and  design.  That  he  is  a  designing  agent,  and  is  influenced 
by  motives,  all  will  grant.  This  implies,  that  in  all  his  actions 
he  aims  at  the  attainment  of  some  object  or  end,  by  such  means 
as,  in  his  view,  are  adapted  to  it.  The  end  operates  as  a  mo- 
tive. If  the  end  is  pleasing  to  his  feelings,  he  is  influenced  to 
use  every  exertion  to  attain  it.  If  an  object  is  disagreeable  or 
painful,  he  will  be  influenced  to  avoid  it.  Tiiis  necessarily 
implies,  that  his  mind  is  endued  with  some  property,  which  is 
pleased  or  disgusted  by  all  objects  within  his  view  ;  a  proper- 
ty, which  is  aflbcted  antecedent  to  action,  and  which  gives  rise 

21 


4ie 

to  every  exertion.  This  is  requisite,  in  order  for  him  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  motives,  and  to  act  with  design. 

Some  contend  for  a  self-determining  power  ;  and  some,  for 
an  efficiency  in  men  to  produce  all  their  voluntary  exercises, 
as  essential  to  praise  and  blame.  According  to  these  theories, 
man  is  endued  with  a  power  antecedent  to  volition,  a  power 
which  is  to  produce  volitions.  In  order  for  this  power  to  op- 
erate, or  exert  itself  to  produce  volitions,  some  object  must 
please  or  disgust  it,  and  in  this  way  influence  it  to  act.  If  this 
be  not  the  fact,  the  agent,  in  exerting  his  power,  is  not  gov- 
erned by  any  motive.  And  if  objects  are  neither  pleasant  nor 
painful  to  this  power,  it  is  in  a  state  of  indiflerence  ;  and  if  a 
man  can  exercise  his  power  in  this  state,  he  must  act  without 
design.  For  his  supposed  power  is  not  inclined  towards  any 
object,  and  of  course  he  caimot  aim  at  one  object  more  than 
another  ;  or,  in  such  a  state,  he  aims  at  no  object,  or  acts 
without  any  design.  I  see  no  way  to  avoid  this  conclusion. 
Hence,  if  moral  agents  are  influenced  by  motives,  and  act  with 
design,  then  this  supposed  power  is  of  such  a  nature,  that  in 
view  of  objects  it  is  pleased  or  disgusted,  and  in  this  way  in- 
fluenced to  obtain  the  object,  if  agreeable,  and  to  avoid  it,  if 
painful.  Then  what  is  the  difterence  between  this  power, 
whether  self-determining,  or  efficient,  and  what  is  called  by 
me  the  faculty  of  taste,  or  the  heart .''  The  taste,  and  this  sup- 
posed power,  are  each  of  them  pleased  or  the  contrary  with  all 
objects  in  view ;  and  by  this  means  are  influenced  to  act,  to 
seek,  or  avoid  the  object,  and  in  the  pursuit  aim  at  the  posses- 
sion, or  avoidance  of  it,  according  to  the  pleasure  or  pain  the 
object  or  end  aflbrds. 

If  this  self-determining  and  efficient  power  is  totally  desti- 
tute of  any  feeling,  than  how  is  it  to  be  put  in  motion,  or  excit- 
ed to  exertions  ?  It  certainly  cannot  be  influenced  by  motives, 
nor  act  with  design.  Power,  which  has  no  feeling,  does  not 
differ  in  its  nature  from  those  powers  we  call  a  lever,  or  a 
sc}-ew.  And  if  it  ever  exerts  itself,  it  must  be  put  in  motion  by 
some  aatecedent  power.  The  agent  must  have  in  view  some 
pleasing  object,  and  have  a  desire  to  obtain  it.  Then  the 
agreeable  object  operates  as  a  motive,  and  influences  him  to 
exert  this  supposed  power  to  reach  it,  just  as  we  use  a  screw 
to  raise  a  weight.  And  for  this  antecedent  to  act,  its  nature 
must  be  the  same  with  the  nature  of  the  faculty  termed  taste. 
Hence,  whatever  pou^e?-  may  be  considered  as  essential  to  praise 


411 

and  blame,  on  examination  It  will  appear  insufficient  to  answer 
the  end  for  which  it  is  invented  ;  or  else  it  will  be  found  not  to 
difler  in  its  nature  from  the  faculty  of  taste,  or  the  heart,  as 
described  in  these  essays. — We  must  then  come  to  this  conclu- 
sion, that  wherever  we  behold  a  created  being,  who  is  endued 
with  the  faculties  of  the  understanding,  taste,  and  will,  and  also 
with  liberty,  he  has  all  the  powers  necessary  to  render  him  a 
moral  agent,  or  proper  object  of  praise  and  blame,  and  future 
rewards.  Then,  to  determine  whether  he  is  praise  or  blame- 
worthy, we  only  have  to  ascertain  his  moral  character,  or  the 
nature  of  his  heart,  whether  it  be  holy  or  sinful.  Here  we 
must  rest  satisfied.  For,  by  the  most  careful  examination  we 
shall  find,  there  is  no  rational  being  in  the  universe,  created  or 
uncreated,  who  is  possessed  of  any  other  powers,  than  the  fac- 
ulties which  have  been  described.  We  know  of  no  others. 
And  we  are  not  conscious  of  any  more,  than  three  distinct 
classes  of  opeiations  ;  perceptions,  affections,  and  volitions. 
And  as  the  operations  of  these  difter  from  each  other,  they  ne- 
cessarily imply  three  distinct  faculties,  to  one  of  which  they  are 
to  be  referred. 


Introduction  ;  Containing-  preliminary  observations,  Po^e  3 
EssAT  1,  On  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  -  -  -  13 
Essay  2,  Of  the  Understanding,  -  ...  20 
Essay  3,  Of  the  Objects  of  Perception,         -         -         -     23 

Essay  4,  Of  the  Memory, 26 

Essay  5,  Of  Judgment  and  Reason,  -         -         -       30 

Essay  6,  On  Conscience,  -----       35 

Essay  7,  Recapitulation,  -----       49 

Essay  8,  Of  Taste, 53 

Essay  9,  Of  Appetites,  -----       61 

Essay  10,  Of  the  Operations  of  Taste,  -         -       71 

Essay  11,  (Omitted  in  numbering.) 

tssAY  12,  Of  the  Will,  and  its  Operations,  -         -       84 

EsSas  15,  General  Observations  on  Moral  Agency,     -       91 
tssAY  14,  Particular  reasons  given,  why  certain  proper- 
ties are  necessary,  to  constitute  a  being  a  proper  and 
complete  moral  agent,  -  -  -        102 

Essay   15,  Of  Liberty  ;  and  the  reasons  why  it  is  necessa- 
ry to  form  a  complete,  perfect,  moral  agent,        -        111 
Essay   16,  Whetlier  liberty  is  necessary  to  vite  and  virtue  ; 
and,  if  not,  for  what  purposes  is  it  requisite,  in  mor- 
al agents  ?  -  -  -  -  131 
Essay  17,  On  Motives,  with  their  influence  in  determin- 
ing the  will,               -             -             -             -  138 
Essay  18,  On  the  Nature  of  Good  and  Evil,           -          146 
Essay   19,  Of  the  Reasons,  why  good  and  evil  are  distin- 
guished by  the  terms  natural  and  moral,          -          155 
Essay  20,  On  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  or  sin,         -         161 
Essay  21,  On  the  subject  of  praise  and  blameworthiness,  179 


414 

Essay  22,  On  the  first  principles,  upon  which  the  Armi- 
nian  and  Calvinistic  systems  of  divinity  are  founded  ; 
and  the  primary  difference  between  them,  -        190 

Essay  23,  On  the  decrees  and  prescience   of  God,  and 

their  consistency  with  each  other,  -         -         208 

Essay  24,  Containing  arguments  from  Scripture,  that  the 
sentiments  advanced  in  the  preceding  essays   are 

true 221 

Essay  25,  Objections  against  this  system,  stated,  and  an- 
swered,        _  -  -  _  _        232 
Essay  26,  An  Examination  of  the  ideas  of  Rhetoricians, 
concerning  a  Taste  for  beauty,  noveUy,  and  gran- 
deur,            -             .             -             _  .        249 
Essay  27,  On  total  Depravity,         -         -         -         _     256 
Essay  28,  On  benevolence  or  holiness,              -         -        279 
Essay  29,  On  Regeneration,              -             -  -      313 
Essay  30,  A  summary  View  of  the  system,  advanced  and 

illustrated  in  these  essays,  -  -         -       350 

Essay  31,  On  the  nature  of  the  happines*  of  heaven,         371 
Notes,  Referring  to  different  parts  of  this  work,  399 


ERRATA. 

Page  44,  line  18  from  top,  insert  anrf between  mbject  and  predicatt. 

Page  127,  line  11  from  bottom,  for  it,  read  if. 

Page  168,  line  6  from  top,  for  toA'e.  read  like. 

Page  190,  title  of  the  essay,  for  Anninians,  read  Anninian. 

Page  213,  line  20  from  top,  for  Josiah,  read  Isaiah. 

Pa^e  224,  line  13  from  top,  for  different,  read  distiiKt. 

Page  225,  line  13  from  bottom,  for  in,  read  on. 

Page  232,  line  6  from  beginning  of  the  essay,  for  they,  read  the. 

Page  287,  line  2  from  top,  for  every,  read  any. 

Paze  288,  bottom  line,  dele  his. 

Page  31  ti,  line  5  from  bottom,  before ybr,  add  except. 

Page  321,  top  line,  for  otiiers,  read  then ;  line  15  from  top,  for  in,  read  into. 

Page  335,  line  15  from  top,  for  or,  read  as. 

Page  341,  line  6  from  bottom,  for  is,  read  was. 

Page  358,  line  2  from  bottom,  dele  the  letter  y. 

Pago  36G,  line  11  from  lop,  foi  scorn,  read  seem. 

Page  367,  line  9  from  top,  after  man,  insert  is,  and  dele  the  comma. 

Page  386^  line  12  from  top,  dele  of  course. 

J'age  392,  lioe  13  frgm  bottom,  fcr  ttrm  noU,  read  Urminatt. 


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